Labour Migration and the Regional Problem in Britain, 1920-1939 by Pitfield, David Edward
LABOUR MIGRATION AND THE REGIONAL 
PROBLEM IN BRITAIN, 1920-1939 
by 
David Edward Pitfi~ld B.Sc. 
Thesis submitted to the University of Stirling 
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, 
November 1973 
PREFACE 
Whilst reading for my first degree at the University of Bristol 
I became particularly interested in two diverse fields of study. An 
interest in Regional Economics was motivated by the sparse coverage 
given to the consideration of the spatial organisation of the economy 
in most standard works. The other interest was in British Economic 
History of the inter-war years. I am indebted to Dr, B.W.E. Alford 
for inspiring and developing my curiosity for this subject. In choosing 
a subject for research, I endeavoured to combine these two interests. 
Virtually no work has been done on the formative years of British 
regional policy. I thought this to be a particularly important gap to 
fill in that I could closely document regional policy in these years and 
give some insight into the processes of government policy formulation. 
In addition, the inter-war years is a unique period in the history of 
British regional policy. It is the only period when the objective of 
policy was to move 'workers-to-the-work', rather than 'work-to-the-workers'. 
Even less information is readily available on policies encouraging labour 
migration, than on the better known Special Areas policy. Consequently, 
my own interests and the gap in interpretation suggested the examination 
of the role of labour migration policies in the inter-war period as the 
subject for my research. 
The thesis is set out in three sections. The first section is an 
introduction. The regional problem is described, the pattern of labour 
flows documented and the factors influencing these flows is shown. The 
second section is concerned with regional policies. These are traced 
from the introduction of transference policy until, and including, the 
introduction and development of Special Areas policy. The effects of 
these policies are judged at a regional level and, in Chapter 8, at the 
micro-economic level. The final section describes the culmination of 
the inter-war year's experience of regional policies with the appearance 
of the Barlow Report and the discrediting of transference. The conclusion 
shows the importance of transference in the inter-war years and the 
paradox of the post- World War II situation where labour migration has 
been ignored as a policy tool. 
In preparing this thesis I have become indebted to many people for 
their advice and encouragement. I would first like to thank my 
supervisors. Dr. E.S. Richards, now of the Flinders University of South 
Australia, had the task of introducing me to research. He allowed me 
scope to develop my ideas but ensured that I did not stray too far from 
my central objective. Professor R.H. Campbell has been my supervisor for 
the greater part of my studies and I am greatly indebted to him for the 
advice, criticisms and encouragement that he has given from his careful 
reading of my work. His early insistence on my putting pen to paper 
ensured that ideas were not lost and that my work reached a recognizable 
form at an early stage. 
I also acknowledge the help freely given on specific matters by 
Mr, J.W. McGilvray and Dr. M.A. Greig of the Economics Department of 
Stirling University. Mr, McGilvray read Chapters 5 and 7 and made many 
useful and informative comments. Dr Greig examined Appendix 2 to 
Chapter 7 and gave me the benefit of his experience of work on regional 
multipliers. Mr· J. Travers of the Registrar-General for Scotland's 
office in Edinburgh was good enough to discuss the basis for some of the 
iii 
work presented in Chapter 2 and its first Appendix. 
I am also grateful to Mr. R. Weeden of the University of Reading 
for permission to cite his work on labour migration in Britain in the 
1960's. Mrs- R.M. Stafford is also to be thanked for giving me permission 
to quote from the Steel-Maitland papers, held at the Scottish Record 
Office. 
The staff of libraries and record offices that I have used in the 
course of my study have all helped me in my research. Particular mention 
should be made of the staff of the Public Record Office at Chancery Lane 
and at Portugal Street and of the staff of the National Library of 
Scotland in Edinburgh. 
Finally, I should like to thank my wife Jean. Her assistance has 
ranged from general encouragement to specific aid and has been more 
valuable than she will have realized. 
iv 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
PREFACE ii 
LIST OF TABLES ix 
LIST OF DIAGRAMS xiii 
LIST OF MAPS xiv 
A. LABOUR MIGRATION AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEM 
Chapter 1 THE NATURE OF THE REGIONAL PROBLEM 2 
I Regional Delineations 2 
II Regional Problems 5 
III Indicators of the Regional Problem 7 
IV Causes of the Regional Problem 11 
Chapter 2 THE VOLUME AND DIRECTION OF LABOUR FLOWS 24 
I Available Evidence on Labour MOvement 24 
II Main Features of Net Migration in Britain 27 
III Labour Movements by Region 32 
IV Conclusion 47 
Appendix 1 Methodology of Net Migration Estimation 53 
. 
2 Net Migration Estimates for the Counties 65 
and Ministry of Labour Regions of 
Britain, 1920-1939 
3 Maps showing Net Migration 125 
Chapter 3 FACTORS INFLUENCING LABOUR MOBILITY 
I Current Approaches to the Study of Labour 
Mobility 
II Contemporary Research on the Factors 
influencing Migration 
III Conclusion 
B. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEM 
Chapter 4 THE INTRODUCTION OF INDUSTRIAL TRANSFERENCE 
I The Introduction and Development of 
Transference Policy to 1934 
II Pressures for Transference Policy 
III An Economic or Social Policy? 
Appendix The Depressed Areas 
Chapter 5 THE CONTRIBUTION OF TRANSFERENCE 
I Short-Run Effects of Transference, 
1928-1934 
II Long-Run Effects of Out-Migration in the 
Losing Areas 
III Conclusion 
vi 
Page 
130 
130 
140 
153 
157 
157 
171 
177 
181 
185 
185 
198 
204 
Chapter 6 THE QUEST FOR AN EFFECTIVE REGIONAL POLICY, 1934-1937 
I Introduction 
II Origins of the Special Areas Act, 1934 
III Changing Interpretations of the Objectives of 
Regional Policy 
IV Special Areas Act, 1937 
V Transference Policy: The Possibility of 
Contradiction 
VI Conclusion 
Appendix A Regression Analysis of the Impact 
of Changes in Transference Policy 
in 1935 
Chapter 7 SPECIAL AREAS POLICY AND INDUSTRIAL TRANSFERENCE: 
THE CONTRIBUTION OF CONTRADICTIONS, 1935-1939 
I The Impact of Regional Policies on the 
Special Areas 
II A Local Analysis of the Impact of Policy 
III Factors Inhibiting Regional Policy 
Appendix 1 The Special Areas 
2 A Regional Employment Multiplier for 
the Late 1930's 
3 A Regression Analysis of the Impact 
of Regional Policy on the Special 
Areas, 1934-1938 
Page 
212 
212 
214 
224 
235 
243 
246 
249 
256 
256 
269 
276 
299 
306 
321 
4 Net Migration, Direct Factory Employment 332 
and Unemployment for Certain Towns in 
the Special Areas, 1934-1938 
vii 
Chapter 8 STEWARTS AND LLOYDS, LTDo AND RICHARD THOMAS AND 
CO. LTD.: A STUDY OF LOCATION IN THE IRON AND 
STEEL INDUSTRY 
Page 
338 
I Richard Thomas & Co. Ltd.: Government Intervention 338 
in Factory Location 
II Stewarts & Lloyds, Ltd.: The Non-Interventionist 350 
Case 
III The Two Cases Compared 357 
C. THE CULMINATION OF THE INTER-WAR YEAR'S EXPERIENCE OF REGIONAL 
POLICIES: THE DISCREDITING OF TRANSFERENCE 
Chapter 9 THE BARLOW REPORT: REGIONAL POLICIES DESIDERATUM 366 
I London as a Regional Problem: the Views of Barlow 366 
II Was London's Growth Excessive? 
III Migration and Imbalanced Regional Development 
IV Conclusion 
Appendix The Concept of Optim\Dll City Size 
Chapter 10 CONCLUSION: THE LEGACY OF THE INTER-WAR YEARS 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
viii 
375 
380 
385 
392 
399 
406 
L 1ST OF TABLE S 
Table Page 
I Unemployed Insured as a Percentage of Insured Population. 18 
Ministry of Labour Regions, 1929, 1932 and 1937 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
VII 
VIII 
IX 
X 
XI 
Unemployed as a Percentage of Insured Population. Pairs 
of Labour Exchange Areas within Regional Divisions, 
1929, 1932 and 1937 
Index Numbers of Insured Persons aged 16-64 in Employment 
in Certain Industries in Ministry of Labour Regions at 
the end of June, 1929, 1932 and 1937 
Index Numbers of Insured Population in Ministry of Labour 
Regions July, 1929, 1932 and 1937 
Regions ranked by three indicators of Regional Disparity: 
Percentage Unemployed, Employment Growth, Net Migration 
as a Percentage of Popu1ation.1929,1932 and 1937 
Regional Distribution of Industry and Change in 
Employment, 1923-1937 
Unemployment Percentages in the 'North' and 'South', 
1929, 1932 and 1937 
Migration Balances by Distance, 1920-1929 and 1929-1939 
Ratios of Long to Short Distance Movement, 1920-1929 and 
1929-1939 
Origin of Migrants in Oxford C.B., July 1936 
Residential Distribution of Workers Employed by Morris 
Motors Ltd. in their Cowley and Radiator Works, and by 
Pressed Steel Company.1931 and 1936 
19 
20 
20 
21 
22 
23 
48 
48 
49 
49 
Table 
XII Percentage of Population of Ce rt ai n I\oToughs Barll 50 
outside C9ndon in England and Wales, 1931 
XIII Residential Dis t ribution of Employees of Carreras Ltd. 50 
1935-1936 
XIV Duration of Journey Time by Hinutes of Carreras' 51 
Employees Replying to Questionnaire 
xv Factory Growth in Cer~ain Outlying Districts of 51 
London, 1900-1932 
XVI Unemployment in Selected Depressed and Non-Depressed 206 
Counties, 1928-1934 
XVII Unemployment and the Balance of Net ~1igration in Ministry 
of Labour Regions, 1928-34 207 
XVIII The R~6~ession of Unemployment in Selected Counties 208 
on Transference and a National Unemployment variable. 
1928-1934. The Regression of Unemploymeut in Ministry 
of Labour Regions on Net Migration and a National 
Unemployment variable. 1928-1934. 
XIX The Regression of Unemployment in Selected Counties on 2C~ 
Transference adjusted for ,,,astage and multiplier effects 
" and a National Unemployment variable. 1928-1934. The ~3 
coefficients. 
The Regression of Unemployment in Mini~try of Labour 
Regions on Net Migration adjusted for wastage and 
mUltiplier effects and a National Unemployment variable. 
" 1928-1934. The ~3 coefficients. 
XX Areas Losing Population, 1920-1929 and 1929-1939 210 
XXI L'abour TransfereTlce, 1928-1938 249 
XXII, The Regression of Transference on National Unemployment 
for 1929-1934, 1929-1938 and 1935-1938 252 
x 
Table 
XXIII Predicted Total Transference and Actual Transference, 253 
1935-1938 
XXIV Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the 286 
Special Areas, 1934-1938 
XXV Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the 287 
Scottish Special Area, 1934-1938 
XXVI Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the 287 
West Cumberland Special Area, 1934-1938 
XXVII Direct Employment in New and Extended Fa.ctories in the 288 
South Wales Special Area, 1934-1938 
XXVIII Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the 288 
North East Coast Special Area, 1934-1938 
XXIX Industrial Establishments in the Special Areas, 1932-1938289 
XXX Net Migration from County accumulations approximating 291 
the Sp~cia1 Areas, 1934-1939 (mid-years) 
XXXI Transference in England and Wales, 1934-1938 
XXXII Unemployment in the Special Areas. 1934-1938 
292 
293 
XXXIII The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on a 294 
National Unemployment variable, 1934-1938 
XXXIV The Contribution to the Change in Unemployment in the I 295 
Scottish and English and Welsh Special Areas of Regional 
Policies, 1934-1938 
XXXV The 'Hard-Core' Unemployment Problem in the Special Areas 296 
among Men. 1934-1938 
XXXVI Percentage of Expanding and Declining Industries to all 297 
Expansions in the Special Areas. 1934-1938 
xi 
Table 
XXXVII 
XXXVIII 
XXXIX 
XL 
XLI 
XLII 
XLIII 
XLIV 
Taxation in the U.K. 1938/9, 1948/9, 1959/60 
Taxation in the U.K. 1934/5-1938/9 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on 
a Regional Policy variable and an indicator of 
National Unemployment. Scotland, 1935-1938 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on 
a Regional Policy variable and an indicator of 
National Unemployment. England and Wales, 1935-1938 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on a 
Page 
319 
320 
326 
327 
328 
Regional Policy variable and an indicator of National 
Unemployment. England, Wales and Scotland, 1935-1938 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on 
Different Regional Policy instruments. Scotland 
1935-1938 
329 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on 
Different Regional.Policy instruments. England and 
Wales, 1935-1938 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on 
Different Regional Policy instruments. England, Wales 
and Scotland, 1935-1938 
330 
331 
XLV Population and Net Migration in London's Conurban Ring, 
XLVI 
XLVII 
XLVIII 
mid-1930 - mid-1939 
Population Density per square mile. 
London, mid-1930 - mid-l939 
389 
Resident Population. 
390 
Vehicular Traffic at Hammersmith Bridge and Putney Bridge, 
London, July 1930-1937 
Infant MOrtality in Greater London, 1930-1939 
xii 
390 
391 
LIST OF DIAGRAMS 
Diagram 
I Intra-Regional Migration: Northumberland and Durham 
to 1931 
Page 
52 
II 
III 
IV 
V 
VI 
Transference and National Unemployment, 1929-1938 254 
The Regression of Transference on National Unemployment, 255 
1929-1938 
Percentage Unemployed in the Special Areas and 
Great Britain, 1934-1938 
A Diagrammatic Representation of the Concept of 
Optimum City Size 
Average Cost per 1000 Population of Certain Local 
Government Services 
298 
397 
398 
LIST OF MAPS 
Map 
1 Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
England and Wales, Yearly Mean, 1920-1929 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
England and Wales, Yearly Mean, 1929-1939 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
Scotland, Yearly Mean, 1920-1929 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
Scotland, Yearly Mean, 1929-1939 
South Wales Special Area (except Pembroke Dock) 
West Cumberland Special Area 
North East Coast Special Area 
Scottish Special Area 
Page 
126 
127 
128 
129 
302 
303 
304 
305 
A. LABOUR MIGRATION AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEM 
CHAPTER I 
The Nature of the Regional Problem 
I 
A considerable literature exists on the methods of regional 
delineation. In the context of this study a few remarks will suffice. 
Generally, a set of regional boundaries will depend on the objectives 
and focus of policy. This will affect the total number of regions as 
well as their boundaries. It is not surprising to realize that regional 
definitions, dependent on the choice of appropriate areas for the 
implementation of different objectives will differ. For example, a 
concern with land-use planning will dictate a different and greater 
number of areal subdivisions than will a concern with, say, electricity 
generation. But a different problem is posed by the question of choosing 
regional boundaries for more general economic objectives. Again, the 
nature of the principle objectives will affect the number and delineation 
of the regions. 
Broadly, there are three types of region: the homogeneous region, 
the nodal region and the planning region. The homogeneous region is 
internally consistent in some of its characteristics, for example, it may 
be an area of high unemployment, or of a concentration of slow-growth 
industries. A nodal region is defined in terms of its dominant node and 
will be characterized by complementarity between its unlike constituents, 
extending to the point where the sphere of influence of a neighbouring 
node become more important. These two types of region are operational 
concepts; if regions appropriate to this study were to be chosen and data 
PAGE 
MISSING 
IN 
ORIGINAL 
collected relevant to these areas, at this point these two approaches 
would have to be discussed. However, as it is, this study is retro-
spective and must depend on existing data. This is available for planning 
regions. These are the regions that are chosen by Governments for the 
administration of policies. Thus the problems of choosing between the 
two operational approaches of regional delineation and the additional 
bl f d · 1 b d . . 1 pro ems 0 rsw1ng actua oun ar1es are av01ded. It may be the case, 
however, that these planning regions are designed to incorporate the 
concepts of either homogeneity or nodality. 
The regions to be studied in this thesis are four in number: the 
Ministry of Labour Divisional areas, the Depressed Areas, the Special 
Areas and the boundaries of England, Wales and Scotland. Some statistical 
difficulties were encountered in collecting data appropriate to these 
regions. The Ministry of Labour regions were large aggregates used by 
the Ministry of Labour and based on local employment exchange areas. 
They are defined in an Appendix to Chapter 2. Statistical problems arose 
in this case as it was necessary to approximate these areas in the 
presentation of data, by aggregating information for counties approximating 
the Divisional boundaries. Further, the change in Divisional boundaries 
in 1936 and 1937 produces complications which necessitated some aggrega-
tion to reduce, but not eliminate, the resulting inconaistencies in the 
data in an effort to obtain continuous series for the period. The 
Depressed Areas were based on employment exchange areas and were introduced 
1. An introduction to the subject of regional delineation is provided by 
A.J • Brown , The Framework of Be ional Economics in the United, Kin dom 
(Cambridge, 1972 , pp.27-5l; H.W.Richardson, Reg10nal Econo~c8 1969), 
pp.223-23l; F.J.B.Stilwell, Regional Economic Policy (1972),pp.37-42. 
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with the Industrial Transference scheme. They defined the areas in 
which this scheme operated. Different schedules were in force at 
different points in time and different schedules were used for adult 
and juvenile labour. Another schedule of Depressed Areas defined the 
regions in which Government contracts were to be preferentially placed. 
In these cases data has had to be presented which only approximates 
these areas. One major difficulty, in this instance, is the lack of 
certain knowledge as to the definitions employed at any particular point 
in time. An indication of these areas is provided in the Appendix to 
Chapter 4. The Special Areas were introduced by the Special Areas 
(Development and Improvement) Act of 1934. They too were based on 
employment exchange areas and a listing of their geographical coverage 
is presented in an Appendix to Chapter 7. Statistical difficulties took 
the form of a necessity to adjust certain series to approximate theae 
boundaries. Both the Special and Depressed Areas, as can be seen from 
their delineation, were an attempt to establish homogeneous regions with 
respect to unemployment experience. Finally, in some instances, data is 
available for England Wales and Scotland, but this is less useful than 
that for the areas described above. Scotland and Wales are Ministry of 
Labour Divisional Areas, and as such, merely duplicate the earlier 
definitions. To regard England as a separate region is of little interest, 
particularly in view of the sphere of operation of regional policies 
defined by the Special and Depressed Areas. 
4 
II 
There are, in general, three types of problem region: underdeveloped 
regions, depressed regions and over-congested regions. The fi rs t type 
are now, and were in the 1920's and 1930's, a relatively small problem 
in Britain in comparison to other countries. They are Characterized 
by an absence of industrial development and a backward agriculture. 
SuCh regions, as mid-Wales or the Highlands of Scotland, are not the 
concern of the central part of this thesis. Depressed regions are 
Characterized by the decline of their major industries and the failure 
of these to be replaced by expanding industries. It is these areas of 
Wales, Scotland and the north of England that were the focus of interest 
of regional policies in the inter-war period. The regional definitions 
of Special and Depressed Areas were concerned with these areas. 
Finally, the 'over-congested regions' are areas where "economic growth 
has reached a scale in a given time that is bigger than the optimal from 
the point of view of internal environmental conditions of the over-
congested region and the development of other regions of the country".2 
The concern of contemporaries with the growth of London in the late 
1930's illustrates the recognition of the existence of this type or region. 
But no separate regional delineation was used to identify the range of 
this problem; statistics related to the county area, to Greater London 
and to London and the South East. The latter two areas were Ministry 
of Labour regions. 
2. A.R.Kuklinski, 'Regional Development, Regional Policies and Regional 
Planning: Problems and Issues', Regional Studies, 4 (1970),270. 
5 
In the identification of problem region types, and their delineation 
by contemporaries, it can be seen that regional policy was first concerned 
with the depressed areas and, subsequently, with the over-congested 
region. It now needs to be shown how contemporaries regarded these 
problem regions. 
Dennison talks of the "social problems of localized lUlemployment". 3 
A depressed area was an area "in which national lUlemployment is heavily 
4 
concentrated". Lieutenant-Colonel Hurst (M.P. for Manchester, Moss 
Side) spoke of the "short-time and lUlderemployment from which our cOlUltry, 
particularly the North of England is suffering". 5 Stanley Baldwin was 
concerned with "the lUlexampled spectacle of pools of unemployed labour in 
the mining industry". 6 It would be repetitious to cite more examples. 
Academics, politicians and the press were all concerned with the problem 
of localized unemployment and labour surplus to the needs of the local 
. 7 
economes. 
3. S.R.Dennison, The Location of Industry and the Depressed Areas (1939), 
p.lOl. 
4. 'ibid. p.123. 
5. Hansard(Commons),5th ser,136,165l,2l Dec.1920. 
6. S.Baldwin, On England (1937),p.38. 
7. For example, the terms of reference of the Board of Trade sponsored 
surveys of the Industrial areas, that appeared in 1932. See the 
bibliography for full references. Also see Industrial Transference 
Board. Report (Parl.Papers, 1928, X); Comudssioners for the 
Special Areas. Reports (see bibliography); E.D.llcCallum, 'The 
Problem of the Depressed Areas of Great Britain', International Labour 
Review, 30 (1934). Newspaper references to the problem of unemploy-
ment are legion. Examples are found in the Glasgow Herald, 12 Nov. 
1928; The Times, 20'March 1934; The Economist, 31 Oct. 1936. 
6 
The depressed areas were, first and foremost, a problem of localized 
unemployment. Unemployment statistics, therefore, are the best 
indicator of the problem. 
The over-congested areas were a more complex phenomena, less easily 
identified by anyone index. The Barlow Report was concerned with health 
and housing conditions, the provision of public open spaces and playing 
fields, smoke and noise, traffic congestion, and the threat of aerial 
8 9 
attack. The P.E.P. Report was similarly concerned with atmospheric 
11 · 1 I I d d f . d • 1 10 po ut10n, oca trave an umps 0 1n ustr1a waste. A general 
index of such problems is more difficult to determine. Nevertheless, 
all may be related to the rate of population growth and the density of 
settlement. 
III 
National unemployment was continually high throughout the period. 
From 1920 to 1939, the average percentage of insured unemployed was 13.5 
per cent. ll Over a million insured workpeople were unemployed at all 
8. Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population. 
Report (P.P.,1939-40, IV). 
9. Political and Economic Planning (hereafter, P.E.P.), Report on the 
Location of Industry (1939). 
10. Other evidence of similar concerns is widespread. For example, see 
M.P.Fogarty, Prospects of the Industrial Areas of Great Britain (1945). 
11. Department of Employment and Productivity, British Labour Statistics: 
Historical Abstract, 1886-1968 (1971), Tables 160, 162. These 
figures refer to Great Britain and Northern Ireland from 1922, before 
that date they include the Republic of Ireland. The effects of 
changes in the administration of the unemployment insurance schemes 
are noted at the source. 
7 
times and almost three million in the early 1930's. 
These national figures conceal sharp regional variation •. Scotland's 
figures were persistently above those for the whole of the U.K., ranging 
from 10.6 per cent in 1927 to 27.7 per cent in 1932 and averaging 17.9 
per cent for the period for which these statistics are avai1ab1e. 12 
The figures for Wales, averaged 28.3 per cent over the 11 years from 1927, 
never falling below 19.8 per cent, whilst reaching a height of 37.5 per 
cent. For England, the average was 13.9 per cent and the range 9.0 per 
13 
cent to 20.7 per cent. Outstanding variations were also present between 
the other regions. In the Ministry of Labour regions before the cyclical 
downturn of 1929, whilst the national figure was 10.4 per cent, that for 
the various regions were as shown in column 1 of Table 1. In 1932, at 
the bottom of the cycle, the regional breakdown of a higher national figure 
of 22.1 per cent was as shown in column 2. In 1937, when unemployment 
had recovered to pre-depression levels, the figures were as shown in 
column 3. Throughout, there is a clear distinction between the first 
three regions and the latter three; a 'North' 'South' problem was evident. 
These regions were not homogeneous in unemployment experience. 
Statistics for pairs of labour exchange areas from within each regional 
division are shown in Table II. However, the other 'planning regions' -
12. London and Cambridge Economic Service, The British Economy: Key 
Statistics, 1900-1970 (1971), Table E. 
130 MoP. Fogarty , op.cito Table 80 
8 
the Special Areas and the Depressed Areas - were more similar. 14 
Unemployment for these areas is shown in later chapters. 
Although unemployment is perhaps the best indicator of the regional 
problem, it does not exhaust the indicators of disparities. A variety 
of alternatives can be suggested, for example, incomes per capita, 
employment growth, industrial structure and the degree of specialization, 
the volume of building activity, mortality rates or net migration. 
These alternative indicators are all related, however, to depression and 
unemployment. The growth of insured employment by regions is shown in 
Table III. This shows that while employment in London and the South 
East expanded by half as much again as it had been in 1923, Wales suffered 
an absolute as well as a relative decline. All regions suffered 
during the cyclical depression, as revealed in the figures for 1932, but 
the incidence was far from even although the relative order of the regions 
did not change. When the distribution of growth of the insured popUlation 
is considered the figures become more revealing. Table IV shows that the 
greater part of the increase in insured popUlation over the period was 
concentrated in the south and midlands. Nevertheless, insured population 
continued to increase absolutely in the other areas and whereas insured 
employment grew faster than insured population in southern Britain, it 
14. There were some variations within these areas. For example, 
Newcastle, within the North East Coast area, was more favourably 
affected than areas of S. W • .!.'n.trham. As a consequence, the Special 
Areas Commissioner refrained from his activities in Newcastle. 
Public Record Office (hereafter, P.R.O.) Cabinet Committee on the 
Reports of the Investigations into the Depressed Areas. Report of 
Inter-Departmental Comudttee, D.A. (34) 10, 11 Jan. 1937. 
CAB 27/577. 
9 
grew more slowly than insured population in northern Britain. The 
balance took the form of net migration and unemployment. 
When these indicators are considered together, the regions can be 
ranked as in Table V. The correspondence between the rankings provided 
by the different indicators is perfect and illustrates the 'North' 'South' 
problem in Britain. This ranking remained virtually identical over 
time. Spatially, Wales and the North are consistently the worst 
performers whilst London and the South East and the South West fare the 
best. Other indicators, such as activity rates and the other variables 
15 
earlier cited, would show a similar spatial pattern. But whilst London 
and the South East was a best performer by static criteria, its rate of 
growth resulted in problems of a different kind. 
The problems of London are illustrated by the rate of growth of 
insured population and employed insured population. Both of these, of 
course, are related to the rate of growth of total population which, when 
set equal to 100 in 1923, has a value of 115 in 1937 and of 117 by 1939. 
15. For example, Daly and Atkinson suggested that labour disputes had a 
similar pattern. M.Daly, E.Atkinson, 'A Regional Analysis of Strikes, 
1921-36', Sociological Review, 32 (1940). Rankings of building 
crafts employment per capita for the three years suggests the following 
order for the regions: South West, Scotland. London & the South East, 
Midlands, North, Wales. Calculated from I.Bowen, 'Building Output 
and the Trade Cycle (U.K.1924-38)', Oxford Economic Papers, No.3 (1940), 
Table D. A.D. Campbell shows that Scottish incomes per head were less 
than those of the rest of the U.K. for the period 1924-1949. A.D. 
Campbell, 'Changes in Scottish Incomes, 1924-49'. Economic Journal, 
65 (1955). This is explained by lower wages, lower activity rates 
and higher unemployment. Comparable estimates for other regions are 
not available for the period. 
10 
At the same time as population increased, so did the density of 
settlement. These figures, and other indicators of the problems of the 
over-congested region, are shown in Chapter 9. 
IV 
The only indicator of regional problems which has been ignored so 
far are those detailing differences in industrial structure between regions. 
This major topic is not the principal subject of this thesis and it there-
fore makes a relatively early appearance. Variations in industrial 
structure underly the disparate experiences of the 'North' and 'South'. 
Both contemporaries and more recent commentators have been concerned with 
the role of differences in industrial structure in causing different 
experiences of unemployment. 
Contemporaries were aware of this causality. Dennison noted that 
"some industries are declining in the employment they provide, while others 
are increasing in importance, and, broadly speaking, these two groups are 
• . d· ff • f h ,,16 Th· 1 b t s1tuated 1n 1 erent reg10ns 0 t e country • 1S C eavage e ween 
the depressed and prosperous areas was thought, furthermore, to be a 
cumulative process. "As industries develop, popUlation increases by 
migration, the market grows, further industrial development occurs and so 
on. ,,17 This view, which bas its parallel in tbe more recent theses of 
16. S.R.Dennison, op.cit.p.123. 
17. ibid.p.72. 
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Myrdal and Hirschman,l8 sees differences in industrial structure in 
different parts of the country and, with the decline of certain indus-
tries and the expansion of others, so disparities between areas arise. 
Further, these disparities are exaggerated as success breeds success 
and failure leads to further failure. 
Other contemporaries were equally aware of the role of differing 
industrial structures in leading to localized depression. But an 
al ternati ve hypothesis would see the regional disparities as a product 
differences in the rates of expansion of the same industries between 
different regions. For the aggregates of 'Inner' and 'Outer Britain' , 
Champernowne distinguished between these components, but concluded that 
structure was the more important explanation, 1929-36. 19 The Barlow 
Report also considered the relative roles of 'composition' and 'growth' 
of 
effects and similarly concluded that differences in industrial structure 
were the major factor behind differences in the growth of different 
regions, 1923-37. 20 (See Table VI.) 
Differences in industrial structure might be the explanation for 
18. G.Myrdal, Economic Theo and Underdevelo ed Be ions (1957); A.O. 
Hirschman, The Strategy of EconoD11c Development New Haven, 1958), 
Chapter 10. Also see A.P.Thirwal1, 'Migration and Regional Unemploy-
ment: Some Lessons for Regional Planning' , Westminster Bank Review 
(Nov. 1966) 
19. D.G.Champernowne, 'The Uneven Distribution of Unemployment, I', 
Beview of Economic Studies, 5 (1937-8) 
20. Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, 
op.cit. Appendix II; Chapter 2. 
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the differences in unemployment experience that have been noted between 
h . f 1 b h ..• . . 21 t e pa1rs 0 a our exc ange areas w1th1n the M1n1stry of Labour reg10ns. 
But at once it becomes clear that whether the differences in unemployment 
are attributed to industry-mix or differential growth depends on the 
level of industrial aggregation. For example, within Wales, Merthyr 
Tydfil was an area in the heart of the South Wales coalfield which concen-
trated on producing steam coal for export. Swansea, on the other hand, 
as well as its greater diversity of employment resulting from its nodal 
functions, was an area on the west of the field producing anthracite for 
which demand did not fall so catastrophica1ly.22 Simply, differential 
growth is the explanation if no distinction is made between types of coal 
industry; otherwise, different industrial structures are the explanation. 
There is not this difficulty when dealing with the North. The Tyneside 
area was "primarily concerned with coal export, ship construction, marine 
engineering and ship repairing,,23 and suffered more from unemployment than 
Middlesborough on Teeside, where steel production's ability to maintain 
itself absolutely, and to improve its relative poStion, enabled similar 
industries to those found on Tyneside to be less susceptible to 
24 
unemployment. 
Another problem now appears and that is to disentangle the effects of 
21. supra,Tab1e II. 
22. see B.Thomas, 'Labour Mobility in the South Wales & Monmouthshire 
Coal Mining Industry',Economic Journal, 41 (1931). 
23. G.H.Daysh, 'A Distressed Industrial Region - Tyneside', Econnm~c. __ 
Geography, 11 (1935), 162. 
24. J.T. Gleave, 'The Teeside Iron and Steel Industry', Geographical 
Journal,9l (1938). 
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the two influences. It seems that 'composition' may affect 'growth,.25 
A region concentrating its employment in a few industries suffering from 
secular decline will experience repercussions on the other industries of 
the area from this decline. Local demand is likely to fall and a lack 
of alternative employment opportunities will result in out-commuting and 
out-migration. Ultimately, industrial growth in the area might also 
suffer as locational disadvantages set in, discouraging the location of 
expanding industries. The consideration of the diversity of local 
employment was thus a cause for concern. Tress showed how diversity could 
be measured and demonstrated that a number of towns experiencing heavy 
unemployment in 1931 had little changed their diversity by 1937. 26 
Luton and Oxford within the prosperous south also had little diversity; it 
was suggested that lessons learnt from the depressed areas ought to be 
27 
applied to the present prosperous areas. But the lesson of the depressed 
areas might not have been unmistakable. Diversification is not the 
25. Mackay argues that the proportionality shift in shift-share analysis 
only records the minimum influence of industrial composition. 
This reflects both the influence of working with aggregated data 
and the secondary impact on growth of all industries in a region 
from a decline in employment in industries heavily weighted in the 
region. D.I.Mackay. 'Industrial Structure and Regional Growth -
A Methodological Problem', Scottish Journal of Political Econo , 
15 (1968). Also see G. McCrone, Regional Policy in Brita1n 1969), 
~~~r7 
26. R.C.Tress. 'Unemployment and the Diversification of Industry'. 
Manchester School. 9 (1938). This technique has been subsequently 
developed. See A.Rodgers, 'Some Aspects of Industrial Diversifica-
tion in the U.S.'. Pa ers & Proceedi s of the Re iona1 Science 
Association. 1 (1955; W.Isard. Methods of ReS10na1 Analysis 
(Cambridge. Massachusetts. 1960~,pp.270-9. 
27. Tress.op.cit.; Survey of the Social Services of Oxford and District 
(1938-40),l,pp.70,98. 
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appropriate policy if it is not an unfavourable structure that a region 
is suffering from. 
It is clear that caution must be exercised before easily accepting 
the structural explanation of regional differentiation. This is 
particularly the case as it has been shown in the p08't-war period that a 
number of areas do not apparently conform with an industry-mix explanation 
f h · d· . 28 o t e1r 1sparate exper1ences. However, it has been suggested above 
that the methodology of these investigations might lead to an underesti-
mation of the 'composition' component in regional growth. Besides, the 
. fl . 11· . d 29 two 1n uences are pract1ca y 1ntertw1ne • It must be concluded on 
28. It seems that the North, Wales and the East and West Ridings of 
Yorkshire suffer chiefly from an unfavourable industrial structure, 
whilst the South East benefits from a favourable structure. In 
the areas where differential growth is the major explanation - in 
Scotland and the North West the impact is unfavourable whereas in 
the Midlands, East Anglia and the South West it is favourable. 
For example, see A.P.Thirwall, 'A Measure of the Proper Distribution 
of Industry', Oxford Econondc Papers, new sere 19 (1967); A.J. 
Brown,op.cit,pp.13l-l46; F.J.B.Stilwell, 'Regional Growth and 
Structural Adaptation', Urban Studies, 6 (1969); C.H.Lee, Regional 
Economic Growth in the United Kin dom since the 1880's (Maidenhead, 
1971 ,p.244. The Barlow Report found that in Mid-Scotland and the 
West Riding of Yorkshire, Nottinghamshire and Derbyshire areas that 
differential growth was important. Royal commission on the Distri-
bution of the Industrial Population, op.cit. 
29. G.McCrone,op.cit.; D.I.MaCkay,op.cit. The methodology of calcula-
ting the contributions of industrial structure and differential 
growth to disparate regional experiences is described and discussed 
in the references cited in footnote 28 and in H.S.Perloff, E.S. Dunn, 
E.E.Lampard, R.F.Muth, Regions, Resources, and Economic Growth 
(Baltimore, 1960); E.S.Dunn,A Statistical and Analytical Technique 
for Regional Analysis', Papers & Proceedings of the Regional Science 
Association, 6 (1960); T.W.BuCk, 'Shift and Share Analysis - A 
Guide to Regional Policy?', Regional Studies, 4 (1970); F.J.B. 
Stilwell, 'Further Thoughts on the Shift and Share Approach' , 
Regional Studies, 4 (1970). 
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the available evidence for the inter-war period that structural differ-
ences were the major explanation of regional disparities between the 
planning regions. 
The impact of the cyclical downturn on regional disparities is 
another factor to be considered. A priori, capital goods industries 
and heavy industries will tend to experience wide fluctuations over a 
cycle, whereas the amplitudes of the fluctuations of consumption industries 
will tend to be less. The most volatile element of aggregate demand is 
investment; capital goods using industries can always delay renewing 
plant and equipment or adding to existing capital stock if economic con-
ditions should seem to warrant it, but consumption demand can never 
30 become zero. Additionally, when some factor leads to a revival in 
aggregate demand, investment demand, having declined very rapidly, is 
also likely to show a similarly rapid rate of increase. The rate of 
change in consumption is likely to be .less startling. Given the 
distribution of industries in Britain, therefore, it would be expected 
that the differential impact of cyclical depression would be reflected 
in the appearance of greater disparities between regions in the midst of 
depression. This indeed seems to be the case, as is shown in Table 
VII. 31 However, more recent work on regional cycles suggests that 
30. Another factor is the relative 'lumpiness' of investment demand 
compared to consumption demand. 
31. Thirwall has shown that generally it is the regions of high 
unemployment that exhibit the greatest sensitivity to cyclical 
variations in unemployment. A.P.Thirwa11, 'Regional Unemployment 
as a Cyclical Phenomenon', Scottish Journal of Political Econo!!, 
13 (1966). 
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industrial structure is not the explanation for different amplitudes 
of cycle, except in the North. 32 This is so even though poor regional 
growth may be explained for some regions by industry-mix. Consequently, 
caution must again be exercised in accepting the explanation outlined 
above to account for differences in regional cycle experience. However, 
interregional cyclical variations are not a chief concern as it is 
evident that major disparities remain both before and after the cyclical 
depression of the early 1930's. The regional problem was one of 10ng-
standing and was primarily due to structural causes. Cyclical 
depression served to magnify these disparities. 
32. It has been shown that interregional variations in the cyclical 
sensitivity to unemployment are due more to interregional differ-
ences in the cyclical sensitivity of individual industries to 
unemployment than to different industrial structures. C.P. 
Harris, A.P.Thirwa11, 'Interregional Variations in Cyclical 
Sensitivity to Unemployment in the U.K. ,1949-64' , Bulletin of the 
Oxford University Institute of Economics and Statistics, 30 (1968). 
This may reflect a tendency to hoard labour by industries in 
regions where labour scarcity is feared or for branch plants in 
the regions of high unemployment to adjust their activities more 
readily than parent plants in the low unemployment regions. 
Either explanation seems inapplicable to the inter-war period. 
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Table I 
Unemployed Insured as a Percentage of Insured Population. 
Ministry of Labour Regions! 1929, 1932 and 1937. 
(i) (ii) 
1929 1932 
London & South West 5.6 13.7 
South West 8.1 17.1 
Midlands 9.3 20.1 
Northa/ 13.5 27.7 
Wales 19.3 36.5 
Scotland 12.1 27.1 
a/ North, North West and North East regions. 
Source: M.P. Fogarty, op.cit, Table III. 
(iii) 
1937 
6.4 
7.8 
7.2 
13.8 
22.3 
15.9 
Table II 
Unemployed as a Percentage of Insured Population. 
Pairs of Labour ExChange Areas within Regional Divisions, 1929, 
1932 and 1937. 
London and S.E. 
South West 
Midlands 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
Southampton 
Luton 
Bristol 
Bath 
WaUsaU 
Birmingham 
Tynesideb/ 
Middlesb,ougk. 
Merthyr Tydfil 
Swansea 
Glasgow 
Edinburgh 
1929 
9.2 
4.1 
11.8 
8.7 
12.2 
6.8 
23.0 
12.2 
44.7 
22.5 
14.6 
9.2 
1932 
22.6 
7.9 
20.4 
15.4 
26.6 
15.3 
40.5 
41.9 
60.9 
37.5 
30.7 
15.5 
1937 
.9:' 7 
5.5 
9.4 
5.4 
9.8 
4.3 
25.2 
15.2 
41.6 
23.5 
17.4 
11.1 
b/ Tyneside is composed of statistics available for Gateshead, 
South Shields, Newcastle and North Shields. 
Source: M.P. Fogarty, op.cit, pp. 31-3. 
Table III 
Index Numbers of Insured Persons aged 16-64 in Employment in Certain 
Industries in Ministry of Labour Regions at the end of June, 1929, 
1932 and 1937. 
Jtme 1923 = 100 
1929 1932 1937 
London and South East 123.6 122.6 152.2 
South West 116.6 113.6 139.0 
Midlands 110.7 101.0 132.0 
North 104.2 88.3 109.0 
Wales 84.6 68.6 85.8 
Scotland 104.8 91.0 111.6 
Source: Ministry of Labour, Annual Report for the year 1938 
(ParI. Papers, 1938-9, XII), Appendix XII. 
Table IV 
Index Numbers of Insured Population in Ministry of Labour Regions. 
July, 1929, 1932 and 1937. 
July 1923 '"' 100 
1929 1932 1937 
London and South East 117 128 146 
South West 113 122 134 
Midlands 110 116 127 
North 104 108 110 
Wales 97 103 102 
Scotland 102 107 112 
Source: M.P. Fogarty, op.cit, Table V. 
Table V 
Regions ranked by three indicators of Regional Disparity: Percentage 
Unemployed, Employment Growth, Net Migration as a Percentage of 
Population. 1929, 1932, 1937. 
Unemployment Employment Net Migration Growth 
London and South East 1 1 1 
South West 2 2 2 
Midlands 3 3 3 
North 5 5 5 
Wales 6 6 6 
Scotland 4 4 4 
Note: The ranks were determined by averaging the ranks recorded in 
eaCh of the three years for each of the variables and rounding 
to the nearest whole number. 
Source: Tables I, III; Chapter 2, Appendix 2. 
Table VI 
Regional Distribution of Industry and Change in Employment, 1923-1937. 
% insured 
in 1923 in:-
7 local 
industries 
16 rapidly 
expanding 
basic 
industries 
5 rapidly 
declining 
basic 
industries 
18 other 
% insured 
in 1937 in:-
7 local 
industries 
16 rapidly 
expanding 
basic 
industries 
5 rapidly 
declining 
basic 
industries 
18 other 
G.B. 
24 
14 
23 
39 
30 
19 
14 
37 
London 
& Hone 
Co's. 
35 
21 
1 
43 
38 
25 
1 
36 
W. Rid-
Mid- ing, 
lands Notts. 
& Derby 
26 
12 
46 
20 
30 
7 
42 
14 
9 
43 
33 
21 
14 
32 
33 
Mid 
Scot- Lanes. 
land 
25 
10 
24 
40 
33 
13 
15 
39 
19 
9 
36 
36 
26 
16 
24 
35 
North- G1am-
umber- organ, 
land, Mon-
Durham mouth 
16 
6 
49 
28 
25 
9 
33 
32 
13 
4 
50 
24 
22 
6 
41 
31 
Notes: Local industries - "essentially local in character" and therefore 
found in all communities. 
Basic industries - interregional exporting industries. 
Expanding industries - no. of insured persons increased as fast 
or faster than the total population, 1923-37. 
Declining industries - no. of insured persons declined either 
absolutely or relatively to total population, 1923-37. 
Source: Royal Comudssion on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, 
op.cit, p. 276. 
Table VII 
Unemployment Percentages in the 'North' and 'South', 1929, 1932 and 1937. 
'South' * 
'North' ** 
Difference 
1929 
7.7 
15.0 
7.3 
1932 
16.9 
30.1 
13.2 
1937 
7.1 
17.3 
10.2 
* London and South East, South West and Midland regions of 
the Ministry of Labour 
** Wales, Scotland and Northern regions of the Ministry of 
Labour 
CHAPTER 2 
The Volume and Direction of Labour Flows 
I 
Gross migration statistics are the best measure of labour flows in 
that they yield the most information, in particular, on the origin and 
destination of movements and on the relative importance of in- and out-
migration from a particular area. This latter advantage may be of 
especial i~ortance when analysing the factors that influence labour 
movements. The various economic, social and psychological factors that 
influence migration may best be related to the actual movements rather than 
to an aggregate measure of movement such as net migration. However, the 
only information on gross migration for this period is not suitable. The 
comprehensive estimates of Friedlander and Boshier1 pertain to the periods 
1911-31 and 1931-51 and whilst providing valuable guidelines to the 
interpretation of other migration data for this period, this data itself 
covers too wide a time span for use in a study of the shorter inter-war 
period~ Further, t~e data of this study are also subject to some errors, 
being based on residence and birthplace information from the Census. The 
failure of the 1931 Census to include such information necessitated the 
construction of estimates for this date. 2 
1. D.Friedlander and R.J.Boshier,'A Study of Internal Migration in 
England and Wales, Part I: Geographical Patterns of Internal Migration 
1851-1951', Popa1ation Studies, 19(1965-6). 
2. Others make use of birthplace and residence data in the construction 
of local estimates. For example, A.E.C.Hare and M. I.Michaels , 'Migration 
of Population' in London School of Economics, The New Survey of London 
Life and Labour, VI(1934). 
Th h d h . . h . 3. f f e ot er ata t at eX1sts, W1t one except10n, 1S ar rom 
comprehensive. There is the Ministry of Labour data on transference 
from the Depressed Areas. This information directly reflects the impact 
of Government policies to induce labour migration and includes totals 
for each calendar year and information on the origins and destinations 
of assisted migrants. 4 However, useful as this is, the object of policy 
was to further the movement of 'spontaneous' migration by assisting 
potential migrants from severely depressed areas to undertake the move 
that they may have otherwise avoided. Consequently, from the standpoint 
of judging policy, such a series of data is insufficient. 
Elsewhere, Brinley Thomas, in a series of articles in the late 1930's,5 
the Ministry of Labour, and others, provide data on migration culled from 
analyses of unemployment books exchanged under the insurance schemes. This 
information may also be used as a guide in interpreting conclusions drawn 
from other sources, but again, it is subject to a number of errors.6 
3. H.Makower, J.Marschak and H.W.Robinson,'Studies in MObility of Labour', 
Oxford Economic Papers, Nos.l,2,4(1938-40). 
4. Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population, Memorandum of Evidence of the Ministry of Labour, 3 Feb. 1938, 
Appendix IV. The transference scheme is described in Chapter 4. 
5. B.Thomas,'Labour MObility in the South Wales and MOnmouthshire Coa1-
Mining Industry, 1920-30', Economic Journal, 41(1931); B.Thomas,'The 
MOvement of Labour into South-East Eng1and,1920-32', Economica,1(1934); 
B.Thomas,'The Influx of Labour into London and the South-East,1920-36', 
Economica,4(1937); B.Thomas,'The Influx of Labour into the Midlands, 
1920-37', Economica,5(1938); P.R.0.Supp1ementary Evidence submitted to 
the Barlow Commission by the Ministry of Labour,HLG 27/30. 
6. Ministry of Labour data for the post-World War II period was found to 
be subject to errors of such a magnitude that it was discredited and 
discontinued. See Ministry of Labour Gazette,76(1968),p.120. 
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For example, the changing distribution of the insurance scheme amongst the 
active population is one factor hampering interpretation of the data. The 
implicit reliance on workplace data as an indicator of migration ignores the 
centrifugal movement of population to outlying districts. Further, the 
practice of a large number of employers to return the books of their 
employees to a central London office, irrespective of the location of their 
works, means that even this is not accurately measured. Movements in London, 
in particular, are likely to be overstated. Finally, the irregular timing 
of such estimates fails to provide data for individual years and is chiefly 
of value in indicating the broad direction and volume of labour flows over a 
long period of time. 
The work of Makower, Marschak and Robinson involved the construction 
of net migration residuals from the population and vital statistics data 
of the Registrar-General for England and Wa1es. 7 However, their work only 
resulted in the presentation of data for the periods 1927-31 and 1931-6 
for the various counties and the whole of Scotland was treated as a county. 
Given these sources of information on migration pertaining to varying 
levels of spatial and temporal aggregation it was decided that it would be 
valuable to compute net migration residuals for the counties of England, 
Wales and Scotland using a method in principle identical to that of Makower, 
Marschak and Robinson. Not only would this yield a comprehensive series of 
estimates for these areas, enabling regional figures to be obtained by 
7. A.D~K~Owen,'Socia1 Consequences of Industrial Transference', 
Sociolofica1Review,29(1937). Similar estimates were made by Owen for 
the Reg1strar-Genera1 regions for the periods 1921-31 and 1931-5. Also 
see R.M.Titmus8;Poverty and Population: A Factual Study of Contemporary 
. Social ·Waite(1938). 
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aggregation, but information for each year would be obtainable and thus 
could be related to changing economic circumstances. The possession of 
such a series would also aid the work of the following sections of the 
thesis as well as being of some descriptive importance in itself. 
Before presenting this data and describing the patterns of labour 
movement it and surrogate estimates reveal, it is vital to set-out the 
errors and biases that such estimates are liable to. To attain this 
objective, the methodology of computing net migration estimates by the 
residual method is described. This discussion is to be found in the first 
Appendix to this chapter. 
II 
This section summarizes the principal features of the results. The 
detailed estimates are presented in Appendix 2. 
The counties of the south of England gain population from migration 
whilst the northern and Welsh counties lose. The exceptions are Leicester, 
Nottingham and Rutland in the English midlands, London, Cornwall and a number 
of counties in north Wales and Cheshire. The examination of migration as a 
percentage of county population is more revealing. This shows that the 
greater part of the country experiences slight in- or out-migration, in 
contrast to Scotland where movements are of greater impact. The counties 
that lose most heavily are those of south and _id-Wales, the extreme north 
and London. The declining industries of Wales led to the observed movement 
from that area and whilst it seems probable that these migrants went to 
England it is also true that a number returned to north Wales, an area from 
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which many came in the late nineteenth century. Cheshire and F1intshire's 
balance may also be attributable to a centrifugal movement of the 
population of the Liverpool conurbation. Similarly, the County of London 
shows such a movement, the principal benefactors appearing to be Middlesex, 
Hertfordshire, Surrey and West Sussex. Cumberland, Northumberland and 
Durham are, like Wales, losing population as a result of the decline in 
their basic heavy industries, in particular coa1-mining. 
The period 1929-39 illustrates a similar distribution of in- and out-
migration on balance, although the number of areas gaining population has 
increased. The examination of the impact of movement in percentage terms 
illustrates a polarization of the tendencies evident in the 1920's. 
London is now losing more heavily whilst a greater number of the surrounding 
counties are gaining both from this movement and from long distance move-
ments from elsewhere. The counties of mid- and south Wales are also losing 
more heavily, as is Durham. 
The description of the movements aggregated to the levels of Ministry 
of Labour regions merely serves to make clear the 'North'-' South' pattern 
8 
of losing and gaining areas, and the polarization of the 1930's. A 
feature to note is the apparent loss of population by Greater London in the 
1920's. As can be seen in Appendix 2, this balance of out-migration i. 
very slight and when the net movement over the decade is considered a10ng-
side the volume of annual movement it seems that a negative balance is a 
somewhat freak result for the 1920-29 period. 
8. The aggregation of county results to the Ministry of Labour regions is 
an approximation. This results from the latter's regions being based 
on employment exchange districts, whilst the population and vital 
statistics data is available for local authority areas. Appendix 2 
notes the discrepancies. 
28 
In the period 1920-29, it can be seen that each county of Scotland was 
o 
a net loser of pjpulation by migration. The exception appears to be the 
County of Bute; Appendix 1 explains this descrepancy.9 The examination of 
yearly mean percentage movement shows the peripheral counties suffering the 
heaviest proportional movement. Stirling and Midlothian lose a smaller 
proportion of their population than all other counties and the heavy losses 
experiences by West Lothian and Berwick suggest a movement of population to 
adjacent counties. The decline of the shale oil industry, in particular, 
may account for West Lothian's predicament. 
In the 1930's, the general pattern of loss by migration is not so 
strongly maintained. Aberdeen, with its relatively progressive agriculture, 
gains in the north,lO whilst Renfrew, Midlothian, Dumfries,ll Roxburgh and 
Selkirk gain in the south. The examination of proportional migratory 
movements reveals that the country as a whole experiences less loss of 
population by'udgration in the period 1929-39 than in the 1920's. Only the 
position of Bute (already explained), Kirkcudbright12 and Ze'tland worsen 
whilst the remainder, with the exceptions of West Lothian, Ross and Cromarty, 
Sutherland, Peebles, East Lothian, Fife and Stirling, improve. Midlothian 
probably gains from West Lothian, East Lothian and Peebles, whilst Dumfries' 
gain is the product of a boundary change. Renfrew is probably benefiting 
from a centrifugal movement of Glasgow's population whilst the border 
9. infra, note 14. 
10. This is also a product of a boundary change at the expense of Kincardine 
County. 
11. This is a product of a boundary change at the expense of Kirkcudbright. 
12. As a result of the boundary change to the gain of DUmfries. 
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counties of Selkirk and Roxburgh may have been attracting population from 
their neighbouring depressed counties in northern England. 
The examination of regional aggregates demonstrates the overall loss 
of population by migration despite the gains of some counties and illustrates 
the relative improvement between the 1920's and the 1930's, although, of 
course, the 1920's data is subject to a greater degree of error than that 
for the 1930's. 
Once the results had been computed it was decided to analyse the net 
movements in terms of long or short distance. For all counties, all 
negative movements and all positive movements were separately summed. The 
difference between these totals was taken to illustrate the balance of 
overseas migration, whilst the absolute values of the remaining totals were 
summed and divided by two to represent net total inter-county moves in each 
of the time periods involved. Similarly, a calculation was made to obtain 
statistics of net totals of inter-regional movements. Tables VIII and IX 
summarize these results for England and Wales and for Great Britain. 
If inter-regional moves represent long distance movements, then the 
difference between this figure and that for the net total of all inter-
county movements represents short distance and intra-regional movement. In 
the 1930' s, long distance movement became more important and this seems to 
fit with the observed tendency towards polarization. There were also a 
great many more movements in the 1930's than in the 1920's. 
The net migration estimates suggest two factors requiring special 
explanation. Firstly, why does there seem to be an increase in long 
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distance movements in the 1930's and secondly, why does the proportional 
impact of migration in Scotland appear to be less in the 1930's than in 
the 1920's? This contrasts with the apparent polarization of experience 
in England and Wales. These questions involve the analysis of factors that 
influence migration movements, their timing and their destination and, as 
such, will be left to the following chapter. 
It now remains to examine whether the surrogate data mentioned at the 
beginning of this chapter tends to confirm or reject the conclusions that 
have been drawn on the patterns of labour movements. Generally, the 
described pattern of movement is supported. The conclusions that can be 
drawn from Makower, Marschak and Robinson are that London and the South-East 
was the principal recipient of internally migrating population in the 1920's 
and that this originated in the north and Scotland. In the 1930's a 
similar relation seems to hold, but overseas immigrants replaced Scotland 
as one of the main suppliers of popUlation. Friedlander and Roshier's work 
suggests that out-migration from the north was high, much of it originating 
from districts dominated by coal-mining and heavy industry in Northumberland 
and Durham. They also suggest that there was a trend towards long distance 
migration in response to changes in economic circumstances, although Makower 
et a1 point out that long distance movement was more important in the late 
1920's than in the early 1930's. This suggests that there was an 
interruption to the trend occasioned by the cyclical downturn of the early 
thirties. The conclusions offered by those whose work was based on 
analysing the distribution of unemployment insurance books is also not 
contradicted. 
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III 
Short and long distance movements have been isolated by comparing 
inter-regional movement totals and inter-county movement totals. It is 
necessary to attempt a fuller description of labour movements and 
especially of intra-regional movements. Given the hypothesized relation-
ship between migration and distance expressed in gravity models,13 it would 
be surprising if short distance movement was not predominant. This is the 
case in the 1920's, though not in the 1930's. Further, centrifugal move-
ments of popUlation from large urban agglomerations are important and these 
tend to be intra-regional. Intra-regional movements can be approximated by 
isolating those counties within a region whose balance of migration differs 
from the total. Other evidence may also be brought to bear. A region by 
region approach will be taken. 
The resulting miscellany is not an ideal account of labour movements 
by region. But the available evidence is so thinly scattered that a more 
coherent account is probably impossible. 
North 
Within the North, only one county consistently differed from the 
regional aggregate. Cheshire, except in a few years, was a recipient of an 
inflow of labour. A total of some 53,000 moved to Cheshire over the entire 
period. Lincolnshire too was a slight gainer of popUlation from migration 
13. See W.Isard,Methods of Regional Analrsis(Cambridge,MaSSachusetts,1960), 
Chapter 11 for an introduction. A s mple model would be, 
d •• 
1J 
where, migration between i and j (Mi.) is seen to be some function of 
the product of population of the twoJareas ( P. and P. ) divided by 
the distance between them ( d •• ). 1 J 
1J 
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in the 1930's, though on balance it was a deficit area in the 1920's and 
this was also true of the North and East Ridings of Yorkshire. All other 
constituent counties experienced an outflow of population in both the 
1920's and the 1930's. What light can supplementary evidence throw on this 
data? 
It has been suggested that an analagous movement of population to the 
centrifugal movement in the London area was taking place on Merseyside. 
More specifically, it was suggested that areas on the Wirral peninsula were 
exhibiting rapid rates of population increase not attributable to natural 
increase. This was the growth of suburbia to the Merseyside conurbation; 
"the outward migration into semi-detached villas has been gathering momentum 
during the last twenty years," Smith observed in 1942, and "the outward 
migration into Bebington and Wirral has been largely of this kind.".14 
The examination of Lancashire as a whole reveals that just as out-
migration from the county, in terms of percentages of the population, 
compared unfavourably with other parts of the country showing similar 
1 . . 15 •• 1 h'" h' h unemp oyment stat1st1cs, so 1t 1S a so true t at m1grat10n W1t 1n t e 
county from areas of high unemployment to those of relatively low 
unemployment was surprisingly small. It was observed that, 
14. W.Smith, The Distribution of Population and the Location of Industry 
on Merseyside(Liverpool,1942),pp.22,23. The spread of large towns 
during this period seems to be a general phenomenon. See G.D.A. 
MacDougall 'Inter-War Population Changes in Town and Country', Journal 
of the Royal Statistical Society,103(l940). A ready explanation for 
, the East and North Ridings of Yorkshire and Lincolnshire is not available. 
15. See J.Jewkes,'The Mobility of Labour and the Localisation of Industry', 
Transactions of the Manchester Statistical Society(1932-3); Board of 
Trade, An Industrial Survey of the Lancashire Area (by the University 
of Manchester) (1932),pp.83-7. 
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"the fine-spinning and weaving areas have not, to any appreciable 
extent, drawn labour from the coarse spinning towns. Accrington 
appears to have drawn labour from Blackburn and Burnley, but 
Blackburn and Burnley, in turn, have taken labour from Accrington. 
The movement within the industry appears not as a broad movement 
produced by a common economic stimulus, but as the inexplicable 16 
variety of individual action prompted by purely personal factors.", 
The only other part of the North on which supplementary evidence on 
labour movements is available is for the North-East Coast area comprising 
the counties of Durham, Northumberland and the Cleveland district of 
Yorkshire. The analysis of net migration on Tyneside 1921-31 reveals 
startling contrasts between the various local authorities concerned. The 
expression of net migration over the decade as a percentage of the 1921 
Census population reveals that Jarrow had a net loss of 20.3 per cent, 
Gateshead 12.0 per cent, South Shields 13.2 per cent and Wallsend 7.0 per 
cent. 17 Two outlying areas gained by migration over the same period, 
suggesting once more that all conurbations were undergoing a centrifugal 
movement of population. These were Gosforth (10.9 per cent) and Whitley 
and Monkseaton (7.0 per cent). Newcastle's loss was amongst the lowest 
which suggests that it was considerably more diversified in the employment 
it could offer than some of its close neighbours. 
Migration estimates between Northumberland and Durham and other counties 
in England and Wales over the years 1925-3718 reveal the following order of 
16. J.Jewkes and H.Campion,'The Mobility of Labour in the Cotton Industry', 
Economic Journal,38(1928),137. 
17. G.H.J.Daysh,'A Distressed Industrial Region: Tynesid6: Economic 
Geography,ll(1935),165. 
18. H.Makower, J.Marschak and H.W.Robinson,'Studies in MObility of Labour: 
Analysis for Great Britain, Part II',Oxford Economic Papers,No.4(1940),45. 
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counties with significant migratory f10ws. 19 Cumberland is first, 
followed by Yorkshire, Staffordshire, Lancashire, Lincolnshire and 
Cheshire. These are intra-regional moves within the north except that 
to Staffordshire. When distfance is also considered in calculating the 
significance of migration the order becomes Staffordshire, Cumberland, 
Yorkshire, Cornwall, Lincolnshire and Cheshire. 20 The principal conclusion 
that emerges is the strong link between labour movements and similar 
industrial structures in losing and gaining counties. 
Within the North-East alone, the most notable movements over the whole 
period were those that resulted in the increasing concentration of 
population in the three large conurbations and the "movement of people 
from ••• the western parts of the Durham coalfield, especially South-West 
19. ibid. Significance was determined by calculating an index of mobility 
by the formula, 
(ua-ub)ab 
where, M • no. of migrants from Northumberland and Durham to the 
receiving county weighted by ub, 
ua • unemployment percentage in Northumberland and Durham, 
ub • unemployment percentage in receiving county, 
ab - product of the total insured population in the two 
counties. 
This definition is to be found in H.Makower, J.Marschak and H.W.Robinson, 
'Studies in Mobility of Labour: A Tentative Statistical Measure', 
Oxford Economic Papers, No.l(1938),93. 
20. H.Makower et aI, op.cit.(1940). Distance is entered into the ~quation 
as D, where D is the distance from Northumberland and Durham to the 
receiving county to the power (v) of the regression coefficient between 
the number of migrants and distance between origin and destination. 
. . A -
M DV ~ 
(ua-ub)ab 
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Durham, where coal-mining was declining .•. L-t~7 •.. the eastern parts of 
the county where output was increasing in the deep concealed portions of 
the field".2l The difficulties facing coalminers in seeking fresh 
employment once unemployed tended to result in new employment being most 
often found in other mining occupations, perhaps in other areas of the 
country. The uneven development of the Durham coalfield enabled some of 
the displaced miners to avoid the complications of inter-regional migration 
whilst still gaining new employment. The remaining intra-regional 
22 
migration did not favour all three conurbations equally. The two main 
centres of attraction were Tyneside and Teeside and although the former 
seems to have been more important absolutely, the relative achievement of 
Teeside, given its smaller population, may be more significant. In 
particular, Stockton-on-Tees had large inflows, 1921-31, from seven of 
the other towns covered by the cited study and nearby Billingham's progress 
in the heavy chemical industry may be a partial explanation for this 
achievement. Out of shipbuilding, engineering, metal industries, mining and 
quarrying, and chemicals, the latter was the only basic industry to expand 
its employment 1923-38 and the greater part of this expansion was completed 
by 1930. 23 But with these exceptions, the greater part of total movement 
within the area was confined to short distance movement as can be seen from 
d· I Th' 1 h hI' f' • 1 24 ~agram. ~s a so sows t e comp ex~ty 0 ~ntra-reg~ona movement. 
21. Northern Industrial Group, North East Coast: A Survey of Industrial 
Facilities(Newcastle,1949),p.132. The Durham miners had a tradition 
of mobility; see A.E.Smailes,'Population Changes in the Colliery 
Districts of Northumberland and Durham',Geographical Journal,9l(l938). 
22. The following is largely based on 'Labour in the North East Coast Area', 
Chapter XV of Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of the North East 
Coast Area(by Armstrong College} (1932). 
23. Northern Industrial Group, op.cit. Table 75. 
24. Coverage does not include movements from the named towns to 'E' or '0' 
or from 'E' to '0'. The balis of unemployment book data, which is 
concerned with workplaces, means that the data might also include 
instances of commuting as well as intra-regional migration. 
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Wales 
In Wales the annual average loss, 1920-29, was of the order of 
17,000 persons and for the period 1929-39, 28,000. In percentage terms 
this loss was of a greater magnitude than that shown by the north. Every 
county but one exhibited continual out-migration on balance almost through-
out the inter-war years. The one exception was Flintshire which absorbed 
some 4,700 persons 1920-29 and a further 5,600 in the remaining years 
before the outbreak of World War II. In relation to total inter-county 
movement these sums are insignificant and besides, it seems probable that 
Flintshire was not absorbing labour from the depressed parts of Wales alone 
but from the North-West of England, in particular from Lancashire. 25 Other 
contributing areas seem to have been Carnarvonshire, Anglesey, Merionethshire, 
Montgomeryshire and Cardiganshire in Wales and Shropshire and Staffordshire 
in England. 
What other sources provide information on movements within the 
principality? The South Wales coalfield, was ably analysed by Brinley 
Thomas in the 1920's. MObility was seen to be greater than that recorded 
by Jewkes and Campion for Lancashire cotton workers, although it was 
subsequently shown that mobility in the coal industry of the North-East 
Coast area was higher. 26 The analysis of migration in ten valleys showed 
that the smallest proportion of migrants to total insured population was in 
the four valleys in the heart of the coalfield: Merthyr Vale, Aberdare, 
25. Friedlander and Roshier, op.cit. 276,277. 
26. Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of the North East Coast Area, 
op.cit. p.473. 
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Rhondda and Port Talbot. Two valleys on the east of the field, in 
Monmouthshire, showed only slight improvement. However, the four valleys 
on the west of the field (Rhymney, Swansea, Amman, and Neath) showed a 
marked superiority. Labour was moving from the declining steam coal 
. h h' 27 reg10ns to t e new ant rac1te areas. But as University College noted 
. 193228 " 1n , ••• the greater part of the transfer of Welsh miners is transfer 
from Wales to other areas of Great Britain and consists, very largely ••• 
of transfers to relief work. Such net transfers of miners as take place 
within Wales is more evenly distributed over the whole of industry.". But 
again, that intra-regional movement within Wales was not inconsiderable 
is shown by the prevalence of such movements in those recorded by 
Friedlander and Roshier who, like Makower et aI, calculate an index of 
migration in order to consider the influence of total populations of losing 
29 
and gaining areas on migration totals. However, they do not attempt to 
enter distance into the equation and, consequently, their results tend to 
over-emphasize the significance of intra-regional migration in Wales. 
Makower et al have analysed the counties of Glamorganshire and Monmouthshire 
for the period 1925-37 and their results, analagous to those presented for 
Northumberland and Durham, reveal the following ranking before distance is 
considered. First is the rest of Wales, followed by, Carmarthenshire, 
Pembrokeshire, Durham, Staffordshire and Denbighshire. 3O The introduction 
27. B.Thomas,'Labour Mobility in the South Wales and Monmouthshire Coal-
Mining Industry',op.cit. Rbymney's growth was not attributable to its 
geological good fortune, but rather to its situation between two very 
depressed districts and the location within it of the Tredegar Iron and 
Coal Company's villages at Blackwood. 
28. Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of South Wales(by the University 
College of South Wales and Monmouthshire)(1932),p.149. 
29. Friedlander and Roshier, op.cit. 250,251. 
30. Makower et aI, op.cit. (1940). 
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of distance into the analysis gives the following ranking, the rest of 
Wales, followed by, Durham, Staffordshire, Pembrokeshire, Carmarthenshire 
and Denbighshire. But the aggregation of eleven counties as the 'Rest of 
Wales' produces misleading results and if absolute movements are examined, 
it remains true that inter-regional movement was much more important 
quantitatively. 
Scotland 
Scotland has already been dealt with as fully as possible in the course 
of introducing the estimates of net migration. 
Midlands 
The period 1920-29 saw a loss by migration at the rate of about 9,500 
per annum. This is in contrast to a gain over the years 1929-39 at an 
annual rate of some 14,000. Of the regions encountered thus far, the 
Midlands shows the most diverse trends between its constituent counties. 
For example, whereas Derbyshire and Staffordshire lose population throughout 
the period they are dissimilar in that the former's performance is better 
in the 1920's, the latter in the 1930's. Leicestershire and Nottinghamshire 
both gain in both periods but the former fares relatively better in the 
1920's whilst Nottinghamshire's performance in the 1930's is better than in 
the 1920's. MOre distinguished still are the performances of Worcestershire 
and Warwickshire; whereas Worcestershire lost some 9,000 persons by migration 
in the 1920's it gained 20,500 in the 1930's and Warwickshire converted a, 
1920's loss of 13,600 to a 1930's gain of 120,000. It seems most probable 
that these changes were the result of predominantly inter-regional labour 
39 
31 
movements. The Midlands, being a land-locked region, facilitated such 
movement to a greater extent than others by reason of its geography. 
Can a reasonable guess or better be made on intra-regional movement 
in the Midlands? It is clear that at least Herefordshire and Shropshire 
contributed to Warwickshire's expansion in the 1920's, It is also probable 
that much of this movement was the second step of a two step movement from 
Wales, rather than a movement by Herefordshire and Shropshire natives. 
More generally, it is likely that those areas with relatively high rates 
of unemployment were contributing labour to those areas with relatively low 
rates. The Potteries, the Notts/Derby coalfield and the Black country may 
well have been deficit areas whilst Coventry, Birmingham and Rugby, Corby 
and Newark were receiving labour inflows. 32 
South West 
The South West gained each year 8,600 persons by migration, 1920-29. 
31. Friedlander and Roshier, op.cit. 276,277. Flows from various Welsh 
counties to Midland counties seem to have been particularly important. 
32. These areas were principally concerned with the following industries: 
Potteries: pottery, bricks and glass, some coal-mining and metal 
manufacture. 
Notts/Derby coalfield: coa1-mint.i~~ artificial silk, hosiery and 
miscellaneous metal manufacture. 
Black Country: engineering, metal and electrical products, mining, 
textiles. 
Coventry: motor vehicles, cycles, aircraft, rayon. 
Birmingham: similar to Black Country. 
Rugby: mechanical and electrical engineering. 
Corby: iron and steel. 
Newark: mechanical engineering. 
See B.Thomas,'The Influx of Labour into the Midlands, 1920-37',op.cit. 
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Between 1929-39 the annual average net inflow rose to 14,500. Contrary to 
the regional trend of the 1920's, both Cornwall and Gloucestershire showed 
an overall loss from net migration, whilst in the 1930's this was again 
true of Cornwall whilst Wiltshire replaced Gloucestershire as the other 
exception. The most significant inflows by greatest size were received in 
most years of the 1930's by the counties of Gloucestershire, Hampshire and 
Oxfordshire. It has been suggested that much of the inflow came from South 
33 Wales. Additionally, there was some movement from the region to the 
South-East, in particular to Middlesex, and the adjacent counties of 
Warwickshire and Oxfordshire displayed some interchange of population. 
MOst evidence on intra-regional movements relates to Oxfordshire and 
so further discussion will be confined to that county. Which areas were 
most important in contributing population to Oxford? Using a calculation 
of mobility uncorrected for distance, Makower et a1 34 were able to rank 
counties in importance. Of other counties in the South West region the 
following order emerged; Wiltshire, followed by, Somersetshire, Hampshire, 
Gloucestershire, Dorsetshire, Devonshire, and finally Cornwall. However, 
with the exception of Wiltshire, counties outside the South-West made more 
significant contributions to Oxford's expanding population; these included 
Buckinghamshire, Suffolk, Cambridgeshire and Herefordshire. If the influence 
of distance is also allowed on mobility, the ranking then assumes the 
33. Friedlander and Roshier, op.cit. 276,277. Flows from many South Wales 
counties to South West counties are deemed 'significant' in this 
analysis. 
34. Makower et aI, op.cit. (1938),102. 
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following precedence; Westmorland, followed by, Bedfordshire, Sussex, 
Pembrokeshire, Wiltshire, Berkshire, Suffolk, Buckinghamshire, 
Cambridgeshire, and Cornwall. 35 There are many more contributors by 
this revised standard before another county from the South-West appears 
in the ranking. This is explained by those factors, other than close 
proximity, that led to in-migration to Oxford. The chief attraction of 
Oxford was the Pressed Steel and Morris Motor works. The automobile 
industry was the attracting force and the analysis of the counties in the 
second list above reveals that it was those counties where metal and mining 
industries were most important that provided the greater part of the 
significant labour inflows. However, when an analysis of numbers alone is 
considered it can be concluded that one-third of all 'foreigners' in 
Oxford in July 1936 were from the prosperous South-West and that, with the 
exception of Wales, there were few migrants from the depressed areas of 
the country. (See Table X.) 
When very short distance movement is examined it is necessary to be 
aware of the analagous nature of commuting in that the latter may be a 
substitute for short distance migration. It was argued that "the non-
existence of alternative labour markets within daily travelling distance 
has been a contributory caase of the dereliction of the Special Areas. 
In Scotland ••• the basic industries ••• are particularly interdependent 
and the sharing of prosperity or depression by the whole area is 
inevitable on this account." 36 In the South-West region, by contrast, 
commuting was a real alternative to migration. Table XI shows the growth 
35. Suffolk, Buckinghamshire and Cambridgeshire are tied. 
36. K.K.Liepmann,'The Daily Ebb and Flow of Labour Between Home and 
Workplace in English Industrial Areas: A Statistical and Sociological 
Study', (unpublished Ph.D. thesis,London School of Economics,l942),p.ll8. 
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of such a network about Oxford. 
London and the South East 
London and the South East gained population by migration at an annual 
average rate of 22,800, 1920-29, whilst over the same period the South East, 
without Gre$ter London, benefited by migration to the extent of about 
24,800 persons per year. Between 1929 and 1939 London and the South East 
had an increased net rate of inflow of about 101,000 per year whilst the 
South East raised its annual total to approximately 49,000 persons. It is 
true of the region as a whole that it was a centre of attraction for 
potential migrants throughout the country and significant contributions were 
made by the depressed areas, especially South Wales and the North-East. 
However, the tendencies within the region were by no means uni-directional 
and London is the most notable exception. As Foley puts it, 
"in the two decades before World War II, the Conurban Ring gained 
1.7 million residents and the Regional Ring gained 5.9 million, 
while the County of London lost nearly half a million ••• the 
Conurban and Regional Rings with a combined population of a fifth 
of England and Wales in 1921 accounted for four-fifths of the 37 
total net population increase in England and Wales, 1921-1939." 
Considerable population changes were taking place and the role of intra-
regional migration in these changes will now be suggested. 
Much of the inter-regional migration to the region was destined for the 
Home Counties. An examination of rates of absorption demonstrates that, 
37. D.L.Fo1ey, Controlling London's Growth: Planning the Great Wen, 1940-
1960 (Berkeley, 1963),pp.9,11. The Conurban Ring is that part of Greater 
London not included in the County of London and the Regional Ring is 
that part of the South-East not in Greater London. 
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"the motor car industry at Dagenham has proved'a particularly strong magnet 
~n~7 the high rates at Dover and Canterbury are explained by the rapid 
development of the Kent coalfield." 38 Although on arrival, lodgings 
within the L.C.C. area may have been the first accomodation of a migrant, 
when more permanent accomodation was sought it was, for similar reasons as 
those motivating Londoners, generally found in the Conurban Ring. It was 
often the case that employment opportunities were to be found in the newly 
expanding industrial sectors and to cut down on the cost (both financial 
and physical) of long daily journeys to work it was to the advantage of the 
employee to make his home as near as possible to his place of employment. 
Further, the housing situation was far more favourable in the outlying 
areas than in London itself. Such new development as did take place in 
central London was of the slum clearance type and was primarily intended to 
re-house an already resident population. Greater activity took place, by 
both private and local authority builders, in suburban areas. Of the total 
estimated householders on L.C.C. Housing Estates in 1937, for example, 
only 24 per cent were to be found in block dwellings as opposed to the 
estates at Becontree, St. Helier and elsewhere. 39 
Not only were inter-regional flows destined for the areas surrounding 
the capital, but a considerable volume of movement took place from the 
county area to Greater London and beyond. The magnitude of this movement 
is suggested by the net migration estimates; 1920-29 London lost about 
38. B.Thomas,'The Movement of Labour into South-East England, 1920-32', 
op.cit.225. The rate of absorption is the number of foreign books 
recorded as a proportion of all books exchanged. 
39. K.K.Liepmann, op.cit. Calculated from data provided in the Summary 
Table of L.C.C. Housing Estates. 
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320,000 persons by migration whilst Greater London lost 18,200. 40 In the 
remainder of the period the County of London lost 492,000 whilst Greater 
London gained 520,000. The county figures reveal that Middlesex gained, 
on balance, some 130,000 in the 1920's and some 540,000 in the 1930's; 
Essex, 134,000 and 166,000; Kent, 42,000 and 196,000; and Surrey, 118,000 
and 320,000. The remaining counties of the South East displayed a much 
smaller magnitude of net in-migration. The major point is that most were 
gaining and were gaining by large amounts, the exceptions being Huntingdon-
shire, Norfolk and Suffolk. These exceptions are attributable to rurall 
urban migration outweighing any inflow arising from either long distance 
migration from the depressed industrial areas of the country or short 
distance migration out from London to a rural residence. 41 
Within the L.C.C. area the Outer Boroughs seem to have benefited at 
the expense of the Inner Boroughs in terms of population movements and 
this observation, coupled with those of Thomas on rates of absorption in the 
region, suggests that there was a succession of short distance movements 
radiating out from cent~81London until the outer counties were reached. 
"The inner boroughs, Stepney, Bethna1 Green, Bermondsey and Poplar, have all 
on balance lost their London-born population to the gain of the boroughs on 
the outskirts, particularly East Ham and West Ham.". 42 The second step 
postulated would then be movement by East Ham natives to other parts of 
Essex or to some other county. Table XII reflects out-migration from the 
centre of London of already moved provincial migrants and the concentration 
40. This loss could be deceptive; see supra. 
41. The suggestions of this paragraph are supported by the studies of 
B.Thomas, and Friedlander and Roshier, op.cit. 
42. A.E.C.Hare and M.I.Michaels, op.cit. p.242. 
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of newer imudgration in the Outer Boroughs. 
Industrial development on the outskirts of London was an important 
factor in initiating these labour movements. It seems that, "at first, 
after the removal of the factory, most of the workers would travel to it 
daily from London. Later they seek either a new job nearer their home, or 
h d 11 • h f " 43 anot er we 1ng nearer to t e new actory •.. It was found that "there 
has been an appreciable outward movement of the London furniture trades to 
parts of Greater London beyond the county boundary •••• When furniture 
factories are thus transferred from East and Central London to the suburbs 
they do not in the main carry their operatives with them ••• their places 
being filled by labour locally recruited. ",~,44 In contrast was the movement 
of Carrera's Ltd. in 1929 from premises in City Road E.C.L to Hampstead Road 
N.W.l. Although this reaalted in an increase in labour recruited in the 
northern and north-western postal districts, even as late as October 1936 
almost a third of its labour force still faced a daily journey to work of 
an hour or more. It is reasonable to assume that a good deal of its labour 
f d • h d·· h f • h· • 45 orce move 1n t e same 1rect1on as t e actory 1n t e 1nterven1ng years. 
Of the factory migration recorded by Smith46 it seems unlikely that the 
example of the furniture trades would be universally repeated and, consequently, 
labour movements would be expected to tie in with factory movements. The 
43. ibid. p.250. 
44. London School of Economics, The New Survey of London Life and Labour,~~ 
(l931),p.213. 
45. Based on Tables 2 and 3 of data on Carreras Ltd. in K.K.Liepmann, op.cit. 
See Tables XIII and XIV. 
46. D.H.Smith, The Industries of Greater London(1933). See Table xv. 
46 
result was the growth of communities, especially in the north-west, at 
Edmonton, Enfield, Southall, Uxbridge, Hayes, Hendon and Greenfield. 
Finally, although the location of employment opportunities may have 
dictated part of both inter-regional and intra-regional labour flows, there 
was also the purely residential motive. As Hare and Michaels put it, 
although "the major part of the stream /of labour from places other than 
London7 flowed into the industrial districts of Middlesex and Essex, Surrey 
and Kent received relatively many more Londoners into their purely 
residential suburbs." 47 
IV 
This examination of labour movements has suggested a number of 
interesting conclusions. Firstly, inter-regional or long distance movement 
was more important in the 1930's than in the 1920's. Secondly, the 
proportional impact of migration varied between different counties and, in 
England and Wales, polarized in the 1930's. Thirdly, the detailed analysis 
of movements by region has illustrated the shortcomings of the available 
information but, nevertheless, has highlighted the importance of inter-
regional and intra-regional movements for each region. Explanations for 
these observations must be sought in the following chapter. 
47. A.E.C.Hare and M.I.Michaels, op.cit. p.253. 
47 
Table VIII 
Migration Balances by Distance, 1920-1929 and 1929-1939 
(1) 
Net inter-
county 
moves 
England and Wales 
1920-29 684,166 
1929-39 1,302,541 
Great Britain 
1920-29 686,958 
1929-39 1,481,327 
(2) 
Net inter-
regional 
moves 
282,994 
653,837 
282,994 
772,292 
(3) 
Short 
Distance 
moves 
Col. (1) 
- Col. (2) 
401,173 
648,703 
403,965 
709,035 
The figures in brackets represent alternative residuals of 
external migration. The divergence results from the fact 
that the county data for Scotland does not exactly sum to 
the results from the popUlation and vital statistics data 
for the country as a whole. The latter were used in 
determining the regional figures. 
Table IX 
(4) 
External 
Balance 
-299,480 
619,768 
-634,582 
(-650,694) 
501,452 
(501,313) 
Ratios of Long to Short Distance Movement, 1920-1929 and 1929-1939 
England and Wales 
1920-29 0.71 
1929-39 1.01 
Great Britain. 
1920-29 0.71 
1929-39 1.09 
Table X 
Origin of Migrants in Oxford C.B., July 1936 
Region Total Miles from Oxford 
less than 50 51-100 over 100 
South West 4058 3480 431 
Wales 1195 689 
London 1178 40 1138 
South East 995 373 428 
Midlands 911 261 606 
North 1157 
Scotland 158 
Source: Survey of the Social Services of Oxford and District 
(1938-40), I, Appendix I. 
Table XI 
147 
506 
194 
44 
1157 
158 
Residential Distribution of Workers Employed by Morris Motors Ltd. 
in their Cowley and Radiator Works, and by Pressed Steel COmpany 
1931 and 1936. 
Area 1931 1936 % Increase 
Oxford (including Cowley, Summerton 
Botley) 4278 6148 
Suburbs of Oxford 473 1627 
Villages within 6-7 miles 392 893 
Villages and Towns, 7-15 miles 594 784 
Larger Towns, 20-40 miles 252 415 
Miscellaneous: mainly small villages 135 323 
Source: Sutveyof the Social Services of Oxford and District 
(1938-40), I, Appendix IV. 
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244 
128 
32 
65 
140 
Table XII 
Percentage of Population of Certain Boroughs Born Outside London in 
England and Wales, 1931. 
Borough % 
Bethna1 Green 6.9 
Stepney 8.6 
Shoreditch 8.8 
Paddington 37.8 
Hampstead 37.9 
Westminster 39.7 
Source: London School of Economics, The New Survey of London Life 
and Labour (1934), VI, p.263. 
Table XIII 
Residential Distribution of Employees of Carreras Ltd. 1935 and 1936. 
Postal District 
N.W. 
N. 
East 
S.E. 
S. W. 
W. 
E. Central 
W. Central 
Outside London 
November 1935 
No. % 
193 7.8p8 •3 
753 30.5 
933 37.7 
141 5.7 
69 2.8 
45 1.8 
83 3.4 
27 1.1 
228 9.2 
-
2472 100.0 
October 1936 
No. % 
223 8.6 p9 •1 
789 30.5 
867 33.5 
155 6.0 
70 2.7 
47 1.8 
89 3.5 
39 1.5 
305 11.9 
2584 100.0 
Table XIV 
Duration of Journey Time By Minutes of Carreras'Emp1oyeesReplying to 
Questionnaire. 
Minutes % No. 
under 30 34.4 287 
31-59 30.8 257 
60 25.3 211 
over 60 9.5 79 
Source: K.K.Liepmann,'The Daily Ebb and Flow of Labour Between Home and 
Workplace in English Industrial Areas: A Statistical and 
Sociological Study', (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London School of 
Economics, 1942), Carreras Ltd., Tables 2, 3. 
Table XV 
Factory Growth in Certain Outlying Districts of London, 1900-1932. 
Areal New Firms Movement from London Others 
Lea Valley 36 55 29 
Western 85 99 51 
Western: Hendon 22 28 15 
Park Royal 37 39 10 
Hayes & Southall 12 9 10 
Chi swick, etc. 2 14 23 16 
1 Lea Valley Area includes Tottenham, Edmonton, Enfield. 
2 Chiswick, Brentford, Heston and Isleworth. 
Source: D.H.Smith, The Industries of Greater London (1933), 
pp. 41, 106-9. 
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DIAGRAM I 
Intra-Regional Migration: Northumberland and Durham to 1931 
\ 
o 
Hale C.:oss Movement 
over 100. 
100-1000 ~ 
over 1000 ---~ 
E - from unspecified areas 
of the counties . 
from outside the 
area 
o 
Sunderland 
Source: Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of the North E8~t Coast Area 
(by Armstrong College) (1932), pp. 468-488,502 . 
APPENDIX 1 
Methodology of Net Migration Estimation 
I The Residual Technique 
Net migration for a period is defined as the discrepancy between the 
theoretical change in population {from the rate of natural increase} 
1 
and actual change. In symbols -
where, 
N}L = {P -P} - N ~~~l t+l t 1 
= net migration during the period 1, 
= total population of the area under study in 
time t+l, 
= total population in time t, and, 
= natural increase of population Pt during the period 1. 
Therefore, to obtain true net migration, the Pt +l , Pt and Nl components 
all have to be perfectly measured. 
II Sources of Bias 
1. Inappropriate Natural Increase Data 
The first problems concern Nl • As Isard points out, 
"normally, vital statistics for any given period of 
time do not differentiate between the original and 
migrant populations of an area, between the births 
and deaths of the original population and the 
births and deaths of the migrant population. Hence, 
without such a distinction, the investigator is often 
forced to use a crude form of the residual technique 
to obtain a migration estimate." 2 
1. W.Isard, Methods of Regional Analysis (Cambridge,Massachusetts, 
1960},p.54. 
2. ibid. pp.54,55. 
This crude variation was necessary for the data for Great Britain. 
From the increase in total population over a period it was necessary 
to subtract natural increase attributable to the total and the migrant 
populations. As Isard concludes, "the resulting figure on net 
migration over the period (either in or out) tends to be an under-
estimate". The more significant migration actually is, the greater 
this error becomes as in this case natural increase of the total 
population of an area is not likely to approximate that for the original 
population alone. The age-selective nature of migration tends to 
compound this bias. As it is the younger age groups that find it possible 
and/or desirable to move so it is that natural increase rates for this 
age group tend to exceed that for the population as a whole. Therefore, 
for example, net migration into the Greater London area tends to be 
underestimated for these reasons. 
2. Inaccurate Population Estimates 
Although the registration of births and deaths in Great Britain in this 
period was accurate (although not broken down to be attributable to a 
base population rather than an area) the population estimates Pt +l and 
Pt were subject to large margins of error. 
The basis of all population estimates in England and Wales was 
the census population. Intercensal estimates of population were 
arrived at by estimating net migration and natural increase over the 
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intercensal period and adding this to the census population. 3 This 
procedure continued over the decade until the next census provided a 
check on the accuracy of this procedure. A new basis might then be 
taken depending on this latter judgement. There is "some circularity 
in using the Registrar-General's population estimates to derive net 
migration since the population estimates are themselves derived, in 
part, from a judgement about the volume of movement to and from each 
area. Thus the residual technique is merely a re-working of the 
original estimation procedure - backwards.,,4 
This 'judgement' ·about the volume of migration was on a basis 
that varied between England and Wales and Scotland and also changed 
in different periods. The level of accuracy of population estimates 
3. This point was made clear in 1928 in reply to criticisms from local 
authorities. "Local Authorities", it was noted, "have occasionally 
questioned the difference between one annual estimate and that for 
preceeding year as insufficiently justified by population movements 
in the interval, on the assumption that each estimate is strictly 
based upon the preceeding estimate and takes account of subsequent 
changes only. This is not, however, the official practice. If this 
course had been adopted, any imperfection in any annual estimate 
would be confirmed, and the consequent error would be cumulative 
over a succession of years. The practice of the Department, on the 
contrary, has been not to exclude any evidence of population movement 
even though received later than the publication of the estimate for 
the period in which it occured. Thus each annual process of 
estimation involves, in a sense, a fresh review of the whole period 
which has elapsed since the previous census, advantage being taken 
of any new material which has come to light to promote the progressive 
correction and perfection of the figures." Therefore, the problem 
arises that not too much reliance may be put on the data for 
individual years, nor on aggregations of data that do not use census 
years as their terminal dates. See The Registrar-General's Statistical 
Review of England and Wales for the year 1928, Text,p.l47. 
4. R.L.Welch, Migration in Britain: Data Sources and Estimation 
Techniques(Birmingham,197l),p.S9. 
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similarly varied. To rework the Registrar-General's estimation 
procedure to obtain net migration estimates it is necessary to take 
account of these variations in the population estimates. 
a) Population estimates for England and Wales 
In England and Wales, popUlation projections were arrived at as 
detailed in the Annual Report of the Registrar-General for 1920 and 
the Statistical Reviews for the years 1921-39. The 1920 mid-year 
population was based on a projection from the 1911 Census with some 
adjustments in the light of the Preliminary Returns from the 1921 
Census. The 1921 mid-year populations were taken from these 
Preliminary Returns; the estimate from the 1911 Census of the 1921 
popUlation being found to be in excess of the Census population by 
0.1 per cent. Some adjustment was made to these figures in view of 
the fact that the census date was the 19th June and the distribution 
of the enumerated population between localities was influenced by 
those counted whilst on holiday. An allowance for migration became 
necessary for an estimate of the 1922 population. Two conditions 
were satisfied: 
n(l) that the several individual estimates shall aggregate to 
the far more reliably calculated figure of the total national 
population, and 
(2) that the method shall be capable of impartial application 
throughout the whole of the country restricting in its scope therefore 
to evidences of movement which are available for all areas. tiS 
5. The Registrar-General's Statistical Review of England and Wales 
for the year 1922, Text, p.113. 
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Principally, changes in registers of local Government electors were 
employed. This source was open to a number of defects as reported 
by the Registrar-Genera1. 6 These defects are bound to be inherent 
in any reworking of the Registrar-Genera1's estimates. In 1923 this 
method was revised slightly and then continued without substantial 
modification until 1928. 7 
The 1928 estimates were to "form a principal factor in the 
basis of the distribution of large exchequer monies under the local 
Government Act, 1929", and were thus subject to the "utmost care in 
their preparation.,,8 Firstly, the Parliamentary Electoral Registers 
were used to calculate migration DOvements from the 1921 Census to 
mid-1928. Secondly, "all local authorities were ••• circularized 
6. "It is not claimed that the results are other than experimental 
in character, for while it is reasonable to suppose that any 
marked migration, either inwards or outwards, would duly make its 
impression upon the electoral figures, it does not follow that 
changes in the register are all attributable to migration ••• 
the mere attainment of franchise age of the existing population, 
so far as this is not counter-balanced by the deaths of persons 
already on the register, affects the electorate and falls with 
varying weight in areas of different age constitution .... again, 
persons admitted to the·franchise are restricted ••• numbering 
only about ~ per cent-I of the total population and the 
assumption has to be made that movements within the franchise 
qualifications correspond to similar movements in the whole 
population. Finally, electoral registration can only take place 
after six months residence in an area, and such migration change 
as is reflected is that of a period at least six months prior to 
the period to which the records relate." Ibid. The exception to 
this procedure was London whose population was based on estimates 
compiled for the purposes of the Equalization of Rates Act, 1894. 
This continued to be true until 1928. 
7. An allowance was included to take account of the differing 
expected rates of growth of electorates between populations of 
differing age constitutions. From 1927 onwards the qualifying 
period for inclusion in the Electoral Register was reduced to 
three months from six. 
8. The Registrar-General's Statistical Review of Bngland and Wales 
for the year 1928, Text, p.147. 
57 
with a view to securing any statistical data bearing on the 
question, which had been incidentally compiled in the course of 
local administration".9 
In 1929 another technique was necessitated. 
"In respect of movements between 1928 and 1929 ••• the 
value of the electoral material as an indicator of 
migration has been destroyed by the alteration in 
electoral qualifications and the consequent addition 
of large numbers of individuals enfranchised for the 
first time under the Representation of the People 
(Equal Franchise) Act of 1928. The newly enfranchised 
are mainly women ••• continuity ••• has been broken 
and the differences between the 1928 and 1929 registers 
rendered useless as indexes of population movement." 10 
Therefore, 
(1) a projection from the 1928 estimate on the assumption 
that the trend in movement 1921-8 was maintained was made, and 
(2) figures based on the new electoral returns and 
supplemented for juvenile population with reference to the 1921 
age distribution of the population were compared and where the 
differences were not negligible, a compromise was reached after the 
consideration of housing and other incidental information. The 
1930 estimates were made by "simple arithmetical interpolation 
between the published 1929 estimates and the provisional 1931 
figures".ll These latter were the preliminary census populations 
adjusted to a residential basis by the subtraction of visitors and 
their redistribution partly to areas with boarding schools with 
9. ibid. 
10. The Registrar-Genera1's Statistical Review of England and Wales 
for the year 1929, Text, p.97. 
11. The Registrar-General's Statistical Review of England aDd Wales 
for the year 1930, Text, p.102. The projection of the mId-year 
national est~te to the month of the Census compared well. 
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absent boarders and partly in accordance with the distribution of 
population between areas. Similarly, the 1931 estimates were 
adjusted to a mid-year date from the basis of the provisional census 
estimates. 
In 1932 the same basic method as used in most of the previous 
intercensa1 period was reinstated. Additional tests and special 
measures were instituted in order that the errors, inherently 
inseperab1e from computed estimates, should fall within the lowest 
attainable limits. In particular, statistics on new dwellings were 
found to give the most reasonable checks on migration estimates 
incorporated in the population estimates and derived from the 
register of electors. This method continued in operation until the 
National Register was used to modify the popUlation estimates in 
1939. 12 
b) Population Estimates for Scotland 
In Scotland the basis of popUlation estimates was as detailed be1ow. 13 
For the period 1921-8, to the previous years popUlation was added a 
natural increase component and an allowance for migration. The latter 
was an arithmetic progression of previous intercensa1 periods' 
migration for each county. This method was not very accurate for the 
greater part of the 1920's given the change in migration trends after 
12. The Registrar-Genera1's Statistical Review of England and Wales 
for the years 1938 and 1939, Text, p.l60. 
13. I should like to thank James Travers of the Registrar-General 
for Scotland's office for his assistance in providing information 
on the Scottish methodology. 
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World War I, and is subject to similar criticisms as the English 
and Welsh data. From 1929 and the Local Government (Scotland) Act 
the distribution of central government monies depended upon 
population estimates and estimation procedures were revised 
accordingly. The new estimates used returns for local areas showing 
the number of inhabited houses and the number of local government 
electors. Given this information and the natural increase data for 
the period 1921-9, an estimate for 1929 was arrived at. Similar 
methods were then used through the remainder of the period. In 
contrast to England and Wales, in Scotland the basis of each year's 
estimate was not the previous census but the previous year's 
population. However, these estimates may contain revisions and 
thus artificially inflate or deflate any residual migration estimate 
that might be derived. Hence, the same problems exist which affect 
the English and Welsh residuals. 14 
III Data Problems in the Application of the Residual Technique 
1. Population Definitions 
Problems arise in reworking the popUlation and natural increase data 
to obtain net migration. Firstly, there is the question of the 
definition of the popUlation. The Registrar-General's popUlation 
estimates refer to the home population; which is population, of all 
14. The 1921 Census of Scotland also had the disadvantage, from the 
point of view of estimating the resident population. of having been 
conducted in mid-summer. In particular, the County of Bute's 
popUlation was greatly inflated and, as a result, the inclusion of 
the years 1920-21 in the time series results in Bute apparently 
gaining population at a prodigous rate over the decade 1920-29. The 
shortcomings of the arithmetic mean as a measure of central tendency 
are thus illustrated. Further, Bute's population was an estimated 
constant 1922-28 and thus no weight whatsoever can be put on the 
net migration estimates for this county. 
6Q 
types, actually in Britain, distributed by area according to residence. 
However, in some cases before 1932, in England and Wales, death rates 
refer to the civilian population only. The latter is defined as the 
total population minus members of H.M.Forces at home or overseas. A 
rough method of adjustment was necessitated to make these data 
compatible which took the following form. 
If, BR. = birth rate per 1000 of home population in area j, 
J 
DR. = death rate per 1000 of civilian population in area j, 
J 
lIP • 
J 
= home population in j'th area, 
CP. = 
J 
civilian population in area j, and, 
N. = estimated natural increase per 1000 of home population in 
J 
area j, then, 
" N. = 
( DR. 'UP.) 
BR. - J J 
J J -----
CP. 
J 
2. Time Periods Involved 
Secondly, vital statistics in both Scotland and England and Wales 
referred to calendar years, whereas the population estimates were for 
mid-year periods. It was necessary to adjust the vital statistics to 
refer to the mid-year to mid-year periods and the assumption was made 
that the birth and death rates were constant throughout the year and 
thus proportional in their impact on population over time. The rates 
per 1000 were halved so as to apply to the relevant six monthly periods 
and then applied to the population estimate of the beginning of the 
mid-year period. 
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3. Boundary Changes 
The last of the major problems involves boundary changes. In 
England and Wales the following procedure was invoked by the Registrar-
General until 1933. In the year that a boundary change took place, the 
recorded population estimate referred to the area as defined on the 
30th June of that year. Consequently, the migration residual is inflated 
or deflated, depending on the direction of the boundary change in the 
mid-year period involving the occurence of the revision. The tables of 
Appendix 2 note where a change affected county boundaries and in the 
earlier years note the 1921 Census population involved and in later years 
note the actual population involved. From 1934 onwards the "statistics 
of areas whose boundaries have been altered are composite figures 
combining the 'before change' and 'after change' position for the 
respective periods involved ••• The population shewn /.lsl a constructed 
figure appropriate for use with the partial or mixed records of births 
15 
and deaths for the current year." Thus the boundary change is 
gradually incorporated into the population and vital statistics 
estimates and may affect the migration residual, as compared with 
previous years, in more than one mid-year to mid-year period. Again, 
the tables of Appendix 2 note where a change affecting county areas 
took place and indicates the actual population involved in the change. 
In Scotland, the Annual Reports contain estimates of the population 
involved in boundary changes and where these affect county aggregates 
the tables of Appendix 2 again include details. The impact of these 
15. The Registrar-General's Statistical Review of England and Wales 
for the year 1934, Tables, Part I, Medical, p.70A. 
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revisions on the migration residuals is unclear as it is not known how 
the vital statistics estimates were adjusted in such circumstances, if 
at all. Nevertheless, it is at least clear that the mid-year period 
involving the boundary change will include the influence of the change 
in the migration residual for that period. 
IV Interpreting the Results: Some Cautionary Remarks 
It may be agreed, as Isard said, that the "methods for estimating 
migration are not nearly as good as we might like them to be. 
Nevertheless, these methods are useful and yield estimates that are 
worth the effort involved provided the results are used with discretion.,,16 
Some general observations relating to the interpretation of the 
results need to be made in conclusion. Firstly, these estimates do not 
reveal the direction of movement, although they may suggest a direction. 
Surrogate data may be used to aid interpretation in this sphere. 
Secondly, movements will be missed if there is return migration within 
the time period considered and thus the total net movement of population 
will be understated. It will also be understated as intra-county move-
ments are excluded. Thirdly, more movements will be included as inter-
county movements, the smaller the counties involved. For example, a 
movement from Manchester to Liverpool, a distance of some 35 miles will 
not be included. However, a movement from Peterborough to Leicester, 
a similar distance, will. Fourthly, the shape of the geographical area 
will have some relevance. More migrations are likely to be included in 
16. Isard, op.cit. p.52. 
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inter-county movements if a county has an elongated geographical shape. 
Finally, the distribution of the population within a county is also 
important. Large concentrations of population on a county boundary 
are also likely to lead to short distance movements, especially 
movements to suburbia, being included as inter-county moves. The 
proximity of Liverpool to the Cheshire border and of London to the 
surrounding Home Counties are cases in point. 
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APPENDIX 2 
Net Migration Estimates for the Counties and Ministry of Labour Regions* 
of Britain, 1920-1939 
Population refers to mid-year points. 
Net Migration refers to mid-year to mid-year periods. 
Boundary Changes are indicated at the foot of each area's data. For the 
interpretation of these figures see Appendix 1. 
* Registrar-General region aggregates can also be derived from the county 
data. 
The Counties of England 
BEDFORD SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 205,387 -307 -0.15 
1921 207,040 1,006 0.49 
1922 209,387 567 0.27 
1923 211 ,250 303 0.14 
1924 212,700 -971 -0.46 
1925 212,580 912 0.43 
1926 214,330 -186 -0.09 
1927 214,830 -1,696 -0.79 
1928 213,770 1,075 0.50 
Totals, 1920-9 703 0.34 
Means, 1920-9 78 0.04 
1929 215,380 2,391 1.11 
1930 218,300 1,766 0.81 
1931 220,680 2,153 0.98 
1932 223,330 1,964 0.88 
1933 225,730 3,146 1.39 
1934 229,350 4,650 2.03 
1935 234,700 12,148 5.18 
1936 247,670 5,260 2.12 
1937 253,860 6,951 2.74 
1938 261,980 2,265 0.86 
1939 265,540 
Totals, 1929-39, 42,694 19.82 
Means, 1929-39 4,269 1.81 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
BERKSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 289,990 -595 -0.21 
1921 292,473 -177 -0.06 
1922 294,313 -249 -0.08 
1923 295,780 -162 -0.05 
1924 297,240 -777 -0.26 
1925 297,870 600 0.20 
1926 299,830 2,778 0.93 
1927 303,660 8,872 2.92 
1928 313,500 -628 -0.20 
Totals, 1920-9 9,661 3.33 
Means, 1920-9 1,073 0.35 
1929 313,580 -2,178 -0.69 
1930 312,080 -1,696 -0.54 
1931 311,430 3,701 1.19 
1932 315,910 1,359 0.43 
1933 317,800 2,037 0.64 
1934 320,350 1,675 0.52 
1935 322,800 892 0.28 
1936 324,520 1,431 0.44 
1937 326,660 705 0.22 
1938 328,250 1,495 0.46 
1939 330,800 
Totals, 1929-39 9,420 3.00 
Means, 1929-39 
Boundary Change. 
942 0.29 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area (.) 
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BUCKINGHAMSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net: Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 232,728 -510 -0.22 
1921 234,547 453 0.19 
1922 236,651 320 0.14 
1923 238,400 3,099 1.30 
1924 242,900 671 0.28 
1925 244,800 2,595 1.06 
1926 248,600 2,376 0.96 
1927 252,000 5,015 1.99 
1928 257,910 2,476 0.96 
Totals, 1920-9 16,497 7.09 
Means, 1920-9 1,833 0.74 
1929 261,170 4,970 1.90 
1930 267,000 3,703 1.39 
1931 271,760 4,690 1.73 
1932 277 ,300 1,972 0.71 
1933 279,980 2,372 0.85 
1934 283,150 4,015 1.42 
1935 288,100 5,849 2.03 
1936 294,900 8,182 2.77 
1937 304,100 4,252 1.40 
1938 309,600 3,066 0.99 
1939 314,200 
Totals, 1929-39 43,070 16.49 
Means, 1929-39 4,307 1.52 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1933 
Population involved -40 
Other area(s) Oxfordshire 
CAMBRIDGESHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 128,295 -255 -0.20 
1921 129,094 -136 -0.11 
1922 129,591 -384 -0.30 
1923 129,770 -210 -0.16 
1924 130,070 -659 -0.51 
1925 129,810 -1,219 -0.94 
1926 129,020 200 0.15 
1927 129,530 3,732 2.88 
1928 133,510 -107 -0.08 
Totals, 1920-9 961 0.75 
Means, 1920-9 107 0.08 
1929 133,540 3,516 2.63 
1930 137,200 2,546 1.86 
1931 139,990 2,071 1.48 
1932 142,200 1,580 1.11 
1933 143,780 1,434 1.00 
1934 145,200 1,091 0.75 
1935 146,400 1,317 0.90 
1936 147,790 581 0.39 
1937 148,460 1,004 0.68 
1938 149,650 1,545 " 1.03 
1939 151,350 
Totals, 1929-39 16,686 12.50 
Means, 1929-39 1,669 1.18 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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CHESHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 1920-9 
Means, 1920-9 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1,025,045 
1,033,572 
1,039,296 
1,044,810 
1,055,920 
1,060,99G 
1,072,660 
1,082,960 
1,092,010 
1,096,410 
1,096,500 
1,092,310 
1,093,660 
1,098,660 
1,107,650 
1,119,000 
1,129,717 
1,139,820 
1,147,180 
1,156,670 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means, 1929-39 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
-1,947 
-2,108 
-1,073 
5,012 
-67 
6,481 
5,587 
5,000 
1,195 
18,079 
2,009 
-3,051 
-7,733 
-1,327 
3,345 
7,088 
8,718 
8,464 
8,065 
4,832 
6,583 
34,984 
3,498 
1931;1933;1936 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.19 
-0.20 
-0.10 
0.48 
-0.01 
0.61 
0.52 
0.46 
0.11 
1. 76 
0.19 
-0.28 
-0.71 
-0.12 
0.31 
0.65 
0.79 
0.76 
0.71 
0.42 
0.57 
3.19 
0.31 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
-1,810;-180;173 
Lancashire;Lancashire;Derbyshire 
CORNWALL 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 313,549 -584 -0.19 
1921 315,325 -258 -0.08 
1922 316,617 -304 -0.10 
1923 317,500 -508 -0.16 
1924 318,100 -1,905 -0.60 
1925 317,100 -1,927 -0.61 
1926 315,900 -698 -0.22 
1927 315,800 1,625 0.51 
1928 317,960 -454 -0.14 
Totals, 1920-9 -5,013 -1.60 
Means, 1920-9 -557 -0.18 
1929 317,710 -3,166 -1.00 
1930 314,700 -2,483 -0.79 
1931 312,450 1,452 0.46 
1932 313,900 -12 -0.00 
1933 313,700 423 0.13 
1934 313,950 -172 -0.05 
1935 313,700 -1,290 -0.41 
1936 312,300 -1,388 -0.44 
1937 310,600 -327 -0.11 
1938 309,900 576 0.19 
1939 310,100 
Totals, 1929-39 -6,387 -2.01 
Means, 1929-39 -639 -0.20 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
population involved 
Other area(s) 
CUMBERLAND 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 267,021 -474 -0.18 
1921 269,891 -535 -0.20 
1922 271,989 -453 -0.17 
1923 273,730 265 0.10 
1924 276,100 -2,427 -0.88 
1925 275,390 -3,397 -1.23 
1926 273,720 -2,372 -0.87 
1927 272,850 -7,162 -2~62 
1928 266,980 -3,166 -1.19 
Totals, 1920-9 -19,720 -7.39 
Means, 1920-9 -2,191 -0.80 
1929 265,100 -2,512 -0.95 
1930 263,790 -2,210 -0.84 
1931 262,780 -245 -0.09 
1932 263,470 -1,528 -0.58 
1933 262,570 -2,227 -0.85 
1934 260,900 -1,833 -0.70 
1935 259,800 -1,897 -0.73 
1936 258,620 -3,603 -1.39 
1937 255,590 -1,066 -0.42 
1938 255,120 -554 -0.22 
1939 255,280 
Totals, 1929-39 -17,676 -6.67 
Means, 1929-39 -1,768 -0.68 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
DERBYSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 712,074 -1,585 -0.22 
1921 720,432 -528 -0.07 
1922 728,380 -3,056 -0.42 
1923 732,800 1,721 0.23 
1924 741,500 -1,640 -0.22 
1925 746,400 -27 -0.00\ 
1926 752,600 -345 -0.05 
1927 757,600 551 0.07 
1928 763,200 -2,838 -0.37 
Totals, 1920-9 -7,746 -1.09 
Means, 1920-9 -861 -0.12 
1929 765,000 -6,454 -0.84 
1930 762,900 -5,406 -<>.71 
1931 762,100 -4,398 -0.58 
1932 761,600 -535 -0.07 
1933 764,300 -9,791 -1.28 
1934 757,641 -1,044 -0.14 
1935 759,800 141 0.02 
1936 762,583 -728 -0.10 
1937 764,400 -793 -0.10 
1938 766,800 -1,203 -0.16 
1939 768,900 
Totals, 1929-39 -30,211 -3.95 
Means, 1929-39 -3,021 -0.40 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934; 1936 
Population involved 
-2,436;-173 
Other area(s) Yorkshite(West Riding),Staffgrd'hir,;Chelhire 
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DEVONSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 684,875 -1,442 -0.21 
1921 688,843 -762 -0.11 
1922 691,332 1,770 0.26 
1923 695,760 1,024 0.15 
1924 699,260 -2,997 -0.43 
1925 698,210 2,288 0.33 
1926 702,390 1,603 0.23 
1927 705,520 6,650 0.94 
1928 713,480 7,399 1.04 
Totals, 1920-9 15,534 2.27 
Means, 1920-9 1,726 0.24 
1929 721,560 -2,264 -0.31 
1930 719,870 706 0.10 
1931 721,140 6,473 0.90 
1932 727,740 965 0.13 
1933 728,900 -1,875 -0.26 
1934 727,350 2,775 0.38 
1935 730 ,500 4,190 0.57 
1936 734,850 4,909 0.67 
1937 739,500 2,211 0.30 
1938 741,660 4,872 0.66 
1939 746,790 
Totals, 1929-39 22,961 3.18 
Means, 1929-39 2,296 0.31 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
OORSETSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 220,345 -369 -0.17 
1921 221,924 -442 -0.20 
1922 222,886 558 0.25 
1923 224,600 2,735 1.22 
1924 228,400 -514 -0.22 
1925 228,900 2,555 1.12 
1926 232,500 1,938 0.83 
1927 235,300 3,573 1.52 
1928 239,660 -53 -0.02 
Totals, 1920-9 9,981 4.53 
Means, 1920-9 1,109 0.48 
1929 240,340 4,434 1.84 
1930 245,340 -6,402 -2.61 
1931 239,400 -909 -0.38 
1932 238,900 2,558 1.07 
1933 241,900 1,052 0.44 
1934 243,400 2,337 0.96 
1935 246,200 1,919 0.78 
1936 248,550 954 0.38 
1937 249,840 2,050 0.82 
1938 252,240 1,490 0.59 
1939 254,170 
Totals, 1929-39 9,484 3.9S 
Means, 1929-39 948 ·0.39 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1931 
population involved -2,130 
Other area(s) Southampton (Hampsbire) 
.. 
..lJ.. 
DURHAM 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 1,476,146 -4,040 -0.27 
1921 1,497,574 -1,253 -0.08 
1922 1,517,617 -6,571 -0.43 
1923 1,530,620 -389 -0.03 
1924 1,549,310 -11,580 -0.75 
1925 1,555,120 -17,959 -1.15 
1926 1,553,860 -15,249 -0.98 
1927 1,552,930 -52,308 -3.37 
1928 1,513,660 -17,144 -1.13 
Totals, 1920-9 -126,492 -8.57 
Means, 1920-9 -14,055 -0.91 
1929 1,508,260 -18,120 -1.20 
1930 1,501,960 -16,745 -1.11 
1931 1,497,380 -15,621 -1.04 
1932 1,492,270 -14,165 -0.95 
1933 1,487,630 -13,141 -0.88 
1934 1,483,000 -17,991 -1.21 
1935 1,473,400 -22,779 -1.55 
1936 1,458,520 -22,221 -1.52 
1937 1,443,420 -10,449 -0.72 
1938 1,440,090 -9,278 -0.64 
1939 1,437,860 
Totals, 1929-39 -160,510 -10.64 
Means, 1929-39 -16,051 -1,08 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
ELY 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 73,034 -220 -0.30 
1921 73,642 313 0.43 
1922 74,653 -31 -0.04 
1923 75,250 251 0.33 
1924 76,070 -108 -0.14 
1925 76,480 23 0.03 
1926 77,070 38 0.05 
1927 77,660 -405 -0.52 
1928 77,780 -122 -0.16 
Totals, 1920-9 -261 -0.36 
Means, 1920-9 -29 -0.04 
1929 78,180 -919 -1.17 
1930 77,790 -787 -1.01 
1931 77,580 528 0.68 
1932 78,590 -6 -0.01 
1933 78,950 2,420 3.07 
1934 81,686 442 0.54 
1935 82,500 -1,172 -1.42 
1936 81,700 -433 -0.53 
1937 ~1,590 -449 -0.55 
1938 81,480 -190 -0.23 
1939 81,620 
Totals, 1929-39 -565 -0.72 
Means, 1929-39 -57 -O~O6 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
Population involved 896 
Other area(s) Lincolnshire (Holland) ,Norfolk 
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ESSEX 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 1,440,260 -2,837 -0.20 
1921 1,455,605 -2,718 -0.19 
1922 1,467,184 5,628 0.38 
1923 1,486,390 15,322 1.03 
1924 1,514,450 2,051 0.14 
1925 1,527,760 25,203 1.65 
1926 1,564,400 24,868 1.59 
1927 1,599,500 44,359 2.77 
1928 1,653,430 22,814 1.38 
Totals, 1920-9 134,691 9.35 
Means, 1920-9 14,966 0.95 
1929 1,685,370 29,895 1.77 
1930 1,724,600 23,916 1.39 
1931 1,758,470 25,900 1.47 
1932 1,793,200 23,562 1.31 
1933 1,824,300 11,589 0.64 
1934 1,842,550 8,907 0.48 
1935 1,858,900 12,998 0.70 
1936 1,879,760 18,397 0.98 
1937 1,905,700 3,903 0.20 
1938 1,917,600 7,806 0.41 
1939 1,933,300 
Totals, 1929-39 166,873 9.90 
Means, 1929-39 16,687 0.94 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
GLOUCESTERSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 755,346 -1,540 -0.20 
1921 762,272 -2,178 -0.29 
1922 766,057 -843 -0.11 
1923 770,270 -1,097 -0.14 
1924 773,890 -4,455 -0.58 
1925 773,060 -6,553 -0.85 
1926 770,350 1,422 0.18 
1927 775,060 4,911 0.63 
1928 782,510 -2,137 -0.27 
i t 
Totals, 1920-9 -12,471 -1.65 
Means, 1920-9 -1,386 -0.18 
1929 782,630 2,216 0.28 
1930 787,050 556 0.07 
1931 789,940 3,303 0.42 
1932 795,090 3,685 0.46 
1933 800,100 -117 -0.01 
1934 801,250 -1 -0.00 
1935 803,125 1,778 0.22 
1936 806,610 2,447 0.30 
1937 810,670 2,835 0.35 
1938 815,620 8,488 1.04 
1939 826,590 
Totals, 1929-39 25,188 3.22 
Means, 1929-39 2,519 0.31 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1930;1931;1933;1935 
Population involved 270;-330;1,470;-125 • 
Other area(s) Somerset,Wi1ts.jWarwickjSomersetjWarw1 ck 
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HEREFORDSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 110,936 -236 -0.21 
1921 111,829 -449 -0.40 
1922 112,192 338 0.30 
1923 113,260 143 0.13 
1924 114,140 -577 -0.51 
1925 114,180 210 0.18 
1926 114,990 -995 -0.86 
1927 114,450 -2,811 -2.46 
1928 112,000 -1,633 -1.46 
Totals, 1920-9 -6,010 -5.42 
Means, 1920-9 -668 -0.59 
1929 110,670 -203 -0.18 
1930 110,700 -118 -0.11 
1931 110,770 347 0.31 
1932 111,200 42 0.04 
1933 111,320 -676 -0.61 
1934 110,800 -383 -0.35 
1935 110 ,600 -953 -0.86 
1936 109,780 -734 -0.67 
1937 109,150 -659 -0.60 
1938 108,660 19 0.02 
1939 108,930 
Totals, 1929-39 -3,318 -3.00 
Means, 1929-39 -332 -0.30 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
HERTFORD SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 329,350 -682 -0.21 
1921 332,220 -27 -0.01 
1922 334,706 747 0.22 
1923 337,800 4,218 1.25 
1924 344,200 556 0.16 
1925 346,600 6,861 1.98 
1926 355,300 7,164 2.02 
1927 364,100 12,533 3.44 
1928 378,200 4,500 1.19 
Totals, 1920-9 35,869 10.89 
Means, 1920-9 3,985 1.12 
1929 384,100 8,120 2.11 
1930 393,700 6,367 1.62 
1931 401,900 10,032 2.50 
1932 413,400 6,600 1.60 
1933 421,200 6,843 1.62 
1934 429,350 10,738 2.50 
1935 441,700 16,571 3.75 
1936 460,150 12,500 2.72 
1937 474,700 8,471 1.78 
1938 485,500 11,097 2.29 
1939 499,200 
Totals, 1929-39 97,340 25.34 
Means. 1929-39 9,734 2.25 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
population involved 
Other area(s) 
74 
HUNTINGDON SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 54,298 -140 -0.26 
1921 54,670 
-44 -0.08 
1922 55,031 5 0.01 
1923 55,430 -71 -0.13 
1924 55,700 -434 -0.78 
1925 55,550 -208 -0.37 
1926 55,640 9 0.02 
1927 55,880 236 0.42 
1928 56,320 227 0.40 
Totals, 1920-9 -421 -0.78 
Means, 1920-9 -47 -0.09 
1929 56,730 -574 -1.01 
1930 56,360 -451 -0.80 
1931 56,140 -123 -0.22 
1932 56,180 -73 -0.13 
1933 56,250 -502 -0.89 
1934 55,900 -373 -0.67 
1935 55,700 -331 -0.59 
1936 55,500 808 1.46 
1937 56,380 56 0.10 
1938 56,560 517 0.91 
1939 57,210 
Totals, 1929-39 -1,047 -1.85 
Means, 1929-39 
-
105 -0.18 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
KENT 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 1,091,513 -1,918 -0.18 
1921 1,101,208 -1,937 -0.18 
1922 1,107,645 -281 -0.03 
1923 1,115,280 9,506 0.85 
1924 1,131,880 -2,740 -0.24 
1925 1,134,800 4,717 0.42 
1926 1,145,050 5,126 0.45 
1927 1,154,790 16,402 1.42 
1928 1,175,100 13,302 1.13 
Totals, 1920-9 42,177 3.86 
Means, 1920-9 4,686 0.41 
1929 1,191,880 4,734 0.40 
1930 1,200,400 4,595 0.38 
1931 1,209,260 30,979 2.56 
1932 1,243,870 26,859 2.16 
1933 1,273,970 24,089 1.89 
1934 1,301,450 22,937 1.76 
1935 1,328,700 28,389 2.14 
1936 1,361,700 25,826 1.90 
1937 1,392,130 14,185 1.02 
1938 1,411,550 14,021 0.99 
1939 1,431,100 
Totals, 1929-39 196,614 16.50 
Means, 1929-39 19,661 1.52 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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LANCASHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of EOEulation 
1920 4,926,936 -10,017 -0.20 
1921 4,969,147 -11,329 -0.23 
1922 4,998,235 -9,483 -0.19 
1923 5,021,610 93:2 0.02 
1924 5,052,800 -16,460 -0.33 
1925 5,061,730 -19,862 -0.39 
1926 5,065,960 10,981 0.22 
1927 5,097,750 -8,069 -0.16 
1928 5,108,150 -32,455 -0.64 
Totals, 1920-9 -95,762 -1.94 
Means! 1920-9 
-1°1 640 -0.21 
1929 5,089,580 -27,246 -0.54 
1930 5,075,290 -17,118 -0.34 
1931 5,072,870 -41,221 -0.81 
1932 5,043,640 -11,587 
-0.23 
1933 5,040,640 -7,669 -0.15 
1934 5,041,150 -11,989 -0.24 
1935 5,036,700 -10,644 -0.21 
1936 5,031,630 -25,579 -0.51 
1937 5,013,180 -7,573 -0.15 
1938 5,014,520 -10,028 -0.20 
1939 5,013,830 
Totals, 1929-39 -170,655 -3.35 
Means! 1929-39 -17.066 -0.34 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1931;1933 
Population involved 1,810;180 
Other area(s) Cheshire i Cheshire 
LE ICE STERSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of EOEulation 
1920 496,011 -1,069 -0.22 
1921 500,621 -549 -0.11 
1922 504,613 -513 -0.10 
1923 508,300 3,015 0.59 
1924 515,100 -1,291 -0.25 
1925 516,900 1,768 0.34 
1926 521,600 4,510 0.86 
1927 528,900 6,243 1.18 
1928 538,000 206 0.04 
Totals, 1920-9 12,319 2.48 
Means. 1920-9 1.369 0.26 
1929 540,690 -69 -0.01 
1930 543,000 -161 -0.03 
1931 545,510 -43 -0.01 
1932 547,600 1,487 0.27 
1933 550,600 1,002 0.18 
1934 553,250 1,117 0.20 
1935 556,300 1,383 0.25 
1936 559,400 2,590 0.46 
1937 563,600 402 0.07 
1938 565,900 963 0.17 
1939 569,000 
Totals, 1929-39 8,671 1.60 
Means. 1929-39 867 0.16 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1935 
Population involved -70 
Other area~8l Warwickshire 
-
..lA..... 
LINCOLNSHIRE (HOLLAND) 
Year Population 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 1920-9 
Means, 1920-9 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means, 1929-39 
85,1'8 
85,461 
86,051 
86,660 
87,400 
87,680 
87,460 
88,060 
88,860 
89,400 
90,950 
92,000 
93,110 
93,590 
93,725 
94,155 
94,680 
95,490 
95,560 
95,520 
Net Migration 
-757 
-36'k 
-241 
-94 
-539 
-985 
-31 
94 
-159 
-3,072 
-341 
896 
321 
414 
-122 
-418 
-171 
-41 
317 
-413 
-579 
206 
21 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1930;1934 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.89 
-0.42 
-0.28 
-0.11 
-0.62 
-1.12 
-0.04 
0.11 
-0.18 
-3.61 
-0.39 
1.00 
0.35 
0.45 
-0.13 
-0.45 
-0.18 
-0.04 
0.33 
-0.43 
-0.61 
0.23 
0.03 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
-170;-25 
Linco1nshire(Kesteven);E1y 
LINCOLNSHIRE (KESTEVEN) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 111,757 -4,800 -4.29 
1921 108,008 141 0.13 
1922 108,947 -539 -0.49 
1923 109,190 228 0.21 
1924 110,170 -603 -0.55 
1925 110,240 -1,589 -1.44 
1926 109,310 -2,038 -1.86 
1927 107,940 1,080 1.00 
1928 109,600 0 0.00 
Totals, 1920-9 -8,118 -7.26 
Means, 1920-9 -902 -0.81 
1929 110,010 -746 -0.68 
1930 109,670 -431 -0.39 
1931 109,660 277 0.25 
1932 110,320 -727 -0.66 
1933 109,880 -883 
-0.80 
1934 109,200 936 0.86 
1935 110,360 2,203 2.00 
1936 112,800 449 0.40 
1937 113,520 585 0.52 
1938 114,400 1,506 1.32 
1939 116,230 
Totals, 1929-'39 3,169 2.88 
Keans, 1929-39 317 0.28 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1930 
Population involved 170 
Other area(s) Lincolnshire (Holland) 
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LINCOLNSHIRE (LINDSEY) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 392,886 2,476 0.63 
1921 400,400 1,558 0.39 
1922 406,147 -553 -0.14 
1923 409,130 1,213 0.30 
1924 413,770 -2,518 -0.61 
1925 414,380 -1,166 -0.28 
1926 416,160 -1,161 -0.28 
1927 417,430 -4,578 -1.10 
1928 415,260 -3,828 -0.92 
Totals, 1920-9 -8,557 -2.18 
Means, 1920-9 -951 -0.22 
1929 413,380 2,943 0.71 
1930 418,020 -38 -0.01 
1931 419,980 1,167 0.28 
1932 422,790 -105 -0.02 
1933 424,110 -506 -0.12 
1934 425,150 -1,061 -0.25 
1935 425,885 -742 -0.17 
1936 426,790 -1,962 -0.46 
1937 426,540 -784 -0.18 
1938 427,570 2,169 0.51 
1939 431,330 
Totals, 1929-39 1,082 0.26 
Means, 1929-39 108 0.03 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
LONDON 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 4,479,730 -8,845 -0.20 
1921 4,524,000 -21,690 -0.48 
1922 4,540,740 -7,179 -0.16 
1923 4,570,109 -18,585 -0.41 
1924 4,586,000 -2,360 -0.05 
1925 4,612,000 -23,039 -0.50 
1926 4,615,400 -87,235 -1.89 
1927 4,550,000 -99,325 -2.18 
1928 4,469,000 -51,591 -1.15 
Totals, 1920-9 -319,847 -7.14 
Means, 1920-9 -35,539 -0.78 
1929 4,430,000 -43,704 -0.99 
1930 4,399,000 -39,539 -0.90 
1931 4,374,300 -26,501 -0.61 
1932 4,357,800 -65,085 -1.49 
1933 4,298,600 -72,485 -1.69 
1934 4,230,200 -51,559 -1.22 
1935 4,185,200 -50,799 -1.21 
1936 4,141,100 -51,156 -1.24 
1937 4,094,500 -37,639 -0.92 
1938 4,062,800 -53,347 -1.31 
1939 4,013,400 
Totals, 1929-39 -491,813 -11.10 
Means, 1929-39 -49,181 -1.16 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
78 
MIDDLESEX 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 1,248,428 
-3,069 -0.25 
1921 1,260,364 
-2,605 -0.21 
1922 1,269,100 
-1,607 -0.13 
1923 1,278,080 5,233 0.41 
1924 1,293,010 5,039 0.39 
1925 1,306,430 14,799 1.13 
1926 1,329,630 19,158 1.44 
1927 1,356,400 56,764 4.18 
1928 1,420,660 34,493 2.43 
Totals, 1920-9 128,205 10.27 
Means, 1920-9 14,245 1.05 
1929 1,462,650 93,435 6.39 
1930 1,564,100 70,174 4.49 
1931 1,643,790 49,791 3.03 
1932 1,702,530 46,279 2.72 
1933 1,756,820 45,289 2.58 
1934 1,810,200 46,993 2.60 
1935 1,866,800 63,412 3.40 
1936 1,940,400 63,705 3.28 
1937 2,014,500 31,991 1.59 
1938 2,058,300 32,751 1.59 
1939 2,103,300 
Totals , 1929-39 543,828 37.18 
Means, 1929-39 54,383 3.17 
Boundary Change. 
Year{s) 
Population involved 
Other area{s) 
NORFOLK 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 489,921 -1,285 -0.26 
1921 494,094 -249 -0.05 
1922 497,816 -48 -0.01 
1923 501,250 378 0.08 
1924 504,900 -3,080 -0.61 
1925 504,480 -2,037 -0.40 
1926 504,910 -1,003 -0.20 
1927 506,040 -1,770 -0.35 
1928 506,240 -937 -0.19 
Totals, 1920-9 -10,031 -2.05 
Means, 1920-9 -1,115 -0.22 
1929 506,870 -3,505 -0.69 
1930 504,790 -2,993 -0.59 
1931 503,530 565 0.11 
1932 505,410 -1,882 -0.37 
1933 504,420 -2,878 -0.57 
1934 502,589 -2,386 -0.47 
1935 501,500 -829 -0.17 
1936 501,730 -526 -0.10 
1937 502,170 -1,652 -0.33 
1938 501,660 -276 -0.05 
1939 502,540 
Totals, 1929-39 -16,362 -3.23 
Means, 1929-39 
-1,636 -0.32 
Boundary Change. 
Year{s) 1934 
Population involved -871 
Other area{s) Ely 
Z2 
NORTHAMPTON SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 302,414 -477 -0.16 
1921 305,069 -529 -0.17 
1922 306,790 -601 -0.20 
1923 308,050 -695 -0.23 
1924 309,000 -1,145 -0.37 
1925 309,270 -2,583 -0.84 
1926 307,940 -632 -0.21 
1927 308,260 367 0.12 
1928 309,440 540 0.17 
Totals, 1920-9 -5,756 -1.90 
Means, 1920-9 -640 -0.21 
1929 310,730 -304 -0.10 
1930 311,060 -375 -0.12 
1931 311,320 -1,195 -0.38 
1932 310,630 16 0.01 
1933 310,930 60 0.02 
1934 311,100 1,643 0.53 
1935 312,900 660 0.21 
1936 313,900 2,461 0.78 
1937 316,760 603 0.19 
1938 317,940 -197 -0.06 
1939 318,540 
Totals, 1929-39 3,371 1.08 
Means, 1929-39 337 0.11 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
NORTHUMBERLAND 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 731,846 -1,922 -0.26 
1921 740,134 -450 -0.06 
1922 748,200 -980 -0.13 
1923 755,030 925 0.12 
1924 763,540 -3,812 -0.50 
1925 766,680 -4,603 -0.60 
1926 768,660 -874 -0.11 
1927 713,480 -22,917 -2.96 
1928 755,530 262 0.03 
Totals, 1920-9 -34,371 -4.70 
Means, 1920-9 -3,819 -0.50 
1929 759,960 -5,883 -0.77 
1930 758,120 -4,961 -0.65 
1931 757,240 -110 -0.01 
1932 760,730 -1,467 -0.19 
1933 762,470 -188 -0.02 
1934 765,100 -1,628 -0.21 
1935 766,400 -5,358 -0.70 
1936 763,750 -2,876 -0.38 
1937 763,180 -1,450 -0.19 
1938 763,710 4,311 0.56 
1939 770,040 
To.tals, 1929-39 -19,609 -2.58 
Means, 1929-39 -1,961 -0.26 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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NOTTINGHAMSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 641,095 -974 -0.15 
1921 648,369 -1,272 -0.20 
1922 654,030 -2,277 -0.35 
1923 657,900 -1,199 -0.18 
1924 662,300 -3,398 -0.51 
1925 664,000 -1,866 -0.28 
1926 666,900 2,612 0.39 
1927 673,800 11,197 1.66 
1928 689,300 2,978 0.43 
Totals, 1920-9 5,802 0.90 
Means, 1920-9 645 0.09 
1929 696,100 8,941 1.28 
1930 708,600 6,234 0.88 
1931 718,800 -255 -0.04 
1932 722,300 2,413 0.33 
1933 728,000 -645 -0.09 
1934 730,350 73 0.01 
1935 733,700 1,798 0.25 
1936 738,400 3,449 0.47 
1937 744,600 1,334 0.18 
1938 749,200 4,418 0.59 
1939 757,000 
Totals, 1929-39 27,759 3.99 
Means, 1929-39 2,776 0.39 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s} 
Population involved 
Other area(s} 
OXFORDSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 186,687 -525 -0.28 
1921 187,910 -257 -0.14 
1922 188,812 268 0.14 
1923 190,100 765 0.40 
1924 191,720 -1,243 -0.65 
1925 191,160 -578 -0.30 
1926 191,350 1,394 0.73 
1927 193,360 4,612 2.39 
1928 198,600 518 0.26 
Totals, 1920-9 4,953 2.65 
Means, 1920-9 550 0.28 
1929 199,680 4,810 2.41 
1930 205,000 3,601 1.76 
1931 209,300 1,990 0.95 
1932 211,840 2,042 0.96 
1933 214,320 2,285 1.07 
1934 217,100 1,816 0.84 
1935 219,600 2,317 1.05 
1936 222,690 2,685 1.21 
1937 226,100 2,296 1.02 
1938 229,290 2,953 1.29 
1939 233,260 
Totals, 1929-39 26,794 13.42 
Means, 1929-39 2,679 1.25 
Boundary Change-
Year(s} 1933 
Population involved 40 
Other area(s) Buckinghamshire 
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PETERBOROUGH 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 46,574 -54 -0.12 
1921 47,057 -11 -0.02 
1922 47,442 160 0.34 
1923 47,930 184 0.38 
1924 48,400 -110 -0.23 
1925 48,520 343 0.71 
1926 49,060 503 1.02 
1927 49,710 1,160 2.33 
1928 51,040 -113 -0.22 
Totals, 1920-9 2,062 4.43 
Means, 1920-9 229 0.47 
1929 51,090 484 0.95 
1930 51,750 94 0.18 
1931 52,040 -1 -0.00 
1932 52,170 161 0.31 
1933 52,370 764 1.46 
1934 53,150 338 0.64 
1935 53,600 862 1.61 
1936 54,650 537 0.98 
1937 55,340 357 0.64 
1938 55,860 603 1.08 
1939 56,660 
Totals, 1929-39 4,199 8.22 
Means, 1929-39 420 0.78 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
RUTLAND SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 18,060 -48 -0.27 
1921 18,172 -7 -0.04 
1922 18,292 -26 -0.14 
1923 18,382 -79 -0.43 
1924 18,400 -224 -1.22 
1925 18,240 -270 -1.48 
1926 18,020 -20 -0.11 
1927 18,060 -155 -0.86 
1928 17,960 111 0.62 
Totals, 1920-9 -720 -3.98 
Means, 1920-9 -80 -0.44 
1929 18,100 -114 -0.63 
1930 18,020 -111 -0.62 
1931 17,960 119 0.66 
1932 18,120 -197 -1.09 
1933 17,930 -112 -0.63 
1934 17,800 -119 -0.67 
1935 17,700 -53 -0.30 
1936 17,670 -62 -0 •. 35 
1937 17,610 221 1.25 
1938 17,860 -69 -0.39 
1939 17,860 
Totals, 1929-39 -498 -2.75 
Means, 1929-39 -SO -0.27 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area (8) 
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SHROPSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 240,487 -599 -0.25 
1921 242,528 -428 -0.18 
1922 244,056 -192 -0.08 
1923 245,600 -381 -0.16 
1924 246,900 -1,612 -0.65 
1925 246,800 -3,235 -1.31 
1926 245,100 -1,391 -0.57 
1927 245,000 -1,680 -0.69 
1928 244,440 -1,570 -0.64 
Totals, 1920-9 -11,089 -4.61 
Means, 1920-9 -1,232 -0.50 
1929 243,840 -884 -0.36 
1930 243,900 -814 -0.33 
1931 244,080 -372 -0.15 
1932 244,400 -1,001 -0.41 
1933 243,900 -1,713 -0.70 
1934 242,700 -1,371 -0.56 
1935 241,900 -620 -0.26 
1936 241,800 -1,508 -0.62 
1937 240,800 10 0.00 
1938 241,400 2,843 1.18 
1939 244,900 
Totals, 1929-39 -5,430 -2.29 
Means, 1929-39 -543 -0.22 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
SOME RSET SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 452,840 -1,148 -0.25 
1921 455,399 -296 -0.07 
1922 457,676 1,196 0.26 
1923 461,060 4,492 0.97 
1924 467,570 -1,955 -0.42 
1925 467,050 115 0.02 
1926 468,500 1,945 0.42 
1927 471,420 3,287 0.70 
1928 475,530 -386 -0.08 
Totals, 1920-9 7,248 1.60 
Means, 1920-9 805 0.17 
1929 475,800 -2,955 -0.62 
1930 473,460 -2,093 -0.44 
1931 471,970 4,965 1.05 
1932 477,160 -3,449 -0.72 
1933 473,700 -1,668 -0.35 
1934 472,000 -217 -0.05 
1935 471,900 -491 -0.10 
1936 471,370 643 0.14 
1937 471,803 1,224 0.26 
.1938 472,900 5,494 1.16 
1939 478,740 
Totals, 1929-39 1,453 0.31 
Means, 1929-39 145 0.03 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1930;1935;1937 
Population involved 
-170;-1,470;47 •. 
Other area(s) GloucestershirejGlouce.ter'hire ;Wilt!bit. 
SOUTHAMPTON (HAMPSHIRE) 
Year Population Net Migration 
1920 888,368 -1,467 
1921 897,004 1,798 
1922 906,583 2,385 
1923 915,800 9,165 
1924 931,150 2,451 
1925 939,140 -672 
1926 943,700 6,260 
1927 953,950 23,724 
1928 981,310 9,656 
Totals, 1920-9 53,299 
Means, 1920-9 5,922 
1929 994,130 -6,224 
1930 990,860 4,940 
1931 999,440 16,685 
1932 1,019,670 3,496 
1933 1,026,500 3,070 
1934 1,032,750 5,721 
1935 1,041,900 6,831 
1936 1,052,100 10,653 
1937 1,066,100 11,234 
1938 1,080,900 14,707 
1939 1,099,200 
Totals, 1929-39 71,112 
Means, 1929-39 7,111 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1931 
population involved 2,130 
Other area(s) Dorsetshire 
STAFFORDSHIRE 
Year 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 
Means, 
1920-9 
1920-9 
Population 
1,354,650 
1,372,876 
1,388,616 
1,399,820 
1,414,980 
1,421,560 
1,421,620 
1,432,340 
1,439,310 
1929 1,440,080 
1930 1,442,950 
1931 1,446,030 
1932 1,444,770 
1933 1,449,680 
1934 1,453,534 
1935 1,459,900 
1936 1,464,740 
1937 1,475,310 
1938 1,483,650 
1939 1,495,530 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means, 1929-39 
Net Migration 
-2,748 
-1,495 
-3,711 
721 
-6,701 
-12,602 
-869 
-4,312 
-8,971 
-40,687 
-4,521 
-6,375 
-7,059 
-9,937 
-2,315 
-3,288 
-1,527 
-2,905 
3,052 
283 
3,311 
-26,761 
-2,676 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.17 
0.20 
0.26 
1.00 
0.26 
-0.07 
0.66 
2.49 
0.98 
6.00 
0.62 
-0.63 
0.50 
1.67 
0.34 
0.30 
0.55 
0.66 
1.01 
1.05 
1.36 
7.15 
0.68 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.20 
-0.11 
-0.27 
0.05 
-0.47 
-0.89 
-0.06 
-0.30 
-0.62 
-3.00 
-0.32 
-0.44 
-0.49 
-0.69 
-0.16 
-0.23 
-0.11 
-0.20 
0.21 
0.02 
0.22 
-1.86 
-0.19 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
population involved 
Other area(s) 
1928;1929;1931;1932;1934 
2,220;-50;-70;630;11 • 
WorcesterjWorcesterjWarwickjWarw1CkiDerby 
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SUFFOLK EA.ST 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 285,327 -811 -0.28 
1921 288,009 -66 -0.02 
1922 290,544 -290 -0.10 
1923 292,600 894 0.31 
1924 295,730 -1,654 -0.56 
1925 295,770 -1,715 -0.58 
1926 295,550 1,198 0.41 
1927 298,090 -1,414 -0.47 
1928 297,970 -1,236 -0.41 
Totals, 1920-9 -5,093 -1.79 
Means, 1920-9 -566 -0.19 
1929 297,920 -3,758 -1.26 
1930 295,460 -2,765 -0.94 
1931 293,960 2,616 0.89 
1932 297,440 200 0.07 
1933 298,390 241 0.08 
1934 299,300 2 0.00 
1935 299,900 -861 -0.29 
1936 299,570 -557 -0.19 
1937 299,550 615 0.21 
1938 300,770 248 0.08 
1939 301,710 
Totals, 1929-39 -4,020 -1.35 
Means, 1929-39 -402 -0.13 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area (8) 
SUFFOLK WEST 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 108,387 -332 -0.31 
1921 109,196 -501 -0.46 
1922 109,406 -305 -0.28 
1923 109,720 -267 -0.24 
1924 110,040 -485 -0.44 
1925 110,010 -2,139 -1.94 
1926 108,260 142 0.13 
1927 108,660 -323 -0.30 
1928 108,520 275 0.25 
Totals, 1920-9 -3,933 -3.63 
Means, 1920-9 -437 -0.40 
1929 108,890 -2,206 -2.03 
1930 106,800 -1,674 -1.57 
1931 105,240 91 0.09 
1932 105,340 -424 
-0.40 
1933 104,900 -629 
-0.60 
1934 104,250 -366 
-0.35 
1935 103,900 -274 
-0.26 
1936 103,610 -715 
-0.69 
1937 102,890 354 0.34 
1938 103,290 386 0.37 
1939 103,730 
Totals, 1929-39 -5,458 -5.01 
Means, 1929-39 -546 -0.51 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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SURREY 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 917,845 -1,923 -0.21 
1921 924,838 -956 -0.10 
1922 931,065 -3,462 -0.37 
1923 934,200 7,668 0.82 
1924 947,000 5,844 0.62 
1925 957,300 25,383 2.65 
1926 987,300 17,136 1. 74 
1927 1,008,500 45,697 4.53 
1928 1,057,990 22,597 2.14 
Totals, 1920-9 117,984 12.85 
Means, 1920-9 13,109 1.31 
1929 1,084,150 47,254 4.36 
1930 1,135,500 36,550 3.22 
1931 1,176,840 40,412 3.43 
1932 1,221,400 30,353 2.49 
1933 1,255,500 29,193 2.33 
1934 1,288,350 37,452 2.91 
1935 1,330,500 33,187 2.49 
1936 1,368,800 29,652 2.17 
1937 1,403,300 18,200 1.30 
1938 1,427,200 18,210 1.28 
1939 1,451,600 
Totals, 1929-39 320,462 29.56 
Means, 1929-39 32,046 2.60 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
SUSSEX EAST 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 497,403 -1,015 -0.20 
1921 499,751 -181 -0.04 
1922 501,446 2,824 0.56 
1923 505,840 4,846 0.96 
1924 511,840 1,462 0.29 
1925 513,930 7,216 1.40 
1926 521,800 5,472 1.05 
1927 527,570 10,347 1.96 
1928 537,900 1,646 0.31 
Totals, 1920-9 32,617 6.56 
Means, 1920-9 3,624 0.70 
1929 539,190 -2,115 -0.39 
1930 536,760 -879 -0.16 
1931 535,730 11,195 2.09 
1932 546,350 5,384 0.99 
1933 550,840 4,885 0.89 
1934 554,950 /4f182 0.86 
1935 559,100 4,177 0.75 
1936 562,420 2,979 0.53 
1937 564,460 3,034 0.54 
1938 566,680 4,160 0.73 
1939 570,200 
Totals, 1929-39 37,600 6.97 
Means, 1929-39 3,760 0.68 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
population involved 
Other area (s) 
SUSSEX WEST 
Year Population 
1920 183,924 
1921 184,874 
1922 185,803 
1923 187,310 
1924 190,730 
1925 193,540 
1926 201,800 
1927 207,550 
1928 211,010 
Totals, 1920-9 
Means, 1920-9 
1929 213,360 
1930 215,000 
1931 216,760 
1932 225,300 
1933 231,100 
1934 238,250 
1935 244,700 
1936 250,500 
1937 259,900 
1938 264,900 
1939 272,000 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means, 1929-39 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
'Other area(s) 
WARWICKSHIRE 
Year 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 1920-9 
Means, 1920-9 
Population 
1,394,456 
1,409,633 
1,424,591 
1,429,400 
1,434,580 
1,436,900 
1,433,000 
1,458,700 
1,484,380 
1929 1,487,740 
1930 1,520,100 
1931 1,548,070 
1932 1,547,530 
1933 1,556,500 
1934 1,564,050 
1935 1,576,675 
1936 1,594,250 
1937 1,625,100 
1938 1,651,600 
1939 1,681,300 
Totals, 1929-29 
Means t 1929-39 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Net Migration 
-474 
63 
737 
2,775 
2,297 
7,701 
5,239 
2,998 
2,082 
23,418 
2,602 
1,411 
1,411 
8,338 
5,766 
7,058 
6,212 
5,580 
9,200 
4,714 
6,644 
56,333 
5,633 
Net Migration 
-3,661 
-394 
-8,SOl 
-6,886 
-8,188 
-14,116 
16,054 
16,298 
-4,291 
-13,684 
-1,521 
24,983 
19,263 
-8,133 
2,742 
1,700 
6,032 
10,672 
23,872 
18,030 
20,002 
119,162 
11,916 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.26 
0.03 
0.40 
1.48 
1.20 
3.98 
2.60 
1.44 
0.99 
12.73 
1.32 
0.66 
0.66 
3.85 
2.56 
3.05 
2.61 
2.28 
3.67 
1.81 
2.51 
26.40 
2.37 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.26 
-0.03 
-0.60 
tIo().48 
-0.57 
-0.98 
1.12 
1.12 
-0.29 
-0.98 
-0.11 
1.68 
1.27 
-0.53 
0.18 
0.11 
0.39 
0.68 
1.50 
1.11 
1.21 
8.01 
0.76 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
1928;1931;1932;1935 
580;780;-630;195 
WorcesterjWorc,Staffs ,Gloucs j Staffs jGlouc'j Laic. 
.~. 
WESTMORLAND 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 61,355 -65 -0.11 
1921 61,686 -46 -0.07 
1922 61,992 -82 -0.13 
1923 62,230 -70 -0.11 
1924 62,390 -100 -0.16 
1925 62,440 -598 -0.96 
1926 62,080 -410 -0.66 
1927 61,900 763 1.23 
1928 62,830 203 0.32 
Totals, 1920-9 -405 -0.66 
Means, 1920-9 -45 -0.07 
1929 63,190 448 0.71 
1930 63,780 368 0.58 
1931 64,250 201 0.31 
1932 64,480 -91 -0.14 
1933 64,360 19 0.03 
1934 64,350 -156 -0.24 
1935 64,200 -109 -0.17 
1936 64,120 -29 -0.04 
1937 64,120 -389 -0.61 
1938 63,770 -431 -0.68 
1939 63,450 
Totals, 1929-39 -169 -0.27 
Means, 1929-39 -17 -0.03 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
ISLE OF WIGHT 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of popUlation 
1920 84,759 -173 -0.20 
1921 85,172 -365 -0.43 
1922 85,152 298 0.35 
1923 85,710 587 0.68 
1924 86,460 -225 -0.26 
1925 86,300 440 0.51 
1926 86,790 -677 -0.78 
1927 86,090 247 0.29 
1928 86,350 351 0.41 
Totals, 1920-9 482 0.57 
Means, 1920-9 54 0.06 
1929 86,680 -720 -0.83 
1930 85,930 -492 -0.57 
1931 85,400 1,004 1.18 
1932 86,280 -55 -0.06 
1933 86,040 -55 -0.06 
1934 85,800 120 0.14 
1935 85,800 263 0.31 
1936 85,930 -64 -0.07 
1937 85,690 206 0.24 
1938 85,750 120 0.14 
1939 85,800 
Totals, 1929-39 327 0.38 
Means, 1929-39 33 0.04 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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WILTSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 289,844 -557 -0.19 
1921 292,266 -103 -0.04 
1922 294,371 267 0.09 
1923 296,600 8,469 2.86 
1924 306,900 -1,586 -0.52 
1925 306,900 2,206 0.72 
1926 310,600 -1,652 -0.53 
1927 310,100 -1,673 -0.54 
1928 309,570 -1,649 -0.53 
Totals, 1920-9 3,723 1.28 
Means, 1920-9 414 0.15 
1929 308,950 -4,532 -1.47 
1930 305,300 -3,256 -1.07 
1931 302,960 1,163 0.38 
1932 304,900 168 0.06 
1933 305,800 -1,458 -0.48 
1934 305,000 -155 -0.05 
1935 305,700 -2,557 -0.84 
1936 304,000 257 0.08 
1937 304,957 211 0.07 
1938 305,900 3,713 1.21 
1939 310,500 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means, 1929-39 
-6,445 -2.09 
Boundary Change.. 
Year(s) 1930;1937 
-645 -0.21 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
-100;-47 
G1oucestershire;Somersetshire 
WORCESTERSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 403,489 -880 -0.22 
1921 407,293 -227 -0.06 
1922 410,814 -393 -0.10 
1923 413,610 107 0.03 
1924 416,720 -2,590 -0.62 
1925 416,840 -1,135 -0.27 
1926 418,390 93 0.02 
1927 420,660 -1,370 -0.33 
1928 421,170 -2,983 -0.71 
Totals , 1920-9 -9,379 -2.32 
Means, 1920-9 -1,042 -0.25 
1929 419,800 543 0.13 
1930 421,910 -1,132 -0.27 
1931 422,610 364 0.09 
1932 424,510 2,332 0.55 
1933 428,100 2,845 0.66 
1934 432,100 3,635 0.84 
1935 437,100 2,254 0.52 
1936 440,920 3,219 0.73 
1937 445,670 2,341 0.53 
1938 449,670 4,122 0.92 
1939 455,850 
Totals, 1929-39 20,523 4.89 
Means, 1929-39 2.052 0.47 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1928;1929;1931 
Population involved -2,800;50;-380 
Other area(s) Staffordshire,WarricklhirejStaffsjWaryisk 
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YORKSHIRE(EAST RIDING) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a i. of population 
1920 450,080 -1,175 -0.26 
1921 454,717 -1,170 -0.26 
1922 458,094 -410 -0.09 
1923 462,070 -3,380 -0.73 
1924 462,920 -2,570 -0.56 
1925 463,990 -4,051 -0.87 
1926 463,420 630 0.14 
1927 467,180 1,863 0.40 
1928 472,060 1,683 0.36 
Totals, 1920-9 -8,580 -1.91 
Means, 1920-9 -953 -0.21 
1929 476,320 1,290 0.27 
1930 480,200 470 0.10 
1931 483,400 2,491 0.52 
1932 488,450 677 0.14 
1933 491,470 181 0.04 
1934 493,950 -692 -0.14 
1935 495,800 854 0.17 
1936 498,940 46 0.01 
1937 501,240 -435 -0.09 
1938 503,330 251 0.05 
1939 505,980 
Totals, 1929-39 5,132 1.08 
Means, 1929-39 513 0.11 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
YORKSHIRE (NORTH RIDING) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a i. of Population 
1920 439,205 -1,000 -0.23 
1921 443,999 -668 -0.15 
1922 448,305 -2,559 -0.57 
1923 450,200 1,103 0.25 
1924 455,100 -3,224 -0.71 
1925 455,200 -2,333 -0.51 
1926 456,400 -4,327 -0.95 
1927 455,200 -3,802 -0.84 
1928 454,260 -276 -0.06 
Totals, 1920-9 -17,086 -3.89 
Means, 1920-9 -1,898 -0.42 
1929 456,440 6,382 l.40 
1930 465,100 1,821 0.39 
1931 469,240 2,173 0.46 
1932 473,400 -908 -0.19 
1933 474,400 -4,657 -0.98 
1934 471,525 -1,306 -0.28 
1935 472,100 -5,155 
-1.09 
1936 468,750 2,140 0.46 
1937 472,700 -1,440 -0.30 
1938 473,300 1,152 0.24 
1939 476,.500 
Totals, 1929-39 204 0.04 
Means, 1929-39 20 0.01 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
Population involved -1,325 
Other area(s) Yorkshire(West Riding) 
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YORKSHIRE(WEST RIDING) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 3,275,980 -5,538 -0.17 
1921 3,305,163 -9,811 -0.30 
1922 3,323,863 -10,364 -0.31 
1923 3,338,220 -3,401 -0.10 
1924 3,356,990 -5,327 -0.16 
1925 3,372,040 -10,595 -0.31 
1926 3,382,190 21,204 0.63 
1927 3,420,410 -23,908 -0.70 
1928 3,411,470 1,869 0.05 
Totals, 1920-9 -45,870 -1.40 
Means, 1920-9 -5,097 -0.15 
1929 3,424,860 10,908 0.32 
1930 3,446,510 6,110 0.18 
1931 3,464,920 -27,188 -0.78 
1932 3,446,980 -9,078 -0.26 
1933 3,445,000 2,238 0.06 
1934 3,454,750 -3,860 -0.11 
1935 3,459,800 -11,822 -0.34 
1936 3,455,490 -7,229 -0.21 
1937 3,455,100 -3,714 -0.11 
1938 3,460,400 15 0.00 
1939 3,469,700 
Totals, 1929-39 -43,620 -1.27 
Means, 1929-39 -4,362 -0.13 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
Population involved 3,750 
. Other: area(s)' Derbyshire, Yorkshire (North Riding) ... 
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ANGLESEY 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 50,952 -146 -0.29 
1921 51,202 37 0.07 
1922 51,493 236 0.46 
1923 51,940 173 0.33 
1924 52,290 -99 -0.19 
1925 52,290 90 0.17 
1926 52,500 -529 -1.01 
1927 52,060 -759 -1.46 
1928 51,340 -15 -0.03 
Totals, 1920-9 -1,013 -1.99 
Means, 1920-9 -113 -0.22 
1929 51,330 -1,718 -3.35 
1930 49,620 -1,282 -2.58 
1931 48,350 252 0.52 
1932 48,590 -318 -0.66 
1933 48,240 -254 -0.53 
1934 47,950 -305 -0.63 
1935 47,600 -272 -0.57 
1936 47,280 -487 -1.03 
1937 46,720 -129 -0.28 
1938 46,530 11 0.02 
1939 46,500 
Totals, 1929-39 -4,502 -8.77 
Means, 1929-39 -450 -0.91 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
BRECKNOCKSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 60,472 -42 -0.07 
1921 61,069 61 0.10 
1922 61,644 -217 -0.35 
1923 61,900 -40 -0.06 
1924 62,320 -498 -0.80 
1925 62,260 -1,111 -1.78 
1926 61,580 -552 -0.90 
1927 61,340 -1,437 -2.34 
1928 60,180 -990 -1.64 
Totals, 1920-9 -4,825 -7.98 
Means, 1920-9 -536 -0.87 
1929 59,450 -1,439 -2.42 
1930 58,220 -1,114 -1.91 
1931 57,270 -322 -0.56 
1932 57,030 -458 -0.80 
1933 56,660 -669 -1.18 
1934 56,150 -876 -1.56 
1935 55,400 -883 -1.59 
1936 54,600 -1,160 -2.12 
1937 53,500 -480 -0.90 
1938 53,060 -594 -1.12 
1939 52,540 
Totals, 1929-39 -7,995 
-13.45 
Means, 1929-39 -800 
-1.42 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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CARDIGAN SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 57,666 -136 -0.24 
1921 57,654 24 0.04 
1922 57,704 169 0.29 
1923 57,830 524 0.91 
1924 58,290 -209 -0.36 
1925 57,970 510 0.88 
1926 58,410 -416 -0.71 
1927 57,860 -1,627 -2.81 
1928 56,060 175 0.31 
Totals, 1920-9 -986 -1. 71 
Means, 1920-9 -110 -0.19 
1929 56,070 -526 -0.94 
1930 55,340 -388 -0.70 
1931 54,750 298 0.54 
1932 54,840 -557 -1.02 
1933 54,080 92 0.17 
1934 53,950. 93 0.17 
1935 53,800 133 0.25 
1936 53,680 -639 -1.19 
1937 52,770 . -408 -0.77 
1938 52,120 -274 -0.53 
1939 51,650 
Totals, 1929-39 -2,177 -3.88 
Means, 1929-39 -218 -0.40 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
CARMARTHENSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 174,999 -315 -0.18 
1921 176,667 314 0.18 
1922 178,743 -322 -0.18 
1923 180,060 -26 -0.01 
1924 181,550 -948 -0.52 
1925 181,930 -763 -0.42 
1926 182,470 -1,367 -0.75 
1927 182,190 -2,966 -1.63 
1928 180,100 414 0.23 
Totals, 1920-9 -5,979 -3.42 
Means, 1920-9 -664 -0.37 
1929 181,280 -1,297 -0.72 
1930 180,600 -990 -0.55 
1931 180,080 -1,123 -0.62 
1932 179,290 -1,609 
-0.90 
1933 177 ,950 -1,001 -0.56 
1934 171 ,350 -894 -0.50 
1935 176,900 -740 -0.42 
1936 176,390 -2,485 -1.41 
1937 174,090 -1,669 -0.96 
1938 172,700 -947 
-0.55 
1939 171,980 
Totals, 1929-39 -12,755 
-7.04 
Means, 1929-39 -1,276 
-0.72 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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CARNARVON SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 121,812 -335 -0.28 
1921 121,989 -163 -0.13 
1922 122,088 -2,125 -1. 74 
1923 120,213 -161 -0.13 
1924 120,250 -280 -0.23 
1925 119,970 -142 -0.12 
1926 119,810 280 0.23 
1927 120,150 3,744 3.12 
1928 123,900 -100 -0.08 
Totals, 1920-9 717 0.59 
Means, 1920-9 80 0.07 
1929 123,670 -2,990 -2.42 
1930 120,600 -1,987 -1.65 
1931 118,480 1,331 1.12 
1932 119,580 69 0.06 
1933 119,500 20 0.02 
1934 119,400 149 0.12 
1935 119,400 359 0.30 
1936 119,520 -383 -0.32 
1937 118,880 -70 -0.06 
1938 118,590 501 0.42 
1939 118,950 
Totals, 1929-39 -3,001 -2.43 
Means, 1929-39 -300 -0.24 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1923 
Population involved -2,792(1921 Census Population) 
Other area(s) Denbighshire 
DENBIGHSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 150,515 -285 -0.19 
1921 151,716 -274 -0.18 
1922 152,552 2,238 1.47 
1923 155,737 1,372 0.88 
1924 158,160 -531 -0.34 
1925 158,640 -237 -0.15 
1926 159,290 -393 -0.25 
1927 159,580 -148 -0.09 
1928 160,020 -1,014 -0.63 
Totals, 1920-9 728 0.48 
Means, 1920-9 81 0.06 
1929 159,540 -1,948 -1.22 
1930 158,100 -1,333 -0.84 
1931 157,230 -251 -0.16 
1932 157,300 -1,028 -0.65 
1933 156,500 20 0.01 
1934 156,700 -488 -0.31 
1935 156,400 526 0.34 
1936 157,090 -274 
-0.17 
1937 156,950 -283 -0.18 
1938 156,840 -98 
-0.06 
1939 156,920 
Totals, 1929-39 -5,157 -3.23 
Means, 1929-39 -516 -0.33 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1923 
Population involved 2,792(1921 Census Population) 
Other area(s) Carnarvon.hire 
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FLINT SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 101,218 -269 -0.27 
1921 102,077 -330 -0.32 
1922 102,572 137 0.13 
1923 103,380 783 0.76 
1924 104,900 -110 -0.10 
1925 105,460 830 0.79 
1926 106,970 1,111 1.04 
1927 108,750 1,973 1.81 
1928 111,300 573 0.51 
Totals, 1920-9 4,699 4.64 
Means, 1920-9 522 0.48 
1929 112,390 -635 -0.57 
1930 112,300 -354 -0.32 
1931 112,480 85 0.08 
1932 112,900 624 0.55 
1933 113,750 961 0.84 
1934 114,950 751 0.65 
1935 116,000 1,433 ~'"1.24 
1936 117,770 1,369 1.16 
1937 119,540 995 0.83 
1938 121,020 383 0.32 
1939 121,900 
Totals, 1929-39 5,613 4.99 
Means, 1929-39 561 0.48 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
GLAMORGANSHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 1,254,555 -2,680 -0.21 
1921 1,271,758 -43 -0.00 
1922 1,288,367 -4,244 -0.33 
1923 1,298,560 -1,386 -0.11 
1924 1,312,040 -8,864 -0.68 
1925 1,316,820 -16,644 -1.26 
1926 1,312,690 -17,706 -1.35 
1927 1,305,000 -32,783 -2.51 
1928 1,280,400 -13,994 -1.09 
Totals, 1920-9 -98,343 -7.84 
Means, 1920-9 -10,927 -0.84 
1929 1,273,890 -31,832 -2.50 
1930 1,249,020 -25,004 -2.00 
1931 1,230,480 -14,539 -1.18 
1932 1,221,190 +10,006 -0.82 
1933 1,215,340 -12,721 -1.05 
1934 1,206,950 -14,541 -1.20 
1935 1,197,200 -18,559 -1.55 
1936 1,182,590 -26,323 -2.23 
1937 1,159,400 "'7,501 -0.65 
1938 1,154,960 -402 -0.03 
1939 1,157,640 
TotalS, 1929-39 -161,487 "'12.68 
Means, 1929 ... 39 -16,149 "'1.32 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1938 
Population involved 1,170 
Other area(s) Monmouthshire 
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MERIONETHSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 41,740 -137 -0.33 
1921 41,783 76 0.18 
1922 41,951 315 0.75 
1923 42,320 1,305 3.08 
1924 43,710 -812 -1.86 
1925 42,950 668 1.56 
1926 43,640 325 0.74 
1927 43,980 -32 -0.07 
1928 44,000 52 0.12 
Totals, 1920-9 1,760 4.22 
Means! 1920-9 196 0.46 
1929 44,110 -1,019 -2.31 
1930 43,090 -711 -1.65 
1931 42,370 -226 -0.53 
1932 42,120 -307 -0.73 
1933 41,760 -218 -0.52 
1934 41,500 -144 -0.35 
1935 41,300 -177 -0.43 
1936 41,030 -579 -1.41 
1937 40,330 -235 -0.58 
1938 39,970 -18 -0.05 
1939 39,860 
Totals, 1929-39 -3,636 -8.24 
Means, 1929-39 -364 -0.86 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
MONMOUTHSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 450,936 -981 -0.22 
1921 457,658 -42 -0.01 
1922 464,085 -3,197 -0.69 
1923 466,590 -2,104 -0.45 
1924 470,150 -3,351 -0.71 
1925 471,980 -7,946 -1.68 
1926 469,030 -4,319 -0.92 
1927 468,700 -13,385 -2.86 
1928 458,520 -5,757 -1.26 
Totals, 1920-9 -41,083 -9.11 
Means, 1920-9 -4,565 -0.98 
1929 455,870 -13,887 -3.05 
1930 445,100 -10,965 -2.46 
1931 437,010 -5,880 -1.35 
1932 433,590 -5,737 -1.32 
1933 430,050 -5,482 -1.27 
1934 426,550 -6,662 -1.56 
1935 421,900 -6,546 -1.55 
1936 417,140 -10,091 -2.42 
1937 408,510 -7,589 -1.86 
1938 402,380 -4,162 -1.03 
1939 399,640 
Totals, 1929-39 -77,001 -16.89 
Means, 1929-39 -7,700 
-1.79 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1938 
Population involved -1,170 
- : Other- area(s) - Glamorganshire ' ...... 
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MONTGOMERY SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 50,714 -109 -0.22 
1921 50,950 -139 -0.27 
1922 51,087 -121 -0.24 
1923 51,240 115 0.22 
1924 51,640 20 0.04 
1925 51,900 -100 -0.19 
1926 52,070 -205 -0.39 
1927 52,120 -1,298 -2.49 
1928 50,960 -930 -1.82 
Totals, 1920-9 -2,767 -5.46 
Means, 1920-9 -308 -0.60 
1929 50,140 -1,350 -2.69 
1930 48,920 -1,055 -2.16 
1931 47,980 -114 -0.24 
1932 47,950 -628 -1.31 
1933 47,380 -704 -1.49 
1934 46,700 -551 -1.18 
1935 46,200 -296 -0.64 
1936 45,950 -675 -1.47 
1937 45,270 -414 -0.91 
1938 44,890 -118 -0.26 
1939 44,830 
Totals, 1929-39 -5,906 -11.78 
Means, 1929-39 -591 -1.24 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
PEMBROKE SHIRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 90,717 -167 -0.18 
1921 91,480 -205 -0.22 
1922 91,978 -443 -0.48 
1923 92,140 14 0.02 
1924 92,670 -764 -0.82 
1925 92,290 -2,280 -2.47 
1926 90,430 -1,166 -1.29 
1927 89,630 -1,333 -1.49 
1928 88,610 -1,085 -1.22 
Totals, 1920-9 -7,428 -8.19 
Means, 1920-9 -825 -0.91 
1929 87,790 -1,203 -1.37 
1930 86,820 -983 -1.13 
1931 86,020 332 0.39 
1932 86,490 -588 -0.68 
1933 86,040 -511 -0.59 
1934 85,650 -739 -0.86 
1935 85,100 -1,536 -1.81 
1936 83,700 -438 -0.52 
1937 83,270 -145 -0.17 
1938 83,200 -117 -0.14 
1939 83,270 
Totall, 1929-39 -5,926 -6.75 
Meanl, 1929-39 -593 -0.69 
Boundary Change. 
Year(l) 
po~u1ation involved 
Ot er area(s) 
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RADNORSHlRE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 21,530 -70 -0.33 
1921 21,656 50 0.23 
1922 21,857 106 0.49 
1923 22,089 -11 -0.05 
1924 22,200 -9 -0.04 
1925 22,290 -78 -0.35 
1926 22,330 -259 -1.16 
1927 22,200 -364 -1.64 
1928 21,920 -414 -1.89 
Totals, 1920-9 -1,048 -4.87 
Means, 1920-9 -117 -0.53 
1929 21,570 -498 -2.31 
1930 21,140 -372 -1.76 
1931 20,820 83 0.40 
1932 20,970 -202 -0.96 
1933 20,850 -306 -1.47 
1934 20,600 -132 -0.64 
1935 20,500 -371 -1.84 
1936 20,140 -376 -1.87 
1937 19,770 -234 -1.18 
1938 19,540 -32 -0.16 
1939 19,520 
Totals, 1929-39 -2,446 -11.34 
Means, 1929-39 -245 -1.18 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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ABERDEEN 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 301,703 -4,688 -1.55 
1921 300,980 -4,006 -1.33 
1922 300,158 -5,747 -1.91 
1923 297,390 -6,701 -2.25 
1924 293,431 -2,308 -0.79 
1925 293,549 -3,211 -1.09 
1926 292,912 -3,995 -1.36 
1927 291,221 -3,253 -1.12 
1928 290,083 2,633 0.91 
Totals, 1920-9 -31,276 -10.37 
Means, 1920-9 -3,475 -1.17 
1929 294,590 4,195 1.42 
1930 300,703 -2,460 -0.82 
1931 300,231 1,359 0.45 
1932 303,424 171 0.06 
1933 305,464 12,874 4.21 
1934 320,128 233 0007 
1935 322,124 36 0.01 
1936 323,821 -1,213 -0.37 
1937 324,229 -670 -0.21 
1938 325,231 -1,046 -0.32 
1939 326,042 
Totals, 1929-39 13,480 4.58 
Means, 1929-39 1,348 0.45 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
Population involved n.a.* 
Other area(s) Kincardine 
ANGUS (FORF AR) *not available 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 271,639 -3,576 -1.32 
1921 270,950 1,192 0.44 
1922 274,355 -4,884 -1.78 
1923 271,519 -3,736 -1.38 
1924 269,632 -1,598 -0.59 
1925 269,357 -1,155 -0.43 
1926 269,550 88 0.03 
1927 270,771 -2,307 -0.85 
1928 269,372 -5,765 -2.14 
Totals, 1920-9 
-21,741 -8.00 
Means, 1920-9 
-2,416 -0.89 
1929 264,618 4,911 1.86 
1930 270,469 -1,268 -0.47 
1931 270,216 444 0.16 
1932 271,674 -1 -0.00 
1933 272,475 -427 '!!"O.16 
1934 272,866 -249 -0.09 
1935 273,573 -276 -0.10 
1936 274,105 -1,904 -0.69 
1937 272,763 -448 -0.16 
1938 272,847 -953 -0.35 
1939 272,467 
Totall, 1929-39 -172 -0.06 
Means, 1929-39 -17 -0.00 
Boundary Chanae • 
Year (a) 
population involved 
Other area(a) 
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ARGYLL 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 76,179 452 0.59 
1921 76,856 407 0.53 
1922 77 ,390 -382 -0.49 
1923 77,116 -894 -1.16 
1924 76,268 2,209 2.90 
1925 78,477 489 0.62 
1926 79,001 -23 -0.03 
1927 78,990 -0 -0.00 
1928 78,970 -15,385 -19.48 
Totals, 1920-9 -13,128 -17.23 
Means, 1920-9 -1,459 -1.84 
1929 63,498 131 0.21 
1930 63,518 -2,758 -4.34 
1931 60,697 478 0.79 
1932 61,093 285 0.47 
1933 61,268 723 1.18 
1934 61,936 -66 -0.11 
1935 61,786 995 1.61 
1936 62,682 -757 -1.21 
1937 61,800 -43 -0.07 
1938 61,600 316 0.51 
1939 61,830 
Totals, 1929-39 -695 -1.09 
Means, 1929-39 -70 -0.10 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
AYR 
Year. Population. Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 295,862 -750 -0.25 
1921 299,254 -1,009 -0.34 
1922 301,666 -3,024 -1.00 
1923 301,757 -4,374 -1.45 
1924 300,165 3,872 1.29 
1925 306,458 844 0.28 
1926 309,866 -1,582 -0.51 
1927 310,643 -1,014 -0.33 
1928 311,823 -21,335 -6.84 
Totals, 1920-9 -28,373 -9.59 
Means, 1920-9 -3,153 -1.02 
1929 292,549 -8,630 -2.95 
1930 285,838 -6,360 -2.23 
1931 281,525 1,565 0.56 
1932 284,993 72 0.03 
1933 286,806 243 0.08 
1934 288,686 -805 -0.28 
1935 289,442 687 0.24 
1936 291,694 -852 ..Q.29 
1937 292.200 402 0.14 
1938 294,050 849 0.29 
1939 296,622 
Totals, 1929-39 -12,830 -4.39 
Mean. i . ·1929"'39 
Boundary Change. 
"'1,283 -0.44 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area (s) 
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BANFF 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 57,624 -1,111 -1.93 
1921 57,293 -1,171 -2.04 
1922 56,719 -1,719 -3.03 
1923 55,577 -2,083 -3.75 
1924 54,051 102 0.19 
1925 54,692 -1,118 -2.04 
1926 54,144 -1,359 -2.51 
1927 53,238 -1,308 -2.46 
1928 52,341 2,249 4.30 
Totals, 1920-9 -7,519 -13.05 
Means, 1920-9 -836 -1.48 
1929 55,033 -321 -0.58 
1930 55,120 -369 -0.67 
1931 55,126 -110 -0.20 
1932 55,389 217 0.39 
1933 55,939 -865 -1.55 
1934 55,402 -531 -0.96 
1935 55,218 -1,341 -2.43 
1936 54,159 -536 -0.99 
1937 53,886 -619 -1.15 
1938 53,567 -465 -0.87 
1939 53,405 
Totals, 1929-39 -4,939 -8.97 
Means, 1929-39 -494 -0.90 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
BERWICK 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 28,842 -649 -2.25 
1921 28,395 -487 -1.71 
1922 28,022 -632 -2.26 
1923 27,516 -839 -3.05 
1924 26,824 252 0.94 
1925 27,202 -335 -1.23 
1926 26,992 -476 -1.77 
1927 26,602 -428 -1.61 
1928 26,215 540 2.06 
Totals, 1920-9 -3,056 -10.60 
Means, 1920-9 -340 -1.21 
1929 26,790 -29 -0.11 
1930 26,785 -258 -0.96 
1931 26,518 182 0.68 
1932 26,689 -81 -0.30 
1933 26,612 145 0.55 
1934 26,760 137 0.51 
1935 26,882 -189 -0.70 
1936 26,649 -202 -0.76 
1937 26,402 -58 -0.22 
1938 26,295 -169 -0.64 
1939 26,089 
Totals, 1929-39 -522 -1.95 
Means, 1929-39 -52 -0.20 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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BUTE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 16,522 17,156 103.84 
1921 33,711 -15,614 -46.32 
1922 18,100 13 0.07 
1923 18,100 10 0.05 
1924 18,100 6 0.03 
1925 18,100 -11 -0.06 
1926 18,100 -15 -0.08 
1927 18,100 10 0.05 
1928 18,100 1,237 6.83 
Totals, 1920-9 2,792 16.90 
Means, 1920-9 310 7.16 
1929 19,258 -319 -1.66 
1930 18,835 -2,570 -13.64 
1931 16,207 161 0.99 
1932 16,319 8 0.05 
1933 16,258 175 1.08 
1934 16,365 -20 -0.12 
1935 16,302 142 0.87 
1936 16,371 -47 -0.29 
1937 16,231 398 2.45 
1938 16,560 -179 -1.08 
1939 16,302 
Totals, 1929-39 -2,251 -11.69 
Means, 1929-39 -225 -1.14 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
CAITHNESS 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 28,614 ... 574 -2.01 
1921 28,284 -633 -2.24 
1922 27,834 -867 -3.11 
1923 27,108 -968 -3.57 
1924 26,201 76 0.29 
1925 26,345 -554 -2.10 
1926 25,914 -708 -2.73 
1927 25,314 -681 -2.69 
1928 24,720 1,389 5.62 
Totals, 1920-9 -3,519 -12.30 
Means, 1920-9 -391 "'1.39 
1929 26,147 -256 ...a. 98 
1930 25,937 -444 "1.71 
1931 25,535 33 0.13 
1932 25,606 -122 ...a. 48 
1933 25,556 330 1.29 
1934 25,945 -21 ...a.08 
1935 25,969 65 0.25 
1936 26,092 -233 ...a. 89 
1937 25,889 -201 ...a.78 
1938 25,742 -128 ...a. 50 
1939 25,693 
Totals, 1929-39 -977 -3.74 
Means, 1929-39 -98 -0.37 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(i) 
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CLACKMANNAN 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a %ofpopu1atiort 
1920 32,364 -238 -0.74 
1921 32,543 -257 -0.79 
1922 32,583 -569 -1.75 
1923 32,290 -812 -2.51 
1924 31,758 519 1.63 
1925 32,504 -168 -0.52 
1926 32,548 -376 -1.16 
1927 32,374 -346 -1.07 
1928 32,195 -153 -0.48 
Totals, 192&-9 -2,400 -7.42 
Means, 1920-9 -267 -0.82 
1929 32,174 -273 -0.85 
1930 32,030 -156 -0.49 
1931 31,996 44 0.14 
1932 32,155 -7 -0.02 
1933 32,237 -83 -0.26 
1934 32,220 68 0.21 
1935 32,388 -SO -0.16 
1936 32,464 211 0.65 
1937 32,807 184 0.56 
1938 33,117 -178 -0.54 
1939. 33,073 
Totals, 1929-39 -240 -0.75 
Mearts I· 1929--39· 
-24 -0.07 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
DUMFRIES 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a %of Eopu1ation 
1920 75,023 -459 -0.61 
1921 75,365 -547 -0.73 
1922 75,388 -1,315 -1.74 
1923 74,636 -1,823 -2.44 
1924 73,344 1,252 1.71 
1925 74,993 -482 -0.64 
1926 75,029 -982 -1.31 
1927 74,558 -844 -1.13 
1928 74,076 -1,507 -2.03 
Totals, 1920-9 -6,707 -8.94 
Means, 1920-9 -745 -0.99 
1929 72,795 8,123 11.16 
1930 81,158 -634 -0.78 
1931 80,886 334 0.41 
1932 81,524 103 0.13 
1933 81,839 -60 -0.07 
1934 81,963 -301 -0.37 
1935 81,883 -151 -0.18 
1936 81,945 -120 -.0.15 
1937 81,973 -278 -.0.34 
1938 81,818 -608 -0.74 
1939 81,357 
Totals, 1929-39 6,408 8.80 
Mean. i . '1929-39 ' . , , 641 0.91· 
Boundary Change, 
Year(s) 1930 
Population involved 6,000 
Other area (8) !irkcudbt!aht 
.1QL 
DUNBARTON 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 149,251 -593 -0.40 
1921 150,868 -1,317 -0.87 
1922 151,435 -2,521 -1.66 
1923 150,546 -2,275 -1.51 
1924 149,674 157 0.10 
1925 151,106 -1,385 -0.92 
1926 151,084 -676 -0.45 
1927 151,672 -1,476 -0.97 
1928 151,374 1,285 0.85 
Totals, 1920-9 -8,SOl -5.90 
Means, 1920-9 -978 -0.65 
1929 153,675 -6,642 -4.32 
1930 148,010 -1,506 -1.02 
1931 147,542 693 0.47 
1932 149,173 770 0.52 
1933 150,750 1,006 0.67 
1934 152,450 318 0.21 
1935 153,516 934 0.61 
1936 155,242 178 0.11 
1937 156,073 -1,541 -0.99 
1938 155,243 1,232 0.79 
1939 157,299 
Totals, 1929-39 -4,557 -2.97 
Means, 1929-39 -456 -0.29 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1926; 1938 
Population involved G-291; G - 1,000 
Other area(s) Lanark;Lanark 
EAST LOTHIAN (HADDINGTON) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 47,015 -113 -0.24 
1921 47,487 -113 -0.36 
1922 47,757 -667 -1.40 
1923 47,535 -1,009 -2.12 
1924 46,957 944 2.01 
1925 48,261 -139 -0.29 
1926 48,531 -459 -0.95 
1927 48,471 -398 -0.82 
1928 48,401 -1,225 -2.53 
Totals, 1920-9 -3,237 -6.89 
Means, 1920-9 -360 -0.74 
1929 47,494 -512 -1.08 
1930 47,263 -1,271 -2.69 
1931 46,288 233 0.50 
1932 46,836 222 0.47 
1933 47,384 -303 -0.64 
1934 47,411 242 0.51 
1935 47,935 -270 -0.56 
1936 47,922 -535 -1.12 
1937 47,644 -149 -0.31 
1938 47,753 -299 -0.63 
1939 47,722 
Totals, 1929-39 -2,641 -5.56 
Means, 1929-39 ... 264 -0.55 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(.) 
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FIFE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 290,080 -1,414 -0.49 
1921 292,902 -1,617 -0.55 
1922 294,545 -3,771 -1.28 
1923 293,608 -5,222 -1. 78 
1924 291,315 2,062 0.71 
1925 295,990 -3,193 -1.08 
1926 295,452 -3,062 -1.04 
1927 294,684 -2,528 -0.86 
1928 293,986 -4,469 -1.52 
Totals, 1920-9 -23,214 -8.00 
Means, 1920-9 -2,579 -0.88 
1929 291,077 -14,859 -5.10 
1930 277 ,821 -3,784 -1.36 
1931 275,790 1,319 0.48 
1932 278,656 755 0.27 
1933 280,764 -968 -0.34 
1934 281,103 -327 -0.12 
1935 282,169 -553 -0.20 
1936 282,972 -954 -0.34 
1937 283,194 -359 -0.13 
1938 284,082 -256 -0.09 
1939 285,206 
Totals, 1929-39 -19,985 -6.87 
Means, 1929-39 -1,999 -0.69 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
INVERNESS 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 82,816 -731 -0.88 
1921 82,446 -938 -1.14 
1922 81,731 -1,785 -2.18 
1923 80,187 -2,333 -2.91 
1924 78,091 854 1.09 
1925 79,121 -883 -1.12 
1926 78,440 -1,341 -1.71 
1927 77,236 -1,331 -1.72 
1928 76,036 4,176 5.49 
Totals, 1920-9 -4,311 -5.21 
Means, 1920-9 -479 -0.56 
1929 80,353 1,737 2.16 
1930 82,178 -875 -1.06 
1931 81,410 106 0.13 
1932 81,646 -30 -0.04 
1933 81,718 163 0.20 
1934 81,975 -238 -0.29 
1935 81,790 871 1.07 
1936 82,698 -1,276 -1.54 
1937 81,472 -199 -0.24 
1938 81,342 -457 -0.56 
1939 80,999 
Totals, 1929-39 -199 -0.25 
Means, 1929-39 -20 -0.02 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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KINCARDINE 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 41,652 -448 -1.07 
1921 41,779 -110 -0.26 
1922 42,155 -482 -1.14 
1923 42,127 -959 -2.28 
1924 41,601 99 0.24 
1925 42,073 -142 -0.34 
1926 42,262 -465 -1.10 
1927 42,093 -467 -1.11 
1928 41,919 -1,087 -2.59 
Totals, 1920-9 -4,062 -9.75 
Means, 1920-9 -451 -1.07 
1929 41,111 -1,275 -3.10 
1930 40,085 -566 -1.41 
1931 39,772 95 0.24 
1932 40,112 371 0.92 
1933 40,714 -13,154 -32.31 
1934 27,748 -946 -3.41 
1935 26,894 -211 -0.78 
1936 26,765 -394 -1.47 
1937 26,455 -88 -0.33 
1938 26,443 -672 -2.54 
1939 25,853 
Totals, 1929-39 -16,839 -40.96 
Means, 1929-39 -1,684 -4.42 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
Population involved n.a.· 
Other area(s) Aberdeen 
• not available 
KINROSS 
Year Population Net Migration Net MIgration as 
a % of population 
1920 7,910 -9 -0.11 
1921 7,963 -31 -0.39 
1922 7,981 -119 -1.49 
1923 7,916 -175 -2.21 
1924 7,796 144 1.84 
1925 7,988 -24 -0.30 
1926 8,007 -70 -0.88 
1927 7,973 "'68 -0.85 
1928 7,937 -251 -3.16 
Totals, 1920-9 -603 -7.62 
Means, 1920-9 -67 -0.84 
1929 7,700 -204 -2.64 
1930 7,510 -251 -3.34 
1931 7,275 -11 -0.15 
1932 7,269 20 0.28 
1933 7,284 25 0.34 
1934 7,318 "'37 -0.50 
1935 .7,306 -148 -2.03 
1936 7,173 -97 -1.36 
1937 7,079 -44 -0.62 
1938 7,028 4 0.05 
1939 7 ,029 
Totals, 1929-39 -743 -9.64 
Means, 1929-39 -74 -1.00 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(.) 
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KIRKCUDBRIGHT 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 37,229 -358 -0.96 
1921 37,156 -482 -1.30 
1922 36,922 -856 -2.32 
1923 36,318 -1,069 -2.94 
1924 35,460 410 1.16 
1925 36,021 -421 -1.17 
1926 35,804 -631 -1. 76 
1927 35,352 -592 -1.67 
1928 34,893 1,031 2.95 
Totals, 1920-9 -2,967 -7.97 
Means, 1920-9 -330 -0.89 
1929 36,025 -5,714 -15.86 
1930 30,435 -540 -1.78 
1931 30,050 157 0.52 
1932 30,321 -40 -0.13 
1933 30,381 -45 -0.15 
1934 30,470 -116 -0.38 
1935 30,487 565 1.85 
1936 31,162 -891 -2.86 
1937 30,358 -72 -0.24 
1938 30,359 -244 -0.80 
1939 30,202 
Totals, 1929-39 -6,940 -19.27 
Means, 1929-39 -694 -1.98 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1930 
Population involved c. - 6,000 
Other area(s) Dumfries 
LANARK 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 1,532,208 -17,283 -1.13 
1921 1,539,307 -8,088 -0.53 
1922 1,551,293 -2,210 -0.14 
1923 1,567,208 -3,270 -0.21 
1924 1,581,066 "'38,041 -2.41 
1925 1,559,113 -4,404 -0.28 
1926 1,570,888 -11,797 -0.75 
1927 1,573,734 -3,003 ." .. 1.9 
1928 1,584,373 6,683 0.42 
Totals, 1920-9 -81,413 -5.31 
Means, 1920-9 -9,046 -0.58 
1929 1,602,563 -30,346 -1.89 
1930 1,583,695 -872 -0.06 
1931 1,595,597 -471 -0.03 
1932 1,606,715 -2,791 -0.17 
1933 1,614,626 -6,605 -0.41 
1934 1,618,857 - 3, 760 -0.23 
1935 1,625,880 -14,928 -0.92 
1936 1,621,211 -3,069 -0.19 
1937 1,627,803 -2,219 -0.14 
1938 1,635,937 -8,694 -0.53 
1939 1,638,058 
Totals, 1929-39 -73,756 -4.60 
Means, 1929-39 -7,376 -0.46 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1926; 1935; 1938 
Population involved. S. 12,500; S. - 15; c. 1,600 
Other area(s) Dunbarton, Renfrew; Renfrew; Dunbarton, Renfrew 
1e9 
MIDLOTHIAN (EDINBURGH) 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 505,879 -4,750 -0.94 
1921 506,378 -827 -0.16 
1922 509,229 -2,307 -0.45 
1923 510,493 -3,959 -0.78 
1924 509,986 -5,277 -1.03 
1925 507,492 -664 -0.13 
1926 509,547 -2,057 -0.40 
1927 510,092 504 0.10 
1928 512,817 1,639 0.32 
Totals, 1920-9 -17,697 -3.50 
Means, 1920-9 -1,966 -0.39 
1929 516,252 6,704 1.30 
1930 524,661 3,912 0.75 
1931 530,306 4,358 0.82 
1932 536,123 4,910 0.92 
1933 542,455 2,637 0.49 
1934 546,721 2,311 0.42 
1935 550,646 1,686 0.31 
1936 553,792 970 0.18 
1937 556,203 1,329 0.24 
1938 559,202 745 0.13 
1939 561,738 
Totals, 1929-39 29,563 5.73 
Means, 1929-39 2,956 0.55 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
MORAY (ELGIN) 
Year PopUlation Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 41,692 -585 -1.40 
1921 41,561 -648 -1.56 
1922 41,257 -1,051 -2.55 
1923 40,522 -1,311: -3.23 
1924 39,516 289 0.73 
1925 40,094 -587 -1.46 
1926 39,800 -785 -1.97 
1927 39,246 -720 -1.83 
1928 38,691 900 2.33 
Totals, 1920-9 ""4,497 -10.7' 
Means, 1920-9 -500 -1.22 
1929 39,752 924 2.32 
1930 40,909 -418 ""1.02 
1931 40,692 209 0.51 
1932 41,058 ... 82 ...a. 20 
1933 41,171 -159 -0.39 
1934 41,185 -294 ...a. 71 
1935 41,058 ... 117 -0.28 
1936 41,083 -227 ...a. 55 
1937 41,002 -320 ...a. 78 
1938 40,844 -111 .-0.27 
1939 40,911 
Totals, 1929 ... 39 -594 "'1.49 
Means, 1929-39 -59 -0,14 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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NAIRN 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a X of population 
1920 8,831 -118 -1.34 
1921 8,790 -136 -1.54 
1922 8,712 -238 -2.74 
1923 8,547 -277 -3.24 
1924 8,320 74 0.89 
1925 8,427 -112 -1.33 
1926 8,355 -150 -1. 79 
1927 8,226 -146 -1.78 
1928 8,096 197 2.43 
Totals, 1920-9 -907 -10.27 
Means, 1920-9 -101 -1~16 
1929 8,317 20 0.24 
1930 8,352 -137 -1.64 
1931 8,231 -25 -0.30 
1932 8,234 15 0.19 
1933 8,277 -12 -0.15 
1934 8,276 -55 -0.66 
1935 8,227 59 0.71 
1936 8,317 -60 -0.72 
1937 8,292 -9 -0.11 
1938 8,303 -59 -0.71 
1939 8,275 
Totals, 1929-39 -263 -3.16 
Means, 1929-39 -26 -0.32 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
ORKNEY 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 24,254 -228 -0.94 
1921 24,109 -249 -1.03 
1922 23,870 -489 -2.05 
1923 23,379 -652 -2.79 
1924 22,729 275 1.21 
1925 22,991 -231 -1.01 
1926 22,754 -360 -1.58 
1927 22,368 -355 -1.59 
1928 21,982 40 0.18 
Totals, 1920-9 -2,248 -9.27 
Means, 1920-9 -250 -1.07 
1929 22,020 286 1.30 
1930 22,215 ... 253 -1.13 
1931 22,028 92 0.42 
1932 22,106 -139 -0.63 
1933 21,942 157 0.72 
1934 22,086 -21 -0.10 
1935 22,056 -192 ...0.87 
1936 21,811 ... 0 -0.00 
1937 21,730 106 0.49 
1938 21,799 -154 ...0.70 
1939 21,641 
Totals, 1929-39 "'117 ...0.53 
Means, 1929-39· "'12 ...0.05 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s} 
Population involved 
Other area(s} 
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PEEBLES 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a ~ of population 
1920 15,304 -56 -0.37 
1921 15,330 -81 -0053 
1922 15,292 -232 -1.52 
1923 15,096 -352 -2.33 
1924 14,795 255 1.72 
1925 15,0,85 -80 -0.53 
1926 15,051 -181 -1.21 
1927 14,914 -167 -1.12 
1928 14,777 198 1.34 
Totals, 1920-9 -697 -4.56 
Means, 1920-9 -78 -0.50 
1929 14,989 67 0.45 
1930 15,089 -529 -3.50 
1931 14,607 29 0.20 
1932 14,644 56 0.38 
1933 14,699 -41 -0.28 
1934 14,644 -83 -0.57 
1935 14,541 79 0.54 
1936 14,606 -83 -0.57 
1937 14,501 -32 -0.22 
1938 14,471 -344 -2.37 
1939 14,121 
Totals, 1929-39 -881 -5.88 
Means, 1929-39 -88 -0.59 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
PERTH 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 125,245 -470 -0.38 
1921 125,515 -411 -0.33 
1922 125,594 -1,369 -1.09 
1923 124,722 -1,893 -1.52 
1924 123,266 ,1,368 1.11 
1925 124,905 1 0.00 
1926 125,231 -.35 -0.35 
1927 125,072 -1,198 -0.96 
1928 124,093 -4,247 -3.42 
Totals, 1920-9 -8,654 -6.91 
Means, 1920-9' -962 -O~77 
1929 119,976 1,169 0.97 
1930 121,301 -2,405 -1.98 
1931 119,175 726 0.61 
1932 120,044 -14 -0.01 
1933 120,000 651 0.54 
1934 120,669 -33 -0.03 
1935 120,799 -760 -0.63 
1936 120,148 -329 -0.27 
1937 119,729 -24 -0.02 
1938 119,657 408 0.34 
1939 120,137 
Totala, 1929-39 -611 -0.51 
Mearl.; '1929-39' ' -61 -o~05 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
9~~~t, ar~a<!> :::m: q , 
RENFREW 
Year Population Net Migration 
1920 296,581 -2,040 
1921 298,887 -1,973 
1922 300,571 -3,093 
1923 300,929 -3,226 
1924 300,659 -293 
1925 302,897 -13,856 
1926 291,773 -2,129 
1927 291,998 -2,728 
1928 291,391 3,566 
Totals, 1920-9 -25,772 
Means, 1920-9 -2,864 
1929 296,752 -10,148 
1930 288,462 -1,068 
1931 289,547 1,714 
1932 293,160 1,258 
1933 295,900 1,223 
1934 298,708 1,321 
1935 301,704 6,107 
1936 309,382 3,251 
1937 314,244 1,126 
1938 317,179 3,589 
1939 322,642 
Totals, 1929-39 8,372 
Means, 1929-39 837 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1926;1935;1938 
Population involved .£.. -12,211 ;.£.. 15 ;.£.. -600 
Other area(s) Lanark j Lanark j Lanark 
ROSS AND CROMARTY 
Year. . Population Net Migration 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 1920-9 
Mearts, 1920-9 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Totals, 1929-39 
71,345 
70,790 
70,351 
69,175 
67,518 
68,565 
68,128 
67,239. 
66,352 
67,360 
63,649 
62,917 
62,580 
62,031 
62,507 
62,047 
62,094 
62,704 
62,846 
61,956 
Mearts i --1929-39 - - - - - - - - -
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(a) 
11' 
-1,062 
-761 
-1,426 
-1,899 
871 
-547 
-927 
-917 
948 
-5,720 
-636 
-3,725 
-719 
-331 
-493 
501 
-426 
134 
703 
233 
-865 
-4,987 
-499 -
Net Migration as 
a i. of population 
-0.69 
-0.66 
-1003 
-1.07 
-0.10 
-4.57 
-0.73 
-0.93 
1.22 
-8.69 
-0.95 
-3.42 
-0.37 
0.59 
0.43 
0.41 
0.44 
2.02 
1.05 
0.36 
1.13 
2.82 
0.27 
Net Migration as 
aX of population 
-1.49 
-1.08 
-2.03 
-2.75 
1.29 
-0.80 
-1.36 
-1.36 
1.43 
-8.02 
-0.90 
-5.53 
-1.13 
-0.53 
-0.79 
0.81 
-0.68 
0.22 
1.13 
0.37 
-1.38 
-7.40 
-0.75 
ROXBURGH 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 45,149 -465 -1.03 
1921 44,989 -493 -1.09 
1922 44,636 -959 -2.15 
1923 43,833 -1,260 -2.87 
1924 42,727 520 1.22 
1925 43,335 -375 -0.87 
1926 43,001 -644 -1.50 
1927 42,383 -651 -1.54 
1928 41,768 1,453 3.48 
Totals, 1920-9 -2,874 -6.37 
Means, 1920-9 -319 -0.71 
1929 43,256 2,471 5.71 
1930 45,740 -16 -0.03 
1931 45,729 315 0.69 
1932 46,083 150 0.33 
1933 46,240 117 0.25 
1934 46,373 -153 -0.33 
1935 46,294 -45 -0.10 
1936 46,258 -301 -0.65 
1937 45,908 -104 -0.23 
1938 45,783 -359 -0.78 
1939 45,410 
Totals, 1929-39 2,074 4.79 
Means, 1929-39 207 0.49 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1939 
Population involved c.-100 
Other area(s) Selkirk 
SELKIRK 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 22,773 -300 -1.32 
1921 22,606 -362 -1.60 
1922 22,342 -554 -2.48 
1923 21,857 -696 -3.18 
1924 21,219 176 0.83 
1925 21,433 -274 -1.28 
1926 21,182 -403 -1.90 
1927 20,792 -420 -2.02 
1928 20,403 1,371 6.72 
Totals, 1920-9 -1,463 -6.42 
Means, 1920-9 -163 -0.69 
1929 21,786 841 3.86 
1930 22,624 -178 -0.79 
1931 22,440 218 0.97 
1932 22,651 89 0.39 
1933 22,698 -1 -0.01 
1934 22,649 -14 -0.06 
1935 22,611 -263 -1.16 
1936 22,279 -226 -1.02 
1937 21,967 11 0.05 
1938 21,923 98 0.45 
1939 21,996 
Totals, 1929-39 574 2.63 
Means, 1929-39 57 0.27 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1939 
Population involved c.100 
Other area(s) Roxbursh 
114 
STIRLING 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 161,454 -2,167 -1.34 
1921 161,726 -1,733 -1.07 
1922 162,029 -3,229 -1.99 
1923 160,669 -4,157 -2.59 
1924 158,276 665 0.42 
1925 160,512 -1,723 -1.07 
1926 160,471 -1,883 -1.17 
1927 166,221 -1,609 -1.00 
1928 160,098 8,771 5.48 
Totals, 1920-9 -7,064 -4.37 
Means, 1920-9 -785 -0.48 
1929 170,096 -5,291 -3.11 
1930 166,092 -1,386 -0.83 
1931 166,138 602 0.36 
1932 168,022 517 0.31 
1933 169,591 635 0 0 37 
1934 171,279 -836 -0.49 
1935 171,532 -579 -0.34 
1936 172,001 -410 -0.24 
1937 172,659 -425 -0.25 
1938 173,410 -323 -0.19 
1939 174,277 
Totals, 1929-39 -7,495 -4.41 
Means, 1929-39 -750 -0.44 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
SUTHERLAND 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 18,011 -229 -1.27 
1921 17,800 -290 -1.63 
1922 17,517 -486 -2.78 
1923 17,057 -541 -3.17 
1924 16,481 138 0.84 
1925 16,568 -266 -1.60 
1926 16,294 -376 -2.31 
1927 15,912 -370 -2.33 
1928 15,536 1,292 8.31 
Totals, 1920-9 -1,129 -6.27 
Means, 1920 .. 9 -126 -0.66 
1929 16,809 -485 -2.89 
1930 16,282 -281 -1. 73 
1931 15,951 -82 -0.51 
1932 15,810 30 0.19 
1933 15,796 177 1.12 
1934 15,931 -146 -0.92 
1935 15,745 42 0.26 
1936 15,770 -310 -1.96 
1937 15,442 -128 -0.83 
1938 15,293 -11 -0.07 
1939 15,271 
Totals, 1929-39 -1,195 -7.11 
Meanaj 1929-39 -120 -0.73 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Othetatea(a) 
11S 
WEST LOTHIAN (L INL ITHGOW) --------
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of EOEulation 
1920 83,491 -1,144 -1.37 
1921 83,966 -1,098 -1.31 
1922 84,221 -1,855 -2.20 
1923 83,617 -2,499 -2.99 
1924 82,406 880 1.07 
1925 84,493 -843 -1.00 
1926 84,765 -1,270 -1.50 
1927 84,464 -1,153 -1.37 
1928 84 2149 12357 1.61 
Totals, 1920-9 -7,626 -9.13 
Means z 1920-9 -847 -1.01 
1929 86,265 -5,354 -6.21 
1930 81,737 -984 -1.20 
1931 81,593 -371 -0.46 
1932 82,015 130 0.16 
1933 82,831 -709 -0.86 
1934 82,815 -636 -0.77 
1935 82,893 -618 -0.75 
1936 82,960 -174 -0.21 
1937 83,484 -650 -0.78 
1938 83,524 -634 -0.76 
1939 83 z564 
Totals, 1929-39 -10,001 -11.59 
Means z 1929-39 -l zOOO -1.18 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area~s) 
WIGTOWN 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of 202u1ation 
1920 30,863 -380 -1.23 
1921 30,782 -474 -1.54 
1922 30,570 -783 -2.56 
1923 30,049 -969 -3.23 
1924 29,319 270 0.92 
1925 29,761 -361 -1.21 
1926 29,564 -596 -2.02 
1927 29,165 -570 -1.95 
1928 28.772 1 0.00 
Totals, 1920-9 -3,862 -12.51 
Means I 1920-9 -429 -1.42 
1929 28,885 449 1.55 
1930 29,468 -433 -1.47 
1931 29,209 84 0.29 
1932 29,452 -61 -0.21 
1933 29,556 -59 -0.20 
1934 29,672 -85 -0.29 
1935 29,770 33 0.11 
1936 29,973 -328 -1.09 
1937 29,783 -233 -0.78 
1938 29,723 -272 -0.92 
1939 29 1634 
Totals, 1929-39 -906 -3.13 
Means. 1929-39 -91 -0.30 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area~82 
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ZETLAND 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 25,722 -229 -0.89 
1921 25,520 -312 -1.22 
1922 25,208 -558 -2.21 
1923 24,646 -670 -2.72 
1924 23,914 284 1.19 
1925 24,142 -287 -1.19 
1926 23,845 -428 -1.79 
1927 23,392 -369 -1.58 
1928 22,941 1,211 5.28 
Totals, 1920-9 -1,359 -5.28 
Means, 1920-9 -151 -0.57 
1929 24,067 -2,183 -9.07 
1930 21,837 -438 -2.01 
1931 21,330 260 1.22 
1932 21,493 -281 -1.30 
1933 21,117 149 0.70 
1934 21,173 -50 -0.23 
1935 21,043 -282 -1.34 
1936 20,701 72 0.35 
1937 20,704 -474 -2.29 
1938 20,155 -226 -1.12 
1939 .19,868. 
Totals, 1929-39 . -3,452 -14.34 
Means, 1929-39 -345 -1.51 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) . 
117 
The Ministry of Labour Regions 
(In contrast to the actual Ministry of Labour regions, which were based on 
local employment exchange areas, the following aggregates are based on 
county data. Where the resulting aggregate differs from the actual 
Ministry of Labour Region, the differences are noted, in brackets, below.) 
Greater London 
City of London and Metropolitan Police District 
London & South East 
South East 
South West 
Midlands 
North East 
North West 
Greater London plus South East 
Areas in Essex, Hertfordshire, Kent and Surrey which are 
outside the Greater London area plus Bedfordshire, Berkshire, 
Buckinghamshire, Cambridgeshire, Ely, Huntingdonshire, Norfolk, 
Suffolk, Sussex, and the Soke of Peterborough 
(Includes Camber1ey, Surrey and Abingdon and Faringdon, 
Berkshire) 
Cornwall, Devonshire, Dorsetshire, G1oucestershire, 
Oxfordshire, Somersetshire, Southampton(Hampshire), 
Wiltshire, and Isle of Wight 
(Excludes Camber1ey, Surrey and the Abingdon and Faringdon 
districts of Berkshire) 
Derbyshire, Herefordshire, Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, 
Nottinghamshire, Rut1andshire, Shropshire, Staffordshire, 
Warwickshire, and Worcestershire. 
(Includes Buxton, Chape1-en-1e-Frith, G1ossop, Hadfield, and 
New Mills, all of Derbyshire) 
Lincolnshire, Yorkshire 
(Includes Barno1dswick, Bentham, Saddleworth, and Cleveland, 
all of Yorkshire) 
Cheshire, Lancashire 
(Excludes districts of Derbyshire and Yorkshire noted as 
being included in the Midlands and North East areas, with 
the exception of Cleveland, Yorkshire) 
North 
Wales 
Scotland 
Northumberland, Durham, Cumberland and Westmorland 
(Excludes Cleveland district of Yorkshire. Includes 
Berwick district of Northumberland) 
All the Welsh Counties 
All the Scottish Counties 
(Excludes the Berwick district of Northumberland) 
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GREATER LONDON 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 7,452,825 -6,479 -0.09 
1921 7,535,582 -28,063 -0.37 
1922 7,573,469 -10,507 -0.14 
1923 7,625,461 -4,943 -0.06 
1924 7,679,218 4,222 0.05 
1925 7,733,282 24,723 0.32 
1926 7,805,870 -36,782 -0.47 
1927 7,809,963 17,580 0.23 
1928 7,864,130 22,042 0.28 
Totals, 1920-9 -18,207 -0.24 
Means, 1920-9 -2,023 -0.03 
1929 7,916,680 121,910 1.54 
1930 8,070,100 85,951 1.07 
1931 8,192,240 79,836 0.97 
1932 8,302,329 34,078 0.41 
1933 8,360,500 18,749 0.22 
1934 8,401,000 46,575 0.55 
1935 8,474,900 71,961 0.85 
1936 8,575,700 52,265 0.61 
1937 8,655,000 13,815 0.16 
1938 8,700,000 -1,801 -0.02 
1939 8,728,000 
Totals, 1929-39 523,338 6.61 
Means, 1929-39 52,334 0.64 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
LONDON & SOUTH EAST 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 12,102,494 -25,268 -0.21 
1921 12,212,682 -29,462 -0.24 
1922 12,282,523 -2,846 -0.02 
1923 12,372,389 35,380 0.29 
1924 12,492,860 4,542 0.04 
1925 12,568,230 65,995 0.53 
1926 12,702,950 2,983 0.02 
1927 12,764,470 103,180 0.81 
1928 12,919,850 50,752 0.39 
Totals, 1920-9 205,257 1.70 
Means. 1920-g 22,806 0.18 
1929 13,0l4,050 137,251 1.05 
1930 13,196,590 100,340 0.76 
1931 13,349,400. 166,435 1.25 
1932 13,557,720 84,570 0.62 
1933 13,674,900 64,865 0.47 
1934 13,770,225 95,550 0.69 
1935 13,904,700 131,113 0.94 
1936 14,076,470 125,670 0.89 
1937 14,240,190 59,058 0.41 
1938 14,343,630 51,001 0.36 
1939 14,439,460 
Totals, 1929-39 1,015,853 7,81 
Means, 1929-39 101,585 0.75 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
Population involved -15 
Other area(s) South W.st 
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SOUTH EAST 
Year 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 1920-2 
Means! 1920-9: 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means! 1929-39 
Population 
4,649,669 
4,677,100 
4,709,054 
4,746,928 
4,813,642 
4,834,948 
4,897,080 
4,954,507 
5,055,720 
5,097,370 
5,126,490 
5,157,160 
5,255,391 
5,314,400 
5,369,225 
5,429,800 
5,500,770 
5,585,190 
5,643,630 
5,711,460 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1934 
-15 
Net Migration 
-18,790 
-1,399 
7,661 
40,324 
320 
41,272 
39,765 
85,600 
28,710 
223,463 
24,829 
15,341 
14,389 
86,599 
50,492 
46,117 
48,975 
59,153 
73,405 
45,244 
52,802 
492,515 
49,252 
Population involved 
Other area(s) South West 
SOUTH WEST 
Year Population Net Migration 
1920 3,876,613 -7,805 
1921 3,906,115 -2,864 
1922 3,929,486 5,595 
1923 3,957,400 25,632 
1924 4,003,450 -12,429 
1925 4,007,820 -2,126 
1926 4,022,080 11,535 
1927 4,046,600 46,953 
1928 4,104,970 13,246 
Totals, 1928-1 77,737 
Means, 1920-' 8,637 
1929 4,127,480 -8,403 
1930 4,127,510 -4,922 
1931 4,132,000 36,125 
1932 4,175,480 9,398 
1933 4,190,960 1,657 
1934 4,198,600 12,225 
1935 4,218,425 12,959 
1936 4,238,400 21,096 
1937 4,265,260 21,938 
1938 4,294,160 42,413 
1939 4,345,150 
Totals, 1929-39 144,486 
Means, 1929-39 14,449 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1931;1934;1935 
Population involved -330;40;-125 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.40 
-0.03 
0.16 
0.85 
0.01 
0.85 
0.81 
1. 73 
0.57 
4.81 
0.51 
0.30 
0.28 
1.68 
0.96 
0.87 
0.91 
1.09 
1.33 
0.81 
0.94 
9.66 
0.92 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.20 
-0.07 
0.14 
0.65 
-0.31 
-0.05 
0.29 
1.16 
0.32 
2.01 
0.21 
-0.20 
-0.12 
0.87 
0.23 
0.04 
0.29 
0.31 
0.50 
0.51 
0.99 
3.50 
0.34 
Other areaCs) Mid1IQd'iMid1ands.Lgndon & S.E.iM!d1IQd. 
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MIDLANDS 
Year Population 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
Totals, 1920-9 
Means, 1920-9 
5,673,672 
5,736,822 
5,792,374 
5,827,122 
5,873,620 
5,891,090 
5,900,160 
5,957,770 
6,019,200 
1929 6,032,750 
1930 6,083,140 
1931 6,127,250 
1932 6,132,660 
1933 6,161,260 
1934 6,173,325 
1935 6,206,575 
1936 6,243,443 
1937 6,303,000 
1938 6,352,680 
1939 6,417,810 
Totals, 1929-39 
Means, 1929-39 
Net Migration 
-12,277 
-5,879 
-18,932 
-3,533 
-27,366 
-33,857 
19,016 
24,328 
-18,451 
-76,950 
-8,550 
20,063 
10,320 
-23,503 
4,982 
-10,619 
8,056 
12,376 
35,611 
21,771 
34,210 
113,267 
11,327 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1931;1934;1935;1936 
330;-2,425;125;-173 
Net Migration as 
a % of population 
-0.22 
-0.10 
-0.33 
-0.06 
-0.47 
-0.57 
0.32 
0.41 
-0.31 
-1.36 
-0.15 
0.33 
0.17 
-0.38 
0.08 
-0.17 
0.13 
0.20 
0.57 
0.35 
0.54 
1.88 
0.18 
Population involved 
Other area(s) South West;North East;S.W.;S.W.;North West 
NORTH EAST 
Year population Net Migration Net Migration as a % of population 
1920 4,755,046 -10,794 -0.23 
1921 4,797,748 -10,311 -0.21 
1922 4,831,407 -14,665 -0.30 
1923 4,855,470 -4,331 -0.09 
1924 4,886,350 -14,781 -0.30 
1925 4,903,530 -20,717 -0.42 
1926 4,914,940 14,278 0.29 
1927 4,956,220 -29,251 -0.59 
1928 4,951,510 -710 -0.01 
Totals, 1920-9 -91,284 -1.92 
Me arts , 1920-9· -10,143 -0.21 
1929 4,970,410 21,674 0.44 
1930 5,010,450 8,253 0.16 
1931 5,039,200 -20,665 -0.41 
1932 5,035,050 -10,264 -0.20 
1933 5,038,450 -4,046 -0.08 
1934 5,048,300 -6,153 -0.12 
1935 5,058,100 -14,703 -0.29 
1936 5,057,450 -6,238 -0.12 
1937 5,064,590 -6,201 -0.12 
1938 5,074,560 4,515 0.09 
1939 5.095,260 
Totals, 1929-39 -33,828 -0.68 
Means, 1929-39 -3,383 -0.07 
Boundary Change. 
Year(a) 1934 
Population involved 2,400 
Other area(s) Hidlandl 12 
NORTH WEST 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of 202u1ation 
1920 5,951,981 -11,964 -0.20 
1921 6,002,719 -13,437 -0.22 
1922 6,037,531 -10,556 -0.17 
1923 6,066,420 5,944 0.10 
1924 6,108,720 -16,528 -0.27 
1925 6,122,720 -13,380 -0.22 
1926 6,138,620 16,567 0.27 
1927 6,180,710 -3,069 -0.05 
1928 6,200,160 -31,260 -0.50 
Totals, 1920-9 -77 ,683 -1.31 
Means z 1920-9 -8 z631 -0.14 
1929 6,185,990 -30,297 -0.49 
1930 6,171,790 -24,851 -0.40 
1931 6,165,180 -42,548 -0.69 
1932 6,137,300 -8,243 -0.13 
1933 6,139,300 -581 -0.01 
1934 6,148,800 -3,272 -0.05 
1935 6,155,700 -2,181 -0.04 
1936 6,161,347 -17,514 -0.28 
1937 6,153,000 -2,741 -0.04 
1938 6,161,700 -3,445 -0.06 
1939 6,170,500 
Totals, 1929-39 -135,671 -2.19 
Means z 1929-39 -13 z567 -0.22 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 1936 
Population involved 173 
Other area~s~ . Midlands 
NORTH 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of 202ulation 
1920 2,536,368 -6,501 -0.26 
1921 2,569,285 -2,284 -0.09 
1922 2,599,798 -8,085 00().31 
1923 2,621,610 730 0.03 
1924 2,651,340 ... 17,919 -0.68 
1925 2,659,630 -26,555 -1.00 
1926 2,658,320 -18,905 -0.71 
1927 2,661,160 -81,624 -3.07 
1928 2,599,000 -19,845 -0.76 
Totals, 1920-9 -180,987 -7.14 
Means. .lNe-9 -20.110 00().76 
1929 2,596,510 -26,067 -1.00 
1930 2,587,650 -23,548 00().91 
1931 2,581,650 -15,774 -0.61 
1932 2,580,950 -17,251 -0.67 
1933 2,577 ,030 -15,537 00().60 
1934 2,573,350 -21,608 -<>.84 
1935 2,563,800 "30,143 -1.18 
1936 2,545,010 -28,729 -1.13 
1937 2,526,310 -13,354 00().53 
1938 2,522,690 -5,951 -0.24 
1939 2,526,630 
Totals, 1929-39 "'197,963 -7 .. 62 
Means. 1929-39 -19.796 -0.77 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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WALES 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 2,627,826 -5,672 -0.22 
1921 2,657,659 -632 -0.02 
1922 2,686,121 -7,469 -0.28 
1923 2,703,999 559 0.02 
1924 2,730,170 -16,455 -0.60 
1925 2,736,750 -27,204 -0.99 
1926 2,731,220 -25,196 -0.92 
1927 2,723,560 -50,415 -1.85 
1928 2,687,310 -23,085 -0.86 
Totals , 1920-9 -155,570 -5.92 
Means, 1920-9 -17,286 -0.64 
1929 2,677,100 -60,341 -2.25 
1930 2,628,870 -46,538 -1.77 
1931 2,593,320 -20,072 -0.77 
1932 2,581,840 -20,806 -0.81 
1933 2,568,100 -20,773 -0.81 
1934 2,554,400 "'24,338 -0.95 
1935 2,537,700 -26,937 -1.06 
1936 2,516,880 -42,541 -1.69 
1937 2,479,000 -18,161 -0.73 
1938 2,465,800 -5,867 -0.24 
1939 2,465,200 
Totals, 1929-39 -286,375 -10.70 
Means, 1929-39 -28,638 -1.11 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
SCOTLAND 
Year Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of population 
1920 4,864,396 -44,814 -0.92 
1921 4,882,288 -27,265 -0.56 
1922 4,904,456 -49,073 -1.00 
1923 4,901,100 -62,440 -1.27 
1924 4,881,637 -26,266 -0.54 
1925 4,893,032 -35,371 -0.72 
1926 4,896,638 -39,758 -0.81 
1927 4,891,953 -30,130 -0.62 
1928 4,893,182 -36,098 -0.74 
Totals, 1920-9 -351,214 -7.22 
Means, 1920-9 -39,024 -0.80 
1929 4,884,032 -64,554 -1.32 
1930 4,845,886 -32,451 -0.67 
1931 4,842,554 14,261 0.29 
1932 4,883,000 5,778 0.12 
1933 4,912,000 -1,069 -0.02 
1934 4,934,291 -5,741 -0.12 
1935 4,952,510 -8,768 -0.18 
1936 4,966,302 -10,075 -0.20 
1937 4,976,610 -5,405 -0.11 
1938 4,993,126 -10,4.33 -0.21 
1939 5,006,689 
Totals, 1929"'39 -118,455 -2.43 
Means, 1929-39 -11,846 -0.24 
Boundary Change. 
Year(s) 
Population involved 
Other area(s) 
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APPENDIX 3 
Maps showing Net Migration 
These are based on the data tables found in Appendix 2. A number 
of other maps could be presented on this basis, for example, for 
regional aggregates or for different time periods. It was felt, 
however, that only the most instructive maps should be included in 
the thesis. There is also a risk that the inclusion of a plethora 
of maps would destroy the impact of the more notable ones, shown here. 
Map I 
Map 2 
~p3 
Map 4 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population, 
England & Wales, Yearly Mean, 1920-1929 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
England & Wales, Yearly Mean, 1929-1939 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
Scotland, Yearly Mean, 1920-1929 
Net Migration as a Percentage of County Population. 
Scotland, Yearly Mean, 1929-1939 
Map 1 NET MIGRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF COUNTY POPULATION. 
ENGLAND & WALES, YEARLY MEAN, 1920-1929. 
ml.nus 
• over 1.0 
from 0.5-1.0 
below 0.5 
over 1.0 
from 0.5-1.0 
below 0.5 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Statistical Reviews of the 
Registrar-General for England & Wales. 
Map 2 NET MIGRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF COUNTY POPULATION. 
ENGLAND & WALES, YEARLY MEAN, 1929-1939. 
minus 
over 1.0 
from 0.5-1.0 
below 0.5 
plus 
• over 1.0 
from 0.5-1.0 
below 0.5 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Statistical Reviews of the 
Registrar-General for England & Wales. 
Map 3 NET MIGRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF COUNTY POPULATION. 
SCOTLAND, YEARLY MEAN, 1920-1929. , 
minus 
. over 1.0 
below 0.5 
plus 
over 1.0 
from 0.5-1.0 
o below 0.5 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Reports of the Registrar-General 
for Scotland. 
Map 4 
• 1ft 
NET MIGRATION AS A PERCENTAGE OF COUNTY POPULATION. 
SCOTLAND, YEARLY MEAN, 1929-1939 • 
.. 
, 
~' , 
minus 
over 1.0 
III from 0.5-1.0 
below 0.5 
plus 
III over 1.0 
from 0.5-1.0 
D below 0.5 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Reports of the Registrar-General 
for Scotland. 
CHAPTER 3 
Factors Influencing Labour Mobility 
I 
This first section is concerned with present day approaches to the 
study of factors influencing labour mobility. Although the variables 
influencing migration are numerous, there are two broad approaches to the 
study of these variables. The 'macro-theoretical' approach is concerned 
with the analysis of economic and other factors causing migration between 
areas. This approach may be subdivided into the regression approach, 
which is chiefly concerned with economic variables and their relationship 
to migration, and the gravity model approach, which in its simple form, 
employs demographic variables to explain migration. Refined versions of 
this model may include economic variables and both the simple and refined 
versions are tested by regression analysis. The categorization of 
research is difficult, therefore, as the different 'macro-theoretical' 
approaches overlap. The second main approach to the study of migration 
is through the analysis of the behaviour of the individual. Behavioural 
studies are concerned with the decision-making processes that confront 
a potential migrant on facing the mover-stayer choice. This behavioural 
approach may also be merged with the 'macro-theoretical' approaches. 
The initial discussion considers the regression approach. This 
illustrates the influence of different variables on migration. 
The economic basis of migration is found in the neo-classical 
theory of labour markets. With the assumptions of perfect information 
about all markets in all regions, homogeneous and rational labour, and 
zero migration costs, inter-regional labour movements may be viewed as a 
response to wage differentials resulting from disturbances in the 
equilibrium positions of regional labour markets. Hence, the basic 
economic model sees the direction and volume of migration dependent upon 
wage and income differences. Indices of employment growth or 
unemployment might be used as a proxy for the absence of data on income. 
The relaxation of the restrictive assumptions above, however, allows 
the consideration of other variables as influences on migration. These 
include the flow of information on opportunities in different areas, the 
differing industrial (and socio-cultural) structures of the areas, and 
the differing elasticities of response of the multifarious groups of 
potential migrants. l They also include various other influences such as 
the psychic and physical costs of moving, the attraction of rapid 
employment growth, of favourable climate or of relatively low unemployment. 
These factors are not exhaustive, neither are they necessarily mutually 
1 . 2 exc USlve. 
1. Age, sex, skill, family size, occupational grouping, etc •• 
2. These introductory paragraphs are indebted to many accounts, among 
them, T.P.Lianos, 'The Migration Process and Time Lags', 
Journal of Re iona1 Science, 12 (1972); H.W.Richardson, 
Reglona1 Economlcs 1969 ,pp.295-304; R.A.Hart, 'The Economic 
Influences on Internal Labour Force Migration', 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, 19 (1972); R.L.We1ch, 
Migration Research and Migration in Britain (Birmingham, 1970). 
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There are a number of studies that see migration as a function of 
income differences between areas. 3 With this explanatory variable, as with 
others, the common approach is to incorporate an income variable in a 
regression equation of migration on explanatory variables. Other variables, 
such as employment growth, relative unemployment or migrant stock may be 
1 d ' "1 4 ana yse 1n a S1tIll. ar manner. 
Current British research in this framework reveals a number of impor-
tant influences on migration. A recent study based on gross migration data 
suggests that new industrial building per capita and the proportion of 
service industry employment in each region are important predictors of those 
gross migration flows not accounted for by the simple gravity model at the 
regional 1eve1. 5 Another study using the same data finds that the most sig-
nificant variable in a regression analysis is a 'job availability 
,6 
component. Elsewhere, Oliver concluded on the basis of the now 
3. For example, R.L. Raimon, 'Interstate Migration and Wage Theory', 
Review of Economics and Statistics, 44 (1962); T.P.Lianos,op.cit.; 
L.A. Sjaastad, 'The Relationship between Migration and Income in the 
United States', Pa ers androceedin s of the Re ional Science 
Association, 6 (196). Many models 1nc1ude an 1ncome var1ab1e amongst 
the independent variables, for example, A.Rogers, 'A Regression Analysis 
of Interregional Migration in California', Review of Economics and 
Statistics, 49 (1967) and I.S.Lowry, Migration and Metropolitan Growth: 
Two Analytical Models (San Francisco,1966). 
4. For example, see R.A.Hart, op.cit.; F.R.01iver, 'Interregional 
Migration and Unemployment, 1951-61', Journal of the Royal Statistical 
Societf, Series A, 127 (1964); M.J.Greenwood, 'An Analysis of the 
Determnants of Geographic Labour Mobility in the U.S.', Review of 
Economics and Statistics, 51 (1969); M.J.Greenwood, 'Lagged Response 
in the Decision to Migrate', Journal of Regional Science, 10 (1970). 
5. See R.A.Hart, 'A Model of Inter-regional migration in England and 
Wales', Reaiona1 Studies, 4 (1970). Most movement was between 
prosperous regions. The concept of the gravity model was introduced 
in Chapter 2. 
6. A.B.Jack, 'Inter-regional Migration in Great Britain: Some Cross-
Sectional Evidence', Scottish Journal of Political Econo!y,18(1971). 
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discredited7 National Insurance data, that total migration was best 
explained by relative unemployment and a regional dummy variab1e. 8 The 
more recent work of Hart, again using census data, finds that net migration 
(aggregated from gross figures) is best explained at the county level by 
relative employment growth. 9 Finally, Weeden finds from the same data that 
net migration at the regional level is best explained by the availability 
10 
of job opportunities as reflected in observed unemployment rates. Current 
British research settles for some measure of relative job opportunities as 
the paramount influence on migration within a regression analysis framework. 
At the regional level, unemployment may be taken as a proxy for employment 
opportunities, whilst at the county level, unemployment is less suitable 
than employment growth. 
Apart from the simple regression of migration on various economic 
variables, this approach can be combined with the gravity model, as 
evidenced by some of the recent British research. A simple form of this 
7. See Ministry of Labour Gazette,76(1968),120. 
8. Oliver, op.cit. A.B.Jack also used this data to examine regional 
migration. A.B.Jack,'A Short-Run Model of Inter-regional Migration', 
Manchester School,38(1970). For a definition of the term 'dummy 
variable', see-J.Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York,1972), 
pp.176,7. 
9. R.A.Hart,'The Economic Influences on Internal Labour Force Migration', 
op.cit. 
10. R. Weeden,'Inter-regiona1 Migration in Britain'. Paper presented to 
the Urban Studies Conference, Oxford, 14-16 Sept.1972. (This paper is 
summarized in A.J.Brown~ The Framework of Regional Economics in the 
United Kingdom (Cambridge,1972),pp.261-3.) 
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model was noted in Chapter 2.11 The evolution of this concept has been 
12 described by Carrothers. A general expression of this model would be, 
M •• = A-lJ 
( ex f3 w. P.). W.(P.) 
1 1 J J 
v D •• 1J 
where, M .. = gross migration from region i to region j, 1J 
P.,P. = some measure of mass in regions i and j, 
1 J 
for example, population, 
w.,w. a regional weights, for example, unemployment rates, 
1 J 
D .. - distance between i and j. 1J 
The many non-demographic influences on migration may be incorporated in 
the regional weights or in the exponents. Some obvious possibilities of 
an economic character have been suggested in the definitions of the 
algebraic components of the model. The alternatives for the denominator 
require a brief elaboration. Physical distance between the two regions 
is one value that might be used, representing travel and removal costs 
of the migrant and his family or the flow of information about 
opportunities in distant areas. Other factors to be considered are the 
role of 'social' or 'psychic' distance, reflecting the different socio-
cultural characteristics of different areas and the strength of 
11. supra,fn.13. 
12. G.A.P. Carrothers, 'An Historical Review of the Gravity and Potential 
Concepts of Human Interaction',Journal of the American Institute of 
Planners,22(1956). Also see, W.Isard, Methods of Regional Analysis 
(Cambridge, Massachusetts,1960),pp.67-9,493-544. 
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immediate environmental and family ties, or of Stouffer's 'intervening 
opportunities,.13 It seems that whatever indicator of distance is used, 
it is bound to represent a variety of influences of distance on mobility. 
The choice of one index rather than another would depend on the objectives 
of the investigator. 
Once the gravity model has been quantified it can be transformed to 
log-linear form and incorporated in a regression analysis, either in whole, 
as in Hart's earlier study which is concerned to explain the variance in 
migration that the unweighted gravity model fails to pick up, or so that 
the coefficients of each of its components can be determined. For example, 
the latter course would give us, 
I 10gM .. - log A + a log w.(P.) + f3 log w.(P.) - v log D.. (2). 1.J 1. 1. J J 1.J 
So far migration has been seen as a function of the various 
characteristics of particular areas in a static framework. The constants 
of the various models express the elasticity of movement with respect to 
particular variables. This will suggest the volume and direction of 
migratory flows but not the timing of response. That is, it may be 
the case that the greater the unemployment difference between region i 
and region j, the greater the expected migration. However, this is not 
13. S.A.Stouffer,'Intervening Opportunities: A Theory Relating 
MObility and Distance',American Sociological Review,5(1940). 
This states that,"the number of persons going a given distance 
is directly proportional to the number of opportunities at that 
distance and inversely proportional to the number of intervening 
opportunities". Some empirical support has been found for this 
hypothesis, for example, see Isard,op.cit.pp.538-41, and most 
recently, E.Mil1er, 'A Note on the Role of Distance in Migration: 
Costs of MObility versus Intervening Opportunities',Journal of 
Regional Science,12(1972). 
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to say that this migration ought to be expected within the same time-span 
as is under consideration. There are a number of lags to consider. If 
a 'push-pull' distinction is made then it might be hypothesized that in 
a region i, suffering severe structural depression, there is created a 
group of potential migrants. Potential migrants will then become actual 
migrants when conditions in the potential receiving areas become 
favourable and they have broken down the barriers to the realization of 
their movement potential. Such barriers might include the various costs 
of moving or the flow of information. 14 Thus, the trade cycle will 
combine with lagged responses to affect the timing of movements. 
The influence of cyclical variations is recognized by the inclusion 
in models of variables measuring employment opportunity. Lagged 
responses ma·~e measured by the denominator, D .. , in the gravity model. 
"Iu 1J 
Specific allowances have also been made for response lags. Ruth 
Fabricant postulates that movements are a function of the expected 
excess demand for labour gap between regions and introduceSa barrier 
function to allow for the relative slowness of response to an incentive 
to migrate. lS Lianos constructs a model where current migration is seen 
to be a function of a stock of potential migrants which is in turn a 
product of past wage differentials between regions. 16 
14. Of course, as conditions improve in the potential rece1v1ng areas, 
so it is probable that conditions would also improve in the region 
of origin. Thus, there will be leakages out of the group of 
potential migrants. 
15. R.A.Fabricant,'An Expectational MOdel of Migration',Journal of 
Regional Science,lO(l970). 
16. Lianos,op.cit. 
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The flow of information and the reduction of uncertainty concerning 
potential locations is a principal factor in causing these de1ays.17 One 
source of information flows is the stock of previous migrants in a potential 
receiving area. Greenwood argues that a failure to include a migrant 
stock variable in a regression analysis results in the direct influences 
of other variables being biased by picking up the influence of these past 
flows. Return migration is another source of such information. Return 
migrants, themselves, will be differently affected by these factors that 
elsewhere lead to uncertainty and lags in response. For them, the cost 
of movement is likely to be less, both in real and other terms. 
Perceived opportunities are likely to more closely approximate actual 
opportunities as information flows are superior. 18 
The discussion of the timing of migration has introduced an approach 
to migration analysis where the 'macro-theoretical' and behavioural 
approaches overlap. The consideration of social networks at the level 
of the individual lead to macro-models incorporating the influences of 
such factors. The failure of a macro-model to be an efficient predictor 
may lead the investigator to analyse influences at a disaggregated level 
to account for the disparity between his expectations and observations 
of reality. However, before leaving the consideration of lags the more 
common practice in research should be noted. This conceals lag 
structures in the quantification of the variables. In Hart's study of 
17. M.J.Greenwood,"An Analysis of the Determinants of Geographic Labour 
Mobility in the U.S.',op.cit.; M.J.Greenwood,'Lagged Response in the 
Decision to Migrate',op.cit. Also see, P.Nelson,'Migration, Real 
Income and Information',Journal of Regional Science,1(1959). 
18. These effects have been incorporated into a model of Canadian 
migration. See, J.Vanderkamp,'Interregional MObility in Canada: 
A Study of the Time Pattern of Migration', Canadian Journal of 
Economics, 1 (1968). 
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inter-regional migration, for example, explanatory variables are taken 
for the ten year period preceding the migration. A similar course was 
taken in Hart's study of county migration. From such a practice it can 
be concluded that past experience is a significant factor in migration 
decisions, yet it does hide the lagged structure of the push-pull 
. . 19 1nteract10n. 
Another field of particular interest is the differentiation of 
migration by categories of sex, age or skill. Again, the behavioural 
and 'macro-theoretical' approaches intertwine. The 'macro-theoretical' 
approach may be applied to various groups of the population but such 
attempts are rare, possibly because of data difficulties. 20 The only 
differentiation of any frequency is to analyse regions independently, 
perhaps after the formulation of a national model and with the objective 
19. Lags in the migration process may also be hidden by estimating 
migration over a period as a function of explanatory variables at 
the beginning of the period, for example, P.Drewe, 'Steps Towards 
Action-Oriented Migration Research', Papers and Proceedings of the 
Regional Science Association, 26 (1971). Weeden's data are averages 
for the period 1961-6. 
Of course, the failure to include lagged relationships between 
variables over time, may be a result of the difficulty in specifying 
such interrelationships and the least squares bias inherent in 
postulating migration as a function of unemployment or income. For 
example, see J.Johnston's comments on Oliver, op.cit. and W.F.Mazek, 
'Unemployment and the Efficacy of Migration: The Case of Laborers' , 
Journal of Regional Science,9(1969). However, the use of average 
values may lessen the forecasting value of a model. See, A.Rogers, 
op.cit. 
20. Oliver, op.cit. does differentiate between male and female 
migration. Weeden confines himself to the male population aged 
15-64. For a recent study on U.S. data see, C.E.Trott, 
'Differential Responses in the Decision to Migrate', pa~er8 and 
Proceedings of the Regional Science Association, 28(191 )cf. 
Roaers,op.cit. and A.Roaers, Matrix Anal sis of Interre ional 
Population Growth and Distributlon Callfornla, 1968 ,pp.92-l10. 
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of examining divergencies in terms of local characteristics of the 
1 · d 21 popu at10n an economy. 
Behavioural studies are now examined. Given the variety of 
influences on migration, macro-models cannot hope to achieve generality. 
Further, they do not reveal very much about the actual process of decision-
making and migration. Consequently, a number of studies have begun at 
this end of the spectrum. One means is to view migration as an investment, 
arguing that the higher the expected rate of return on a move, the more 
likely that move will be made. 22 Another deals with the 'friends and 
relatives effects', which has been discussed in analysing the time-
pattern of migration. There are also a number of probability approaches 
. . h 1 d h . f' l' d 1 23 to m1grat10n t at ea on to t e construct10n 0 S1mu at10n mo e s. 
One attempt in this area has concerned the interaction of duration of 
residence and age in influencing the likelihood of migration. 24 These 
latter approaches are relatively recent and promise a better explanation 
of the actual processes underlying the aggregates that are generally 
21. See 01iver,op.cit.; R.A.Hart, 'The Economic Influences on Internal 
Labour Force Migration', op.cit. 
22. L.A.Sjaastad,'The Costs and Returns of Human Migration', Journal of 
Political Economy, 70 (1962); S.Bow1es, 'Migration as Investment: 
Empirical Tests of the Human Investment approach to Geographic 
MObility', Review of Economics and Statistics, 52(1970); 
Vande rk amp , op.cit. 
23. J. Wo1pert,'Behaviol'al. Aspects of the Decision to Migrate', 
Pa ers and Proceedin s of the Re iona1 Science Association, 
15 1965),159-60. 
24. P.A.MOrrison,'Duration of Residence and Prospective Migration: 
The Evaluation of a Stochastic Model', Demography,4(1967); 
K.C.Land,'Duration of Residence and Prospective Migration: 
Further Evidence', Demography,6(1969). 
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described by gravity models and various socio-economic variables. A 
better synthesis of the 'macro-theoretical' and behavioural approaches is 
the next objective of current work in this field. 
Finally, a postscript on the interdependence of commuting and 
migration is necessary.25 The net migration data of Chapter 2 is based 
on changes of residence, and so at the sub-regional level many counted mi-
gration moves will have been motivated by factors not covered in the 
previous discussion. For example, suburban migration may be motivated 
by the desire for a better environment, a suburban home or greater access 
to open space. Such a move may not involve a change in employment 
location and will not be related to the variables suggested such as 
income, employment growth or relative unemployment. Similarly, 
communities suffering from relatively high unemployment may experience 
'out-commuting' as well as out-migration and thus any model that ignores 
these influences will over-predict migration movements. 
II 
Contemporary research is now examined. Section I has shown that not 
only are there a number of separate and complementary approaches to the 
analysis of factors leading to migration, but that there are a great 
number of possible influences. Such influences are evident in this 
historical context. Some contemporary comments will be presented before 
proceeding to describe the principal model-building attempts of the 
period. 
25. L.Yapa, M.Po1ese, J.Wo1pert, 'Interdependencies of Commuting, 
Migration and Job Site Relocation', Economic Geography, 47 (1971); 
J.B.Holmes, 'Linkages between External Commuting and Out-Migration: 
Evidence from Middle-Eastern Pennsylvania', Economic Geography,48(1972). 
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Jewkes and Winterbottom observed that out-migration from Cumberland 
, h h' h 26 and Furness was heav1est were unemployment percentages were 19. In 
South Wales in the 1920's, rates of population loss by migration varied 
with the severity of depression within the area which in turn was 
27 determined by the geographical distribution of various coal resources. 
In Lancashire, migration loss also varied with the severity of 
28 
unemployment. It was widely accepted that unemployment was a 'push' 
factor, or at least was acting as a proxy for the effects of economic 
d ,29 epreSS10n. "In general, the more depressed the region the greater 
the tendency to emigrate.,,30 
26. J.Jewkes and A.Winterbottom, An Industrial Survey of Cumberland 
and Furness (Manchester,1933),p.27. 
27. Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of South Wales, (by the 
University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire) (1932), 
Appendix 2,p.7. 
28. Board of Trade, An Industrial Surve of Lancashire, (by the 
University of Manchester) 1932 ,p.85 cf. J.Jewkes, 'Mobility 
of Labour and the Localisation of Industry', Transactions of the 
Manchester Statistical Society (1932-3),114. 
29. See also, North East Development Association, Migration: A Study 
of Movement of Po ulation and its effects on the North East 
Newcastle,1950 ,p.13 ; A.D.K. Owen, Soc1al Consequenc es of 
Industrial Transference', Sociological Review, 29 (1937),333 
J.Jewkes, op.cit. p.112. 
30 • R. M. Ti tmus s ,.:.P;;ov.::.;e:.:rrt~':;:;;~:...:J~~~.::.:.~;;-:;.;;..;;..;;;..;;;=.....;S~t;.;u;;;,;;d4-.;:;o.;:.f 
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The attractive power of the receiving regions was thus seen in 
terms of the relative absence of depression and unemployment. A more 
favourable industrial structure and faster growth provided expanding 
opportunities for employment. Movement was also related to the trade 
cycle; neither spontaneous migration nor the Government's Transference 
policy31 could be pursued when cyclical depression had the effect of 
making absorption into the active labour force of the receiving areas more 
difficult. For example, Jewkes and Winterbottom noted that a general 
improvement of conditions in the country would enable transference policy 
to make inroads on the problems of surplus labour. 32 There was less 
inclination to move southwards when depression was widespread, but with 
differing regional rates of recovery, the volume of inter-regional 
• •• d 33 A 1\.._ ." • • f 1 d • m1grat10n 1ncrease • s vwun put 1t, 1n t1mes 0 genera epress10n 
most people tend to stay at home even though they may be living in 
particularly distressed areas. In times of returning general 
'prosperity' many people living in areas which are still relatively 
depressed tend to seek their fontunes elsewhere".34 Such observations 
applied to assisted migrants in particular as the Government's scheme 
d · d b d f' • • 35 was om1nate y movements to e 1n1te vacanC1es. 
31. infra,Chapter 4. 
32. Jewkes and Wiuterbottom, op.cit. p.39. 
33. Titmuss, op.cit. p.282. 
34. Owen, op.cit. p.336 
35. infra, Chapters 4,5. 
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If the respective attractive and repelling forces seemed clear to 
contemporaries, this was even more true of their appreciation of the 
factors which lessened the flow of migrants between areas. It was in 
response to these inhibitory factors to migration that the Government's 
f h • •• d 36 trans erence sc eme was 1n1t1ate • If the volume of movement could be 
made greater, then more progress towards the elimination of disparities 
in regional unemployment would be achieved. Thus, assistance in the 
form of loans and grants towards travelling and removal expenses, 
assistance in finding employment and lodgings, subsidies towards juvenile 
wage rates and various training schemes all represented attempts to 
overcome particular factors that deterred migration at the margin. 
These forms of encouragement might all be related to the sorts of 
influences that were discussed in section I. Assistance with the costs 
of movement did something to reduce the strength of the inverse 
relation between migration and distance. The facilities of the 
Employment Exchange service did much to remove uncertainty, at least 
in respect of employment opportunities. Further, training schemes could 
adapt workers to new occupations and remove the deteriorating effects 
of long unemployment on the individual which made him less suitable 
for employment and less willing to consider such opportunities. 
Distance, age, sex, family ties, skill and the distribution of 
alternative opportunities were all seen as influences on migration. 
The importance of the distance factor is illustrated by the fact that 
of the in-migrants to Oxford by July 1936, 4,154 had originated within 
36. infra, Chapter 4. 
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50 miles of the city, 3,292 between 50 and 100 miles and 2,222 from 
areas over 100 miles away.37 In other cases, occupational similarities 
linked areas together despite the distance between them. One such 
instance was the migration of coal miners from various northern pits 
to the Kent coalfield. The University College of South Wales and 
M h h ' d rob f' h' b 'f ,,38 onmout s lre note a nu er 0 ln 1 ltory actors to mlgratlon. 
"It is clear that since so great a volume of migration and 
transfer has already taken place, the surplus which still 
remains within the region must consist largely of persons 
whom it is especially difficult to transfer. Married men 
with dependents; men who own their own houses; men and 
women who do not possess the youth and energy or the robust 
self-confidence which would help them to uproot themselves 
from familiar surroundings and settle among strangers; 
Welsh speaking persons who would find themselves in an alien 
environment in England; men whom prolonged unemployment has 
rendered physically unfit to take up regular work ••• " 
Brinley Thomas also listed impediments to migration within the South 
W 1 If ' 1 d d h' b'l" h' 39 a es coa le d an contraste t lS to mo 1 lty ln Lancas lre. 
Unemployment benefit was found to be a common factor. Generally, poor 
relief and unemployment benefit were thought to be factors contributing 
, b'l' 40 to lmmo 1 lty. Another general influence was the housing shortage in 
the non-depressed areas, which by putting prices and rents up, operated 
37. Survey of the Social Services of Oxford and District (1938-40) 
1,p.55,pp.290-4. 
38. Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of S.Wales,op.cit. pp.152-3. 
39. B.Thomas,'Labour Mobility in the South Wales and Monmouthshire 
Coal Mining Industry, 1920-30' t Economic Journal,4l (1931); 
J.Jewkes and H.Campion, 'The Mobility of Labour in the Cotton 
Industry't Economic Journal, 38 (1928). 
40. For example, Industrial Transference Board. Report (ParI. 
Papers, 1928, X),p.18 ; S.R.Dennison, The Location of Industry 
and the Depressed Areas (1939),p.186. 
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, h' , d f f h f f 'I' 41 against t e likelihoo 0 more permanent trans er, t at 0 ami les, 
Higher rents in Kent than in older mining areas was one factor amongst 
those inhibiting transfer between coalfields. 42 House ownership was 
h 'd' 43 anot er lmpe iment. However, the Ministry of Labour doubted whether 
the housing shortage was an obstacle to the success of its schemes, 
except in a few cases. It observed that "the great majority of the 
families we transfer are able to find accommodation without special 
difficulty". 44 
A variety of factors tended to make migration difficult. A factor 
that tended on occasion to make it easier were influences of the 
'friends and relatives type', affecting information flows and the 
degree of certainty.45 In Chapter 9 information flows are illustrated 
where the net result for migration was, in the first cases, to inhibit it, 
and in the second, to encourage it. Uncertainty may be diminished with 
the flow of information, but that information may not be in favour of 
migration. For example, the following is a letter from a trainee in a 
Government Training Centre in the south to a member of the sample 
population covered by the Pilgrim Trust Unemployment Inquiry. 
41. P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme - General Review 1938 
LAB 8/218. 
42. P.R.O. East Kent Coalfield. Recruitment of Labour and Conditions 
in the Coalfield. LAB 2/l298/ITB 120. 
43. House ownership was not found to be an impediment in Crook. 
Pilgrim Trust, Men Without Work (Cambridge,1938),p.79. 
44. P.R.O. Scheme for body to build or acquire houses for purpose 
of assisting family transference. LAB 23/139. 
45. P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme - General Review, op.cit. 
Of course, such information flows might also deter migration, 
for example, the case of the Snowdown Colliery in Kent. 
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"You'11 think I've been a long time wri ting but I've had a lot 
to write home. I hope you are keeping well and having a bit better 
luck. Don't think of coming down here, its lousy. The bloke who 
came down with me has gone home, I am supposed to be learning 
sheet metal work, and I've been here 6 weeks and I can't make a 
blacking tin yet. You'd be surprised if you were down here. 
They say they can get a 3 quid a week job any time, but don't 
believe it, one chap went after a job to a brick ground and 
they offered him 30s. a week to work 12 hours a day. We get 
decent food at our digs but we haven't much room to eat it, 
there are 11 of us round a table made for 6. Well, Jim, I've 
been wondering how you going on at • • , have they won the cup. 
There are BOO men down here and I haven't seen one from •• 
yet. I have been teetotal here, the beer's wicked we go to the 
pictures nearly every night. Well Jim don't advise anyone to 
come. When a chap has done his 6 months they find some of them 
jobs but there isn't one out of ten lasts a month and then they 
only get ten pence an hour. Well Jim, I can't find any more to 
say, so I will close wishing you46 the best of luck, and hoping you give Littlewoods a tanning." 
Returnees could be similarly discouraging. A Liverpool mother reported 
to the Inquiry that, "my girl was offered a post as canteen worker in 
London but I did not dare let her go because a girl from the neighbouring 
h h d d d " h "th the baby".47 ouse went t ere, was se uce , an 1S now ome W1 
In contrast, the information flow might be conducive to further 
migration. Hare and Michaels noted that "when a person moves to London 
from the country, the part of London to which he goes seems very often 
to be determined by the fact that relatives or friends already live 
there".48 Again, the Ministry of Labour were aware of this sort of 
connection. 
46. Pilgrim Trust, op.cit. p.226. 
47. ibid. p.262. 
48. London School of Economics, The New Survey of London Life and Labour 
(1934),6,p.239. 
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"For example, it was stated that one family which had been 
removed from Cwmamaa: • • had been responsible for the 
removal of 36 other families from Cwmaman to that district." 
"An applicant from Heywood, Lancs. who had been placed on a 
job in Birmingham, was stated to have been promoted foreman 
of that job and to have been instrumental in securing the 
transfer of from 80 t04~00 men from Heywood to that job during 
the course of a year." 
Contemporaries were aware of the principal factors encouraging 
migration and of those influences which inhibited migratory flows. Both 
'macro-theoretical' and behavioural influences on migration were 
acknowledged. The attempts to incorporate these influences in models 
of migration such as those shown in section I were carried out 
predominantly at the Institute of Statistics at Oxford. This work 
needs to be described at some length. Its conclusions are important 
as they suggest the factors underlying the differing patterns of labour 
movement described in Chapter 2. Even if an explanation of the factors 
influencing labour mobility were the principal objective of this thesis, 
then the existence of this work would tend to make an involvement in 
model-building to explain past labour movements unnecessary. 
A study based on migration into Oxford was the starting point of 
this important work. 50 It was expected, ceteris paribus, that 
migration into Oxford would be greater, the greater the difference in 
49. P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme - General Review,op.cit. 
50. H.Makower, J.Marschak, H.W.Robinson, 'Studies in Mobility of Labour: 
A Tentative Statistical Measure', Oxford Economic Papers, No.1 
(1938) • 
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prosperity between Oxford and other areas. Unemployment rates were 
selected as an index of prosperity.51 But an allowance had to be made 
for differences in "potential migrants" between areas; a more complex 
relation than one simply relating differences in unemployment with 
d ' ff '" 'd 52 1 erences 1n m1grat10n was necess1tate • 
Thus where, 
M = no. of in-migrants from a given county ~o Oxford each year, 
a = no. of insured workers in the county, 
b = no. of insured workers in Oxford, 
ua = annual average unemployed amongst county's insured workforce, 
and, 
ub - annual average unemployment amongst Oxford's insured workforce, 
M ub 
coefficient of mobility, A • ------------
(ua-ub)ab 
then, a 
• • • (3). 
This may be rearranged to give migration as the left-hand term of the 
equation. That is, 
M • ' (ua-ub)ab (3 ) A ub • •• a. 
Further, an attempt was made to include a distance variable in the model 
as it was clear that the mobility coefficient varied with distance from 
Oxford. 53 Thus where, 
51. Other indices were considered. ibid. pp.89-92, including earnings 
disparities. 
52. For example, equal unemployment rates in Rutland and Lancashire 
would not lead us to expect equal migration. ibid.p.93. 
53. The correlation coefficients on the basis of different data on 
migration were 0.82 and 0.72 and the regression coefficients, 
measuring the influence of distance on mobility, were between 1.6 
and 2.1, showing that the influence was not very different from 
year to year or as between types of labour. H.Makower et aI, 
op.cit.pp.lOO,l06. 
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DV = distance of the county from Oxford with the exponent 
equal to the regression coefficient of mobility on 
distance, then, 
M ub DV 
~ = (ua-ub) ab 
• • • (4) 
In terms of migration this expression becomes, 
M = ~ (ua-ub) ab 
ub DV 
••• (4a), 
which is a variant of the simple gravity model discussed in section I. 
This model was fitted with data on migration to Oxford. Women were 
less mobile than men,54 but not necessarily any more deterred by the 
influence of distance. 55 The mobility of those unemployed for over 
twelve months amongst Welshmen was about half that of the rest of the 
56 
unemployed. It was shown that Owen's hypothesis on the impact of the 
57 trade cycle on migration could be supported. The introduction of lags 
into the models of mobility suggested that the appropriate time-lag 
between the incentive to move and migration was less than six months. 
The examination of abnormally high or low mobilities revealed that 
counties with low mobilities had a high proportion of textile workers, 
54. ibid.pp.107,109. This conclusion only held if female movement 
was compared with total unemployment rates; the justification 
being that women's decisions were based on family considerations. 
55. ibid.p.109. 
56. ibid.p.lIO. 
57. supra,fn.34. 
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of workers in metal industries or mining and a low proportion of 
workers in agriculture, personal service, building and public 
d .. . 58 .. 1 a m1n1strat1on. Generally, the analys1s of occupat10na structures 
suggested that migration was less likely from groups with highly 
specific skills and more likely from other groups to whom Oxford's 
motor industry offered an attraction with its automation and process-
. 59 construct10n. 
Armed with this methodology and conclusions specific to migration 
into Oxford, a national study was then made. 60 The terms of model (3) 
were redefined in accordance with a study of net migration between 
. d d' .. 61 AI' h' f d b d count1es an 1V1S1ons. re at10ns 1p was oun etween moves an 
the incentive term for each year, 1927-36. At the county level it was 
concluded "that long period variations in relative unemployment over 
time do lead to similar variations in percentage migration, but that 
for most counties this relation does not always hold good for year-to-
58. ibid.pp.l14,116. 
59. ibid.p.ll6. Also see the comments on migration to the State of 
Michigan in B.Okun and R.W.Richardson, 'Regional Income 
Inequality and Internal Population Migration', Economic Development 
and Cultural Change,9 (1961), reprinted in J. Friedmann and 
W.Alonso (eds),Re ional Develo ment and Plannin: A Reader 
(Cambridge,Massachusetts, 1964 ,p.3l6. 
60. H.Makower, J.Marschak, R.W.Robinson, 'Studies in Mobility of 
Labour: Analysis for Great Britain, Part I', Oxford Economic 
Papers, No.2 (1939); H.Makower, J.Marschak, R.W.Robinson, 
'Studies in Mobility of Labour: Analysis for Great Britain, 
Part II', Oxford Economic Papers, No.4 (1940). (referred to 
subsequently as OEP 1939 and OEP 1940). 
61. OEP 1939,p.80. For example, M now becomes net migration and 
this is related to unemployment within the county and 
unemployment in the rest of the country. Because of the inability 
to specify origins and destinations, a distance variable was not 
incorporated in this model. 
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year fluctuations".62 A similar relationship was found at the 
Ministry of Labour Divisional Area level. The best relationship was 
found when a six month lag was introduced between the incentive and 
migration. 63 The analysis of movements for given periods of time 
showed, in the case of county movements, that migration was proportional 
to the incentive to move and that average mobility was slightly less 
1931-6 than 1927-31. In contrast, in the case of Ministry of Labour 
regions, a threshold existed where in spite of some incentive to move, 
no migration occurred. It was thought that -for 'long distance' 
movements a large initial push is necessary to start migration, whereas 
for 'short distance' movements migration starts more easi1y".64 The 
examination of the impact of distance at the national level revealed 
that it was the major influence on differing mobilities between 
regions. 65 The impact of differing industrial structures was examined 
and it was shown that Northumberland and Durham men had higher 
mobilities for areas with a high percentage of the workforce engaged 
, " d 1 ' d ' 66 l' '1 d 1n m1n1ng an meta 1n ustr1es. Coa m1ners most eaS1 y move to 
h f " b' k d'l d 1 ' d ' 67 Th ot er types 0 m1n1ng, r1C an t1 e an meta 1n ustr1es. us, 
62. 
63. 
ibid.p.83. 
ibid. pp.83-5. 
lag of between 
statistics are 
64. ibid. p.90. 
65. OEP 1940, p.41. 
66. ibid.p.47. 
67. ibid.pp.49,50. 
The character of the data involves a possible 
six and eighteen months as the incentive 
annual averages. 
151 
relative unemployment was found to be an influence on migration, as 
was distance. As with the Oxford study, migration varied with the 
trade cycle so that the impact of depression was to lessen mobility, 
particularly over long distances. The significance of industrial 
structures for spatial movement patterns was again seen, but nothing 
could be added on the influence of age and sex on migration, although 
the direction of impact was well known. 
A number of complementary studies expanded and reinforced these 
conclusions. Daniel examined Welshmen in Oxford to determine the 
impact of various factors on the delay that occurred between becoming 
68 
unemployed and finding new employment. The same author also 
analysed the influence of age on migration. 69 A variety of accounts 
dealt with the question of lags between a given incentive to migrate 
70 
and the actual movement and its variation over the trade cycle. 
68. G.H.Daniel,'Some Factors Affecting the Movement of Labour', 
Oxford Economic Papers, No.3 (1940). 
69. G.H.Daniel, 'Labour Migration and Age Composition', 
Sociological Review, 31 (1939). The Industrial Transference 
Board had considered that older workers were likely to be less 
mobile • Industrial Transference Board. Report,op.cit.p.32. 
Also see R.Titmuss,op.cit. pp.284-S; North East Development 
Association, op.cit.p.ll. 
70. R.S.Walshaw, Migration to and from Merseyside (Liverpool,1938); 
Owen, op.cit. p.336 ; R.S.Walshaw, 'Time Lag in the Recent 
Migration Movements within Great Britain', Sociological Review, 
30 (1938) ; OEP 1939, op.cit. p.8S ; G.H.Daniel, 'Some Factors 
Affecting the Movement of Labour',op.cit. p.lS8. The weight of 
opinion seemed to favour a short lag of well under six months. 
This contrasts with Makower et aI's conclusions on a national 
basis but can be reconciled given that the migration statistics 
depended on the electoral register and some delay between 
movement and registration seemed likely. This concensus differs 
from Walshaw's views, perhaps for this reason and because only 
one member of a family may move with employment opportunities, 
the remainder following at a later date. 
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To conclude this section, a further postscript deals with the 
factors that influence out-migration from a central city residence 
to the suburbs. In section I these general influences have been 
mentioned. In the previous chapter, an indication of the relevant 
factors in connection with the Greater London area were described. 
Broadly, a move may have reflected a desire for a suburban environment, 
the job location remaining the same and commuting distance increasing, 
or, labour migration might be following factory migration or suburban 
employment growth with the objective of reducing the journey to work. 
It seemed that the former case was more typical and Hare and Michaels 
saw "migration out of London • • /8.s_7 •• largely of short distance 
movements in search of a new l~tlieu".71 Herbert Morrison thought, 
"the main motive for the movement of population from the 
county outwards is quite simple. On the whole it is in 
most cases that people are seeking to live under 
conditions that they conceive to be more pleasant, with 
greater amenity and with more space and light and air 
about them, and to get rather more modern than the older-
fashioned conditions that72xist in a very large proportion 
of the County of London". 
This comment might well be taken as holding for the other conurbations. 
III 
In conclusion, and in the absence of a statistical analysis to 
determine the influences on the migration data of Chapter 2, the 
answers to the questions raised by that Chapter must be suggested. 
Migration was selective with respect to age, sex and skill becau8e, 
71. London School of Economics, op.cit.p.260. 
72. Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the 
Industrial Population. Minutes of Evidence of London County 
Council, 16 Feb. 1938, Q.3201. 
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the Ministry of Labour's Transference scheme was selective in its 
choice of transferees for particular vacancies. To ensure a greater 
likelihood of success, a younger worker would be selected. In turn, 
this may have also resulted in the transferee being unmarried, with 
no dependents, without a house of his own, and possibly one of the 
shorter unemployed. Such factors would also operate in the case of 
spontaneous migration. Selectivity with respect to sex would operate 
in favour of men, in particular on works schemes. The migration of 
older women would tend to be linked with that of their husbands and, 
besides, the vacancies for female labour in the expanding factory and 
distributive trades could be filled by drawing local labour into the 
workforce. There was also a particular reluctance on the behalf of 
parents to allow young single girls to move away from home and, 
consequently, most such moves were to domestic service. Skill would 
be a less important factor, given the nature of most vacancies. 
Adaptability was the chief requirement, although a highly specific 
skill might be coupled with a reluctance or inability to take a 
semi- or unskilled position. 
The timing of labour movements was related to the timing of 
push-pull factors. Potential migrants would result from differences 
in prosperity between areas and the actual move would take place 
after a certain lag, dependent on the speed of information flows, the 
breakdown of inertia, and the accumulation of sufficient funds to 
enable the move to be made. In turn, this would be related to the 
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trade cycle, representing the supply of employment opportunities. 
Chapter 4 shows that the official transference scheme was deliberately 
pursued with less vigour at the bottom of the cycle. 
By implication, the greater volume of flows after 1929 must 
represent the influence of the combination of push and pull factors. 
Similarly, the higher proportion of long distance moves in this period 
r fl h .. f 73 e ects t e greater incentive or such moves. The apparent absence 
of a polarization of labour movements in Scotland in the 1930's may be 
a product of errors in the statistics,74 or a reflection of the 
importance of the border. Great Britain may not be the relevant unit 
in which to examine internal population flows, but rather England and 
Wales as one group, and Scotland as another. The absence of a unit of 
attraction as important as London and the South East within Scotland 
may provide the explanation. 
However, in the absence of a statistical analysis, these conclusions 
must be tentative. The fact that they might remain tentative even after 
such an analysis was undertaken is one defence for not following such a 
course. 
73. This suggests that the impact of the general depression was to 
breakdown inertia that had restricted movements in the 1920's. 
perhaps by destroying the hope that the export trades could be 
restored to their former prosperity. However. the depression 
itself did not allow such movements to take place until the later 
years of the decade. 
74. supra, Chapter 2. The 1920's estimates are very unreliable. 
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B. GOVERNMENT POLICY AND THE REGIONAL PROBLEM 
CHAPTER 4 
The Introduction of Industrial Transference. 
I 
A chronological account of the introduction and development of 
transference policy is the subject of this section. 
Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland, the Minister of Labour, referred to 
the problem of unemployment in the coal mining industry in a memorandum 
to the Cabinet in November 1927. 1 He argued that, 
"the seriousness of the unemployment position in coal 
mining lies in its concentration rather than its 
extent. Out of 223,000 registered as unemployed, 
approximately 90,000 are on short time • •• The 
wholly unemployed are approximately 130,000. 
Proportionately to the insured population in the 
industry this rate of unemployment is not higher 
than other industries have experienced and if the 
unemployment were more evenly distributed over 
the coalfields the situation would not arouse the 
same commen t • "2 
Therefore, "the chief hope of relieving unemployment in the industry lies 
1. P.R.O. Unemployment in the Coal Mining Industry. Memorandum by 
the Minister of Labour. CP 295(27). 23 Nov. 1927. CAB 24/189. 
A leader in the Glasgow Herald, 12 Nov.1927, argued for "special 
schemes to develop the mobility of labour" and Sir A.Mand had, on 
the 21 Nov. 1927 , suggested "a scheme for increasing the mobility 
of personnel in the coal industry • • to encourage • • • the worker 
leaving a district where he cannot find work for one where he 
might • • • to other industries and to other parts of the Empire". 
Letter to The Times, 21 Nov.1927. The Ministry of Labour had also 
argued for transfer in 1926. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report 
for the year 1926 (Parl.Papera,1927,X),p.23. 
2. My emphasis. 
in the absorptive power of other industries. For this power to 
operate, however, two conditions are necessary. First, the other 
industries must themselves be in a fairly prosperous state, and, second, 
the miners must be brought into touch with those other industries. ,,3 
This policy had already begun. Transfers of men from the northern 
coalfields to other coalfields had commenced and there was also a drift 
from coal mining into other industries. The Minister proposed to use 
the Employment Exchange machinery to facilitate this transfer, especially 
f · . f 4 o Juven11es rom the worst-off areas. Concentrated unemployment was 
pOlitically embarassing to the Government and this was the motivation 
behind Stee1-Mait1and's proposals. 
The Cabinet agreed to set up a committee "to consider the general 
question of unemployment in the coal trade, including the problem of 
. . . ,,5 
m1grat1ng m1ners • At the committee's first meeting on the 2 December 
1927, the Minister of Health (Neville Chamberlain) outlined the method 
to be adopted in implementing the policy proposed by the Minister of 
Labour. 6 
3. P.R.O. Unemployment in the Coal Mining Industry. op.cit. This 
suggests that perhaps the spread of unemployment was not the 
objective, cf. £n.2. 
4. ibid. The establishment of more training centres was hoped to 
speed up the process of disintegration of concentrated unemployment. 
Overseas migration was another instrument. 
5. P.R.O. Cabinet Conclusions. Cabinet 59(27)4, 30 Nov. 1927. 
CAB 23/55. 
6. ibid. Report, Proceedings and Memoranda of the Cabinet Committee 
on Unemployment in the Coal Trade. 1927. CAB 27/358. 
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"The Minister of Health said that the plan which he now 
proposed to outline would have a certain dramatic 
effect in political circles. He proposed to treat the 
situation in the coalfields as an emergency problem, 
and to give power to the Ministry of Labour to schedule 
black spots in special areas, and set up a new ad hoc 
central authority of three commissioners whose sole 
business it should be to try and transfer redundant 
labour from those areas. Such a body could not make 
work, but it would have some practical advantages. It 
would have nothing else to do; it would be new and 
attract attention; it would be independent of anyone 
Department but could enlist the help of all; it would 
have a better jumping-off ground for approaching the 
captains of industry and enlisting their co-operation 
than would the Ministry of Labour. It should perhaps 
have a business man at its head; it would be appointed 
for a limited period; it would need some funds; it 
would act through the machinery of the Ministry of 
Labour in transferring people and applying the 
necessary safeguards; it could be set up quickly and 
start dealing with the problem at once."7 
An Interim Report was drafted incorporating these proposals. The only 
reservation was from the President of the Board of Education who con-
sidered that some action should also be taken to encourage the location 
of new industries in the coalfield areas. He thought that rating relief 
Would be a sufficient inducement; Chamberlain disagreed. 8 
The Report aimed at the dispersal of the surplua labour to areas 
where employment was available. It favoured some measure "which will 
have the double effect of convincing the country that the Government is 
earnestly grappling with the problem of surplus labour in congested areas, 
and at the same time of enlisting the active co-operation of the public 
departments, of employers and of voluntary agencies in the task of 
-
7. Original emphasis. 
8. P.R.O. Report, Proceedings • • .etc. CAB 27/358. 
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training and transferring it elsewhere". 9 Hence, the King's speech 
annolUlced that "a Board is to be appointed to recommend the executive 
action to be taken by the Departments concerned,,10 and on 6 January 1928 
Sir Warren Fisher, Sir John Cadman and Sir David Shackleton were 
appointed to the Board "for the purposes of facilitating the transfer 
of workers and in particular of miners, for whom opportlUlities of employ-
ment in their own district or occupation are no longer available". 11 
No longer were miners only to be considered. However, the aims of 
policy had already been decided and the Board were only to recommend 
methods of implementing and popularizing those aims. As they stated in 
their Report, "we have accepted as a fact the existence of a problem of 
surplus labour in certain industries, requiring to be dealt with by 
transfer". 12 
The Board chose to concentrate on the problem in the coal mining 
industry. They estimated a permanent surplus of 200,000 and guessed 
that this figure would have to be increased to accolUlt for the surplus in 
shipbuilding, iron and steel and heavy engineering. They also confirmed 
the localized character of the surplus. Large blocks of unemployed 
existed in the coalfields of Northumberland and Durham, South Wales and 
Scotland. Serious local problems from 'pockets' of unemployment arose 
9. ibid. Comudttee on Unemployment in the Coal Trade. Interim 
Report. CP 302(27). 5 Dec.1927. CAB 24/190. 
10. ibid. King's speech. CP 315(27). 22 Dec 1927. CAB 24/190. 
This was previously announced by Sir P.Cunliffe-Lister in a debate 
in the House of Commons on 7 Dec.1927. The Times, 8 Dec.1927. 
11. Industrial Transference Board. Report. (P.P.,1928,X),p.2. 
12. ibid. p.5. 
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in East Lancashire, the Forest of Dean, Cannock Chase in the Midlands 
and elsewhere. The remedy for this situation "should be the dispersal 
of the heavy concentrations of unemployment by the active encouragement 
of movement from the depressed areas to other areas, both in this 
country and overseas", 13 but certain difficulties stood in the way of 
this aim. 
Coal miners were strongly tied to their local communities. No 
industry that required heavy labour was expanding fast enough to absorb 
the surplus and those industries that were expanding, such as electrical 
engineering, artificial silk, printing and publishing or motor manufacture, 
had a low labour-output ratio. Neither was there an area of Britain 
that was completely free from unemployment. 
Several recommendations were nevertheless advanced. 
Firstly, "grants of assistance such as those made by the Unemploy-
ment Grants Committee jibe Board note4) • • • are a 
negation of the policy which ought in our opinion to 
be pursued • • • we are clear that the continuance or 
stimulation of their activities would merely retain the 
unemployed in the depressed areas and put further 
financial burdens on local authorities already very hard hit. 
If works of this kind are to be undertaken at all, they 
should be undertaken in areas where employment generally 
is good, so that they might provide work for unemployed 
from the depressed areas, with ultimate chances of 
permanent absorption into industry."14 
This recommendation was subsequently adopted. Secondly, the work of the 
Employment Exchanges in the sphere of placing rather than insurance was 
to be publicised with the hope that a greater proportion of employers 
13. ibid. p.16. 
14. ibid. p.18. 
fn.25. 
On the Unemployment Grants Committee. see infra 
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would be encouraged to use these facilities. Thirdly, Training Centres 
were to be increased in number, although direct transfer was thought to 
be vital if an impact on the surplus was to be made. Fourthly, a 
variety of financial aids were also commended, including the advance of 
fares, advances towards the cost of removal expenses of families and 
towards the maintenance of families of married men who temporarily took 
up residence in other areas. Finally, land settlement schemes were 
advocated for the older men who might not be susceptible to training 
. . 15 or m1grat10n. 
Generally, a transfer policy "can be made to produce the absorption 
of many, to open up more chances, and to distribute more equally the 
incidence and burden of unemployment". 16 The measures outlined above 
were one means of encouraging such results, but the chief emphasis seems 
to have been on appeals for co-operation. As the Board put it, "State 
agencies and State action can help, but the problem of unemployment in 
the depressed industries is one which can only be solved if the whole 
community realise. its existence and consciously resolves to grapple 
with it" .17 The Report was endorsed by the Minister of Labour who agreed 
15. The Board's recommendations for encouraging overseas migration 
included the reduction of shipping rates, governmental assistance, 
the simplification of formalities and the co-operation of Empire 
Governments. This topic is outside the scope of this thesis. 
16. Industrial Transference Board, op.cit.p.20. The Minister of Labour 
noted that the Board "do not boggle at the fact that complete 
absorption of the surplus in the immediate future cannot be hoped 
for, and that a transfer policy will mean to some extent a redistri-
bution of unemployment. They regard this as on balance a gain." 
P.R.O. Report of Industrial Transference Board. Memorandum by 
the Minister of Labour. CP 206(28). 29 June 1928. CAB 24/196. 
17. Industrial Transference Board t op.cit.p.28. Original emphasis. 
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that "the first ftmction of the State is to ensure free play for the 
forces making for transfer". 18 
Reaction to the Board's Report was generally favourable. The 
Glasgow Herald thought it "dolorous in respect of facts, but far from 
d •• " 19 epress1ng 1n tone It agreed that "ordinary remedies will not 
suffice, and heroic measures must be adopted. Even the transfer of a 
whole community may be imposed by circumstances, and no one will seek to 
minimise the implications; labour has always been most difficult to move, 
despite the asserverations of the early political economists ••• ".20 
Opposition to such possibilities was foreshadowed when it was noted that 
although the proposals were "in every case scientific • • • they may 
appear to the sentimental to be at times almost callous". 21 The 
President of the Glasgow Chamber of Commerce at a quarterly meeting "made 
no objection to the study of the question of transference of population, 
but he believed that for them here to accept the position indicated in 
the report and do no more was not a solution but a confession of defeat". 22 
18. P.R.O. Report of Industrial Transference Board, op.cit. 
19. Glasgow Herald, 24 July 1928. Also see ~he Times,24 Ju~y 1928 -
"Taken altogether the Board's report has the great menta of candour 
and courage. It advances no heroic proposals, for there is none to 
make; but all its suggestions are simple and immediately possible." -
and The Economist, 28 July 1928. Critical Parliamentary reaction 
saw the report as a condemnation of the Government's past policy. 
Looking forward, some critics centred on the fact that it did not 
appear to propose an employment policy and hence there was pressure 
for works schemes. See the reports in The Times, 25 & 26 July, 1928. 
20. Glasgow Herald,op.cit. 
21. ibid. 
22. ibid. 31 July,1928. 
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He wanted heavy industry restored to its former prosperity. The 
Government's simultaneous announcement of the forthcoming rating reforms 
d 'd h" 23 were eS1gne to meet t 1S p01nt. 
Followingthe compilation of the Report, policy was to be pursued on 
the following lines. The Report was to be published, including the appeal 
for the co-ope •• tion of employers in the scheme. Press support came next 
and then a House of Commons statement giving the Government's backing to 
the appeal. A letter from the Prime Minister was to be sent to employers 
in each employment exchange area asking that employment be given to 
Depressed Area men and was to be followed up by letters from the employment 
24 
exchanges urging employers to take note of the Prime Minister's appeal. 
This covered the effort to be made on behalf of direct transference. It 
was recognised that transfer would take some time to become operative and 
the proposed rating relief scheme could have no immediate effects. Thus, 
public works as a means of relief could not be ruled out. Given the need 
to avoid contradiction in policy, relief works were to be located in 
prosperous areas and supplied with labour from the Depressed Areas. Relief 
works in the Depressed Areas would retard out-migrationo 25 
23. The difficulties of overseas migration are illustrated by the reaction 
of the Australian Prime Minister, Mr. Bruce, who was reported to have 
declared that he "is not prepared for the transfer from Great Britain 
to Australia of the problem of unemployment which Great Britain is 
unable to solve". ibid. 
24. P.R.O. Unemployment Policy. Appeal to Employers. CP 245(28). 
July 1928. CAB 24/196. 
25. The Unemployment Grants Committee(hereafter, the UGC) had been set 
up in 1920 to provide temporary relief by way of public works in 
localities where unemployment was severe. This policy was now to be 
changed. This change was considered and recommended by an Inter-
Departmental Committee on Unemployment (Scottish Record Office, hereafter, 
S.R.O., DD 10/184) and the Cabinet Unemployment Policy Committee. 
P.R.Oo CP 325(28). CP 334(28). CAB 24/198. 
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The policy instrument of Transfer Relief Works was announced on the 
8 November 1928 and a circular letter to local authorities laid down the 
conditions under which t~ey would be eligible for 'transfer grants'. Such 
grants were more favourable than the grants towards schemes undertaken in 
areas of exceptional unemployment. Generally, 50 per cent of the labour 
26 
employed was to be from the Depressed Areas. The Unemployment Grants 
Committee (hereafter, the UGC) wrote to the Scottish Board of Health 
stating "that the idea lying behind this suggested transfer of men is that 
some of the men should 'stick' once the relief works have been completed, 
and so return no more to the impoverished districts whence they came".27 
Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labour wrote to the First Lord of the 
Admiralty, the Secretary of State for War, the Secretary of State for Air, 
the Postmaster-General and the First Commissioner of Works, urging them 
to appeal to government contractors to comply with the Industrial Transference 
Board's recommendation. Subsequently a slip was attached to all contracts 
urging the employment of Depressed Area men and the use of employment 
e h f ·1·· f . 28 xc ange aC1 1t1es or recru1tment. 
In December 1928, the schemes were further extended. It was recognised 
that the break up of families was an obstacle to transfer and so the 
26. The acceleration provisions were also to be relaxed and road works 
on non-classified roads towards which the Ministry of Transport was 
not making grants became eligible for assistance. See P.R.O. 
Correspondence with Ministry of Labour in Connection with Schemes 
Promoted Subsequent to Issue of UGC Circular, 9 Nov.1928. LAB 4/183. 
27. ibid. Letter of 19 Nov.1928. 
28. P.R.O. Adoption of Industrial Transference Board's Report by various 
Government Departments. LAB 2/493/ET 2784. 
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Household Removal Scheme was initiated. A free grant was to be paid 
towards lodging and incidental expenses of the transferred male and towards 
the costs of the removal of his family.29 But a shortage of accommodation 
in the receiving areas was to limit the progress of this scheme and most 
transferees were young single men. This scheme was limited to the 
depressed mining areas, whilst the existing facilities, although operating 
mainly in respect of miners, included within its scope a limited number of 
areas where the main industry was iron and steel or shipbuilding. These 
areas were not to be included in the Household Removal Scheme as a maximum 
return from any effort was thought to depend upon the concentration of that 
eff B · d h d . . d' 30 ort. eS1 es, t ere was a eS1re to restr1ct expen 1ture. 
This was the position in respect of transference policy in its early 
maturity. The principa~ recommendations of the Industrial Transference 
Board had been adopted and the policy had evolved to a wide-ranging attack 
on the surplus of the Depressed Areas by encouraging out-migration. The 
underlying principle of these efforts was approved by the incoming Labour 
Government in 1929. 31 
29. Ministry of Labour Gazette,37(1929),p.7. A number of conditions were 
attached to these facilities, for example, they were reserved to the 
insured unemployed from the depressed mining areas who had the 
intention of permanent removal and twelve weeks was allowed in which 
the family was to be moved. 
30. P.R.O. Distressed Mining Areas. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour. 
CP 409(28). 18 Dec.1928. CAB 24/199. 
31. ibid. Transfer of Miners. Memorandum by the Minister of Labour. 
CP 187(29). 1 July 1929. CAB 24/204; Cabinet Transference Committee. 
Report, Proceedings, Memoranda. 1929. CAB 27/400. 
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Subsequent changes in the scheme were a result of three factors. 
Firstly, the supply of easily transferred labour was deteriorating as 
the 'cream' of the surplus was transferred. Secondly, the receiving 
areas had a growing need for labour, particularly because of the demands 
of the Transfer Relief Works. Thirdly, there was the onset of the 
general depression. These pressures led to a number of changes. 
Changes consequent on the first two pressures .are discussed initially. 
Transfer Relief Works began to be used as a source of labour for 
ordinary vacancies in the receiving areas. The rate of transfer, therefore, 
came to depend on the vitality of such programmes and in an effort to 
increase this total, a norm of two months was set after which labour was 
32 to be discharged from relief works to make way for fresh transfers. 
Another means of increasing the supply of labour was to extend the areas 
covered by the transference schemes. Transfer Instruction Centres 
(T.I.C.s) had provided 'hardening' courses from May 1929 in an attempt to 
forestall the decline in the quality of labour. 33 Labour in the 'grey 
areas' (in which special loan facilities were available to unemployed 
workers other than miners) had become eligible for recruitment to the T.I.C ••• 
These areas were the whole counties of Northumberland, Durham, Glamorgan, 
Monmouth and Lanark. But still the supply was insufficient and so 
proposals to revise the scheduled catchment area of the transference 
schemes were discussed. Depressed cotton areas in Lancashire, Cheshire, 
32. P.R.O. Labour Migration. Refusals of Offers of other employment 
by men employed on Relief Works. LAB 2/1324/ED 23733. 
33. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report for the year 1929. (P.P., 1929-30, 
XV) ,p.17. 
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Yorkshire and Derbyshire were brought within the ambit of the juvenile 
transference scheme in March 1930 and of the adult scheme in June 1930, 
but these facilities were not used to any extent because, it was thought, 
of the character of unemployment in these areas. Short time working was 
very evident and the family income was the relevant consideration for the 
potential migrant rather than personal income. Later the same year, these 
areas were also proposed as recruitment areas for the T.I.C.s, but with the 
34 cessation of Transfer Relief Works these proposals were abandoned. 
Other methods of increasing the labour supply were more specific in 
character. The grants of the Household Removal Scheme were extended to 
employed married workpeople provided that labour was available in the area 
to take up the resulting vacancy. These people were to have been largely 
unemployed in the four months prece;ding transfer. The idea was to make 
35 eligible for assistance people on short-time or in temporary employment. 
In June 1930, the period for which these grants were payable was extended. 
The extension allowed a longer search for accommodation in the new area by 
the transferred individual and was intended to prevent return migration on 
th . f' 36 e exp1ry 0 ass1stance. Finally, grants in aid of wages from the Lord 
Mayor's Fund to juvenile labour were to be paid for an extended period, 
from October 1929, in the case of boys in the South East area, if on transfer 
-
34. See P.R.O. Revision of schedule of depressed areas and extension of 
field of recruitment for Transfer Instructional Centres. LAB 2/1273/ 
ET 725; Transfer of Juveniles from depressed cotton areas in 
N.W. Division. Treasury sanction for free fares to include 
Lancashire and adjoining counties. LAB 2/l293/ETJ 462; Board of 
Trade, An Industrial Survey of the Lancashire Area (by the University 
of Manchester) (l932),p.l4. 
35. P.R.O. Household Removal Grants. LAB 2/1325/ED 39540. 
36. ibid. Household Removal Scheme. LAB 2/l326/ET 5160. 
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they were under 16 years of age. This was designed to facilitate the 
migration of younger boys than the schemes had hitherto concentrated on. 37 
The third factor affecting the evolution of the schemes was the onset 
of the general depression. Growing unemployment in the potential receiving 
areas lead to an increased antipathy towards transference. It also forced 
the Government to relax its preferences on works schemes and the UGC policy 
was amended. From July 1929, the requirement that 50 per cent of the 
labour on works schemes in the prosperous areas must come from the 
Depressed Areas was not rigidly enforced. 38 In the case of Birmingham, 
for example, following representations in October 1929 by the council, the 
transfer rate of grant was allowed from the UGC and only 25 per cent of 
39 the labour was required to be from the Depressed Areas. Later, the 
condition that half of the labour employed on a transfer scheme must come 
from the Depressed Areas was waived. The preferential rate of grant to 
the prosperous areas works schemes was, however, continued. The apparent 
illogic of this policy was not lost to the Depressed Areas. Lanark County 
Council wrote to the UGC,40 
37. P.R.O. Labour Migration of Welsh boys to S.E. LAB 2/l293/ETJ 922. 
38. Final Report of the Unemployment Grants Committee. December 1920-
August 1932(P.P., 1932-3,XV), p.8. 
39. P.R.O. Birmingham Town Council. Works for the Relief of Unemployment. 
Correspondence with Treasury on Conditions of Transfer. LAB 2/737/ 
ED 694/87. 
40. Scottish Record Office. Transfer Policy and UGC. DD 10/215. 
Letter dated 30 July 1929. 
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"As your Connnittee are aware, a large part of Lanarkshire • 
is suffering from serious unemployment, and the proposal to 
give better financial terms to the prosperous districts is 
one that is not only viewed here with the greatest concern 
but, if I may respectfully say so, connotes a policy that is 
very difficult to understand." 
Similar complaints were made by other authorities, among them Dunfermline. 4l 
The worsening unemployment situation, and such opposition, led to 
further changes. In June 1930, the Prime Minister presided at a conference 
of local authorities to consider what further measure could be taken in 
dealing with unemployment. Modifications of terms and conditions of grants 
were announced that would be more favourable to local authorities. All 
authorities became eligible for the award of the maximum 'transfer grants' 
and the employment of labour from the Depressed Areas was waived as a 
condition. Total employment on such schemes increased as a result, whilst 
the proportion of labour from the Depressed Areas fell drastically.42 
Nevertheless, "it was realised that •••• not only were such schemes 
making little impression on the unemployment figures, but the maximum 
results had been attained", 43 Consequently, the UGC's powers were limited 
to the consideration of schemes submitted by June 1931 and on which work 
could start by October of the same year. The May Committee recommended a 
substantial cut in grants and, effectively, the activities of the UGC were 
severely constrained, prior to its dissolution in 1932. 
41. ibid. Letter of 2 August 1929. 
42. Final Report of UGC, op.cit.pp.9-l0. 
43. ibid.p.lO. 
170 
From 1930, the importance of the UGC schemes for encouraging 
transfer had ceased. At the same time, the factors which resulted in this 
policy change made the vigorous pursuit of the transference policy less 
acceptable and more difficult in practice. Henceforth, unemployment policy 
ignored regional policy in favour of attempts to revitalise employment 
nationally. It was not until 1934, with the re-emergence of regional 
disparities with partial recovery from general depression, that attempts 
to " 1 1" "" d 44 operate a reglona po lCY were agaln eVl ent. These fluctuations in 
economic conditions and in policy reflect themselves in the numbers 
45 transferred. 
II 
This section supplements the chronological account of section I 
with an examination of the pressures on policy formulation and amendment. 
It is evident that the general principle of moving labour away from the 
Depressed Areas was early decided upon. Subsequent changes in policy were 
merely designed to increase the likelihood of achieving this objective, 
sometimes in the face of changing circumstances, for example, the decrease 
in supply of easily placed labour. Thus, although changes from 1928 
onwards can be seen as pragmatic in character, the point of central 
interest is the origin of the initial objective. 
It might be argued that the introduction of transference policy was 
designed to smooth migration between regional labour markets in an attempt 
to bring the economy nearer to the laissez-faire position of the neo-
«. and 
45. infra. Chapter 6. 
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classicists. With migration flows responding perfectly to wage 
differentials, the supply equals demand identity would be true in all 
regional labour markets. However, abandoning Say's Law in favour of a 
recognition of the existence of unemployment of a cyclical and frictional 
kind, and accepting the existence of wage rigidities, Beveridge put this 
case in 1909. 
"Unemployment arises because, while the supply of labour grows 
steadily, the demand for labour, in growing, varies incessantly 
in volume, distribution and character • • • Fluctuations of 
demand are now provided for by the maintenance of huge stagnant 
reserves of labour in varying extremities of distress. To be 
able to follow the demand men must possess greater powers of 
intelligent movement from place to place • • • To be able to 
wai t for demand men mus t have a reserve for eme rgencies. " 
"It is a policy of making reality correspond with the 
assumptions of economic theory. Assuming the demand for 
labour to be single and the supply perfectly fluid, it is 
not hard to show that unemployment must always be in process 
of disappearance - that demand and supply are constantly 
tending to an equilibrium. The ideal for practical reform, 
must be to concentrate t~g demand, and to give the right 
f1 ui di ty to the supp ly • " 
Hence, Beveridge argued for unemployment insurance and the Employment 
Exchange system. Transference was an accentuated element of the work 
carried out under the latter head. Beveridge's case for migration was to 
reduce aggregate unemployment. 
However, it is clear on considering policy proposals and discussions 
amongst politicians and civil servants that policy was the result of a 
reaction to a particular set of circumstances and that this reaction was 
-
46. W.H.Beveridge, Unemployment: A Problem of Industry (19~~ 
pp.235-7. There are some parallels here with the Ministry of 
Labour's Annual Report for 1926,op.cit. 
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not necessarily informed by the tenets of contemporary economic thinking. 
On 8 December 1928, the Ministry of Labour received a request from 
Senator Indri of the Italian National Social Insurance Department for 
information on "internal migration as a means of prevention of or remedy for 
47 
crises of unemployment". The Ministry's handling of this request is 
instructive. A minute dated the 26 January 1929 observed that, 
"there are two possible forms of artic1e:-
(a) a theoretical discussion - which is probably what is 
expected 
(b) a thesis on transference in Great Britain with 
reference to the concrete facts. I am inclined to 
think that it is too early to make a considered 
pronouncement in a foreign journal on this. 
I should like to reply that it is presumed that (b) is 
what is wanted; that it is difficult at this stage in 
the working out of the transference policy to write su~~ 
an article but that we shall be happy to do so later." 
A letter to this effect was dispatched in February 1929. A draft reply 
(which was never sent) on the lines of (b) above, summarized the origin of 
transference policy. In recognition of the localized unemployment in the 
heavy export industries and the specialized character of these localities, 
the memorandum observed that, 
-
"whole communities have lost their source of livelihood on 
which they and their forefathers depended. There is no 
alternative livelihood available in the localities; these 
areas offer few advantages for new industries and the only 
permanent solution of the position lies in ~e migration of 
the surplus population to other districts." 
47. P.R.O. Senator Indri. National Social Insurance Department, Italy. 
Requests information on 'internal migration as a means of 
prevention of or remedy for crises of unemployment' for publication 
in Italian Bulletin. LAB 2/l577/STAXS 955. 
48. ibid. 
49. ibid. 
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If the origins of policy were pragmatic then there must have been a 
place for pressure groups in the formulation and subsequent refinements 
of policy. The coal miners were the most obviously interested party. On 
9 November 192B, A.J.Cook wrote to the Secretary for Mines. "The transfer 
of unemployed mineworkers in derelict districts to areas where a reasonable 
prospect of employment exists, and the speeding up of the necessary housing 
schemes in the areas concerned /would, with other policies, result iE7 
the volume of mining unemployment Lbeina7 substantially reduced. ,,50 The 
T.U.C., the Labour Party and the Miners Federation of Great Britain agreed 
" h t at there is a surplus of 250,000 workers in the mining industry • • 
the transfer of labour from over-manned districts to developing areas is 
essential". 51 The Executive Committee of the Miners Federation stated in 
1929 that, 
"this policy • • the transfer and settlement of our unemployed 
mineworkers in other trades and callings • • • together with 
the provision of training centres, formed an integral part 
of the measures which the Federation urged upon the Government 
in 1927, and such a policy is entirely consiste!~ with our 
view as to the economic trend of the industry". 
Clearly, at the national level the miners advocated and approved of 
transference. 53 
50. S.R.O. Cabinet Papers,1926-9. GD 193/433 (Steel-Maitland Papers). 
51. ibid. 'The Mining Situation: An Immediate Programme'. 
52. P.R.O. Cabinet Transference Committee. Report, Proceedings, 
Memoranda. CAB 27/400. Extract from Report of Executive 
Committee of the Miners Federation of Great Britain, June 1929. 
53. Locally, there were some exceptions. For example, the opposition 
of the Kent Mineworkers Association to the transfer of labour to 
the Snowdown Colliery motivated principally by the temperature 
of the pit and the butty system. See P.R.O. Recruitment of men 
for Kentish coalfields from the Depressed Areas. LAB 2/l29B/ED 
17902; East Kent Coalfield. Recruitment of Labour and Conditions 
in the coalfield. LAB 2/l29B/ITB 120. 
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Approval was also expressed by the Labour and Liberal parties. In 
'Labour and the Nation', it was argued that, "the pressure of unemployment 
on the coalfields must be relieved • • • by a system of migration of miners 
into other districts and other suitable occupations" 54 The Liberal Yellow 
Book, recognizing structural depression in many industries, argued that 
" . cons1derable numbers of workers may have to be transferred from the 
localities and trades in which they have been brought up to new places and 
engage in fresh occupations which produce either new classes of exports or 
goods for the home market".55 On the coal mining industry in particular, 
"when everything possible has been done to increase the 
efficiency of the coal mining industry, to concentrate employ-
ment and to reduce costs, there is little doubt we shall still 
have to deal with a large surplus of labour in the coal mining 
industry ••• The measures proposed fall under three heads: 
(a) Limitation of recruiting. 
(b) Pensioning of older workers. 
(c) Transfer of ~~isting workers into other 
industries." 
Either by expressing approval or disapproval, the Press and local 
authorities are the other groups which influenced policy. The long-standing 
problems of the Necessitous Areas were continually represented before the 
Government by local authorities. Because of the burden of unemployment, 
these areas campaigned for Government assistance towards local 
expenditures. Any policy that alleviated local unemployment would deal 
with these complaints. Local representations were made to secure inclusion 
-
54. S.R.O. Cabinet Papera.op.cit. 
55. Report of the Liberal Industrial Inquiry, Britain's Industrial 
Future(1928)p.44. 
56. ibid.pp.358,36l. 
175 
.. 
in the scheduled areas. Attempts were also made for the right to receive 
UGC transfer grants without the employment of 50 per cent Uepressed Area 
labour. 57 However, the longer run effects of out-migration posed problems 
for local finances. The receiving areas also put pressure on the 
~vernment to restrict the transference scheme when the general 
depression deepened and unemployment amongst native labour became 
severe.
58 In the case of local authorities, then, some influence on the 
administration of policy is clearly discernible. But on the initial 
formulation of policy aims, there is nothing to suggest a particular role 
for the local authorities. 
The Press only had an influence on the administration of policy 
When, as the depression worsened, the anomalies of the transference scheme 
became more apparent. Occasional support or occasional criticism had 
little effect. 
The central objective of transference policy, of moving labour out 
of areas of high unemployment emerged with the need to appear to act 
decisively in respect of concentrated unemployment in certain coal 
mining localities. Economic theory was not the basis of this policy, 
although it did justify the Employment Exchange system. Further, the 
influences of various groups on the evolution of policy, though at time. 
significant, never did change this central objective, but merely the 
57. supra; P.R.O. Distressed Mining Areas. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Labour. CP 409(28). 18 Dec.1928. CAB 24/199. 
58. infra, Chapter 5. 
methods of achieving it. The lack of emphasis on transference policy, 
1930-1934, was a dual result of the Government's response to changing 
conditions in realising that transference could less easily be pursued 
and the general opposition to the pursual of the policy that these changed 
59 conditions brought about. 
III 
This final section deals with the expected short-run consequences of 
transference policy in the north and south. The actual consequences of 
policy are dealt with in the following chapter. 
The aim of the transference schemes was to stimulate migration at the 
margin. The existence of spontaneous, unassisted movement was recognized 
by the Government; the objective was to increase this total. 
"It was evident .. ,., • that • • a considerable movement 
southwards from the depressed areas had taken place: the 
policy advocated by the Board was to oil the wheels of the 
movement in order to stimulate the flow of workpeople from 
the depressed areas and further to direct this movement 
into those60rade channels where it could most readily be 
absorbed. " 
Consequently, it is inappropriate to dismiss transference policy as 
inefficient by pointing to the fact that, in the absence of assistance, 
migration would have occurred anyway. 
-
59. It is noteworthy that the Surveys of conditions in various 
depressed areas by University Departments on bekalf of the 
Board of Trade seem to have been ignored at the time of their 
publication. Their suggestions on regional remedies were 
inappropriate in 1932. 
60. P.R.O. Senator Indri •••• op.cit. 
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Given this important preliminary, the task of this section is to 
establish whether transference was an 'economic' or 'social' policy. The 
two extreme standpoints are, respectively, that transference was designed 
to increase employment by moving labour from areas of excess supply to 
areas of excess demand, or that it was merely intended to dissipate 
concentrations of unemployment thus reducing any threatening political 
tension. Snowden argued the latter whilst commenting on UGC transfer 
grants. 
"If there happens to be no unemployment in the district where 
the work is to be carried out there mijpt be something to be 
said for that policy • • • Have they /the Government7 
considered the animosity that might be created between the 
unemployed men in that district and those men who are 
transferred? • • • This particular proposal and all the 
proposals of the Government will not make the slightest 61 
impression upon the magnitude of the unemployment problem." 
Ramsay MacDonald concluded that the object of transference was to spread 
unemp loymen t. 
"The one thought which seems to have been uppermost in their 
minds has been this: 'Where unemployment is most pronounced, 
if we can take it up and scatter it abroad a little, we are 
solving unemployment. If we can take 20 or 30 miners from 
South Wales and put them down as builders' labourers in 
Camberwell, although builders' labourers in Camberwell are 
out of work, well, they will be 10st62 Segregated they are 
seen, but scattered they are lost'." 
The Government's refutation of this argument took the following form. 
The 1927 Annual Report of the Ministry of Labour commented that, 
61. Hansard(Commons),Sth ser.222,392-3,9 Nov.1928 
62. ibid.S8S,12 Nov.1928. 
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"It may be urged that there is in most areas some local 
unemployment and that the method of transfer does not add 
to the volume of employment, but puts one man in while it 
keeps another out. But this is to misunderstand the working 
of the employment market and the problem of transfer • • • 
There may be in an area some unemployment and at the same 
time an unsatisfied demand for labour, because the labour 
available locally does not fit the requirements of the 
vacancies. Moreover, in addition to the existing and known 
demands for labour there are often potential vacancies whicg3 
materialise upon the presentation of a suitable applicant." 
Besides, "no exchange would try to flood any particular place with 
transferred men, nor would it succeed, if it were so foolish as to try. 
Transfer is unpopular enough, even without the kind attentions of the 
Daily Herald and of critics in high places, and to overdo it is the surest 
way of making it impracticable. ,,64 Steel-Maitland added soue specific 
evidence on this point in the Birmingham Post in 1928. 65 
"In the eighteen weeks since June 15, the number of men 
brought in from the depressed areas was 156, whereas the 
total of other men placed by the Birmingham Exchanges was 
3,024, or nearly twenty times as many. How unjustified 
is the hubbub f.' shown by the fact that the total of 
labour engagements in the same area during that time was 
probably about 15,000." 
However, from the expectations of the Industrial Transference Board, 
it is clear that neither of the extremes was expected. In some areas, it 
might be the case that local labour would be displaced and aggregate 
Unemployment would not ch~ge. In other places, and at times when general 
unemployment was not high, transferees might be absorbed without prejudice 
63. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report for the year 1927 (P.P.,1928,XI), 
p.18. 
64. P.R.O. Birmingham Town Council. Works for the Relief of 
Unemployment,op.cit. Letter from J.A.Barlow at the Treasury to 
the Lord Privy Seal, dated 19 Dec.1929. 
65. S.R.O. Bundle of Sir Arthur's Papers whilst Minister of Labour. 
GD 193/94/2. 
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to local labour and aggregate unemployment would be reduced. Although 
Steel-Maitland was prepared to agree with the Government's critics that 
"the policy does not profess to be a 'cure for unemployment''',66 it is 
clear that is some circumstances it could have been just that. It is 
the task of the next chapter to establish the short-run impact of 
transference policy and to determine to what extent the extreme views 
presented above were realized. At the same time, the long-run 
consequences of trans~erence policy will be investigated. 67 
66. P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme. Memorandum by the 
Minister of Labour. CP 324(28). 1 N~.1928. CAB 24/198. 
67. Given the short-run objectives of transference policy, the 
long-run objectives are implicit. That is, unemployment in 
the depressed areas was to be reduced. In the receiving areas, 
these transferees were to be absorbed into the economy with 
expansion, perhaps to the temporary cost of local labour. 
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APPENDIX 
The Depressed Areas 
I Schedule of Depressed Areas for the Adult Transference Scheme in 1929. 
South West 
Cinderford, Co1eford. 
Midlands 
Biddu1ph, Chesterfield, Eckington, Kidsgrove. 
North 
Barns1ey, Birt1ey, Bishop Auckland, B1aydon, Blyth, Chester-Ie-Street, 
Chopwe11, Chorley, Cleator Moor, Cockfield, Crook, Dalton-in-Furness, 
Durham, Falstone, Farnworth, Felling, Fence Houses, Haltwbistle, 
Hebburn, Hindley, Hoyland, Lanchester, Leigh, Maryport, Morpeth, 
Newburn, Pontefract, St. Helens, Seaton Burn, Shildon, Shiremoor, 
Southwick-on-Wear, South Shields, Spennymoor, Standish, Stanley, 
Ulverston, Wallsend, Westhoughton, West Moor, Whitehaven, Wigan, 
Workington. 
Scotland 
Airdrie, Carluke, Coatbridge, Cowdenbeath, Hamilton, Kilwinning, 
Larkhall, Lesmahagow, Motherwell, Wishaw. 
Wales 
Aberdare, Aberkenfig, Abertillery, Ammanford, Bargoed, Blackwood, 
Blaenavon, Blaina, Bridgend, Brynmawr, Burry Port, Caerphilly, Clydach, 
Crumlin, Cymmer, Dowlais, Ebbw Vale, Ferndale, Gamant, Gorseinon, 
Kidwelly, Llanelly, Maesteg, Methyr Tydfil, Morriston, Mountain Ash, 
Neath, Ogmore Vale, Pontardawe, Pontardulais, Pontlottyn, Pontnewydd, 
Pontyclun, Pontycymmer, Pontypool, Pontypridd, Porth, Port Talbot, 
Resolven, Risca, Taff's Well, Tonypandy, Tonyrefail, Tredegar, Treorchy, 
Ystalyfera. 
Source: P.R.O. Cabinet Transference Committee. Report, Proceedings 
and Memoranda, 1929. Memorandum of Minister of Labour. 
CAB 27/400. 
II Changes in the Schedule by October 1934 
a) Additions 
Midlands 
Aud1ey, Clay Cross, C1eobury Mortimer, Heanor, Newcast1e-under-Lyme. 
North 
Asparatia, Cockermouth, Dunston-on-Tyne, Harrington, Jarrow, Mi11om, 
Pa11ion, Penistone, Rotherham, Upho11and, Walker, Willington Quay. 
Scotland 
Bowling, Cambuslang, Dumbarton. 
Wales 
Brymbo, Buckley, Shotton, Treharris. 
Scheduled Cotton Districts 
North 
Accrington, Ashton-under-Lyme, Bacup, Blackburn, Bolton, Burnley, 
Bury, Chadderton, Clitheroe, Colne (including Barnoldswick), Darwen, 
Fai1sworth, Glossop, Great Harwood, Hadfield, Haslingden, Heywood, 
Hyde, Kirkham, Marple, Middleton, Moss1ey, Nelson, Oldham, Padiham, 
Pend1ebury, Preston, Rochdale, Roy ton , Shaw, Stalybridge, Todmorden, 
Whitworth. 
b) Deletions 
North 
Fa1stone, Fence Houses, Seaton Burn, West Moor. 
Scotland 
Cowdenbeath, Ki1winning. 
Wales 
Resolven. 
Source: P.R.O. Special and Distressed Areas. T 172/1827. 
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III 
a) 
Changes in the Schedule by February 1938 
Additions 
South West 
Camborne, Lydney, Newnham, Redruth. 
Midlands 
Chesterton, Eastward, Hucknell. 
North 
Amble, Alston, Ashton-in-Makerfield, Aspill, Bamber Bridge, 
Barnard Castle, Bentham, Castleford, Clayton-Ie-Moor, Congleton, 
Conistone, Consett, East Boldon, Elswick, Featherstone, Gainford, 
Gateshead, Golborne, Guisborough, Hartlepool, Haswell, Heaton, 
Horden, Houghton-Ie-Spring, Haveton Hill, Keswick, Littleborough, 
Middleton-in-Teesdale, Newcastle, North Shields, Ormskirk, 
Oswaldthistle, Pemberton, Prudhoe, Radcliffe, Rawtenstall, 
Saltburn, Seaton Harbour, Seaton Darval, Sedgefield, Silloth, 
Stanhope, Stockton, Sunderland, Thorne, Walkden, Washington Station, 
West Hartlepool, West Moor, Widnes, Wigton, Wingate, Womhwell, 
Wolsingham. 
Scotland 
Alexandria, Ardrossan, Barrhead, Bathgate, Broxburn, Campbletown, 
Clydebank, Dalry, East Calder, East Kilbride, Falkirk, Grangemouth, 
Greenock, Helensburgh, Irvine, Johnstone, Kilbirnie, Kilmarnock, 
Kilwinning, Kirkintilloch, Lanark, Linlithgow, New Milne, Paisley, 
Port Glasgow, Renfrew, Rutherglen, Sanquhar, Shotts. South Queens-
ferry, Stevenston, Stewarton, Strathaven, Uddingston, West Calder. 
Wales 
Abersychan, Barry, Caerau, Cardiff, Cefnmawr, Crickhowell, Cymaman, 
Kenfig Hill, Llantwit Major. Methyr Vale, Mold, Newbridge. Newport, 
New Tredegar, Pembroke Dock, Penarth, Resolven, Rhosllanerchrugog, 
Senghenydd, Swansea, Ton Pentre, Tumble, Usk, Wrexham. Ystrad 
Mynach. 
b) Deletions 
North 
Marple, Pendlebury. 
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Wales 
Crumlin, Shotton. 
Source: Royal Comudssion on the Geographical Distribution of the 
Industrial Population. Memorandum of Evidence submitted by 
the Ministry of Labour, 3 Feb.1938. Appendix LV. 
(The areas scheduled under the Juvenile Transference Scheme 
are also shown here. Appendix VI of this evidence indicates 
the scheduled areas to be preferred in the placing of 
government contracts.) 
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CHAPTER 5 
The Contribution of Transference 
-
I 
The numbers transferred from the Depressed Areas to employment, 
through the employment exchanges, in the years 1928-34 is shown in 
Chapter 6. 1 The total number of individuals transferred is taken in this 
Chapter as an indicator of transference. This covers the 
greater part of all those transferred, although by excluding Household 
Removals the most permanent element of transfer might be ignored. 2 
Totalling this series for the years 1928-34 reveals that 149,907 
individuals were transferred from the Depressed Areas to work in 
the non-depressed areas. 3 The first difficulty is encountered when the 
next step, of examining the change in unemployment in the Depressed 
Areas, is taken. The Appendix to Chapter 4 has shown that the Depressed 
Areas varied in coverage between 1928-34. The laCk of more frequent 
schedules of Depressed Areas makes it impossible to determine when 
changes took place. The simplest course, which is unlikely to introduce 
any great errors, is to consider an aggregate of county employment 
4 
exchange areas that approximates to the Depressed Areas. 
-
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
infra, Chapter 6, Table XXI. 
Le. The Household Removal Scheme was designed to achieve, and 
probably resulted in. transference of a permanent character. 
'Wastage' was a more likely result if a household was split up by 
the transference of an individual. For the magnitude of 'wastage 
rates', lee infra, Chapter 7. 
A further 1,500 transfers were made to prospective vancancies in 
1928. The Scheme then lapsed until 1935. 
The criteria of a Depressed Area varied, although it seeme that 
areas once on the Ichedule were seldom removed. supra, Chapter 4. 
Appendix. 
Unemployment in the counties of Durham, Northumberland, Cumberland, 
Glamorgan, Monmouth and Lanark is shown in Table XVI. This Table 
shows unemployment in selected non-depressed counties for the same 
period. These counties are London, Surrey, Essex, Middlesex, Kent, 
Hertfordshire, Staffordshire, Warwickshire and Leicestershire. 5 Whilst 
transference totalled some 150,000 over the period, unemployment in the 
Depressed Areas increased by 209,835 and in the non-depressed areas 
increased by 150,317. What conclusions can be drawn from this evidence? 
At first sight, it seems little has been learnt. The impact 
of the cyclical downturn and the differing regional rates of recovery 
can be clearly seen but, consequently, the impact of transference is 
masked. It can only be stated that had it not been for transference, 
unemployment in the northern Depressed Areas would have been worse. 
In the southern areas, it is not clear whether transference added to 
6 
unemployment or not and so its impact on the unemployment figures is 
uncertain both in magnitude and direction. 
-
5. The counties selected were the areas where the transference schemes had 
their greatest effect. The North-East area of the Ministry of 
Labour was also an important destination for transferees as well as 
being an important origin. It was thought that to include this area 
would obscure the inter-regional relationship between the north and 
south. Besides, the London area was by far the most important desti-
nation. The depressed cotton areas that were added to the ambit 
of the schemes in 1930 were not included as little use was initially 
made of the facilities offered under the schemes in these areas. 
The importance of areas as origins and destinations is shown in Royal 
Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Popula-
tion. Memorandum of Evidence of the Ministry of Labour. 3 Feb. 1938. 
Appendix IV. 
6. Although transfers were to definite vacancies, this employment might 
not last very long. This would be especially so where transfer was 
to a UGC works programme. Additionally, it was shown in H. Makower, 
J. Marschak, H.W.Robinson,'Studies in Mobility of Labour: A Tentative 
Statistical Measure', Oxford Economic Papers, No.1(1938) ,68, that the 
average lag between arrival in Oxford and unemployment was one and 
two-thirds months. After two years, 90 per cent of in-miarants had 
experienced unemployment. Consequently, the direction of impact of 
transference on unemployment in the receiving areas is uncertain. 
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Transference policy was designed to encourage migration amongst 
those who were not moving of their own free will. That is, examination 
ought to be made of the impact of total migration and not just that 
part assisted by the Ministry of Labour. Net migration statistics 
are shown for counties and Ministry of Labour Divisional areas in 
7 Chapter 2. For the purposes of this chapter, the data for Ministry 
of Labour Regions will be used. Unemployment statistics for these 
areas were obtained from the Ministry of Labour Gazette and are shown 
in Table XVII. The net balance of migration for these years is also 
shown. Again, the impact of the cyclical downturn makes the results 
difficult to interpret. In the North, Scotland and Wales it might be 
hypothesized that unemployment would have been more severe had it 
not been for migration. In the remaining regions the impact is not 
clear. 
Consequently, an attempt was made to refine and improve these 
conclusions via the vehicle of regression analysis. How important 
was transference in explaining changes in unemployment and what was the 
direction of its impact? A priori unemployment would be expected 
to fall in the Depressed Areas as out-migration increased. In the 
receiving areas the relationship might be in either direction, 
depending on whether migrants found work or simply added to the 
unemployment totals of these areas. That is, was transference-simply a 
7. lupra, Chapter 2, Appendix 2. 
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redistribution of the unemployed such that unemployment percentages 
would be equalized over the country, or was it, in effect, an 
employment policy? 
A regression of the form, 
was run, where, when dealing with transference and its impact on 
selected countries, 
E. 
1 
• 
• 
• 
• 
Unemployment in the Selected Counties in 
December of the i'th year, 
Unemployment in Britain in June minus that part 
of unemployment originating in the Depressed or 
non-depressed areas in each of the i years, 
Transference from the Depressed Areas in the 
i I th year, and, 
error term. 
Where net migration and une1PPloyment in Ministry of Labour Regions 
was examined, 
YIi Unemployment in Ministry 
of Labour Regions . • ln 
June of the i'th year, 
X2i • as X2i above, 
X3i • Net migration by region 
in the i'th year, and, 
E. 
1 • 
error term, 
The X2i variable was included 
in both cases as a proxy for those 
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factors of national impact which led to changes in regional unemployment. 8 
These results are presented in Table XVIII. 
It can be seen that the level of explanation is uniformly high, 
but that the contribution of the migration variable is consistently 
low. Although the addition of new independent variables into the 
equation will always result in a higher R2, it may be that the precision 
of the response deteriorates. This is true of equations 1/ and 9/ where 
the mean square of the residuals increases with the inclusion of the X3 
variable. However, all equations are significant at the 5 per cent level 
indicating that they are good predictors. Of the individual regression 
coefficients, however, only that for X2 is significantly different from 
zero.
9 These relatively large standard errors are partially explicable 
by col linearity in the independent variables. The signs of coefficients 
are as expected. The constant in each equation demonstrates the value of 
the dependent variable when the independent variables are equal to O. The 
value is positive in the case of the depressed areas, and negative elsewhere. 
The national unemployment variable is positively related to regional 
unemployment throughout. Although the signs of 63 coefficients cannot 
all be accepted with confidence, they indicate that in the north 
unemployment fell as out-migration increased and in the south unemployment 
8. It will be noticed that this variable was identically quantified 
whether transference in selected counties in December of each year, 
or net migration by regions in June was being analysed. It was not 
possible in the former case to obtain a better indicator. 
9. Autocorrelation in the disturbance terms may invalidate these 
significance tests. n was too small to test for such disturbances. 
l~ 
increased as in-migration increased. This suggests that migrants 
added to southern unemployment, even if they initially transferred to 
certain vacancies, as was true of the transfers under the Ministry of 
Labour's scheme. The exception seems to be London, where many of the 
migrants went. Here it seems unemployment declined as in-migration 
increased, suggesting that migrants were taken into the working labour 
force and, through the impact of their increased personal incomes and 
other demands on the regional economy, created further employment 
opportuni ties. 
An attempt was then made to refine the migration variable such that 
a unit change in it would result in a unit change in regional unemploy-
mente That is, the expected regression coefficient ought to be 1.0. 
Firstly, 'wastage' has to be accounted for. lO Secondly, the multiplier 
effects of the regional redistribution of personal incomes had to be 
considered. The value of this latter adjustment is discussed in 
Chapter 7. 11 A few comments are, however, in order. In de aling wi th 
the areas losing population by migration, it is enough to deflate the 
value of migration by the calculated r, where this represents the number 
of persons who have to move from a region before one more man loses his 
-
10. 
11. 
This was taken as 30 per cent. 
infra, Chapter 7, Appendix 2. 
for dealing with this slightly 
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See infra, Chapter 7. 
The values arrived at are adequate 
earlier period. 
12 emp loymen t. Similarly, in the regions where in-migrants add to 
unemployment it will take r (equal to 5) men to move in and become 
unemployed before regional income is increased sufficiently to 
provide one new job. The difference is in that area where it seems 
that in-migration reduced local unemployment, that is London. In 
this case, regional income increased as factor earning; increased. 
The gain was that part of this increase that was spent locally, (A).13 
Thus where, 
k - income multiplier, 
Yo· average weekly earnings, 
and r • the number of in-migrants who have to move 
in and obtain employment before one more man gains 
employment. 
then, 
r -
Yo 
From the Appendix to Chapter 7 it can be seen that this may be taken as 
2.77 or, in other words, each in-migrant created 0.36 of a job through 
his personal expenditure. As the migrant himself has no direct impact 
-
12. i.e. r • 
1 
s k a 
where, s • ratio of unemployment benefit to average weekly earnings, 
k • income multiplier, 
a • local expenditure coefficient of the unemployed. 
No allowance is made for the impact of remittances from the migrant 
back to his region of origin in this case, or in the case of the 
receiving areal. It was thought that IUch remittances were negli-
gible and spasmodic by one oblerver. See A.D.K.Owen, 'Social 
Consequences of Industrial Transference' ,Sociological Review, 
29 (1937) ,343. 
13. A. local expenditure coefficient of the employed. c.m and tare 
likely to vary between the unemployed and the employed such that 
a > A. See infra, Chapter 7, Appendix 2. 
1 Ql 
on the unemployment figures, only the fractional part of the employment 
multiplier, (k ) was taken. 14 The regression coefficients resulting 
e 
from these adjusted series are presented in Table XIX. lS 
Generally, the comments made on Table XVIII are again applicable. 
The point of specific interest is the magnitude of the coefficients 
attached to the X3 variable. These were expected to be close to 1.0. 
However, the standard errors remain high and the null hypothesis that 
a3 • 0 cannot be rejected. 16 
Therefore the regressions do not enable more positive conclusions on 
the impact of migration on losing and receiving areas. It can only be 
Suggested from Tables XVI and XVII, that if it were not for transference 
pOlicy, unemployment in the Depressed Areas might have been worse than 
it was by 1934. Similarly, it seems that unemployment in the receiving 
-
14. It may be that there is an indirect impact, in that local labour 
would have taken the job in the absence of in-migration. 
15. It must be remembered that the k values used are concerned with the 
income of employees only. Linkige effects are not allowed for. 
For example, the resulting increase or decrease in demand for inputs 
and its effects on employment generation is ignored. Again, changes 
in public service employment are ignored as are those in public 
services and in private industry that result from induced investment. 
The alleged congestion of social capital in the southern regions make 
this an important omission. On the different multipliers see 
A.J.Browu, The Framework of Be ional Economics in the United Kin dom 
(Cambridge,19 ,pp.l76-202,274- 77 and the works clted ln Chapter 7, 
Appendix 2. 
16. As discussed in Chapter 7 one reason for the insignificant coeffi-
cients of migration variables and the uncertainty concerning their 
direction of impact on local unemployment rates is the interrelated 
nature of the variables. For example, high net out-migration may 
lead to lower unemployment and lower unemployment will lead to 
lower net out-migration. This problem is outlined in W.F.Mazek, 
'Unemployment and the Efficacy of Migration: The Case of Laborers' , 
Journal of Refional Science,9(1969). A single equation model can 
only be usedf the appropriate lags are incorporated in the system. 
Thus errors in model specification or in measurement of the variables 
will bias a. 
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areas was worse than it would have been in the absence of in-migration, 
with the possible exception of London. What is now required is some 
evidence from other sources. 
There is little doubt that the magnitude of the impact of trans-
ference was generally small in either the north or the south. Depression 
was so deep in the basic heavy industries of south Wales that despite the 
outflow of population, unemployment remained severe. 17 In Cumberland 
and Furness out-migration did vary with the intensity of depression, but 
was of an insufficient magnitude to remove the labour surplus of the 
area. 18 . ThlS was true of all areas losing population, as is shown in 
Table XVI. Consequently, the impact on areas receiving population was 
also slight. 19 
The chief doubt does not concern the degree of impact but the direc-
tion of impact of in-migration in the receiving areas. It seems that 
two factors had influence on the direction of this impact. Firstly, . 
the trade cycle and secondly, the role of the Unemployment Grants 
-
17. Board of Trade, An Industrial Survey of South Wales (by the 
University College of South Wales and Monmouthshire) (1932),p.ll. 
18. J.JeWkes and A.Winterbottom, An Industrial Survey of Cumberland and 
Furness (Manchester,1933),p.27. 
19. Numerically, after adjustment for wastage and multiplier effects 
the yearly mean tran.ference for the Depressed Areas was 11,993 which 
compared with an unemployment series that was at its lowest at 
286,276. Again, for the Ministry of Labour regions of North, Scot-
land and Wales, the adjusted out-migration had a mean of 60,944 where-
as unemployment was never below 784,626 and was generally well above 
that. Similar figures for the south are:-
Adjusted transference, 11,993 
Unemployment in selected counties in lowest year,237,029 
Adjusted net migration, 47,579 
Unemployment in regional aagregates in lowest year, 357,756. 
193 
Comudttee (hereafter, the UGC). The trade cycle is dealt with first. 
Chapter 6 shows that as the unemployment situation worsened 
nationally, so prospective vacancies in the principal receiving areas 
of London and the South-East became fewer. 20 This resulted in a 
decline in the number of transfers. It also resulted in a keener 
competition between previously transferred labour and 'native' labour 
for existing vacancies. There are several instances of complaint that 
support this conclusion. Tw b • d 21 o cases may e clte • Firstly, the 
M 22 ayor of Poplar wrote to the Minister of Labour in July 1929. 
"As Mayor of the Borough of Poplar I venture to 
approach you on a matter which is causing considerable 
agitation and some bitterness among the unemployed of 
the District. As you will be aware abnormal unemployment 
in London is confined to the Boroughs of Bermondsey, 
Deptford and Poplar. 
At the present time there are reconstruction works 
proceeding at the West India Docks and the Lee Conservancy 
Board are carrying out extensive works in the northern 
portion of the Borough. The undertakers of these works in 
order to qualify for the Government subsidy are compelled 
to employ 50 per cent of workers, the majority of whom 
are unskilled from other depressed areas. I think you will 
readily agree with me that the transference of men from 
depressed areas to a distressed area such as Poplar gives 
rise to a justifiable complaint from Poplar's unemployed. "23 
This and further representations were to have some effect. The UGC 
Were instructed to "henceforth ••• regard relief works in the areas of 
-
20. infra, Chapter 6,Diagram III. 
21. Also, see the representations by the Amalgamated Engineering 
Union to the Ministry of Labour. P.R.O. LAB 2/l396/ET 1275. 
22. P.R.O. Metropolitan Borouah of poplar protesting against the 
importation of workers from distressed areas, in regard to work 
being undertaken by the Lee Conservancy Board. LAB 2/l2l2/ET 5085. 
23. ibid. Letter dated 9 July 1929. 
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Shoreditch, Bermondsey and Poplar as unsuitable for the introduction 
of men from the depressed mining areas". 24 Nevertheless, there was 
still the problem of Depressed Area men previously transferred to 
UGC works schemes in the non-depressed areas who, on completion of 
this work, would look for further employment. Indeed the objective 
of the policy was to encourage labour once transferred, to gain 
permanent employment in the receiving area. This may have had severe 
effects in particular localities where the cessation of a large UGC 
Works scheme and the coincidence of high local unemployment was found. 
However, the extent of this friction ought not to be overestimated. 
Of the 23,018 men who transferred to work on schemes that were completed 
by August 1932, only 5,178 secured work in the new area and a further 
2,730 transferred to other works schemes. 25 It can only be presumed 
that the remainder represented wastage. 
Secondly, with the formation of the Labour Government, the 
preference given by government departments to the employment of 
civilian labour from the Depressed Areas came into question. Lansbury 
wrote to Bondfield in August 1929 pointing out that "vacancies in the 
industrial grades, wherever possible, are filled by labour transferred 
from the depressed areas, to the exclusion of local men. I am not 
at all anxious to continue this policy and consider that we can no longer 
. d" 26 refuse to engage men who are unemployed 1n Lon on • Later the same 
-
24. ibid.Draft letter dated 31 Aug.1929. 
25. Final Report of the Unemployment Grants Committee. December 1920-
August 1932. (Parliamentary Papers, 1932-3,XV), p.26. 
26. P.R.O. Adoption of Industrial Transference Board Report by various 
Government Departments. Employment of Civilian Labour from 
depressed mining areas by Government contractors. LAB/2/493/ET 2784. 
Letter of 9 Aug.1929. 
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month he wrote again. "I enclose you a sample letter from hundreds which 
I receive at home and here addressed to me from London men wanting 
work. I also receive at my door each morning many verbal applications. 
My desire is that for ordinary employment - not relief work - London men 
shall be eligible. II27 As a result, vacancies in the industrial grades of 
the Office of Works were to be divided equally between local labour and 
those from the Depressed Areas. By 1931, Lansbury was questioning 
whether this arrangement ought to continue in the case of building 
1 d b 1 h • . • d 28 emp oyees an , su sequent y, t e cond1t10n was wa1ve • 
These two instances suggest that, although as depression 
deepened, transferred labour might gain employment at the expense of 
the local unemployed, in total, unemployment would tend to fall 
slightly. Transferees were gaining employment and through the 
multiplier effects of their expenditure out of their incomes, some 
other labour could be employed. This is the conslusion suggested by the 
regression analysis of Greater London. However the reservation must 
again be made that transferred labour, although initially finding 
work, might not retain it for any length of time. In so far as 
return migration was not encouraged (and it seems it often was) then 
27. ibid.Letter of 26 Aug.1929 
28. ibid.Lettersof 5 May 1931,10 July 1931. 
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unemployment in the receiving areas would worsen. 29 
The policies of the UGC were the other major influence on the 
direction of impact of in-migration on unemployment in the receiving 
areas. After July 1930, all local authorities were eligible for 
the award of maximum grants, hitherto only awarded to 'transfer' schemes. 
The employment of a certain proportion of transferred labour was 
waived as a condition of grant, although still thought desirable. 3D 
The result was a large increase in the total employment on such 
schemes, but a corresponding fall in the importance of transferred 
labour in this employment. 3l Assistance for works could be obtained 
without employing Depressed Area men whereas before this 
alteration it was in the interests of local authorities to 
-
29. A departmental survey of transference in 1938 found that at most 
non-depressed area offices a number of Depressed Area men were 
registered as unemployed. A local surplus of unskilled labour 
prevented the absorption of such labour and, besides, many employed 
were in temporary posts. Further, of some 330 returnees the 
following reasons were given (and considered typical) for their 
decision. 
(a) Job finished, no further work available 110 
(b) Left job of own accord (home sick etc.) 85 
(c) Work, or considered there was work, in home area 34 
(d) Sickness or domestic reasons 32 
(e) Discharged (unsuitable, misconduct etc.) 23 
(f) Wages insufficient 22 
(g) Difficulty of securing reasonable accommodation 
at a reasonable rate 17 
(h) Unable to obtain any work 12 
(i) Other 9 
P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme-General Review 1938. LAB 8/218. 
Other evidence on the reasons for 'wastage' are to be found in P.R.O. 
National Advisory Council. Circulars. Transfer of Juveniles from 
Distressed Mining Areas to Employment in other districts. LAB 
2113l2/EJJ 525/10. 
30. Final Report of UGC,op.cit.pp.9-l0. 
31. ibid.p.lO. 
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do so.32 Consequently, as employment on such works schemes was bound 
to be short-term, so the decreasing importance of such schemes for 
transferees might suggest that employment gained after mid-1930 was 
mo re pe rmanen t . However, just as UGC transfers were small in relation 
to total transfers,33 so not all migration was through the Ministry of 
Labour and thus not to definite vacancies. A job would have been 
progressively more difficult to obtain from 1930 onwards and migration 
would to some extent have been discouraged. To the extent that it was 
not discouraged, unemployment in the receiving area would have been 
. 34 lncreased as transferees added to southern unemployment. In short, it 
is not possible to determine the certain direction of impact of in-
migration on unemployment in the receiving areas, although it seems to be 
poSitively related to unemployment in most circumstances. Variations in 
labour market conditions over time and space affect this conclusion. 
II 
The long-run effects of migration will now be examined in the losing 
32. Retrenchment prevailed in 1931 and the activities of the UGC were 
curtailed following the May Report. Report of the committee on 
National Expenditure, (P.P.,1930-1,XVI). 
33. The Miniatry of Labour set up the Transfer Instructional Centres in 
1929 following the increasing failure of many transferees to retain 
their jobs. This failure was attri~uted to the decline in the 
quality of labour being transferred. Ministry of Labour Annual 
Report for the year 1929 (P.P.,1929-30.XV),p.17. 
34. The fact that most migrants were young, male and single would have 
also resulted in return movements being easily made in the face of 
adversity. The net migration statistics will not include such 
movements if they took place within a year. 
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regions. Contemporary fears of the deleterious effects of prolonged 
Out-migration were widespread. Public opinion in south Wales and 
Cumberland was against transference because it led to the loss of the 
best type of labour, there was a burden on the rates as rateable values 
fell, and together these factors provided an obstacle to new employers 
locating in these areas. 35 The selectivity of out-migration took several 
forms • Cumberland County Council observed that the age-selective nature 
of migration resulted in the age distribution of the remaining population 
being heavily weighted with dependents. As a result, expenditure on 
social services was increased whilst rateable value, at best, remained 
stationary. 36 It was estimated, for example, that 66 per cent of the 
net outward balance of migrants from south Wales, 1921-31, were under 30 
and 87 per cent under 45. For Durham and Northumberland the respective 
percentages were 69 and 87. 37 Depression and the ageing of the popula-
tion meant that in places like Glamorgan, two-thirds of the county rate 
Was attributable to public assistance charges, whereas in Blackpool the 
proportion was one-twentieth. 38 The age-selective character of migration 
-
35. P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme.op.cit. Such opinions were 
widespread and the Ministry of Labour noted that "this publicity 
has had Some adverse affect on the willingness of a number of 
applicants to consider transference to more prosperous areas". 
36. P.R.O. Summaries of Evidence.HLG 27/373. Cumberland County Council. 
37. H.W.Singer, Transference and the Age Structure of Migration. 
Interim Report of the Pilgrim Trust Unemployment Enquiry. Cited in 
A.D.K.Owen,op.cit.p.4l. Additionally, of Oxford natives at the 
end of 1937, 71 per cent of the total were in the 14-39 age group. 
Of Oxford Welshmen, 80 per cent were in this group. See, G.H. 
Daniel, 'Labour Migration and Age Composition', Sociological Review, 
31(1939) ,307. 
38. P.R.O. Memorandum of Evidence of the County Councils Association. 
HLG 27/42. 
199 
was partially a product of Ministry of Labour policy in an effort to 
ensure the success of its transfer activities and its good reputation 
with employers in the receiving areas. But naturally it was the younger 
population who were more willing and able to migrate. Selectivity was 
not confined to age. Generally, the P.E.P. Report considered that 
migrant groups "probably contain many of the potential local leaders of 
me d • • • f . " 39 d" n, an ~n~t~ators 0 new enterpr~ses and contemporary ~scuss~on of 
the leading role of Welsh migrants in trade union activities in the 
south suggests that this was partially true. 40 Further, migration also 
tended to be skill-biased. The more highly skilled were more employable 
and more mobile. The skill distribution of the remaining population was 
thus affected and local shortages could result. Such migration was not a 
contribution towards the reduction of the surplus of labour that character-
ized these areas. Migration also tended to reduce the active population 
at a faster rate than the total population. The Ministry of Labour thought 
that "migration tends to lessen the chance of attracting new industries to 
the depressed areas by reducing the size of what was one of their chief 
-
39. Political and Economic Planning. Report on the Location of 
Industry in Great Britain(l939),p.l42. 
40. See A.D.K.Owen,op.cit.; M.Daly, 'Social Consequences of Industrial 
Transference', Sociololical Review,309l938) and A.D.K.Owen, 'Social 
Consequences of Industrial Transference: A Rejoinder', Sociololical 
Review,30(1938). Prominent parts in strikes in Oxford's motor 
works are said to have been played by Welshmen. G.B. Daniel , 'Some 
Factors Affecting the Movement of Labour', Oxford Economic Papers, 
No. 3(1940) ,157. 
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assets, namely, an experienced industrial population". 41 Thus, the 
fall in numbers, and perhaps in the quality of the labour force, were 
thought to be factors discouraging the location of new industrial activity 
in these areas. Similarly, the rate burden, even after de-rating was a 
related deterrent to new enterprise, although perhaps largely psycholo-
gical. 42 
The other principal argument against out-migration alleged the 
resulting under-utilisation of social capital. Flirttshire County Council 
noted that factory closures resulted in the migration of population and 
the under-utilisation of social capital. 43 The Tyneside Industrial 
Development Board echoed these fears. "The transference of labour • 
is disadvantageous to the area from which the labour is taken because the 
debt burden of services falls more heavily on the remaining population and 
41. Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population. op.cit. 2 Feb.1938,para.26. 
42. The highest rate charged by a local authority in the year 1928/9 was 
at Merthyr TydfiL K.Hancock, 'The Reduction of Unemployment as a 
Problem of Public Policy', Economic History Review, 2nd.ser.lS 
(1962),336. The 1929 Local Government Act derated industry by 
7S per cent. Despite the decline in the real rate burden on 
industrialists, which at all times was a small proportion of total 
costs of production, high rates were still thought to deter the 
location of industrial establishments. This was argued by the 
District Commissioner for the South Wales Special Area in 1935. 
P.R.O. Transference of labour and the resultant effect on existing 
social services and rates. Notes on the rate position in South 
Wales. LAB 23/75. Population loss also affected the size of the 
central government's block grant to local authorities. It was 
estimated that Rhondda lost £43.000, 1934-9, on a per capita basis. 
S.R.Dennison, The Location of Industry in the Depressed Areas 
(1939).p.192. 
43. P.R.O.Summaries of Evidence.op.cit. Flintshire County Council. 
However, Flintshire was generally gaining population by migration. 
supra,Chapter 2,Appendix2. 
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the pUblic services become partly redundant. ,,44 Further, although out-
migration might result in services becoming redundant there was no 
prospect of expenditure being reduced commensurately. For one, the 
remaining population might impose an extra charge on the public assis-
tance rate. Secondly, services might not be proportionately reduced 
with population losses and even if they were, there was an inevitable lag 
whilst expenditure continued above limits justified by demand. 45 
However, areas with high rates of out-migration also tended to have high 
rates of natural increase. Social capital could only become under-
utilised, as a result of migration, if population growth became negative. 
In many areas this had not resulted by 1939 as the age-distribution of 
the population had not yet been skewed sufficiently towards the aged for 
natural increase to fall to a level that did not offset losses by 
migration. Merthyr Tydfil was one exception. 46 Table XX shows those 
counties that were experiencing ~egative population growth. Even in 
these counties it must be remembered that social capital may have been 
oVer-utilised or of poor quality and ready for replacement. As 
Professor Marquand stated, "the actual waste of material equipment -
houses, buildings, transport and public utilities and the like - has 
" 47 perhaps been overstressed in some arguments • 
It is immediately apparent that to question the under-utilisation of 
-
44. ibid.Tyneside Industrial Development Board. 
45. P.R.O. Memorandum of Evidence of the County Councils Association. 
op.cit. 
46. A.D.K.Owen.op.cit.(1937).339. 
47. Professor Marquand in. 'South Wales Has a Plan'. Quoted by 
A.D.K.Owen, op.cit.(1938).81. 
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capital in the Depressed Areas is also to question the alleged wastage 
involved in duplicating capital in the receiving areas of the south. 
The Ministry of Labour considered that, 
"the establishment of industries in new and 
undeveloped areas has its disadvantages. 
Thus it involves expenditure for the 
provision of roads, houses, schools and similar 
services to meet the needs of the inhabitants 
in areas of new industrial development, at a 
time when such services are available and have 
to be maintained in the older industrial 
areas".48 
However, such capital in the northern areas was often in need of replace-
mente D 1" , 1 ' 49 up 1cat10n was prec1se y what was requ1red. Even if such 
facilities were under-utilised in the Depressed Areas, duplication was, 
in fact, an advantage, in a time of low aggregate demand. 50 
Each of the influences of migration on losing areas had their 
parallel effect in the receiving areas. Principally, there was the 
absolute gain in population. Then the effects on the area would have 
been determined by the speed of that gain, its age and skill distribution, 
and its consequent impact on labour supplies and the natural increase 
rate of the area. To some extent, such an influx may have le,d to 
48. Royal Comudssion on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population.op.cit.para.25. 
49. Replacement or duplication does not necessarily imply that the new 
facilities must be provided on the site of the old. 
50. Of course, Keynesian influences had a limited impact before World 
War II. Before the 'General Theory', Baldwin was able to broad-
cast that "the rank and file of the Socialist party and the rank and 
file of the Lib.ral party, if indeed they may be represented by 
Mr. Lloyd George's speech, show that still they believe that 
expenditure is the cure for unemployment". Reported in the 
Glasgow Heraldf 17 Feb.193l. 
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problems of overcrowding, of traffic congestion with the geographical 
spread of settlement, of inflexibilities in the supply of public services 
other than roads, such as hospitals, educational facilities, or public 
health services. To the extent that in-migration lead to concentrations 
of population, in the context of the late 1930's, a strategic disadvan-
tage was also a product of population movements. Clearly, what has to 
be considered is the degree to which the various misfortunes of expanding 
areas were due to migration as such, rather than to population size or 
natural increase. Many of the attendant problems of in-migration were 
exaggerated by those concerned to represent the interests of a parti-
cular area. A discussion of these effects is delayed until Chapter 9 
Where the contribution of in-migration to the problems of London is 
eXamined. As with the prece~ding discussion of the long-term impact of 
ndgration on losing areas, data difficulties prevent the presentation of 
a completely satisfactory account. 
III 
In the short-term the direction of impact of transference policies 
on the Depressed Areas was favourable in reducing unemployment, but of 
nealigible proportions in relation to the size of the unemployment 
problem. The dominatina role of the mid-period depression is explanatioa 
for the relatively low numbers moving, especially after 1930/1. In the 
receivina areas, the impact of mi,ration was nealiaible, except where 
concentrated in particular areas. It is not po.sible to be certain 
~ether the policy ultimately spread unemployment, thus evenina-out 
inter-reaional disparities, or succeeded in placina the miarants in 
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permanent vacancies. 
Given this negligible impact on unemployment in the Depressed 
Areas and the friction created in southern labour markets, examination 
mUst be made as to whether the apparent failure of migration policies 
in this period resulted in the introduction of Special Areas policies 
concentrating on moving jobs to the depressed regions, rather than 
moving labour out of them. 
In the long-term, it appears that migration policies had cumulatively 
unfavourable consequences, to some degree, for both losing and gaining 
areas. Again, a motivation for a new policy approach to the regional 
problem is suggested. But, to the extent that the effects of out-
migration on the Depressed Areas were unfavourable, the likelihood of 
success with Special Areas policies was to be reduced. In this sense, 
the two types of regional policy were contradictory. Similarly, in the 
south, the role of in-migration in adding to population and the labour 
force and accentuating rates of natural increase, by providing an 
increaSing market and an expanding labour suppl~ contradicted later 
attempts to discourage industrial location in these areas. These later 
attempts at decentralisation were themselves partially motivated by the 
ill-effects of in-migration over the long-run. 
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Table XVI 
~nemp1oyment in Selected Depressed and Non-Depressed Counties, 1928-1934. 
Depressed Non-Depressed 
1928 331,076 237,029 
1929 286,276 255,540 
1930 466,519 461,962 
1931 561,288 576,327 
1932 629,373 581,035 
1933 563,416 432,046 
1934 540,9.11 387,346 
Change in 
Unemployment +209,835 +150,317 
Source: Calculated from the Ministry of Labour's Local Unemployment 
Index, 1928-34. 
Totals are for December of each year. 
T.b-le XVII 
Unemployment and the Balance of Net Migration in Ministry of Labour 
Regions, 1928-1934. 
North Scotland Wales 
1928 546,719 136.538 129,132 
1929 529,902 139,904 114,820 
1930 947,371 224,648 157,148 
1931 1,236,122 348,926 194,649 
1932 1,185,495 364,672 234,729 
1933 1,058,916 344,152 216,650 
1934 943,238 305,729 211 ,914 
Change in 
Unemployment + 396,519 +169,191 + 82,782 
Balance of 
Net Migration 375,504 -144,263 -242,030 
London South South Midlands East West 
1928 101,306 34,899 57,038 186,932 
1929 101,492 33,928 59,572 162,764 
1930 156,187 54,688 75,269 275,264 
1931 254,001 91,898 113,656 425,637 
1932 296,309 125,842 142,790 397,506 
1933 259,785 96,850 131,688 330,067 
1934 194,519 72,098 108,982 256,106 
Change in 
Unemployment + 93,213 + 37,199 + 51,944 + 69,174 
Balance of 
Net Migration +380,146 +327,248 + 94,054 + 7,120 
Source: MinistEl of Labour Gazette.July issue, 1928-34; for net 
migration, see supra, Chapter 2,Appendix 2. 
Figures are for June of each year. 
Table XVIII 
The Re&ression of Unem210I!ent in Selected Counties on Transference and a 
National Unem210I!ent Variable. 1928-1934 
Independent Constant Regression Change 
R2 variable Coefficient in R2 n 
Northern Counties 
X2 0.49(0.09) 0.90 0.91 7 1/ 
X3 
-0.88(1.57) 0.01 
Southern Counties 
178138.55 
X2 0.33(0.05) 0.88 0.91 7 2/ 
X3 1.91(1.62) 0.03 
- 65572.01 
The Resression of Unem210I!ent in Ministrl of Labour Resions on Net Misration 
and a National Une~loyment !ariab1e. 1928-1934 
Independent Constant Regression Change R2 variable Coefficient in R2 n 
North 
- X2 0.68(0.10) 0.92 0.94 7 3/ 
X3 1.19(1.15) 0.02 
SCotland 
231114.46 
X2 0.16(0.01) 0.96 0.98 7 4/ 
X3 0.62(0.30) 0.02 
Wales 3486.99 
- X2 0.06(0.01) 0.83 0.90 7 5/ 
X3 0.74(0.43) 0.07 
.hondon 
87050.60 
X2 0.14(0.01) 0.95 0.97 7 6/ 
X3 -0.30(0.20) 0.02 
South East 
- 48583.51 
X2 0.05(0.01) 0.90 0.96 7 7/ 
X3 0.29 (0.11) 0.06 
South West 
- 42912.10 
X2 0.05(0.01) 0.87 0.90 7 8/ 
X3 0.31(0.27) 0.03 
Midlands 
- 10548.77 
X2 0.17 (0.03) 0.90 0.01 7 9/ 
X3 0.71(0.80) 0.01 
- 10989.46 
Standard Errors in brackets. 
All equations are significant at the 5 per cent level. Of the individual 
coefficients, that for X2 is uniformly significant, that for X3 is not. 
Table XIX 
~e Regression of Unemployment in Selected Counties on Transference 
~djusted for wastage and multiplier effects and a National Unemployment 
:ox: ~ariable 1928-1934. The S3 coefficients. 
Northern Counties Southern Counties 
-1.76(3.14) 3.83(3.24) 
!Ee Regression of Unemployment in Ministry of Labour Regions on Net 
Migration adjusted for wastage and multiplier effects and a National 
~employment variable. 1928-1934. The e) coefficients. 
North Scotland Wales 
2.38(2.31) 1.25(0.59) 1.49(0.86) 
London South East South West Midlands 
-1.22(0.82) 0.58(0.22) 0.62(0.55) 1.43(1.59) 
Standard Errors in brackets. 
None of the coefficients are significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table XX 
Areas Losing Population, 1920-1929 and 1929-19391/ 
1920-1929 
Counties where out-migration 
offsets positive natural 
increase 
Argyll (-16.6) 
Orkney (-9.2) 
Cai thne s s ( - 8. 6) 
Berwick (-7.1) 
Wigtown (-6.4) 
Nairn (-5.8) 
Ross & Cromarty (-5.6) 
Moray (-4.7) 
Banff (-4.5) 
Selkirk (-4.3) 
Perth (-4.2) 
Roxburgh (-4.2) 
Kirkcudbright (-3.2) 
Pembroke (-3.2) 
Dumfries (-3.0) 
Inverness (-3.0) 
Cardigan (-2.8) 
Kinross (-2. 7) 
Angus (-2.6) 
Aberdeen (-2.4) 
Peebles (-2.1) 
Brecon (-1.7) 
Lines. Kesteven (-1.6) 
Kincardine (-1.3) 
Ayr (-1.1) 
LONDON (-1.1) 
Montgomery (-1.1) 
Hereford (-0.9) 
CUMBERLAND (-0.7) 
Clackmannan (-0.6) 
Counties with out-migration 
& negative natural increase 
Sutherland (-6.7) 
Zetland (-6.4) 
1/ Figures in brackets show per cent rate of population growth over 
decade. 
Upper case lettering - Selected Counties in earlier analysis. 
COlUlties 
COlUlties where out-
migration offsets 
positive natural 
increase 
*Kincardine (-37.1) 
*tirkcudbright (-16.2) 
MONMOUTH (-12.3) 
Brecon (-11.6) 
Montgomery (-10.6) 
Radnor (-9.5) 
Anglesey (-9.4) 
LONDON (-9.4) 
GLAMORGAN (-9.1) 
Kinross (-8.7) 
Cardigan (-7.9) 
Peebles (-5.8) 
Carmarthen (-5.1) 
Pembroke (-5.1) 
DURHAM (-4.7) 
Suffolk West (-4.7) 
CUMBERLAND (-3.7) 
West Lothian (-3.1) 
Banff (-3.0) 
Fife (-2.0) 
Caithness (-1. 7) 
Denbigh (-1. 6) 
Hereford (-1. 6) 
Lancashire (-1.5) 
Rutland (-1. 3) 
Norfolk (-0.9) 
N ai rn ( -0 • 5) 
Ta,ble XX (continued) 
1929-1939 
CClUlties with out-
migration & negative 
natural increase 
Zet1and (-17.4) 
Bute (-15.3) 
Merioneth (-9.6) 
Sutherland (-9.1) 
Ross & Cromarty (-8.0) 
*Carnarvon (-3.8) 
Argyll (-2.6) 
Berwick (-2.6) 
Cornwall (-2.4) 
Orkney (-1. 7) 
Ministry of Labour Regions 
Regions where out-migration 
offsets positive natural 
increase 
Wales (-7.9) 
North (-2. 7) 
North West (-0.3) 
COlUlties with 
in-migration 
& negative natural 
increase 
1.0. W. (-1.0) 
Upper case lettering - Selected Counties in earlier analysis. 
*Negative BOlUldary Changes of Magnitude affect conclusions. 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Statistical Review8 of the 
Registrar-General for England & Wales and the Annual Reports 
of the Registrar-General for Scotland. 
CHAPTER 6 
The Quest for an Effective Regional Policy, 1934-1937. 
I 
An examination of much of the literature dealing with regional 
policies in Britain yields the impression that either no policy 
existed before 1934 when a 'move-industry-to-the-workers' policy was 
introduced, or, that whereas a policy of labour transference was 
encouraged from 1928 this abruptly ceased in 1934, by reason of its 
failure, to be replaced by a policy encouraging the movement of the 
other mobile factor of production. 1 For example, a recent account 
notes that, "for thirty-five years, attempts have been made by 
governments to check the out-migration, to provide new sources of 
employment and to improve the long-term economic prospects of the 
older, coalfield-based regions of Britain". 2 Elsewhere, Loasby 
considers that, "it vas the apparent failure of migration significantly 
to reduce inter-regional variations in unemployment that prompted the 
initial government intervention in the 1930,.~3 Neither of these 
accounts reflects the reality of the times. A transference policy 
2. 
3. 
•• 
An exception is A.J. Brown, The Framework of Balional Economic. 
in the United Kingdom (Cambridge, 1972), pp. 281-5. 
M. Chisholm and G. Manners, 'Geographic Space: A New Dimension 
of Public Concern and Policy', in M. Chisholm IIld G. Manners, eds, 
Spatial Polic; Problems of the British Econo!, (Cambridll, 1971), p.2. 
B. J. Louby, Locadon of Inc1ustry: Thirty Y.ars of "Plmning'-, 
District Bank Bayill. 156(1965), 32, 34. 
was operated from the late 192.'s. This policy continued beyond 
1934 and, as a result of policy changes, was operating at its peak in 
1936, as is shown in Table XXI. It is incorrect to suppose that the 
Special Areas Act of 1934 was a product of the failure of migration 
and transference policies. Transference was encouraged from 1934, not 
discontinued and the origins of the Special Areas Act was not so simple. 
The question arises, therefore, as to whether the coexistence of 
such policies was complementary, as argued by the Special Areas 
Commissioner, or contradictory, as they could equally be held to be. 
Sir Malcolm Stewart argued that, 
"transference should be concentrated on those districts 
which obviously offer the least prospect of recovery. 
At the same time ••••• inducements are needed to attract 
industries in the first place to those districts which 
possess the maximum opportunities for recovery. There 
is nothing paradoxical in these proposals since neither 
policy of itself is sufficient to solve the problems which 
have for many years confronted the Special Areas. "4 
However, McCrone makes the point that, "the allOduB of the more 
enterprising and skilled section of the labour force from the Areas, 
far from relieving the problem, only aggravated it. This was precisely 
the section of the labour force needed to man new industry if it could 
be established in the Areas. ,,5 The conclusion that the policies were 
complementary seems hard to accept given the numbers moving in these 
years and the selective n"'re of migration. However, the Special 
Areas Act of 1934 was not the beginnings of a 'move-industry' policy 
4. Second Report of the Commis.ioner for the Special Areas 
(England and Wales) (Pari. Papers, 1935-6, XII~, para. II. 
5. G. McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (1969), pp. 98-9. 
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and so the two policy instruments did not conflict in their 
, , h' 6 h ' 1ntent10ns at t 1S stage. Furt er, as the 1934 Act d1d not 
herald a 'move-industry' policy, to judge it by its success in 
achieving such aims is a somewhat curious, although a common error. 
II 
The 1934 legislation emerged from two strands of concern for 
the regional problem. In the later part of March 1934, The Times 
published a series of articles on Durham. This was essentially a 
review of the problem previously examined in 1928 with articles on 
South Wales and the North-East coalfields. Some important conclusions 
were arrived at in the last article of the series. 7 The younger 
unemployed were to be transferred from Durham, as existing policy 
in tended, and it proposed "se condly, and simultaneously, but without 
raising false hopes that will hold back migration, to give determined 
practical thought to the chances of inducing the establishment of new 
industries locally, however small, or the development of more intensive 
agriculture". It proposed the appointment of investigators to consider 
an appropriate course of action, noting that the problem itself was 
well known. A leading article of the same date, reviewing the work 
of the special correspondent, envisaged a "Director of Operations 
against the derelict areas ••• He would be the channel and instrument 
6. Whether the different instruments conflicted in term. of results 
is examined in the next chapter. 
7. The Time., March 2Q,2l,22 1934. Republished in pamphlet form as 
'Places Without a Future: The Burden of Durham' to be found at P.R.O. 
Inter-Departmental Committee on Depressed Areas. Commissioner for 
Special Areas-General Policy. BT 55/15. 
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of a concerted national effort to rid the land of these terrible pools 
of idleness in which manhood is slowly and fatally sinking. He would 
bind together the agencies of relief and amelioration and direct 
remedial measures with concentrated force." The leader continued. 
"some of the remedial measures are known, but others, more effective, 
have to be discovered". 
In these few sentences are the forerunners of the Commissioners 
appointed to investigate conditions in the four areas, the principal 
policy conclusions of the subsequent reports and the styling of the 
Commissioner for Special Areas as -Director of Operations" with the 
implication that his work, by necessity, should to some extent be 
experimental. Further leading articles of the 26th March and the 
13th April continued to advocate this course of action and on 19th 
April the appointment of investigators into conditions in certain 
depressed areas was announced. 8 Mr H.Macmillan (Stockton-on-Tees) 
later considered that "it would not be an exaggeration to say that 
the decision of the Government to make those appointments was brought 
about no doubt by their own inquiries, and partly by the pressure 
of public opinion. but very largely as a result of a series of articles 
which appeared in the 'Times' newspaper in the summer of this year. 
and which revealed for the first time to many southern readers the 
, 9 
full amount of distress". 
8. Hansard (Commons) 5th sere 288,1100, 19 April 1934. 
9. ibid.295, 227-8, 20 Nov. 1934. 
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The second, and not altogether distinct, strand of thought 
that heralded the 1934 legislation were the Reports of the 
I . 10 nvesugators. These were originally prompted, it seems, by 
The Times and the highlighted disparities between 'North' and 
'South', as some recovery was experienced from the cyclical 
depression. The proposals of the Investigators were far from 
revolutionary. As The Economist noted, "the proposals contained in 
these four reports do not reveal anything particularly novel or •• 
. k. ,,11 strl. lng • Arthur Greenwood (Wakefield) considered "that there is 
very little which was not put before the Government on the Floor of 
the House, when, two years ago, I think, we had a three days' Debate 
12 
on the problem of the unemployed", and Mr Daggar (Abertillery) 
quoted a statement of Professor Marquand to a Welsh newspaper. 
"The publication of the reports of the four coumissioners serves 
chiefly to draw attention to the tragic delay of the Government in 
dealing with this problem. We find that no new information has been 
discovered and that almost the whole of their recommendations have been 
13 
made before." The speeches of Mr Buchanan (Gorbals) and Mr Lawson 
(Chester-le-Street) echoed these opinions. 14 Even so, the recommendations 
10. Reports of the Investigation. into the Industrial Conditions 
in Certain Depressed Areas (P.P.,1933-4,XIII). 
11. The Economist, 10 Nov. 1934. 
12. Hansard (Commons) 5th sere 293, 2076, 14 Nov. 1934. 
13. ibid.2258, 15 Nov. 1934. 
14. ibid.2267-73, 2280, 15 Nov. 1934. 
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were diluted after consideration by the various departments concerned. lS 
The exception was the cautious comment on a proposal of the Investigator 
for Durham. 
"Captain Wallace proposes the appointment of a Commissioner 
to coordinate all activities in connection with Government 
schemes for a rehabilitation of the Durham and Tyneside area. 
Such a Commissioner should not be under the necessity of 
referring any but major questions to London. This suggestion 
must be considered in relation to all the areas, since presumably 
if a Commissioner were appointed for one area, similar appointments 
would have to be made for each of the others. It is difficult 
to see the value of such appointments unless the Commissioners 
were given considerable funds and powers."16 
Not only was this earmarked for further consideration but the subsequent 
difficulties a Commissioner would have with insufficient money and authority 
were foreseen. 
After the various government departments had considered the 
Investigators' Reports, it was the turn of a Cabinet Comudttee. It 
was here concluded that the Reports were unimaginative and were 
"unlikely to satisfy the expectations that have been created in all 
quarters by the appointment of the Investigators" .17 Other measures had 
to be considered. For example, one approach that found favour was a 
policy aimed at developing the infra-structure of the areas so as to 
make them more attractive to industry. "These desiderata could be met", 
it was felt, "by the appointment of a commissioner to take charge of all 
18 
special measures in the Depressed Areas". Such a course "would have 
15. P.R.O. Inter-Departmental Committee on Depressed Areas. Notes 
and Memoranda on Reports of ColllDissioners and SUUlllary of 
Recommendations and Departmental C01llDentB thereon. BT 55/15/D.A.9. 
16. ibid. 
17. ibid. Interim Report of the Cabinet Comudttee on the Reports of 
Investiaations into the Depr •••• d Areaa.CP 227(34). 220ct.1934. 
CAB 24/251. 
18. ibid. 
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an important psychological effect in persuading the persons in the 
Depressed Areas that the Government had their plight very much at 
heart. ,,19 Transference was to be the most effective weapon; the 
Special Areas proposals the most dramatic. 
Neville Chamberlain, as Chancellor of the Exchequer, on moving 
the acceptance of the Reports to the House of Commons noted that, 
"there was very little chance of finding any as yet undiscovered remedy 
that anybody had thought of" and he complimented the Investigators 
who, "have not allowed themselves to be led away by any will-o'-the wisps, 
but have chosen to rely •••• upon the cumulative effects of attacks upon 
the problem from many angles". 20 The Government were in agreement with 
the Investigators. "upon the need for an intensification of the 
transference policy". 21 This was particularly stressed as conditions 
in the South of England were improving after the collapse of 1929 and 
this relative revival held the prospect of job opportunities. Before 
1934, the cyclical downturn had had severe effects on the success of 
transference policy. As Mr O. Stanley, the Minister of Labour, 
considered, "there is a possibility today, as trade and industry 
stand now, in certain districts of the country of findinl for people 
from the depressed areas jobs which are not at the expense of persons in 
the locality".22 Consequently, certain changes in the industrial 
19. ibid. 
20. Hansard (Commons) 5th ser. 293, 1992, 14 Nov 1934. 
21. P.R.O. Board of Trade Committee Papers. Inter-Departmental 
Committee on the Depressed Areas. Papers relating to the setting 
up of the Commissioner for Depressed Areas, and the preparation 
of a Draft Bill. BT 55/14/D.A.l. 
22. Hansard(Commons)5th ser.293,2086,14 Nov.1934. 
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transference scheme were to be implemented. The cost of making up 
juvenile wage rates to a sum allowing existence independent from 
the assistance of the family income was to be transferred from the 
Lord Mayors Fund to the Government; Hostels were to be built; 
grants in aid of living expenses to be paid and incidental expenses 
were also to be met. Additionally, an appeal was made to 
employers to use the Employment Exchange machinery when recruiting 
labour. 
Although total recovery was to await the revival of the localized 
basic export industries, in addition to transference, other lines 
of attack were to be followed. One of these was the introduction of 
new industries to the areas. However, any proposals of subsidisation 
to induce such developments were dismissed and it was hoped that the 
Commissioner's 'cleaning-up' of the areas would remove the temporary 
disadvantages and encourage such industrial developments without the 
need for government intervention. The greater part of the 
Commissioner's activities were envisaged to be concerned with the 
residual problem of unemployment. that transfer could not deal with 
through land settlement, allotments, small holdings, 'local 
occupational devices' and certain public works. Mr Stephen Davies 
(Merthyr Tydfi1) appealed to the Government for a different 
emphasis in its policy. 
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"What amazes me", he said, "is either the utter disregard 
of the Government or their utter inability to appreciate 
what this talk of transference actually means • • 
• • No effort is to be made to bring industry to them but 
rather to drive them away where industry might exist. I 
am going to appeal to the Government • • • to c02~ider the 
possibility of bringing industry to the people." 
A similar appeal was made by Lieutenant-Colonel Head1am (Barnard 
Castle).24 
But Chamberlain already considered that the contemplated policy 
was ambitious as it stood. The submission of the recommendations of 
the Investigators to the ordinary procedure 
"which consists, of course, in referring each rec01llllendation 
to the appropriate Government Departments for examination, 
subjecting it to the ordinary checks - the consideration of 
whether it infringes old precedents or creates undesirable 
new ones - in fact, the application of all the necessary 
and proper safeguards which are usually brought into 
operation when considering the expenditure of public money, 
is a procedure which is neither appropriate nor adequate 
to the special conditions of these areas. What we want 
here, as it seems to us, is something more rapid, more 
direct!51ess orthodox, if you like, than the ordinary 
plan." 
Ramsay MacDonald confirmed the Government's approach. 
"The Government are taking on an area, a specially defined 
and examined area; they are going to take an experimental 
area, and not to begin and end there, but, just as a 
scientist takes his test tube into his laboratory, works 
out his results and their reactions, so we begin with that 
area for the purposes of discovery from the experiments 
23. ibid.2054-5,14 Nov.l934. 
24. ibid.2029-31,14 Nov.1934. 
25. ibid.1995-6,14 Nov.1934 
220 
cures, methods of handling, ways of spending public and 
private money, approaches to unemployment, and, having 
got these things out from a limited area, which neverthe-
less is representative in its problems of the whole 
country, we are going to extend these results of our 
working • • • by experimenting in the concentrated area 
you can reach your universal cure. "26 
Generally, the Bill was not well received. Mr John (Rhondda 
n 
West) wondered whether there was any need to move an Amendment. In all 
my experience of this House, I do not think I have ever heard a Bill 
introduced by a Government which has been condemned by practically 
everybody on the Government side. ,,27 Criticisms on specific aspects were 
also numerous, especially on the definition of the areas to be designated 
28 
and the amount of government money to be expended. The regulations 
governing the Commissioner's assistance of local authorities were also 
criticized and prompted Bevan (Ebbw Vale) to prophesy 
"that in six months time the Commissioner who has been 
appointed will be one of the most disillusioned, cynical 
and soured persons that the Government have ever used 
as a decoy to do a shabby job of work. He will be 
compiUed to turn down scheme after scheme. He will be 
frustrated by Government Department after Government 
Department. "29 
This criticism of the measure, and that on finance, seems to have 
been produced by a disappointment that the Commissioner was not to 
undertake large scale public works schemes. By contrast, there was 
general agreement that no assistance should be given to any undertaking 
26. ibid.29S,29-30,20 Nov. 1934. 
27. ibid.13S7,3 Dec.1934. 
28. For example, ibid.1773,S Dec.1934. 
29. ibid.1946,6 Dec.1934. 
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operating for profit, although rate concessions were advocated by 
Mr Hall (Aberdare). There was little to suggest that the Bill was 
viewed as a means of 'move-industry' policy, either by the Government or 
the Opposition. Mr Lindsay (Kilmarnock) wondered whether there was 
any method" apart from the clearing away of slag heaps, which the Minister 
of Labour is going to use to correct the dislocation in the siting of 
• II 30 lndustry • It was evident that the Government placed no emphasis on 
the Commissioner's proposed activities in this sphere. The problem of 
unemployment was seen as a national problem requiring national measures 
such as altering the retirement age and the school leaving age; as a 
problem of industries and not areas requiring the drainage of pits, the 
hydrogenisation of coal, the encouragement of exports and of the shipping 
industry, and the nationalisation of mining royalties; as an inevitable 
feature of the capitalist system, a product of mechanisation and more. 
Opinion was sufficiently diverse to prevent a clear interpretation of the 
problems of the areas. The pressure for a 'move-industry' policy was 
merely one pressure amongst many and it was not developed to an extent 
that could attract many supporters. 
1934 saw a re-examination of the regional problem, prompted by the 
disparate rates of recovery of the north and south from the cyclical 
depression. This resulted in a restatement of faith in the well-tried 
remedy of transference. The improvement of economic conditions in the 
south promised that this approach might become successful in dissipating 
northern unemployment. The innovation of Special Areas policy was a 
product of the Government's need to do lomething dramatic for the.e areal. 
30. ibid.541,26 Nov.1934. Also lee 1310,3 Dec.1934. 
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A multi-faceted approach to the problem of regional unemployment was more 
acceptable than one relying on the much criticized, politically sensitive 
solution of transfer. The Commissioner's aims were to administer those 
palliatives within the Special Areas that had, without exception, been 
seen before. Even the hope that industry might be attracted was an 
31 
echo of previous hopes, neither then nor in 1934 backed by sufficient 
power to enable these hopes to be seriously expected of fulfillment. 
The well-known limitations on the Commissioner's ability to induce 
industry to locate in the Special Areas - the exclusion of major towns 
from within the scheduled areas, the limited funds at his disposal, his 
lack of autonomy in the distribution of these funds and, in particular, 
his inability to aid undertakings established for profit32 - are only 
tenable if objectives are attributed to the legislation that were not in 
the minds of its architects. It was essentially an experimental scheme 
to discover what might best be done to solve the problem of surplus 
population. The Government did not set the Commissioner a task and then 
tie his hands behind his back so that he could not complete it. 
Transference was to be encouraged and Commissioners appointed to experiment 
with additional methods of solving the problem of regional unemployment. 
New industries was only one of the many channels that they were to explore. 
31. For example, the work of the Chief Industrial Advisor to the Board 
of Trade in 1929,1930. This is described at P.R.O. New Industries 
in the Depressed Areas. BT 56/38/C.I.A.1SOO (Parts 1 & 2). 
32. For example see Second Report of the Commissioner for the Special 
Areas(England and Wales),op.cit.; Third Report of the Commissioner 
for the Special Areas(England and Wales) (P.P.,1936-7,XII). 
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As with much post-war legislation in this field, the 1934 Act was 
flexible so Loasby's comment on the situation in post-World War II 
Britain is also found to be applicable. "It is important to note," he 
observed, "that each shift of policy has required only an administrative 
decision to bring it into effect; legislation has followed later, if it 
has been needed at all, and the dates of legislation are therefore poor 
guides to the timing of policy changes. ,,33 It was after 1934 that the 
character of Special Areas policy began to assume a character closer to 
that which is usually attributed to it and that a contradictory element 
began to creep into policy objectives. 
Early in 1935, the English Commissioner announced his intentions on 
future action 34 and it was noted that transference might conflict with 
his other aims, namely the expansion of agriculture and industry, and 
pUblic works. Already the emphasis was roving away from a labour 
mobility cure for the depressed areas. 
"For the younger section of the population in the 
distressed areas the generally accepted remedy is 
transfer to areas of employment, leaving behind a 
relatively elderly and less efficient remainder to 
bear the burden of the future. Transfer there must 
be; but, carried beyond a certain point, transfer 
will leave a waste of social capital and a legacy 
of future liabilities which will add to the 
difficulties of local industrial recovery. When 
the social and economic consequences of industrial 
decline are so tragic the possibilities of some 
33. Loaaby,op.cit.pp.28-9. 
34. The Times.29 Jan.1935. 
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direction of industrial development cannot be 
dismissed from consideration. "35 
The emphasis of policy was to change gradually. Baldwin appealed 
in mid-l935 "to employers generally to make use of the exchanges and to 
give the officials there an opportunity of submitting men and boys from 
36 these areas". Whilst transference was hoped to increase, the Prime 
Minister went on to regret 
"the fact that none of the new industries which have come 
down to the London area have thought fit to establish 
themselves in one of the depressed areas. I cannot 
see yet how we can bring the Government in by any 
form of direct action • • • but I do appeal • • • to 
the men who are undertaking and laying down new 
works to show their gratitude to the country for 
protecting them with a tariff by doing something in 
exchange for the country and going where the country 
needs them most, and that is these areas."37 
The climate of opinion in the House of Commons, however, seems to have 
been in advance of the Government. Mr Macmillan replied that 
35. ibid. 
"the Prime Minister, with engaging frankness, said that 
he realised that the problem of attracting new 
industries to the old areas was the essential problem 
for the Government • • • He said that at present he had 
no ideas and no positive plan to suggest • • • Might I 
suggest one or two? Might I suggest that it is now 
common history that the Government should reconsider 
the policy of derating • • • May I suggest another source 
of investigation? What is the main reason why the new 
industries group around the London area? One of the 
reasons is that power has become mobile. There is no 
need today, &I there used to be, to put down plant near 
the coalfields • • • What is more important is that it 
should be put near the market • • • I suggest for the 
Prime Minister's serious consideration that something 
might be done on the lines of modern transport • • • 
The next policy which might be considered is that of 
36. Hansard(Commona)5th ser.304,20l,9 July 1935. 
37. ibid.202,9 July 1935. 
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making the distressed areas really attractive commodities 
by undertaking on a broad basis, to clear the whole 
of the site and form new factory sites."38 
Mr Scrymgeor-Wedderburn (West Renfrew) also argued that the Government 
could" acquire in the Special Areas estates which may be suitable for 
industrial development and which might very quickly attract new industries 
if they were prepared with that purpose in view". 39 
Meanwhile, opposition to transference was becoming widespread as 
advocates of •. 'move-industry' policy multiplied in number. But the 
Government did not think that transference should be abandoned, preferring 
a multi-pronged attack on the problem of unemployment. The Government 
did not believe that "the introduction of new industries into the 
depressed areas is going to play a very large part in the near future in 
solving the problems of those areas. Speaking generally we doubt the 
feasibility of trying to persuade ordinary industry to go into the 
Special Areas. ,,40 Mr Wise (Smethwick) put the logic behind the 
continuation of transference policy. "Looking at the distressed areas," 
he said, "what new industries can be taken into most of them? Industry 
has not migrated from these areas for fun; it has migrated because other 
areas are economically more suitable. ,,41 The Govemment had no doubt that 
a policy of "transfer, forcefully presented and vigourously prosecuted, 
can do something effective and permanent to bring back many of the 
38. ibid.228-9,9 July 1935. 
39. ibid.242,9 July 1935. 
40. P.R.O. Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the Comsaionera for 
the Special Areas. Report. CP 197(35).18 Oct.1935. CAB 27/577. 
41. Hansard(Commons)5th ser.304,275,9 July, 1935. 
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employable persons in the depressed areas into the stream of production". 42 
"The Cabinet's policy should be a further speeding up and improvement of 
the process of transference. ,,43 
Debating the First Reports of the Commissioners, the Commons again 
found itself divided. Whilst the Opposition argued against transference 
and for the control of the location of industry, the Government stood by 
the status quo. Mr A. Greenwood (Wakefield) opened the debate. 
"The Government have no policY', he asserted, "their 
only hope is to diffuse this problem allover the country, 
through a large scheme of transfer. The industrial 
districts which are distressed would then not look 
quite so bad. People who are the victims would be 
scattered throughout the length and breadth of the 
country, and the Government would then be able to 
point at the distressed areas as having improved; but 
any man who is taken out of a distressed area and 
sent into another part of the country steals a job -
if he gets a job - from some native in the new area, 
unless there is an extension in the demand for labour~~4 
If transference was unacceptable it was also true, Mr Greenwood thought, 
that 
"capitalist enterprises have no moral right to leave 
social capital derelict, and to leave workers hopeless 
and workless, while they take their capital elsewhere ••• 
in these difficult times none of the great patriotic 
employers ought to be allowed to walk away from a district 
and leave a trail of ruin behind them. We assert • • • 
that the Government should control movements of capital 
in these days and that it should • • • also control the 
location of industry."45 
It was at this time that the proposals of Richard Thomas and Co. to open 
42. P.R.O. Note by Chairman of Inter-Departmental Committee annexed to 
Inter-Departmental Committee's Report on the Reports of the eomad-
ssioners for the Special Areas. 27 Sept.1935. CAB 27/577. 
43. ibid. Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the Investigations into 
the Depressed Areas. Proceedings and Memoranda. D.A.(34) 9th 
Meeting,17 Oct.1935.CAB 27/578. 
44. Hansard(eommons)5th ser.304,1673,23 July, 1935. 
45. ibid.1682,23 July 1935. 
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a new plant in the East Midlands orefield were under public discussion 
and this proposed movement and its apparent ramifications may have given 
some impetus to the establishment of a 'control capital movements' 
school of thought. 46 Mr Bevan referred to the proposals of Sir William 
Firth. " "It seems to me, he said, "that when industrialists like Sir 
William Firth talk about the establishment of new steel works at Redbourne 
they are talking antediluvian economics. They are merely taking into 
account the balance sheet of steel production alone, but if you are to 
have economics which are sound you must take into account the obsolescence 
of the social apparatus left behind in the old place. ,,47 
Neither were Government backbenchers content with Government policy, 
althoush they were not at one with the Official Opposition. Lord 
Dunglass (Lanark) put emphasis on transference from areas where there was 
no prospect of attracting new industries and was against preventing 
industries from changing their locations because it might result in a 
decline in the competitiveness of the industry and a subsequent loss of 
business in international markets. If a new location was necessary, the 
workforce ought to be encouraged to move with the plant. However, for 
areas where expenditure on social capital should continue he advocated 
attempts to induce the establishment of new industries, for example, 
46. infra,Chapter 8. 
47. Hansard(Commons)5th ser.304,1673,23 July 1935. 
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through the complete derating of industry in these areas. 48 A similar 
point of view was expressed by Lieut.-Col.Sir C.Headlam. He thought 
that the smaller industries, at present attracted by the London market, 
could be attracted to non-derelict locations in the Special Areas and he 
considered, "the proposal made by the Commissioner on page 16 of the 
Report that there should be a special fund created in order to lend money 
on easy terms for the expansion of existing enterprises and the starting 
" 49 of new enterprises would prove to be a very great help to us. He 
also wondered whether the Government could "bring some influence to bear 
on the railway companies in order that some differentiation in freight 
h . " . 50 c arges ~ght be made. Mr Bevan was in agreement on this last 
b • • 51 o Jectlve. The 'ubsidy of freight rates was also advocated by Lieut.-
Col.C.Kerr (Montrose) in an adjournment debate of the 2nd August and he 
thought "the Government might fiilsfJ.7 •• look into the question of being 
bl . de • f • d • • th " 52 a e to proVl cheap sltes or new ln ustrles ln ose areas. 
The changing emphasis in the aims of policy was further encouraged 
48. ibid.1722-8,23 July 1935. At this time industry was 75 per cent 
derated by the 1929 Local Government Act. However, the burden of 
public assistance was still unevenly distributed, given the unequal 
regional distribution of distresl, and representatives of these 
areas were often arguing for the complete derating of industry, le8s 
frequently for a differential derating, and also for the burden of 
public assistance to be taken over by the central government. It 
was not until April 1937, with the passage of the Local Government 
Act, that the block grant was adjusted to redistribute the rate 
burden somewhat, although not to the extent of equalisation. 
49. ibid.1740,23 July 1935. 
50. ibid. 
51. ibid.1763-4,23 July 1935. 
52. ibid.3063,2 Aug.1935. 
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by Sir Malcolm Stewart's proposals to establish trading estates, on the 
Slough model, in the Special Areas. Noting the limitations of the 1934 
Act and the remote possibility of private enterprise beginning such a 
Venture in these areas, he proposed, "that something should be done to 
provide estates in the Special Areas somewhat similar to those at Slough 
and Trafford Park • • • Some practical measure has to be taken to offer a 
defini te inducement to new industry to establish itself in these areas. ,,53 
The cautiousness of the Government was not far from the Commissioner's 
mind when he submitted his proposals, and, perhaps to soften the blow, he 
observed that, "the proposal is admittedly unorthodox, but it should be 
d d . .II 54 regar e as an exper1men~. This was in the spirit of the original 
legislation and subsequently the unorthodox became Government orthodoxy. 
Mr Baldwin expressed his "conviction that of all the things that can be 
done in those areas, the introduction of new industries is by far the 
most important" and he proferred trading estates as a means to this end. 
"I attach some importance to, and view with some hope, the establishment 
of one or more trading companies charged with the duty of establishing 
and equipping estates in the Special Areas.,,55 Compulsion was still 
abhorrent. Nevertheless, it was becoming clear that Government appeals 
were not having any effect. Mr Anderson (Whitehaven) referred to the 
failure of industrialists to respond to the Commissioner's circular on 
whether they would consider a Special Areas location and added that "I think 
53. P.R.O. Correspondence between the commissioner and the Board of Trade. 
Memorandum of 16 AUI.1935. BT 64/l1/I.M. 1981/35. 
54. ibid. 
55. Hansard(Commons)5th ser.307,74-6,3 Dec.1935. 
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it will be agreed that the idea of persuasion or of appealing to their 
morality has fallen on hard ground, and I feel that, unless something is 
done of a compulsory character, we cannot hope that new industries will 
come into the special areas".56 On December 11th, the Minister of Labour 
announced that, in addition to the trading estate contemplated for the 
North-Eastern area, a similar venture was to be considered for South 
Wales. The Government were now relying on trading estates to fulfill 
the objective of moving industry into the Special Areas. However, the 
teChniques of inducement were still in their infancy although Mr Edwards 
(Middlesb~rough East) did suggest "the possibility of preventing people 
setting up factories in the South in preference to the industrial areas". 57 
A new pressure for an alteration in regional policy was introduced by 
Mr Dalton (Bishop Auckland) on the publication of the Commissioners' 
Second Reports in March 1936. He regretted that transference was the most 
effective policy instrument possessed by the Government58 and thought the 
accomplishments of the Special Areas Commissioners were "wholly inadequate 
in scale and conception". The fresh element was the fear that "if the 
present southward drift of industry continues, before long the whole of 
British industry will be gathered in an ever-expanding ring around 
Greater London - Greater London which in time of peace is a geographical 
" h f 'II' ,,59 abort10n and in t1me of war would be a deat trap or un 10ns. 
56. ibid.192-3,4 Dec.1935. 
57. ibid.104l,11 Dec.1935. 
58. ibid.309.l024,2 March 1936. 
59. ibid.1024-6.2 March 1936. 
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A dual policy was needed. "Positive state action is necessary", Dalton 
continued, "if ••• new industries are to be brought into old areas. 
Without positive state action all the well-meant activities of local 
Development Boards will be impotent, and all appeals addressed to private 
employers will be quite useless." 
Secondly, 
"in future there should be a system of Government 
licensing of sites for all new factories • • • The 
Government should definitely intervene in deciding 
whether a new factory shall go to Durham or South 
Wales or Cumberland or Scotland, or whether it shall 
be allowed to cling on to the outskirts of Greater 
London, in Hertfordshire, or Essex or Middlesex ••• 
I should like to submit this special consideration in 
the case of light industries as distinguished from the 
heavy industries."60 
Mr Dalton's fears for London were echoed. Criticilm8 of trans-
ference and arguments in favour of inducements to industrialists were the 
other pressures for a change in Government policy. Vis coun t Wo lme r 
. (A1dershot) noted that "the amenities of London are much greater than the 
amenities of Northumberland, and a capitalist's wife would much rather live 
near London than near Newcastle. The effect of this • • • will be that 
London will continue to grow •• and •• I submit, ltha!7 il unhealthy 
from a national point of view. ,,61 Mr K. Griffith (Middlesbfrough West) 
was amongst those against transference. "There is, all the difference in 
outlook if work is brought to an area. What you are saying then is, 
'The ship is leaking, all hands to the pumps'; but if you adopt trans-
ference as the main policy you say, 'The ship is sinking, all hands to the 
60. ibid.l029-3l,2 March 1936. 
61. ibid.11l6,2March 1936. 
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boats,.,,62 Other criticisms were voiced by a variety of M.P.s.63 
Lord Dunglass re-advocated his preference for a dual policy of transfer-
ence, which he hoped could be accelerated. for example, by transferring 
more labour to prospective employment. and of inducements to industria-
lists. 64 
Critics of policy with more extreme proposals. advocated some form 
of control over the location of industry. In a debate on the 11th March. 
Mr A. Edwards moved for the appointment of a comadssion to survey industry 
and to take powers to plan the location of industry. "I suggest. 
therefore. that it should be the duty of the proposed commission. • • 
to declare certain areas of the country closed areas. and that no one 
should be allowed to establish a factory in any place in the country 
without a Government permit." "I would suggest an area of 40 miles round 
London being closed, and that even if a permit were given ••• I should 
insist that such factories be placed in satellite towns. such as Welwyn. ,,65 
Further. -in report after report we have been told that light industries 
are essential to the revival of trade in Lthe Specia17 areas. and if 
private enterprise will not respond to the national interest. it should be 
. ,,66 Mr G the duty of the commission to establish such enterpr1ses. reen-
wood also argued for compulsion, pointing to the failure of persuasion to 
have any results and to existing precedents. 
62. ibid.1046.2 March 1936. 
63. For example, Mr Whitely(Blaydon),Mr Anderson,ibid.1064,1079, 
2 March 1936; Sir R.Aake(Newcalt1eoooupon-Tyne) ,1242,3 March 1936; 
Mr W.Joseph Stewart(Rouahton-1e-Spring) ,1286,3 March 1936. 
64. ibid.1093,2 March 1936. 
65. ibid.2145,11 March 1936. 
66. ibid.2147,1l March 1936. 
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"We have time and time again interfered with the rights 
of people to put their businesses where they liked. The 
Town and Country Planning Act enables local authorities 
to exercise very powerful influences to stop the 
establishment of factories, petrol stations and so on 
• • • a Government which is prepared to begin with the 
organisation of our industry for war purposes ought at 
least to have sufficien~7imagination to try to organise 
it for peace purposes." 
More representative of Parliamentary opinion, Mr Boothby (Aberdeen 
and Kincardine East) was sympathetic to the aims of the motion but not 
to the methods. He considered it a "very dangerous thing for the 
State to arm itself with authority to order industries to go into 
districts where they do not wish to go", but, nevertheless, regretted 
the duplication of social capital, the economic and social distress of 
the Special Areas and the strategic disadvantages of the concentration 
of industry about London. 68 Dr Burgin (Parliamentary Secretary to the 
Board of Trade) also preferred persuasion to compulsion. 
Increased pressure for effective Government intervention in the 
location of industry and for the run-down of transference policy was 
to have no immediate results. Following the trading estates experiment, 
the Government announced in April 1936 the formation of the Special 
Areas Reconstruction Association, Ltd. (hereafter, SARA). This was a 
product of recommendations by Stewart, in the previous July, for a 
body to provide capital for new industries to enable them to locate 
in the Special Areas, and to assist existing enterprises. The 
Opposition was against the measure, arguing that the proposed capital 
of the company at El million was not nearly large enough and that it 
67. ihid.2208-9,11 March 1936. 
68. ihid.2l56,11 March 1936. 
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would only begin to touch the problem. The time for experiment, 
it was felt, had ended. Nevertheless, the measure was favourably 
received in some quarters. Mr Magnay (Gateshead) recognized the new 
principle involved in the measure. "To be frank, I never expected 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer would do this. This heterodox 
finance, coming from him, amazed me not a little. ,,69 Mr Bevan also 
saw some significance in the measure. "The ground taken by the 
Government is that it is now necessary to offer inducements to 
industries to establish and maintain themselves in the distressed 
areas. If that is admitted, the inducements offered by the Government 
are not nearly as effective as the inducements which lie in their 
power.,,70 But although significant in principle, the Government 
were still not committed to a single policy weapon. Mr Morrison 
(Financial Secretary to the Treasury) noted that with regard to 
transference 
"there has been a hopeful acceleration of that movement in 
recent years • • • I mention these figures to let the 
hone Members see that though we have bought this measure 
ls~7 to deal with one aspect of the problem, we are by 
no means neglecting the other. We ask the House to take 
the line that we ~fke, that every conceivable measure 
should be tried." 
IV 
In October 1936, the Government announced that the Special Areas 
Act was to be extended for a further period. There was some reaction 
69. ibid.311,1934, 7 May 1936 
70. ibid.1951,7 May 1936. 
71. ibid.1985-6,7 May 1936. 
235 
in the Commons. Sir A. Sinclair (Caithness and Sutherland) regretted 
the mere continuation of the 1934 Act "because even such improvements 
as has taken place in the Special Areas is due not so much to 
increased employment as to transferd'. 72 Mr Dingle Foot (Dundee) 
noted that "a small measure was brought forward last sesaion 
tSARA7; but surely", he asked, "we are not going to stop there. If 
that measure is successful the principle will have to be applied a 
great deal further. The proposal has been made Llor examp1!7 that 
the Government should make a grant towards new industries setting up 
in the Special Areas.,,73 Other criticisms concerned the powers of 
the Commissioners, the geographical coverage of the First Schedule, 
the amount of money actually spent in the Areas and the delay in 
getting trading estates and SARA into action. Not only was the 
Special Areas policy deemed ineffectual, but, there was now a 
coherent case for the intervention of the Government in the field 
of industrial location. The alternative policy of transference was 
unpopular and it had been seen by this time that recovery had passed 
by the depressed areas. 
The Economist observed that "plainly, the Cabinet's present 
inertia is seriously out of touch with public opinion" and it 
welcomed Stewart's Third Report. The Government"should aim not 
merely at improving the lot of the unemployed in the Areas and 
transferring them elsewhere", it argued, 
72. ibid.3l7,46,3 Nov. 1936; Also see The Economist, 
31 Oct.1936. 
73. Hansard (Commons) 5th ser.3l7,553,6 Nov.1936. Other proposals 
were discussed in The Economist,7 Nov.1936. 
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"but also at the deliberate direction of new industries 
into the Areas. Mr. Stewart does not think that there are 
fundamental economic reasons why new industries should come 
to London except in special cases. Accordingly, persuasion 
being 'futile', and compulsion, in his opinion, inadvisable, 
he would 'induce' industrialists to go to the socially 
desirable districts by two main methods. First, he would 
prohibit the location of further new factories in Greater 
London •• and,second1y, he would make concessions in 
rating, inco'l tax, and finance in the Special Areas 
themselves. " 
The success in interpreting the 1934 Act so that trading 
estate companies could be allowed in mid-1935 was important to the 
Commissioner. He used the precedent of indirect aid to private 
enterprise as an argument for direct aid. He considered it 
"necessary to examine an essential principle not now 
recognized by the Special Areas Act. I refer to the 
provision that the functions of the Commissioner shall 
not, except within the specified narrow limits, include 
the carrying on of any undertakings for the purpose of 
gain, or the provision of financial assistance to any 
undertaking carried on for that purpose. It appears to 
me that this restriction needs reconsideration. Its full 
rigour has already been modified through the medium of 
non-profit earning legal entities, which have been set up 
with Government approval. By this means machinery has 
been designed within the limits of the Act which will 
help to foster private enterprise in the Special Areas 
• • • My recommendation is that by means of State-
provided inducements a determined attempt should be 75 
made to attract industrialists to the Special Areas." 
Chamberlain expressed his views on Stewart's Third Report in a 
debate of 17th November 1936. Firstly, he doubted whether the 
prevention of industrial expansion in the London area would 
necessarily result in the diversion of this expansion to tbe 
74. The Economilt,l4 Nov.1936. 
75. Third Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas 
(Bng1and and Wales),op.cit.paras.25,8. 
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Special Areas. Further examination of this proposal was promised. 
Secondly, the proposal for 'State inducements' to new industries 
to locate in the Special Areas was accepted. "I am willing to be 
unorthodox in regard to the Special Areas", he commented. 76 
Nevertheless, he added that the Government 
"cannot see in front of us any scheme by which we can 
hope to give employment in the areas to all the people 
who are there. Therefore, transference must go on 
Leven thoug~7 it is only natural that those who are 
most ready to seek their fortunes elsewhere are the 
youngest, the strongest, the most enterprising - in 
fact, the ~,t active and efficient members of the 
community." 
The general tenor of the reaction to Chamberlain's statement 
was unfavourable. It was thought that the Government needed to 
act and could, given the will, have acted immediately. Mr Boothby 
was of this opinion and also considered that no new proposals had 
been made. Nevertheless, the Government had shifted its grounds 
considerably from the position that the existing legislation was 
simply to be continued for a further period. Mr Lawson considered 
that it was "largely because of the marchers and the general 
uprising in public opinion, that the Government have now come to 
the point of making a promise that they are going to consider, 
. • d 1 k' h " 78 1nvest1gate an 00 1nto t e matter. 
The Government, however, were not yet ready to meet its critics. 
The radical step of providing state inducements to enterprises to 
76. Hanaard(Commona)5th 8er.3l7,1595-6,17 Nov.1936. 
77. ibid.1590-1,17 Nov.1936. 
78. ibid. 1605,17 Nov.1936. 
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locate in the depressed areas was a sufficient new departure and 
the administration began to tackle those questions that had 
previously resulted in any proposal suggesting subsidy of being 
rejected out of hand. Gillett noted that, "it is not going to be 
of any advantage in the long-run to establish industries in areas 
where they cannot possibly survive when the subsidy period comes 
~I 79 to an ena. How was a decision to be reached on what a particular 
firm would receive on a variable scale of possible inducements? 
What criteria were to favour one firm rather than another? What 
was to be done for existing industries who were to be affected by 
subsidised competition? 
The Government's policy was ready for its introduction into 
Parliament in March of 1937. There were three new developments 
in policy. The first was that, to meet the demands of the 
Commissioner, inducements to private industry were to be provided. 
Secondly, special financial assistance was to be made available 
to areas outside of the Special Areas, where local initiative was 
presebt. Thirdly, a fund of £2 million was to be provided by way 
of loan to give financial assistance to industries rather bigger 
79. Letter from Sir George Gillet,: the second English Commissioner, 
.to Ernest Brown, the Minister of Labour, 23 Dec.1936. 
P.R.O. Commissioner for the Special Areas (England and Wales). 
Recommendations in Third Report on State provided inducements 
to attract industry to the Special Areas. LAB8/20S. It was 
widely held in Government circles that the proposed allowances 
in respect of rates, rents and taxes would be ineffective. 
See P.R.O. Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the 
Investigations into the Depressed Areas. Inter-Departmental 
Committee's Report on the Third Reports of the Special Areas 
Commissioners. D.A.(34)lO,ll Jan.1937. CAB 27/577; P.R.O. 
Special and Distressed Areas. T 172/1828; P.R.O. Papers 
leading up to and connected with the passage of the Special 
Areas Amendment Bill 1937. T 161/779/41961/01. 
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than those covered by SARA. This assistance was to be provided 
in both the Special Areas and the new 'certified' areas. These 
last-named areas were to be selected by the Minister of Labour 
and were to fulfill the conditions that heavy and prolonged 
unemployment had been experienced and that in the absence of 
financial assistance no recovery from this situation seemed 
likely. The areas were also to be dependent on one or more 
d d • d • 80 0 h • f h h f L d epresse 1n ustr1es. n t e quest10n 0 t e growt 0 on on 
it was felt that the metropolis was not unique in its experience 
of problems associated with industrial growth. Accordingly, a 
Royal Commission was to be established to study such questions. 
South West Durham was another area of special concern. In this 
case the South West Durham Improvement Association was to be 
set up to improve the economic outlook of the area and to consider 
the problems created by the existence of small and relatively 
isolated villages where there was little prospect of industrial 
development. 81 
SO. 'Certified areas' were a compromise solution to the demands 
and pressures for an extension of the Special Areas 
scheduled in the Act of 1934. Parliamentary pressure for 
the scheduling of an area is evidenced by the concern of 
Lancashire M.P.s. For example, see the debate reported in 
Hanaard(Commons)5th ser.317,1809-65,18 Nov.1936. Lengthy 
consideration is given to the possibility of extension by 
the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Special Areas. P.R.O. 
Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the Investigations into 
the Depressed Areas. Inter-Departmental Committee's Report 
on the Third Reports of the Special Areal Commillioners. 
D.A.(34)10,11 Jan.1937. CAB 27/577; P.R.O. Cabinet Committee 
on the Reportl of the Investigations into the Deprelled Areas. 
Proceeding. and Memoranda. D.A.(34)IOth Meeting, 26 Jan.1937. 
D.A.(34)llth Meeting.10 Feb.1937. CAB 27/578. 
81. Hansard(Commons)5th ser.321,1023-7,9 March 1937. 
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The breadth of these proposals overshadowed previous Government 
efforts, although they fell short of hopes for immediate action on 
the location of industry. It is also significant that this was the 
first policy statement where there was no reference to transference. 
However, the policy statement was not welcomed. 
In reviewing previous achievements, Mr Brown had laid some 
stress on the impact of the rearmament programme. The value of 
Government contracts to the Depressed Areas was £41 million in the 
eighteen months to November 1936 and of this, £24 million had gone 
to the Special Areas. There were numerous proposals for the 
82 future which were to provide employment for 3,000 persons. It 
was this emphasis that distressed The Economist. Reviewing the 
White Paper giving details of the Amendment Bill it said that, 
"it is clear, from the whole tenor of the White Paper, 
that the Government places its reliance not upon any 
such measures as these but upon the defence programme. 
Depression and distress are to be bought off by 
expenditure on guns and battleships. The Special Areas 
plan pales into insignificance besides the rearmament 
programme." 
"The end of the armament programme - which, presumably, 
we must one day envisage - will once more devastate 
areas that have been told to pin their hopes on 
unproductive activity. It is dangerous to encourage 
the Special Areas to pU§3al1 their eggs, for the second 
time, into one basket." 
82. ibid.1114,9 March 1937;1012-3,9 March 1937. Also see note 
by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, D.A.(34)11,15 Jan. 1937 
in P.R.O. Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the 
Investigations into the Depressed Areas. CAB 27/577. 
83. The Econoudst,6 March 1937. Also see Miss Lloyd George 
(Anglesey) in Hanaard(Commons)5th ser.321,1048,9 March 1937. 
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Other aspects of the policy were critized besides the apparent 
emphasis on rearmament. Mr Dalton considered "a Royal Conunission 
• • • a well-known device for postponing decisions" and proposed a 
Minister of Cabinet rank to take the responsibility for the 
1 . f' d 84 ocatlon 0 ln ustry. He also made the point that the benefits 
from the various inducements were not automatic, being at the 
discretion of the Conunissioners. Further, the restriction on the 
Commissioner's powers to assist in spheres where some other 
Government Department had the responsibility had not been removed 
and it seemed that the Treasury loan fund of £2 million was "just 
painfully keeping pace with Lord Nuffie1d~ 85 Many were also to 
echo Dalton's fears for South West Durham. "It appears", he said, 
"that the chief remedy of the Gibb Report is to drive people out 
of the villages and then pull the houses down behind them • • • 
we do not accept the view that this area is unsuited for further 
86 industrial development." 
84. Hansard (Commons) 5th ser.321,1032,9 March 1937. Mr Burke 
(Burnley) also thought a Royal commission unnecessary, 
1096,9 March 1937. 
85. ibid.1042,9 March 1937. Financial restraints were not 
important in preventing the efficient working of a 'move-
industry' policy although, of course, such restraints could 
limit progress in the field of public works and the social 
improvement of the areas. It is ~ belief that financial 
considerations have figured too prominently in explanations 
and judgements of the performance of Special Areas policy. 
If the Government had had clearly defined intentions in 
respect of a 'move-industry' policy then its objectives 
could have been met at no direct financial cost by the 
direction of industry. The proposed embargo on development 
in the London area is a case in point. Public works were not 
limited by finance so much as the desire to avoid expenditure 
on public works for party political reasons. 
86. ibid.1043,9 March 1937. For further information on the 
policy for the South West Durham area, see P.R.O. Special 
Areas. Survey of S.W. Durham for Commissioner. BLG 30/17. 
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But despite these and other criticisms, the policy for the 
Special Areas was now, first and foremost a 'move-industry' policy. 
However, transference had still not been abandoned. Mr Chamberlain 
stated that "for some time there must remain a large number of 
people unemployed • • • whilst other measures are being developed, 
and in those circumstances, where a man has an opportunity of 
raising his own standard by finding continuous employment at good 
wages elsewhere, I cannot understand why hone Members opposite 
87 
show any objection to the process." A 'move-industry' policy 
would take some time to have an effect, in the meantime, 
transference, rearmament and land settlement were to provide short-
term relief. 
v 
Transference had now become a contradictory policy. It became 
increasingly difficult to argue that the coexistence of transference 
and a 'move-industry' policy was aomplementary now that the latter 
was to be pursued with vigour. Mr Storey (Sunderland) considered 
that 
"we have got to concentrate the inducements offered on 
those areas where there is some chance of building up a 
balanced industrial development. I am convinced that the 
time has come when we must make up our minds a8 to the 
areas in which the cure is industrial develoPWfint and 
the areas in which the cure is transference." 
87. Hansard(Commons)5th ser.32l,1573,12 March 1937. 
88. ibid.322,103,6 April 1937. 
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A letter to The Economist the previous year had clearly pointed 
out the dichotomy of aims. 
"It is right that the full blast of change should not 
fallon a small number of people; but their troubles 
should be mitigated", the authors argued, " not by 
measures which encourage them to stop where they are 
but by helping them to move into new employment. The 
further difficulty, however, then remains that a policy 
of transfer started in a district must have so depressing 
an effect on those industries and people that are left 
that there can be no chance of new industries establishing 
themselves there. The existence of the present transfer 
policy is itself sufficient to explain the reluctance of 
new industries to move to the Depressed Areas. The 
transfer remedy, therefore, must be abandoned as a general 
policy. It must be confined to those parts which are 
quite hopeless, but there must be pushed to the limit • • 
• ,,' It emerges clearly that any general policy, applied 
tD"the Depressed Areas indiscriminately, whether it be a 
policy of transfer, or subsid~t or worse still of both 
together, cannot but be bad." 
The bad effects of the coexistence of apparently contradictory 
policy instruments might also have been avoided if both measures 
had quantitatively insignificant effects on the problem of 
regional unemployment, irrespective of the degree of the 
discrimination between areas employed in the application of the 
different policy instruments. The Scottish Special Areas 
Commissioner argued that "what is needed is both the energetic 
continuation of the transference scheme, mainly because of its 
benefit to the less skilled workers, and the vigorous pursuit of 
every practicable and justifiable means of attracting to the 
area the new industries • • • Much more can still be done in both 
ways before the apparently opposing policies of transference out 
89. The Economist,14 Nov.1936. The letter was from P.T.Bauer 
and A.M. Stamp. 
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and attraction in will be in any danger of mutual conf1ict.,,90 
Whether this was so or not, it was clear the stage had been 
reached where the possibility of contradiction was very real 
indeed. 
The numbers transferring declined after 1936. This may 
have been attributable to a number of causes, for instance, 
prospects in the Special Areas improved relative to those facing 
the potential migrant so that labour was encouraged not to move 
and perhaps was absorbed into employment; the success of Special 
Areas policy may have resulted in a decline in transference. 
Transference might also have ceased to be so important if it 
exhausted its supply of potential movers. That is, transference 
may have been so successful in encouraging people to move that 
its job was finished. There is a further possibility and that 
is that transference declined as a result of deliberate policy 
changes inspired by the realisation that contradictory policies 
were coexisting from 1937. 
This latter possibility can be examined further and it is 
interesting to observe the conclusions of a Ministry of Labour 
Departmental examination in 1938. 
90. P.R.O. Memorandum by Commissioner for Special Areas in 
Scotland. The effect on areas of the withdrawal of big 
industries. HLG 27/77. 
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"The broad general conclusion which the Inspectors have 
reached is that industrial transference should be slowed 
down. They suggest that the number of scheduled areas 
should be reduced and that efforts should be concentrated 
in the remaining severely depressed areas. Finally, they 
recommend that we should consolidate the good work 
achieved in transferring people from depressed areas in 
the last few years by taking steps to ensure as far as 
possible that employment should continue to be Wfde 
available for them in the non-depressed areas." 
This appears to be the final link; proposals are being made to 
curtail transference and, implicitly, to dovetail it into a more 
effective 'move-industry' policy. But it is also true that it 
was decided to run-down transference policy because it had been 
successful in moving those that it could. 
"The dearth of applicants who were suitable for transfer 
was commented upon at most of the depressed area offices 
visited. It was often stated that the best of the workers 
had already transferred or were in employment locally, and 
that, pEebab1y because of the prolonged period of 
unemployment which they had experienced •••• , a high 
proportion of the applicants at9iresent registered was 
bordering on the unemployable." 
VI 
A strong case can be made througb the detailed examination of 
policy changes, therefore, for a much later start to a regional 
policy predominately concerned with moving industry to the Special 
Areas. If this is so then the initial legislation of 1934 cannot 
be criticised on the grounds that it did not enable non-existent 
objectives to be achieved. In turn, if this is so, then the 
91. ibid. Industrial Transference Scheme - General Review 
1938. Minute of 9 July 1938. LAB 8/218. 
92. ibid. 
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normal rationalisation of the 1937 amending legislation (to 
cure the faults of the 1934 Act) is not tenable and its origins 
were somewhat different. This reappraisal also throws new light 
on the other regional policy, namely, transference and it is seen 
to be the dominant regional policy after 1934 and probably as 
late as 1936. 
"Transfer has been pursued with more enthusiasm and 
l~ss publicity than the second alternative • • • • 
LOi7 luring new industry into places where men were 
idle • • • Neither circumstance is surprising. A new 
body, new men, and new grants were necessary for the 
latter, but the former could be carried out through 
the Minis§sy of Labour and subsidiaries which already 
existed." 
This, perhaps, explains the underestimation of the role of 
transference policy in the inter-war years. As a result of these 
gradual changes in policy emphasis, it is likely that the two 
apparently contradictory coexisting policies were rarely in fact 
d • 94 contra 1ctory. 
93. The Times,17 Nov.1936. 
94. The exceptions are the period after the 1937 legislation 
and, the extent to which prolonged out-migration from an 
area is bound to make the achievement of a 'move-
industry' objective more difficult, even if not eoexisting 
with a 'move-industry' policy. 
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Table XXI 
Labour Transference, 192~1938 
1. Labour Transferred from the Depressed Areas to Employment through the 
Employment Exchanges, 1928-1938. 
Households 
Total and 
Men Women Boys Girls Individuals Family 
Remova1s* 
1928 3,600** 360*** 1,840 n.a. n.a. 
1929 36,843 2,239 2,622 1,994** 43,698 2,850 
1930 28,258 1,752 1,313 1,708 33,031 2,100 
1931 17,889 2,631 868 1,986 23,374 1,680 
1932 8,359 2,651 628 2,502 14,140 990 
1933 5,333 4,038 1,117 2,955 13,443 605 
1934 6,828 4,420 1,661 3,512 16,421 1,308 
1935 13,379 6,350 5,376 4,648 29,753 3,718 
1936 20,091 8,008 9,449 5,958 43,506 10,025 
1937 24,000 7,675 6,450 38,125 7,673 
1938 18,000 4,131 5,496 27,627 4,000 
2. Subsidiary schemes 
(a) Labour Transferring from the Depressed 
Areas to Prospective Employment, 1928-1937 
1928 1,500** 
1935 1,016 
1936 2,039 
1937 2,052 
(b) Labour Transferring from the Depressed Areas to Employment 
found other than through the Employment Exchanges and 
assisted by the Ministry of Labour (Free Fares), 1936-1938 
1936 4,000 
1937 3,000 
1938 2,000 
Source: A.D.~.Owen, 'Social Consequences of Industrial Transference', 
Sociological Review, 29(1937); Annual Report. of the Ministry 
of Labour; P.R.O. Industrial Transference Scheme. Memorandum 
by the Minister of Labour. CP 324(28). CAB 24/198. 
*Fami1y Removal Scheme began in 1935, the Household Removal Scheme in Dec.1928. 
**Part of year only 
***Women and girls transferred after training. No record, exist of other 
female~ansfer' in this year. 
APPENDIX 
A Regression Analysis of the Impact of Changes in Transference Policy in 
1935 
........ 
The suggestion that transference was encouraged from 1935, whilst at 
the same time Special Areas policy was introduced, was reflected in the 
figures of Table XXI. The peak year of transference activity was 1936. 
But it might be argued that this peak was simply due to favourable circu~ 
stances, such as a buoyant labour market, rather than the product of a new 
impetus from transference policy. This argument can be put to the test. 
After inspection of the movement of the time series involved 
(Diagram II), a regression of transference on national unemployment 
(reflecting the state of employment opportunities in the national labour 
market) was run for the years, 1929-34. 
Y. • a + B X. + E. 111 
where Y. • transference in the i'th 
1 
X. • national unemployment in 1 
E. 
1 • 
error term. 
This was of the form:-
year 
the i'th year 
These results (Table XXII) show that national unemployment is a good 
predictor of transference. The extension of the analysis to include the 
period 1935-8 shows that the level of explanation decreases. although 
the equations dealing with total transfer and adult transfer remain 
aianificant. The examination of the years 1935-8 separately suggests 
that this decrease in explanatory power is attributable to national 
unemployment no longer explaining such a large part of the variation in 
transference after 1935, although in the case of juvenile transfer the 
association is stronger but still far from significant. Thus, the 
differing emphasis on transference policy is to be preferred in explain-
ing the increase in transference activity in this later period. 
Predicting total transfer from equation 3 for the period 1935-8 
gives the estimates of Table XXIII (and see Diagram III). This also 
shows the actual figures for these years. As expected, with the 
exception of 1938, the predicted values of the transference variable are 
exceeded by the actual values. However, given the confidence intervals 
for these predictions, only 1936 can be singled out as definite support 
for the hypothesis that the increased transference activity did not 
simply reflect a greater opportunity for the operation of the schemes. 
Transference was encouraged from 19351 and to such an extent that 
activity in 1936 was exceptional in comparison to that expected from an 
eXamination of the openings available (indicated by national unemployment). 
The Ministry of Labour thought that "the improvement in industrial 
conditions and the extended facilities for assisting transference referred 
-
1. By the advance of fares to transferees to prospective employment and 
the grant of aid towards the cost of lodgings. An allowance for 
dependents was also given. Similar facilities were made available 
to transferred men who had lost their jobs in the south and awaited 
another. Other encouragements included giving free fares to those 
finding employment in non-depressed areas. the extension of the 
Household Removal Scheme to allow a family to follow younger members 
of a family and the extension of the juvenile transference scheme. 
Ministry of Labour, Annual Report for the year 1935 (Parl.Papers, 
1935-6,XIII),pp.21,2,44-50. The scheduled areas were also increased 
between 1934 and 1938. See supra, Chapter 4, Appendix. 
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to in the 1935 Report resulted in a marked increase in the number of 
persons transferred from depressed areas compared with previous year~~ 2 
Other factors may have been offsetting this policy impetus in 1937 and 
1938 and disguising the changed relationship between openings and 
transference. These were the improved expectations of opportunities in 
the scheduled Depressed Areas and the exhaustion of suitable applicants 
for transfer; the latter partially a function of the particularly high 
rate of transfer in 1936. As early as 1936 the Ministry noted the 
influence of the former factor. 
"There remain many unemployed boys and girls in the Special 
Areas who could have been placed in suitable employment in 
other areas but for their own unwillingness to leave home, 
or the reluctance of their parents to allow them to do so. 
To some extent this reluctance was attributable to the 
expectation of increased opportunities of employment locally; 
another factor is uncertainty and ignoranc~ of industrial 
conditions in other parts of the country." 
There seems little doubt that transference was pursued with new vigour 
and some effect from precisely that date at which it is normally 
assumed a 'move-industry' policy began. 
-
2. Ministry of Labour, Annual Report for the year 1936cP.P., 1936-7, 
XII),p.18. 
3. ibid.pp.42-3. 
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Table XXII 
The Regression of Transference on National Unemployment for 1929-1934, 
1929-1938 and 1935-1938 
1929-1934 
,.. ,.. 
a a 11 
,.. 
R2 • 0.28 (1) Y .• 5633.55 - 0.001 X. + e. 
1 1 1 
(0.001) 6 
,.. 
R2 • 0.66(a) (2) Yi • 55862.87 - 0.017 X. + e. 1 1 
(0.006) 6 
,.. 
R2 • 0.73(a) (3) Y. • 61496.41 - 0.017 X. + e. 
1 1 1 
(0.005) 6 
1929-1938 
,.. 
R2 • 0.30 (4) Y. • 16927.23 - 0.005 X. + e. 1 1. 1. 
(0.003) 10 
,.. 
R2 • 0.57 (a) (5) Yi • 48004.72 - 0.014 X. + e. 1. 1. 
(0.004) 10 
{'to 2 (6) Y. • 70499.41 - 0.021 X. + e. R • 0.70(a) 1 1 1. 
(0.005) 10 
1935-1938 
,.. 
R2 • 0.45 (7) Yi • 24729.12 - 0.007 X. + e. 1. 1. 
(0.006) 4 
{'to 
R2 • 0.24 (8) Yi • 36590.44 - 0.008 Xi + et 
(0.010) 4 
{'to 2 (9) Y .• 9395.56 - 0.022 X. + e. R • 0.37 
1 1. 1 
(t.121) 4 
,.. 
In Equations, 1,4,7 Yi • predicted juvenile tranlfer. In 2,5,8 ,.. {'to 
Yi • predicted adult tranlfer o In 3,6 & 9 Yi • predicted total 
transfer (adults + juveniles + free fares + prospective employment, 
see Table XXI) 
Standard errors in brackets. 
(a) significant at 5 per cent level. 
Table XXIII 
Predicted Total Transference and Actual Transference, 1935-1938 
Predicted Total 
" Transference (Y.) 
1 
Actual Transference (Y. ) 1 
1935 27,496 + 8,316 30,769 -
1936 32,545 + 10,291 49,545 -
1937 38,427 + 14,198 43,177 -
1938 30,845 + 9,518 29,627 -
The 95 per cent confidence intervals for the predictions were obtained 
from the formula: 
see J.Johnston, Econometric Methods (New York,1972), pp.38-43. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Special Areas Policy and Industrial Transference: The Contribution 
of Contradictions, 1935-1939 
I 
There are two broad approaches that may be taken in answering 
the question, 'what was the effect of regional policy?' The first 
compares a period of active policy with a period of inactive policy 
and judges the contrast between the two. l A number of problems exist 
with such an approach. It has to be assumed that 'other things are 
equal' but this is never the case and such random fluctuations as 
occur cannot easily be removed from an analysis. There is also an 
inherent systematic bias. Around the bottom of a cycle, disparities 
in regional fortunes are likely to be enhanced. An 'active' policy 
might well result from such an environment but its chances of success 
are lessened by the fact that it is likely to be more difficult to 
encourage migration of labour at such times2 and a policy of guiding 
the location of industry depends on the existence of a desire among 
firms to expand or, indeed, establish themselves. In contrast, a period 
where economic conditions do not demand an 'active' policy is also going 
1. B.Moore and J.Rhodes, 'Evaluating the Effects of British Regional 
Policy', Ecortomic Journal, 83(1973). 
2. Por example, the fall in the rate of migration in 1931-2. 
to be one in which a regional policy will be more successful. The 
second approach identifies the effects of particular policies within 
a period. This approach will be used. 
With the absence of a good many statistics at the regional level, 
a seemingly straightforward approach immediately becomes more complex 
and it is necessary to introduce a number of assumptions even to obtain 
the most basic indicators. How much new employment was provided in the 
Special Areas by industry locating and expanding there? How many people 
transferred out of the Special Areas at the same time? What effect did 
the other actions of the Commissioners (on public works schemes, housing 
developments and social improvements) have on the primary aim of 
reducing unemployment? None of these questions can be simply answered. 
These difficulties encouraged the introduction of a systematic bias 
in the data series. The tenor of the argument has been that labour 
migration policies have been underestimated. In the construction of 
statistical series, the impact of labour migration on the reduction of 
unemployment in the Special Areas is understated, whilst an upward bias 
is introduced into the indicators of the other activities of the Special 
Areas Commissioners. If the resulting data suggests the greater efficacy 
of labour migration policies, such a result is unlikely to be attributed 
to random errors in the data. It will indicate that labour migration, 
even when as little as possible is attributed to the policy, was still 
a more effective instrument than the other policy weapoDs employed 
against'regional depression. 
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An estimate of direct employment provided in new and extended 
factories in all the Special Areas (with an allowance for closures) is 
shown in Table XXIV. 3 It seems from this that the increase in such 
employment was, at best, about 20,000 and, at worst, 10,000, over the 
four year period from 1934. This is a considerable range for minimum 
and maximum estimates but the method of calculation (described in the 
notes to the Table) allows nothing more precise. Tables XXV - XXVIII 
provide similar detail for the four Special Areas in question, and 
Table XXIX provides a summary of the number of establishments for 
each area for the whole period of the Board of Trade Surveys of Industrial 
Deve1opment. 4 The use of the maximum employment estimate introduces a 
systematic bias in this first statistical series. 
3. The Special Areas' geographical coverage is described in Appendix 1. 
The employment estimates do not purport to reflect the direct influence 
of policy. All new employment is included, not just that attributable 
to the operation of policy. For example, it would be unreasonable to 
attribute closure to policy. 
4. Board of Trade, Annual Surve s of Industrial Develo nt, 1934-8. No 
other source of nformat on prov1des an acceptable ind cation of the 
growth of employment in the Special Areas. The total employment 
provided on trading estates in the Areas by May 1939 provides some ~ 
indication of the growth of employment in the year that the Board of 
Trade Surveys do not cover. For this information, see Royal 
Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population. Report 
(Par1. Papers, 1939-40, IV), Appendix III and G.R. Allen, 'The Growth 
of Industry on Trading Estates, 1920-39, with Special Reference to 
Slough Trading Estate', Oxford Economic Papers, new sere 3(1951). 
Another source of information which cannot be used for fear of double-
counting is the estimates of employment to be provided as a result 
of assistance from SARA, the Treasury Fund .. and the Nuffield Trust. 
See P.R.O. Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the Investigations into 
the Depressed Areas. Proceedings and Memoranda. D.A. (34)15. 
CAB 27/578. 
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What were the effects on employment of the other activities of 
the Commissioner? Between 21 December 1934 and May 1936 the Scottish 
Commissioner estimated that 4,626 man-years of employment would be 
provided by public works. The consideration of employment that 'would 
be' provided in public works, introduces the bias towards a large 
impact for this arm of po1icy.5 With the assumption that employment 
was provided for the whole of the sixteen month period (a minimum 
estimate of total numbers employed) then 3,470 persons were provided 
with employment. Unfortunately, no other estimates of the employment 
provided by such as public health works, the provision of hospitals 
or various agricultural schemes is provided by the Scottish 
Commissioner. Consequently, it must be assumed to continue, that 
employment provided bears some constant relation to the commitments 
involved. On the basis of commitments by the Commissioner from the 
Special Areas Fund towards total costs the total employment directly 
provided is 10,167. This total can be broken down temporall,. From 
May 1936 to July 1937 an additional £1,045,833 was allocated to such 
expenditure and from July 1937 to September 1938 a further £1,720,332 
was commited. The associated employment provided in the two periods 
was thus 2,522 and 4,165. If it is-assumed that the resulting 
employment was evenly distributed over each of the periods involved, 
5. There was a considerable divergence be~een money committed and 
money expended. In March 1936, after a request for a breakdown of 
amounts under these two headings, it was stated that "approximately 
£330,000 of the £3,443,000 referred to relates to expenditure by 
the Commissioners and the balance to commitments". Hansard 
(Commons) 5th sere 310,870-1,23 March 1936 
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a monthly rate of public works employment can be obtained. The 
redistribution of these jobs over calendar years gives the following 
figures:-
Dec. 1934 - Dec. 1935 
" 
" 
" 
1935 - " 
1936 - " 
1937 - " 
1936 
1937 
1938 
2,603 
2,134 
2,654 
3,610 
With the assumption that the same relation holds true in England and 
Wales, then a commitment from the Special Areas Fund of £16,670,000 
would provide jobs for 40,341 persons. The use of the same procedure 
utilized with the Scottish data yields estimates of the annual impact 
of public works schemes. 6 
Dec. 1934 - Dec. 1935 
" 
" 
" 
1935 - " 
1936 - " 
1937 - " 
1936 
1937 
1938 
8,337 
12,547 
12,694 
9,370 
The other basic series required is transference. This is simple 
to obtain for the Depressed Areas but not for the more limited Special 
Areas. The Scottish figures, in particular, are unsatisfactory, as they 
refer to non-comparable time periods and are incapable of any feasible 
manipulation. Between August 1935 and May 1937 4,199 adults were 
6. 
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transferred whilst 1,255 juveniles moved between January 1935 and 
July 1937. From June 1937 to June 1938 a further 1,959 adults were 
transferred and 361 juveniles moved July 1937 to July 1938. A total 
movement under the transference scheme is given as 7,774. 7 In Table XXX 
net migration data are presented for county areas approximating the 
Special Area boundaries. Figures for the Scottish Area are included. 
These pertain to mid-year to mid-year periods and, given some assumptions 
on the temporal distribution of net movement, a series pertaining to 
calendar years can be obtained. It is regrettable that transference 
data cannot be presented for the Scottish area but it is argued that net 
migration statistics are a better reflection of the impact of policy on 
labour movement. Transference was intended to spearhead a general 
outf1ux of population and these statistics better reflect this than 
the data on assisted persons alone. 
English and Welsh transference data are shown in Table XXXI. 
Some simple assumptions allow these figures to be presented for 
something like calendar years, 1935-8, and a cumulative total 
transference of about 90,000 is seen. Net migration data for the 
Special Areas of England and Wales have already been shown in Table XXX. 
The only remaining series to be introduced is unemployment 
which is shown in Table XXXII. The notes to the Table describe the 
basis of the data presented. 
7. A crude transference series waa constructed for calendar years 
utilising a number of heroic assumptions for the purposes of 
regression analysis. Even so, only three observations could be 
obtained and such a number was insufficient for a statistical 
analysis. 
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Now that some statistics have been obtained, the impact of policy 
can be judged. Table XXXII has described unemployment 
statistics for the Special Areas and for Britain. It was expect~d 
that inf1uenc~on the national level of unemployment would also influence 
regional unemployment levels so that as national unemployment increased, 
so regional unemployment would also increase. The closer the association 
between these two series, the less scope there is for explaining regional 
unemployment in terms of specifically regional influences. Such regional 
influences might include a very distinct industrial structure, different 
rates of growth of particular industries in particular areas, or the 
influence of regional policy. 
That unemployment at the national and regional level were related 
is shown in Diagram IV. This relationship can be more explicitly 
documented by a simple regression analysis. A linear model was employed 
to regress Special Areas unemployment on national unemployment. The 
national unemployment variable was calculated as national unemployment 
minus Special Areas unemployment. The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table XXXIII. It can be seen that the variables are related 
as R2 demonstrates, and that the relationship is positive. A small 
number of observations, however, prevented the results from attaining 
statistical significance. 8 Nevertheless, the results suggest that 
8, An attempt was made to overcome this problem by pooling the data, 
but although a atatiatically significant equation was produced (7) 
R2waa low and the aign of the regreasion coefficient, contrary to 
expectationa. 
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national factors are important in explaining the variation in unemployment 
in the Special Areas, except in the West Cumberland area. In all cases, 
however, the size of the unexplained residual suggests scope for regional 
factors as an additional explanation of changes in unemployment levels. 
Policy might have been one of these residual explanations. 
The impact of policy can be quantified from the data presented in 
Tables XXIV - XXXI and the information on public works employment. The 
cOmbination of this data gives the aggregates of the upper section of 
Table XXXIV. 9 
However, the contribution of transference to a change in unemployment 
is not equal to its absolute size. Neither can the income or employment 
multiplier effects of Special Areas Fund expenditure or of new factory 
employment be ignored. Firstly, there is the 'wastage rate' of trans-
ference as a result of the failure of movements of population to be 
permanent. Owen estimates this proportion as 27 per cent for adults and 
35 per cent for juvenileslO from Ministry of Labour sources and calcula-
tions based on evidence to the Royal Commission on the Geographical 
Distribution of the Industrial Population suggest that 30 per cent may be 
taken as an overall rate of 'wastage' for adult and juvenile transferees 
-
9. By the accumulation of the influencel of unemployment in thil manner, 
doub1e-countina may be introduced if, for example, a factory cloles 
and all the workers migrate. 
10. A.D.K.Owen,'Social cons.quencel of Industrial Tranlference', 
Sociololical Review,29 (l937) ,338. 
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taken together. ll Secondly, there are multiplier effects to be considered. 12 
The discussion of the appropriate values by which to inflate the direct 
employment series and to deflate the migration series is presented in 
Appendix 2 and from this the employment multiplier (k ) is taken as 
e 
1.35 and r (the number of persons who have to move out of a region 
before one more man loses his employment) is taken as 5. These figures 
maintain the constant bias in the calculations that favour the impact of 
new employment and discredit the short-term impact of migration. The 
effective part of transference to be set against the change in 
unemployment is seen in the lower part of Table XXXIV. Estimates of 
direct and indirect employment arising from the initial direct employment 
estimates are also given. It is probable that the contribution of 
'Public Works etc.' to the generation of indirect employment is 
overstated given its ' once and for all ' character and, similarly, 
the consequences 'of an increase in direct factory employment are 
probably understated. Nevertheless, it is clear that the principal 
revision to the figures of Part A of Table XXXIV are in respect of 
'wastage' from transference, an estimate that can be confidently 
advanced. 
A regression of Special Areas unemployment on national unemployment 
and a regional policy variable was then run. The results are discussed 
in Appendix 3. It is here concluded that policy has some role in 
-
11. Royal Commission on the Geographical Distrib~t~on of the Industrial 
Population. Memorandum of Evidence of the Minutry of Labour, 2 Feb. 
1938, para.56;3 Feb.1938, Appendix IV, Table XV. In 1935, out of 
20 000 adults transferred, there were 6,055 returnees, which gives 
a ;astage rate of 30.23 per cent. In 1936 the figures were 34,039, 
8,429 and 24.76 per cent respectively. Juvenile rates vary from 
29.88 per cent in 1935 to 37.79 per cent in 1936 to 43.31 per cent for 
the period Oct.1934 to Sept.1937. Also see P.R.O. Industrial Transference 
Scheme - General Review 1938. LAB 8/218. 
12. The possibility of a multiplier-capital stock adjustment interactiOD 
is not considered in the estimates of Table XXXIV. 
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explaining variations in Special Areas unemployment, but statistical 
difficulties prevent any definite conclusions being drawn. Indeed, 
given the small number of observations available and the uncertainty 
surrounding the construction of the policy variable estimates, a 
regression analysis was not likely to prove very useful. It was, 
however, the only refinement possible on the observations of Table XXXIV. 
The establishment of some role for regional policy in determining 
Special Areas unemployment led to the question being posed of what the 
relative contributions were of each of the policy instruments. It is 
clear from Table XXXIV that transference is numerically more important 
than the indicators of the other policies. Regression analysis was 
again employed in an attempt to establish the closeness of the 
relationship between Special Areas unemployment and transference and 
Special Areas unemployment and non-transference policy. Appendix 3 
also contains the results of thia, work. The conclusions were again, for 
the reasons outlined above, not very useful. 
The data of Table XXXIV, therefore, is the best indication of 
the relative impact of different policy instruments. The results 
presented in Table XXXIII demonstrated that regional policy had some 
roie in determining Special Areas unemployment. It seems that the 
Scottish Area's Commissioner concentrated on public works and the 
like in order to relieve unemployment. An examination of the relative 
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weighting of his efforts from the information of the reports suggests 
the repetition of Dennison's comment that the Commissioner 
concentrated on those schenes " calculated to produce lasting assets 
to the cotllllunity " in that tmti1 1935, 90 per cent of total grants 
to public works were for sewerage schenes. 13 Transference was kept 
low by the reluctance of the Scottish Commissioner to encourage it 
and by his realisation that, " transference is more difficult •• 
l~han in England and Wa1ef/ •••• because there is in Scotland no 
busy expanding industrial centre like the Midlands or South of 
England and the tine has not yet come when transference to England will 
becone a normal outlet for Scottish youthso,,14 Considerable progress was 
made, however, in expanding factory employment, in particular at 
the Hil1ington Industrial Estate although, as was true of much light 
industry, employment was predominantly for wonen. The unemployment 
problem was not always relieved and, indeed, might even have worsened 
statistically when female labour was made redundant, after being attracted 
into the labour force for the first tine by the local establishment of 
new industry. A considerable problem of unemployment still remained 
in 1938 despite all these efforts. The English and Welsh position 
13. 
14. 
S.R.Dennison, The Location of Indust;t 8nd the Depressed 
Areas (1939) , p.16l. The other Scott1sh Commissioners followed 
these lines. ' 
Final Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (Scotland) 
(P.P., 1938-9. XII). para.174. Additionally, when net migration 
data for the Scotti.h Special Area is examined, it must be recalled 
that it surrounded Gla.gow, and as such, was subject to a considerable 
suburban centrifugal movement of population. 
266 
revealed in Table XXXIV demonstrates the much greater significance of 
transference in the attack on localized unemployment, in comparison to 
the impact of new employment. As in Scotland, public works also made 
an important contribution to the reduction of unemployment. Nevertheless, 
a considerable volume of unemployment remained in 1938. Table XXXV shows 
the most intractable problem of the long unemployed in the Special Areas. 
However, although it is appropriate to judge the efficacy of 
policy by its contemporary aim of reducing unemployment this judgement 
should not be compressed into an artificial time scale. The importance 
of new industrial developments in the Special Areas can hardly be assessed 
on their results to 1938 ( the latest date at which figures can be 
presented ) and even the extension of this period to the outbreak of 
• 
"-war is ~nsufficient. As the District Commissioner for the North-East Area 
pointed out, 
"it is true to say of the Durham and Tyneside Special Area 
that •••• schemes for the removal of industrial dereliction, 
or in other fields where conditions needed improvement, had 
made slow progress by the end of 1936, and a definite policy 
for promoting industrial recovery did not emerge until the 
beginning of the present year". 15 
Even the antecedent of trading estates in the Areas were slow to get under 
way as sites had to be sele~ted, and the initial capital equipment 
provided. 16 
15. C.Forbes Adam in Fourth Report of the coDBdssioner for the 
Special Areas (England and Wales)~.P., 1937-8,X11), para.lS2. 
16. An estate in Cumberland was delayed as a result of indecision on the 
viabnity of one estate for the area and subsequently several small 
sites were utilized. Team Valley was selected with the needs of 
light industry in view. Third Report of the Commissioner for the 
Special Ateas (England and Wales) ~.i., 1936-7,X11), para.12S-6. 
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The likelihood of contradiction between different policy 
instruments is also affected by such longer term considerations. 
Transference, for instance, as well as spontaneous out-migration, 
had been proceeding from these parts of the country since the end 
of the 1914-18 war and the cumulative effects of a continous loss 
of population through such a selective process as migration tended to 
result in the ageing of the population, the removal of its more skilled 
and employable labour and in a deterioration of its social capital. All 
these factors deterred industrialists from locating in the North, 
despite inducements and encouragements from 1936-7 onwards. As 
Dennison noted, "attempts to attract industries, and the reconditioning 
of areas to receive them, do not combine well with a policy of transference; 
in their aims and results, unless they are narrowly controlled, they 
a • • " 17 re lnconslstent • 
Regional policy contained another contradiction besides that 
between transferring people out and moving industry in. Commenting 
on the unemployment figures in Scotland, the Scottish Commissioner 
observed in his final report that, "generally speaking, as in the 
previous year, the main recovery is in the heavy industries which, 
while welcome, does not contribute to a permanent solution of the 
real problem, and, indeed, by obscuring that problem, may, as I have 
said, retard its solution~,;18 The Board of Trade data does not 
-
17. S.R.Dennison,op.cit.p.169. 
18. Final Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (Scotland), 
op.cit.para.20S. 
268 
allow an estimate of the change in employment in manufacturing 
establishments unless extensions are undertaken or new plant 
constructed. The fuller utilization of capacity therefore would 
not be noted and neither would any change in employment in the 
extractive industries. Of the establishments that are covered, 
the data of Table XXXVI emerges. In terms of employment provided, 
the 9.6 per cent of all expansions in the North-East area tended to 
be amongst the largest employers. Shipbuilding concerns at Newcastle 
and West Hartlepool eq>loyed a minimum of 1,900 persons in December 
of their first year and a similar expansion at Hebburn in 1935 
brought at least 600 new jobs. However, the exclusions from the 
data, in particular of government rather than private munitions works, 
and of the extractive industries, makes the results understate the 
extent of this contradiction. 19 
II 
The possibility of contradiction between transference and move-industry 
policy has been indicated. The 'complementary' argument, used to refute 
thi~ depended on the application of different policies to different 
localities and types of labour. Frequent requests were made by both 
-
19. Speaking of 1936-7 the District Commissioner for the West 
CuDberland area said that "the increased demand for iron and 
steel has brought about a considerable improvement and the iron 
ore mines now in production are working to capacity, while 
three new shafts are being sunk". Fourth Report of the 
Comadssioner for the Special Areas (England and Wales),op.cit.para.197. 
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Commissioners for an analysis of the surplus so that an appropriate 
solution could be devised for particular iistricts. 20 In the absence 
of this the English Commissioner was more specific on how he 
imagined contradiction was to be avoided. 
"Whilst there is a hope of revival for the more firmly 
established industrial districts in the Special Areas, 
there are parts of these Areas for which it is difficult to see an 
economic future. These are mainly situatad in some of the 
coal and iron districts up the valleys in South Wales, in 
the West Durham coalfield, and in some of the smaller towns 
and villages surrounding Cleator Moor in Cumberland. Unemployment 
in some of these small districts has, for a number of years, 
amounted to practically three-quarters of the employable 
population. The community in fact is little more than a small 
town or village built round a coal shaft. When the coal ceases 
to be worked the possibility of economic life disappears. 
There is no justification that I can discover for establishing 
industrial enterprise in such places."21 
Transference was the appropriate policy for these areas. Industrial 
development was to be encouraged elsewhere. But it is not possible to 
isolate derelict and non-derelict areas for analysis. 22 The relative 
impact of transference and 'move-industry' policy cannot be contrasted 
20. For example, in the First Report of the coDlllisaioner for the 
Special Areas (Englana and Wales) (P.P.,1934-S,X), para.217; 
Third Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (England 
and Wales), op.cit.para.ll; Third Report of the CoDlllissioner for 
the Special Areas (Scotland) (P.P.,193S-6, XIII),para.15. 
21. First Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (England 
and Wales), op.cit.para.163. Also see Royal Commission on the 
Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population. 
Memorandum of Evidence of the Ministry of tabour,2 Feb.1938, para.32. 
22. Geographical situation and occupational structure is nOt enough. 
For example, Bishop Auckland was considered a suitable location for 
new industry. 
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between the areas. Further, transference cannot be given for 
local authority areas, although net migration residuals can be 
derived from the annual data of the Registrar-General. However, 
it seems that the ability to contrast derelict and non-derelict areas 
is not crucial. The combined impact of policy does not seem to have been 
23 sufficient to allow one policy instrument to hamper another. 
In the West Cumberland area there is no striking relationship between 
the changes in factory employment or the rate of migration. (see Appendix 4) 
Whitehaven did not benefit from the introduction of new factory employment 
before 1938 and yet unemployment declined with a modest loss of population 
from net migration. Maryport did gain a branch factory in leather tanning 
during 1934 but at the same time more persons moved out of the town on 
balance than were employed in the new establishment. Meanwhile, 
unemployment decreased. As it is generally permissible to assume 
that the activities of the Special Areas comadssioner in respect of 
public utility projects are unlikely to have varied in impact so 
dramatically between years, it might be reasoned that the decline 
in unemployment in these towns vas a product of the general revival of 
activity. There was increased employment attributable to increasing 
demand in the iron and steel industries. It might also be argued that 
migration was an important contributor to the improvemen~something like 
-
23. This was realized in the Fourth Report of the Commissioner for the 
Special Areas (Scotland) (P.P., 1937-8,XIII),para.l74. "It is certain 
at any rate that transference out will not conflict with efforts to 
bring fresh industry to the Areas, until much greater progress in 
both directions has been made than has so far proved practicable." 
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1,800 persons moving out, on balance, over the period. But although 
the impact of labour migration policies was probably greater than the 
more recent 'move-industry' policy, in relation to the size of the 
problem, both were relatively inneffectual and, consequently, the two 
arms of policy were not contradictory in practice. 
South West Durham was one of the areas mentioned by Sir Malcolm 
Stewart when identifying the derelict areas where transference was to be 
the primary policy. Bishop Auckland, Crook and Spennymoor are within 
this area. The intention of policy was to encourage the establishment 
of new employments in these towns so that the population of the 
surrounding derelict mining villages might find new employ in a local 
centre, either travelling daily to the centre (thus turning derelict 
villages into dormitory settlements) or moving household. On balance, 
however, migratory movements were outward, although net migration 
statistics do not reveal directional movements and the absence of 
daily travelling data serves to obscure the position. Neither was 
there a rush of new industry into these districts, but unemployment 
did decline. Nevertheless, the problem of excess unemployment remained 
by the end of 1938 so it is probable that the different policy instruments 
were not contradictory. 
Other towus in the North East Coast area illustrate the same point. 
New factory employment and transference are not in practice contradictory 
2n 
solutions when the problem remained as large as it did by the end of 
the period. However, the very reason that the problem did not easily 
succumb to the 'move~industry' policy may have been the result of the 
cumulative effects of out-migration over a long period of time. 
In Gateshead, of the 12,000 unemployed in 1934 many were 
dependent upon the iron and steel industries, shipbuilding or 
perhaps coal-mining and at least as many were male. The new 
employment at the Team Valley Estate and at Gateshead itself was in 
such varied trades as clothing, date and fruit packing, colliery 
machinery, motor vehicle bodies and coaches, wooden furniture, milk 
cartons and oilskin waterproof clothing. With one exception, these 
were all new light industries and could be easily justified as 
providing a necessary diversification of the town's interests, 
making it less susceptible to the vagaries of cyclical and 
structural change. Nevertheless, these same trades did not provide 
employment for the sort of person.·.who dominated the unemployment registers 
of the North-East. "The great majority of the 4,000 or so employees on the 
Team Valley Estate at the outbreak of war were women and girls", 24 
and so it is not surprising that out-migration was high, even though 
25 it declined somewhat as the Estate's progress accelerated. The chief 
24. 
25. 
M.P.Fogarty, Prospeetsof the Industrial Areas of Great Britain 
(1945), p.178. The quoted figure of 4,000 includes expansion 
between 1938 and Sept.1939 from nine factories giving a maximum 
of 1,000 employment opportunities to 110 factories providing 4,000 
actual jobs. 
This suggests causality but migration also depends on conditions 
in the potential receiving areas. 
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employment for men in this connection was the construction work 
involved in laying out the estate rather than in the permanent employment 
it provided them. "The most valuable immediate result of the establishment 
of the trading estate LFogarty addeqj was moral; it gave the area new 
hope.,,26 New employment and out-migration were not contradictory in this 
locality. 
The South Wales area was more dependent on a narrow range of industry 
than any other area and it struggled, in addition, against its topography. 
This hampered any solution couched in terms of setting up large plant 
in particular localities and then recruiting labour from the surrounding 
towns and villages. In turn, however, topography linked the fortunes of 
particular towns and it was often hoped that recovery in one town would 
as.1st the more depressed communities at the head of the north-south 
valleys. Pontypool and Blaenavon were linked by valley formation. New 
factory employment did not materialise until 1938 and until that time 
out-migration was the principal relief of unemployment. The area did 
benefit from a Government arms factory at Glascoed, north east of Pontypool, 
in 1937. Other Government arms factories were located in the South Wales 
26. M.P.Fogarty,op.cit. 
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27 area, the North-East coast being f~owned upon for strategic reasons, and 
plants were established at St. Athan, Glamorgan and at Bridgend by 1937, 
the latter providing some relief for the populations of Maesteg, Glyncorrnwg 
and Ogmore and Garw. Merthyr Tydfil was the home of another armaments 
factory by 1938, although earlier proposals for munitions works in the 
28 area were rejected by the service departments. In the same year a 
telephone accessory manufacturer was established at Dowlais, but in 
relation to the numbers unemployed these new employments were as, with so 
many other areas, only beginning to attack the problem. Migration's 
contribution was more significant. 
Most new factory employment in South Wales was located on the 
Treforest Estate outside Pontypridd and although the project was not fully 
developed before the war it had begun to make an impact on the fortunes 
of the area, in particular of Pontypridd and to a lesser extent towns 
further up the valleys such as Aberdare, Rhondda and Mountain Ash. 
27. All areas other than the South-East and Midlands were at a 
disadvantage when it came to the location of aircraft production; 
engineering experience took precedence over 'vulnerability' in 
choosing locations. See the cases discussed in W. Hornby, 
Factories and Plant (1958) pp.285-96; and Royal Commission on 
the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial Population. 
Memorandum of Evidence of the Ministry of Labour, 2 Feb.1938, Q.2698 
28. P.R.O. Special Areas. Methyr Tydfil. Suggested establishment of • 
government factory, 1936. HLG 30/53, 
However4 of the 2,000 new jobs provided in, for example, cigarette 
lighter accessories, dry ice, brushes, aeroplane parts, toys and ~ancy 
goods, paper, cardboard and cartons, synthetic bottle caps and silk 
printing, by the outbreak of war only 500 were for men. Further, the 
location of the estate created a need for daily travelling of labour 
on a t · 1 29 0 " '11 l' d • .:&. • n ex enS1ve sca e. ut-m1grat10n was St1 a va 1 so .t10n to 
the problem of regional unemployment. 
The general inference that can be drawn from this local analysis 
is that migration was a more effective weapon against unemployment. 
From 1937, with the deliberate pursual of an industry policy, there 
was a risk of the two policies being contradictory. Despite the fact 
that it is not possible to isolate derelict and non-derelict area~ in 
relation to the size of the unemployment problem it is unlikely that the 
two policies came into conflict. 
III 
In practice, the contradiction of policy instruments was avoided. 
Th d • d 30 Wh e factors inhibiting labour movement have been 1scusse, at 
inhibits a policy of attempting to influence the distribution of 
employment by guiding the location of industry? 
29. This was in contrast to Cumberland where a number of small 
estates were chosen as a better means of providing an attack 
on the area's problems. 
30. supra, Chapter 3. 
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The principal limitation before the 1937 Special Areas Amendment 
Act were the restrictions on the Commissioner's powers preventing 
him from undertaking a policy that only became accepted after he had 
begun to issue reports. Opinion overtook the 1934 Special Areas Act and 
attributed intentions to it that were never in the minds of its 
architects. The District Commissioner for Durham was well aware of 
the change in emphasis in policy in 1937 and Sir Malcolm Stewart 
noted in his first report that " the commissioner is not directly 
charged with the duty of relieving unemployment by the provision 
of work". 31 He was to be " solely concerned with measures designed 
to facilitate the economic development or social improvement of the 
areas. ,,32 Policy was not contradictory because, at this stage, there 
was one overriding policy instrument and that was transference. 
Stewart noted the other limitatiomon his power at the same 
date. He quoted Chamberlain in the CODDDOns who said" we are going to give 
the Commissioners a very wide discretion. They must not be afraid of trying 
experiments even if those experiments fail ", 33 and Stanley, the Minister 
for Labour said "of course the commissioner will be responsible through 
me to Parliament for broad policy. I shall have to answer for it in the 
House, but I hope we shall be able to leave him as far as possible 
unhampered in the day to day administration of his duties. ,,34 
31. First Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (England 
and Wales),op.cit.para.6. 
32. ibid. 
33. ibid.para.4. 
34. ibid. 
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But what Parliamentary precedent allowed as powers with "wide 
discretion" was not the same as the meaning of the phrase in 
normal usage. The Commissioner was precluded from assisting under-
takings carried on for gain, he was unable to assist areas outside 
the Special Areas unless substantial employment would be provided 
for people residing within the Special Areas,35 and he was unable 
to provide or supplement a grant toward the cost of any work for 
which a specific grant was payable by any other government 
department, whether this other department was actually paying 
a grant or not. Stewart noted that this latter restriution would 
prevent him providing funds to assist road building which, in 
turn, would severely limit his ability to make a site clearance 
policy effective in attracting industry. Rather than the 
Commissioner being endowed with power "more rapid, more direct, less 
orthodox if you like than the ordinary plan,,36 the Commissioner 
Was "as much subject to orthodox financial control as any Government 
d ,,37 • • .• d tak' • d epartment. The restr1ct10n on ass1st1ng un er 1ngs carr1e 
" owe for gain was circumvented by the mechanism used to establish 
Trading Estates and finally abolished with the introduction of 
35. A legal opinion on the 1934 Act, when it was being considered for 
amendment in late 1936 and early 1937, concluded that it did not 
allow action outside the Spacial Areas for any reason. P.R.O. Powers 
of the Comudssioner to undertake or assist schemes outside the 
Special Areas. LAB 23/31. 
36. These were the words of N.Chamber1ain. Quoted in the First Report 
of the Comudssioner for the Special Areas (England and Wales), 
op.cit.para.4. 
37. This was Sir Malcolm Stewart's view. First Report of the Commissioner 
for the Special Areal (England and Wales), op.cit.para.6. Also see 
the Second Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (Scotland) 
(P.P., 1935-6, XIII), para.5. 
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inducements, Treasury loans and the assistance of SARA in 1936 and 
1937. The policy from then aimed at moving industry, however the other 
restrictions remained. 
Another limitation on the effectiveness of special Areas policy 
was the actual areas designated as 'Special'. Apart from the exclusion 
of parts of Lancashire,38 major towns geographically adjacent or some-
times within the Areas were excluded. The rationalisation for this 
was that unemployment did not constitute such a problem in these towns 
and as there was no conception of a policy encouraging growth in these 
areas and transferring labour short distances to these centres, there 
was no reason to expect their inclusion. However, it can be seen from 
the examples of South West Durham and South Wales, that it was realized 
that industry locating in one particular area suited to it could relieve 
the surrounding population from unemployment but, nevertheless, the 
logical extension of this idea does not seem to have been taken up 
by the Government. Both English and Scottish Commissioners pointed 
out this defect in policy. "In Wales ••• the exclusion of important 
cities and towns such as Cardiff, Newport and Swansea has created an 
artificial boundary within an established industrial region ••• it 
is impossible, in my view, to determine the prospects of the mining 
38. The case for Lancashire's inclusion in the Special Areas was put 
in University of Manchester, Department of Economics and Commerce, 
Readjustment in Lancashire (Manchester, 1936). The Minister of 
Labour was in favour of the inclusion of north-east and south 
Lancashire when the Special Areas Act of 1934 was in the process 
of amendment. The compromise solution of 'certified areas' was 
the result of pressure from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. 
P.R.O. Cabinet Committee on the Reports of the Investigations into 
the Depressed Areas. Proceeding' and Memoranda. D.A. (34) 10th 
Meeting, 26 Jan. 1937. CAB 21/518. 
valleys irrespective of their relation to large industrial centres 
nearby". 39 Th 1· fl· e exc USion 0 G asgow from the Scottish Area was 
noted by Sir Arthur Rose but he seemed to resign himself to the 
status quo on the grounds that experiment could not be expected 
40 
over too wide an area. Post-war commentators have emphasised 
these exclusions. McCrone writes that it was "difficult to 
tackle the problems of economic regeneration in an area when the 
. 41 towns WhiCh formed the focal points of development were excluded" 
and Lee considers that "recent experience has shown, to thus exclude 
the major growth centres from an area is a grave mistake.,,42 The 
evidence of factory development on the North-East coast might be used 
to illustrate this point as the whole of Tyneside was included in the 
Special Area and attracted considerable industrial development in 
relation to that experienced by the rest of the area. 43 
39. 
40 
41. 
42. 
43. 
These, then, were the limitations on the Commissioner's ability 
First Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (England 
and Wales) OPe cit. para 6. 
Third Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas (Scotland) 
op.cit.para.2. The Ministry of Labour wrote to the English 
Commissioner's office in December 1936 saying, "It is I think 
important for political reasons to have some amendment to the 
Act to which Ministers can point as giving good reason for 
continuing to exclude Cardiff etc. from the Special Areas." 
G.McCrone, Ieftonal P'li;: in Britain (1969), p.93. 
C.H. Lee, Ieon.lleono eGtovthin the United Kin dom since 
the 1880's Mal e e, ,p.. Both McCrone and Lee 
erroneously believe that Newcastle was excluded from the Areas. 
This development was without the aid of inducements in Newcastle. 
See Board of Trade, Annual Surveys of Industrial Development,1934-8. 
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to achieve success in his efforts to promote economic development. 
When the objective of promoting economic development became more 
specific from 1937, some of these limitations were removed and the 
coincidence of a more clearly defined objective and the introduction 
of measures to allow this objective to be achieved resulted in the 
upturn in the rate of success that was observable in 1938-9. If 
Stewart's recommendations in his third report to restrict the growth 
of London had been implemented, rather than deliberated upon by the 
subsequent Royal Commission, then some of the industrial growth 
experienced in London might have been diverted to the Special Areas 
and the rate of success would have been higher still. But the policy 
was never sufficiently successful to reach a point at which the dual 
operation of transference and move-industry policy became contradictory. 
Special Areas policy did, however, include some progressive 
achievements. Trading Estates conformed approximately to the current 
concepts of growth points and industrial complexe.~4 and it was found 
that the advance provision of factories, estate communications and services 
meant that a considerable volume of industrial activity could be stimulated 
44. See J.R. Lasuen, 'On Growth Poles', Urban Studies, 6(1969); 
W.Isard and E.W. Schooler, 'Industrial Complex Analysis, 
Agglomeration Economies, and Regional Development·, Journal 
of Regional Science, 1(1959); W.lsard, E.W. Schooler and 
T.Vietorisz;lndu8trial Complex Analysis and Regional 
Develo nt: A Case Stud of Refine -Petrochemical-
Synthet1c F1ber Complexes 1nPuerto R1co New York, 1959). 
without recourse to the additional carrots of contributions towards 
rent, rates and taxes or capital grants. For example, of the 82 
firms in receipt of some form of assistance that located in the 
Scottish area up to September 1938, 44 benefited from a factory or 
site at Hil1ington alone. In England and Wales the respective 
figures were 2lQ and 100. 45 However, the English Commissioner 
considered that Trading Estates were important in influencing the 
location of small light industries, as the Board of Trade data 
demonstrates, and saw the Treasury fund and the Nuffield Trust as the 
more important influences on the location of larger heavy industry. 
The acceptance of a 'move-industry' policy by the Government 
brought the possibility of contradiction to the fore. The availability 
of labour in the Special Areas was often stressed by the Commissioners 
as an attraction to incoming industry and from a survey of industrialists 
it seemed that labour supply was indee. an important influence on 
contemporary location decisions, despite the other con.i'-cations that 
might be taken into account. However, here was a handicap to the 
Commi •• ioner's efforts from 1936/7 onwards. Although it is usually 
assumed that high unemployment percentages mean large reserves of 
labour, this is not necessarily true. Neither is it necessarily true 
45. P.R.O. Correspondence and drafts of memoranda to the Barlow 
Commission. BT 104/91. 
46 that low percentages mean low labour reserves. The continual 
depressed state of the Special Areas throughout the inter-war 
period and the continual out-migration of labour had a number 
of dehabilitating effects on the potential labour supply to 
incoming industry. These effects, both real and imagined, were 
known to industrialists who considered them among the reasons 
for avoiding a Special Areas location. 
The vi~cious circle of depression leading to further depression 
and the disadvantages of high rates were noted by the Commissioner 
as handicaps on a 'move-industry' policy!7 'Technical trade reasons' 
were commonly advanced by industrialists circularized by the Commissioner 
as reason for avoiding the Special Areas. 48 Criticism of policies to 
influence the location of industry usually hinge on the concept of 
'mis-location'. This argument says that businessmen locate according 
to those factors that are likely to influence the success of the firm 
and that to interfere in this decision-making process is bound to make 
46. G.Davies,'Regional Unemployment, Labour Availability, and 
Redeployment', Oxford Econoudc Papers, new ser.19(1967) 
Numbers unemployed in the Special Areas at their highest 
point were about 400,000. This figure for Greater London 
is 295,000. Table XXXV shows the 'hard-core' uneq»loyed 
who miaht be removed from the effective reserve. 
47. First Report of the Comadssioner for the Special Areas 
(England and Wales),op.cit.para.29. 
48. Second Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areas 
(England and Wales)(P.P.,1935-6,Xlll), paras. 10-17. 
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the firm less efficient in production than it otherwise could be. 
The justification for such intervention favours social considerations 
in the locality, arguing that unused labour reserves will be utilised. 
If viewed as an economic problem it can be argued that to use 'wasted 
labour' is to push the economy closer to capacity, however, the economic 
solution may be to allow the firm to locate at its optimum location 
and transfer labour to this location; the consequence for national 
economic fortunes would then be at its highest. For 'mis-location' 
to follow from government intervention in the location of industry 
suggests that businessmen are rational in choosing their locations 
d ' d d d h '1' h' , 49 an 1n ee 0 c oose an opt1mum ocat10n or somet 1ng near 1t. 
However, it is clear that in a number of cases rational decisions were 
50 
not made. A study of location decisions in post-war Britain concluded 
that much of industry was not resource-tied and that costs tended to 
settle down after three years. Some form of subsidy might be necessary 
to assist industry after its initial movement but from then it was not 
49. Contrast the Board of Trade's and Ministry of Labour's evidence 
to Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the 
Industrial Population. Minutes of Evidence, 19,20 Oct.1937 and 
2,3 Feb. 1938. 
50. For example, Morris Motors is at Cowley because it was Nuffield's 
home district. P.W.S. Andrews and E.Brunner, The Life of Lord 
Nuffield: A Stud in Ent. rise and Benevolence (l$Xford,19SS). 
e Br1stol Aerop1ace Co. Lt • set up at F 1ton, Bristol because 
the co~any was formed by Bristolians. D.Napier and Son Ltd. of 
Acton: "The removal in 1902 from Lambeth to Acton would not be 
due to any reasons other than the fortuitous ones such as 
Mr Napier's own residence being on the west side of London and 
the availability of a considerable area of unoccupied land in 
the district at that time." P.R.O. Memorandum by Society of British 
Aircraft Constructors Ltd. HLG 27/53. 
28, 
likely to be any more or less efficient than a comparable entity 
51 
elsewhere. Nevertheless, such fears operated against the 
success of a 'move-industry' policy. 
It seems, then, that the Commissioners approach from 1937 
was justifiable on economic grounds provided he confined his 
attention to 'footloose' industries. Further, post-war experience 
fuggests that the initial subsidisation of industry in new locations 
was the appropriate way of allaying entrepreneurs fears of high cost 
locations. However, the limitations on the Commissioner's powers such 
as the inability to restrict growth about the metropolis and the exclusion 
of major towns from some of the Areas, coupled with the deteriorating 
labour supply, partially as a result of transfer, and the availability 
of ample reserves of labour, probably of a more varied ability, in the 
Midlands and South-East , resulted in his policies being less successful 
than they might have been. As a result the policies of transfer and 
'move-industry' did not become contradictory after 1937, at least not 
conterminously,52 and the failure for policies to contradict each other 
before that date is explicable by the non-existence of a 'move-industry' 
policy. 
51. 
52. 
~ .• !~,.* Lutt!~llJ 'FactOry Location and Ind'f8tdal Movementl A 
'Studt 'of Recent'MOvement'in'Gteat'Btitun (1962).t;p.3l • 
Thempact of continual out:mIaration of population and its 
effects on an area's prospects of attracting industrial 
development were con.idered in the preceding chapter. 
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Table XXIV 
Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the Special Areas, 
1934-1938 
No. of estabs. 
& extensions 
Employment 
at December 
Accumulated 
Total Emp1. 
No. of 
Closures 
Emp1. 
Lost* 
Adjusted 
Employment 
Maxima 
each cumu1at- Min Max Min Max Deco Accum-
year ed u1ated 
15 15 525 1685 525 1685 22 550 1135 1135 
12 27 2375 3388 2900 5073 5 125 3263 4398 
18 45 1400 2692 4300 7165 10 250 2442 6840 
29 74 1900 4271 6200 12036 6 150 4121 10961 
66 140 4475 9540 10675 21576 13 325 9215 20176 
*Minima 
Notes 
(i) Data derived from the Board of Trade, Annual Surveys of Industrial 
Development, 1934-8. 
(ii) The information on expansions in employment was allocated to the 
Special AI~as according to the definitions of the Areas. These 
definitions are presented in Appendix 1. The character of these 
definitions resulted in some ambiguities. A munitions factory 
employing 400-499 persons opened in Linlithgow, Welt Lothian in 
1937, but it was not poslible to determine which lide of the Special 
Areas boundary, which ran through tinlithgow, this factory was placed. 
These figures were included in the analysis in keeping with the intended 
bias in the construction of the data series representing the impact of 
different regional policies. 
(iii) Maximum and Minimum estimates - the Annual Surveys note manufacturing 
and processing plants employing over 25 persons, over 100, over 200, 
etc.. Thus a firm's minimum employment might be 25 aDd its maxilllUlll 99. 
(iv) The accumulations depend on the assumption that no reductions or 
expansions in .. rkforce took place over the period after the case is 
first noted in the Board of Trade data. 
(v) The latter part of the Table where allowance is made for closures of 
plant is again based on the convention of the source including 
establishments employing 25 and over. It is not possible in this case 
to identify a tenable maxima and thus the adjusted employment figures 
are maxima. 
Table XXV 
Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the Scottish Special 
Area, 1934-1938 
No. of estabs. 
& extensions 
each cumulat-
year ed 
6 6 
4 10 
18 18 
7 25 
14 39 
*Minima 
Employment Accumulated No. of Emp1. 
at December Total Empl. Closures Lost* 
Min Max Min Max 
225 694 225 694 7 175 
100 396 325 1090 0 
275 802 600 1892 3 75 
550 1093 1150 2985 1 25 
775 1886 1925 4871 2 50 
Table XXVI 
Adjusted 
Employment 
Maxima 
Dec. Accum-
ulated 
519 519 
396 915 
727 1642 
1068 2710 
1836 4546 
Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the West Cumberland 
Special Area, 1934-1938 
No. of estabs. Employment Accumulated No. of Empl. Adjusted 
& extensions at December -Total Empl. Closures Lost* Employment 
Maxima 
each cumulat- Min Max Min Max Dec. Accum-
year ed ulated 
1 1 25 99 25 99 2 50 49 49 
1 2 25 99 50 198 1 25 74 123 
1 3 25 99 75 297 1 25 74 197 
0 3 75 297 0 197 
2 5 50 198 125 495 0 198 395 
*Minima 
Table XXVII 
Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the South Wales 
Special Area, 1934-1938 
No. of estabs. Employment Accumulated No. of Empl. Adjusted 
& extensions at December Total Empl. Closures Lost* Employment 
Maxima 
each cumulat- Min Max Min Max Dec. Accum-
year ed ulated 
0 0 2 50 -50 -50 
0 0 1 25 -25 -75 
0 0 0 -75 
5 5 375 795 375 795 1 25 770 695 
19 24 1050 2387 1425 3182 5 125 2262 2957 
*Minima 
Table XXVIII 
Direct Employment in New and Extended Factories in the North East Coast 
Special Area, 1934-1938 
No. of estabs. Employment 
. 
Accumulated No. of Emp1. Adjusted 
& extensions at Decembe-r Total Emp10 Closures Lost* Employment 
Maxima 
each cumu1at- Min Max Min Max Dec. Accum-
year ed u1ated 
8 8 275 892 275 892 11 275 617 617 
7 15 2250 2893 2525 3785 3 75 2818 3435 
9 24 1100 1791 3625 5576 6 150 1641 5076 
17 41 975 2383 4600 7959 4 100 2283 7359 
31 72 2600 5069 7200 13028 6 ISO 4919 12278 
*Minima 
Table XXIX 
Industrial Establishments in the Special Areas 1932-1938 
South Wales Factories opened extended closed 
1932 1 
1933 1 1 
1934 2 
1935 1 
1936 
1937 5 1 
1938 19 5 
West Cumberland 
1932 
1933 1 1 2 
1934 2 (1) 2 
1935 1 1 
1936 1 1 
1937 
1938 2 
North East Coast 
1932 7 4 2 
1933 .6 1 2 
1934 5 (6) 3 (2) 11 
1935 2 5 3 
1936 5 (6) 3 6 
1937 14 (12) 4 (5) 4 
1938 26 (25) 6 6 
Scotland 
1932 7 2 10 
1933 3 5 
1934 6 7 
1935 2 2 
1936 6 2 3 
1937 4 (6) - (1) 1 
1938 14 2 
Notes to Table XXIX 
Based on Board of Trade, Annual Surveys of Industrial Development, 1934-8; 
Board of Trade, Survey of Industrial Development,1938,pp.5-6. 
The figures in brackets record where the annual allocation to the Special 
Areas from the Board of Trade data disagrees with the Board of Trade's 
summary table in the Survey for 1938. 
TabU XXX 
Net Migration from County accumulations approximating the Special 
Areas, 1934-1939 (mid-years) 
Scotland. 
(Dunbarton, Renfrew, Lanark excluding Glasgow) 
1934-5 -1,583 
1935-6 1,854 
1936-7 2,257 
1937-8 -1,064b 
1938-9 2,313 
6,190 
West Cumberland 
(Cumberland) 
1934-5 
1935-6 
1936-7 
1937-8 
1938-9 
-1,833 
-1,897 
-3,603 
-1,066 
- 554 
-8,953 
North East Coast 
(Northumberland. Durham) 
1934-5 -19.619 
1935-6 -28.137 
1936-7 -25.097 
1937-8 -11~'9 
1938-9 
- 4.967 
-89.719 
b. extension of Glasgow at expense of 
Dunbarton and Renfrew. 
South Wales 
(Monmouth, G1amorgan, Brecknock) 
-22,079 
-25,988 
-37,574 
-15,570 
5,158 
-106.369 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Statistical Ravie .. of the Raaistrar-
General for Enaland and Wales and the Annual Reports of the 
Reaistrar-General for Scotland. 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
Notes. 
Table XXXI 
Transference in England and Wales. 1934-1938 
Depressed Areas Special Areas 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Indi vi duals Families (4) as % (1) 
17173 1308 
31040 3718 19513 19513a 62.86 
49446 10025 20244 28383b 57.40 
43177 7673 26807 24314ab 56.31 
29627 4000 17531 18549ab 62.61 
(1) & (2) - calendar years. 
co1.(3) Data is for differing periods-
Dec.1934 - Nov.1935 inclusive (juvenile component for 
11 months only) 
Jan.1936 - Aug.1936 
Sept.1936 - Aug.1937 
Oct.1937 - Sept.1938 
col.(4) Adjusted data no longer indicates that 1937 i. the peak 
year for Special Areas transference. 
a. extrapolation to twelve month period on assumption that 
miasing data is equal to monthly averaae of available data. 
b. accumulation of quarterly and monthly data for 
calendar years. 
Source: Based on Annual Reports of the Ministry of Labour and the 
Reports of the Commissioners for the Special Areas (Enlland 
and Wales), aee bibliography. 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
Tab le XXXII 
Unemployment in the Special Areas, 1934-1938 
Numbers 
Scottish England North East W.Cumber1and S.Wa1es G. Britain 
Area & Wales & Coast 
94998 343992 173825 13419 156748 2085815 
82539 317574 160530 14408 142636 1868565 
67505 268007 127860 13565 126582 1628719 
68189 222688 114076 10548 98064 1665407 
64435 231755 106121 8962 116672 1802912 
Percentages 
28.9 35.0 32.9 37.9 37.1 16.6 
25.3 32.7 30.7 40.7 34.5 14.8 
20.5 27.9 24.6 38.6 31.3 12.5 
21.5/16.9 23.1 21. 8 30.5 24.4 12.6 
19.9/17.3 24.1 20.2 25.9 29.0 13.6 
Notes. 
Figures are for December of each year, except 1938 where June 
is taken (unemployment generally tends to be higher in the winter 
months than in midsummer.) 
Boundaries. Total for Ministry of Labour local office areas that 
include any part of the Special Areas. 
Numbers. Total registered unemployed aged 14 and over. 
Percentages. Numbers as a percentage of insured persons aged 
16-64 of July of each year (except 1938 which il 
a percentaae of inlured at July 1937) 
Scotland 1937, 1938. Men and Women aged 18 and over on the 
register as a percentage of the insured 
population aged 18 and over. 
Source: Baled on Reportl of the Commissioners for the Special Areal, 
lee bibliography. 
Tatn. XXXIII 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on a National Unemployment 
. ** Varlable, 1934-1938 
Dependent 
Variable 
Unemployment 
in . . . . 
North East 
Coast 
South 
Wales 
West 
Cumberland 
Scottish 
Area 
English & 
Welsh Areas 
All Special 
Areas 
Pooled obaervations 
of equations 1-6 
Notes 
Constant 
-78206.33 
-48388.72 
5953.00 
-38477 .25 
-81531. 83 
-92112.26 
697102.27 
Standard Errors in brackets 
* Significant at 5 per cent level 
Regression 
Coefficient 
0.13(0.08) 
0.11(0.05) 
0.00(0.01) 
0.07(0.02) 
0.23(0.16) 
0.31(0.22) 
-0.32(0.11) 
n 
0.49 5 (1) 
0.58 5 (2) 
0.07 5 (3) 
0.76 5 (4) 
0.41 5 (5) 
0.40 5 (6) 
0.24 30 (7) 
** Britiah unemployment minus the dependent variable. Observations 
are for December 1934-7 and June 1938. 
Source: see Table XXXII. 
* 
Table XXXIV 
The Contribution to the Change in Unemployment in the Scottish and 
English and Welsh Special Areas of Regional Policies, 1934-1938 
A. Preliminary Estimates 
Transference 
New Factory 
Employment 
Public Works etc. 
Total 
Change in 
Unemployment 
B. Estimates after 
Transference 
New Factory 
Employment 
Public Works etc. 
Total 
Change in 
Unemployment 
Unemployment, 1938 
Scotland, 1934-1938 
7,774 
4,546 
10,167 
22,487 
-30,563 
allowance made for 
4,353 
6,137 
13,726 
24,216 
-30,563 
64,435 
'wastage' 
England & Wales, 1934-1938 
80,759 
15,630 
40,341 
136,730 
-112,237 
and mu1tip1iec effects 
45,225 
21,101 
54,460 
120,786 
-112,237 
231,755 
Table xxxv 
The 'Hard-Core' Unemployment Problem in the Special Areas among 
Men, 1934-1938 
England & Wales 
Nov. 1934 123,555 Dec. 1934 
April 1935 121,100 " 1935 
July 1935 118,518 " 1936 
" 1936 104,964 " 1937 
" 1937 79,989 " 1938 
" 1938 65,182 
Notes. 
Scotland 
28,983 
25,037 
18,718 
14,642 
15,282 
'Hard-core': Men aged 18-64, unemployed for twelve months and over; 
in Scotland there is no upper age limit. 
In England and Wales male 'hard-core' unemployment was about a third 
of total unemployment; in Scotland about one quarter. 
Source: Reports of Ihe Comudssionersfor the Special Areas, see 
bibliography. 
Table XXXVI 
Percentage of Expanding and Declining Industries to all Expansions 
in the Special Areas, 1934-1938 
Expanding* Declining* 
Scotland 82.0 2.6 
North East 51.4 9.6 
West Cumberland 40.0 0.0 
South Wales 62.5 0.0 
Britain 60.9 5.7 
* Definition based on Board of Trade and Ministry of Labour information. 
DIAGRAH IV 
Percentage Unemployed in the Special Arcas and Great Britain, 1934-1933 
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(log. scale) 
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APPENDIX 1 
The Special Areas 
England and Wales 
County Boroughs of Gateshead, Merthyr Tydfil, Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 
South Shields, Sunderland, Tynemouth, West Hartlepool. 
Within the Administrative County of Durham 
Boroughs of Durham, Hartlepool and Jarrow. 
Urban Districts of Annficld Plain, Barnard Castle, Benfieldside, 
Bishop Auckland, Blaydon, Brandon and Byshottles, Chester-Ie-Street, 
Consett, Crook, FelliRg, Hebburn, Hetton, Houghton-Ie-Spring, Leadgate, 
Ryton, Seaham Harbour, Shildon, Spennymoor, Stanhope, Stanley, Tanfield, 
Tow Law, Washington, Whickham, Willington. 
Rural Districts of Auckland, Barnard Castle, Chester-Ie-Street, Durham, 
Easington, Hartlepool, Houghton-Ie-Spring, Lanchester, Sedgefield, 
South Shields, Sunderland, Weardale. 
Within the Administrative County of Northumberland 
Borough of Wallsend. 
Urban Districts of Longbeaton, Newburn. 
Rural District of Haltwhistle. 
Within the Administrative County of Cumberland 
Boroughs of Whitehaven, Workington. 
Urban Districts of Cockermouth, Maryport. 
Rural Districts of Alston with Garrigill, Cockermouth, Ennerdale, Millom, 
Wigton. 
Within the Administrative County of Monmouth 
Urban Districts of Abercarn, Abersychan, Abertillery, Bedn. and Machen, 
Bedwellty, Blaenavon, Ebbw Vale, Llantarnam, Llanfreehfa Upper, Mynyddi.lwyu, 
Nantyglo and Blaina, Panteg, Pontypool, lhymney, Ri.ea, Tredegar. 
Rural Districts of Pontypool, Saint M8llona. 
Within the Adminstrative County of Glamorgan 
Borough of Port Talbot. 
Urban Districts of Aberdare, Bridgend, Caerphilly, Gelligaer, Glyncorrwg, 
Maesteg, Mountain Ash, Ogmore and Garw, Pontypridd, Rhondda. 
Rural Districts of Cardiff, Cowbridge, Llantrisant and Llantwit Fardre, 
Neath and Penybont. 
Within the Administrative County of Brecknock 
Urban District of Brynmawr. 
Rural Districts of Crickhowell and Vaynor and Penderyn. 
Within the Administrative County of Pembroke 
Borough of Pembroke. 
Scotland 
Counties of Dunbarton, Lanark (excluding the City of Glasgow), 
Renfrew 
Within the County of Ayr 
Parishes of Ardrossan, Beith, Dairy, Dreghorn, Dunlop, Fenwick, Galston, 
Irvine, Kilbirnie, Kilmarnock, Kilmaurs, Kilwinning, Loudoun, Riccarton, 
Stevenston, Stewarton. 
300 
Within the County of Stirling 
Parishes of Falkirk, Grangemouth, Muiravonside and Slamannan - "so far 
as situated south of the London and North Eastern Railway line from 
Cast1ecary to Linlithgow." 
Within the County of West Lothian 
Parishes of Bathgate, Ecclesmachan, Kirkliston, Livingston, Linlithgow, 
Torpichen, Uphall and Whitburn "so far as situated south of the London 
and North Eastern Railway line from Linlithgow to Ratho." 
Within the County of Midlothian 
Parishes of Kirknewton, Mid Calder, West Calder. 
Note. 
Source: First Schedule of the Special Areas (Development and 
Improvement) Act, 1934. Public General Statutes, 
25 & 26 Geo V, c.l(1934-5). 
The Depressed Areas scheduled under the Industrial Transference 
Scheme included all the above areas. 
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APPENDIX 2 
A Regional Employment Multiplier for the Late 1930's 
Several estimates of employment and income multipliers exist and an 
increasing amount of literature is appearing on the subject. 1 A range 
of estimates has emerged that puts the income multiplier somewhere between 
1.2 and 1.5 for a standard region in the U.K. in the 1960's and it seems 
useful to take these estimates as a starting point in deriving an employ-
ment multiplier for the 1930's.2 At the outset some shortcomings must be 
noted. There is the problem of projecting backwards estimates for the 
1960's that are based on imperfect data. Such a projection also requires 
1. G.C.Archibald, 'Regional Multiplier Effects in the U.K.', Oxford 
Economic Papers, new ser.19(1967);A.J.Brown, H.Lind and J.Bower8, 'The 
"Green Paper" on the Development Areas. Appendix: Regional Multi-
pliers', National Institute Economic Review,40(1967); T.Wi18on,'The 
Regional Multiplier - A Critique',Oxford Economic Papers,new ser.20 
(1968); D.B.Steele,'Regional Multipliers in Great Britain', Oxford 
Economic Papers,new ser.2l(1969);M.Brownrigg, 'The Resional Income 
Multiplier: An Attempt to Complete the Model', Scottish Journal of 
Political Economy,18(1971); M.A.Greig, 'The Regional Income and 
tmployment Multiplier Effects of a Pulp Mill and Paper Hill', 
Scottish Journal of Political Econo!y,18(197l); M.A.Greil,'Regional 
Multiplier Effects in the U.K.: A Comment', Oxford Economic P!pers, 
new ser.23(197l); D.B.Steele, 'A Numbers Game (or The Return of 
Regional Multipliers)', Re~al Studie8,6(1972); A.J.Brown,!!!!. 
Framework of Resional Econ~cs in the United Kinsdom (Cambridge, 
1972) ,Chapter 8. 
2. The most recent work in this sphere is that of Steele. Simple 
income multipliers rangins from 1.09 for the Northern resion in 1964 
to 1.32 for Scotland were found. Steele's previous estimates for 
these relions at these dates were 1.37 and 1.89 or 1.70 respectively. 
On the basis of the more recent data, the estimates for the standard 
resions of Britain in 1967 ranse from 1.17 for the West Midleds to 
1.31 for the South Western ed Yorkshire and Humberside rea!oas. 
Feedback multiplie~s vary from 1.30 in 1967 for the North and West, 
to 1.42, for Yorkshire ed Bumberside. The variation. are due, 
principally, to difference. in the .ize of region. (smaller regions 
importing more and larser relions exporting Ie •• ). 
a number of assumptions and observations that are likely to be equally 
imperfect. These are noted in the following text. 
Archibald has estimated a minimum multiplier for the standard regions 
3 
of the U.K. His income multiplier(k) is converted to an employment 
mUltiplier for the purpose of estimating the effects on employment of 
the out-migration from a region of the unemployed (or of the employed, 
assuming that the vacancies created are filled by previously unemployed 
persons. ) The out-migration of the unemployed will have depressing 
effects upon income in the region as regional income from unemployment 
benefits declines. But the multiplicand is not the whole loss of payment 
but that part of it that is spent. Assuming that the marginal propensity 
to consume of the unemployed is, at least, not likely to be less than that 
of the employed, and that expenditure patterns similarly result in a 
propensity to import at least no greater than the employed, then Archibald 
arrives at a local expenditure coefficient (s) of 0.3. 4 Personal income 
taxation will not be a relevant parameter for the case of the unemployed. 
-
3. G.C.Archibald,op.cit. Archibald'i estimate of k is a minimum below 
which, he considers, it is unlikely that any regions actual k liea. 
k • 1.2. 
4. It is necessary to distinguish between the local expenditure 
coefficient of the employed and the unemployed, hence s and A. 
Archibald took ~ • 0.3, reasoning that the unemployed were likely to 
conlume at least as much as the employed, if not more, from incremen-
tal income. Similarly, the marlinal propensity to import of the 
unemployed is unlikely to be as hiah as that of the employed. 
Personal income tax h also a relevant parameter in the case of the 
employed. The net effect is that the following relation miaht be 
expected: I&>~. 
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If unemployment benefit is represented by the symbol h, the loss of 
income consequent on the out-migration of an unemployed man is kah. 
Thus, Archibald concludes, if average weekly earnings are given by y 
o 
then, y • k<Jhr, 
o 
where r is the number of men that 
are required to move before income is reduced by y and, on average, 
o 
one more man loses his employment. S Rearrangement yields, 
1 
r • 
ska 
where s· h I y • 
o 
If s • 0.4, then the following values of r emerge6 -
a r 
0.3 6.9 
0.4 5.2 
0.5 4.2 
0.6 3.5 
Thus, "it appears highly probable that no more than seven men need leave 
for one more man to lose his job".7 A larger income multiplier, dependent 
upon less pessimistic aesumptions than Archibald'I, would tend to reduce 
this number as does higher estimates of the local expenditure coefficient 
«(I). There is no reason to expect either of theee to have been substan-
tially different in the 1930'1.8 however, it ie likel, that s (the ratio 
-
S. Thil aSlumes that regional income only has to decrease by y before 
employment faUI by one. An allowance for a profit marainowill 
give the lame result for a decline of income leis than Yo· 
6. G.C.Archibald,op.cit.p.37. 
7. ibid.p.36. 
8. If anything, the lower k would be more applicable to the .maller 
relion. involved. Bowever. a would tend toward. the hiper value. 
liven becau.e of the likely lower value of the marlinal propen.ity 
to import, and the hiaber marlinal propeneity to con.ume out of a 
emaUer diacretionary income would tend to puah ex in the same 
direction. 
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of benefits to average weekly earnings) would have been lower as the 
Coverage of the welfare state was less complete and the scale of benefits 
less comparable with income. The result, therefore, would be for all 
estimates of r to be increased somewhat. For example, if s is 0.2, the 
first observation in Archibald's Table V, partially reproduced above, 
becomes 13.9 rather than 6.9; that is 14 men have to leave the region 
before one more man loses his job. The following table might be hazarded, 
Where values of s vary from 0.2 to 0.4. 
1 
Values of r • ---
ska 
s 
0.4 
0.3 
0.2 
where k • 1.2 and 0& • 0.3 
r 
6.9 
9.3 
13.9 
A priori, s is expected to be lower in the 1930's and preliminary 
investigation suggests that this is so. Calculations of average weekly 
earnings (y ) are not difficult to obtain for the period. 
o 
Bowley put 
them at about £2.50 for both men and women in 1935 in manual industries 
covered by unemployment insurance. 9 For men this figure wa. about £3.00, 
whilst for women it was nearer to £1.50. Chapman and Knight's calcula-
10 tions produce an average weekly earnings figure of about £2.80. This 
figure rose between 1936 and 1938 to about £2.90. Chapman and Kniaht' s 
re'ult is for all indu.tries and services, but excludes director. fee •• 
Given the composition and structure of employment and uneq»loyment in the 
-
9. 
10. 
A.L.Bowley, w;,e. and Income in the United ltinldom .ince 1860 
(Cambridae,193 5,p.l05. 
A.L.Chapman and R.IC.niaht, W .... and Salaries in the United ltiydom, 
1920-1938(Cambridll,1953),p.27. 
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Special Areas, it seems that a figure around £2.75 will be sufficiently 
accurate. 11 
h is more difficult to determine. At the rates of benefit prevailing 
from October 31 1935 to March 30 1938, an unemployed man with a wife and 
child would receive £1.45 per week in benefits. 12 However, only about 
80 per cent of the unemployed received benefit of any sort and so this 
figure overstates the loss of income from unemployment benefits that the 
typical individual experienced on moving from unemployment to employment. 
With the assumption of a total family size of 313 (an unemployed male, 
dependant wife and child), and a coverage of exactly 80 per cent of the 
unemployed by the insurance system, this loss is closer to £1.16 per 
week. 14 In conjunction with y this gives an s ratio of 0.42. This is 
o 
not in accordance with a priori expectations. Fortunately, another 
avenue can be explored. 
Burns15 has detailed the annual expenditure on national insurance 
-
11. Lower wages were prevalent in the heavier industries and much new 
employment was for female labour who cODlDanded a lower wage than men. 
See A.L.Bowley,op.cit.p.5l. 
12. I.M.Burns, British Unemployment Prolrama,1920-l938 (Washington D.C., 
1941),p.368. 
13. Statistics of public assistance claiu and the number of dependents 
involved in these claim suggeltl an average family lize fallinl 
from 3.0 in 1934 to 2.4 in 1938. Conlequently, the h statiltic 
obtained in this way is bi .. ed upwardl by takinl 3.0 as fadly lize. 
Calculated from Burns.op.cit.pp.360,67. 
14. This relult. and the resultina I. are bialed upwardl .. the mean 
percentage of the unemployed aided by inlurance and lupplementary 
sYlteu for the monthl of March, June. September and December in 
the yearl 1934-8 and March 1939 il 79.5. Calculated from Burnl, 
op.cit.Appendix II,p.347. 
IS. Burns. op.cit.pp.347,61.67. 
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and supplementary systems and on public assistance and has given some 
indication of the numbers receiving benefits. If it is assumed that 
monthly expenditure is reflected by annual expenditure divided by twelve, 
it is possible to relate these expenditures to individuals in receipt of 
benefit in any of the four months March, June, September and December in 
the years 1934-8. The results can then be reduced to a weekly total. 
This procedure gives an h of £1.046 (0.0216)16 and at the 1 per cent 
level of significance h is within the range of £0.984 to £1.108. With 
the earnings rates detailed above this gives an s ratio with a range from 
0.339 to 0.443. If h is taken as 1.05 and Yo - 2.75, then s - 0.38. This 
result is in the right direction but perhaps not as low as might have 
been expected. However, the assumptions made in the process of calculation 
will have tended to bias the result away from a priori expectations. 
A further table can be ventured showing the variation in r with different 
values of s (a- 0.3). 
s r 
0.44 6.3 
0.42 6.6 
0.38 7.3 
0.34 8.2 
If the impact of out-migration on employment is judged less favourably, 
with 8 - 0.38, a must take higher values. That is:-
a r 
0.3 7.3 
0.4 5.5 
0.5 4.4 
0.6 3.7 
-
16. Standard error of mean. 
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The appropriate employment multiplier to apply to the increases in 
direct factory employment and public works employment, can be obtained by 
converting Archibald's income multiplier. The number of additional jobs 
(81) consequent on an increase in income of Yo from one man taking on 
employment is given by, 
17 
A is the local expenditure coefficient of the employed. There is also 
an offsetting loss to consider from the decline in unemployment benefit, 
if it is assumed that men move from unemployment to employment or, alterna-
tively, that there is no change in activity rates or in in-migration. This 
1 . . b Q 18 oss 1S g1ven y ~2' 
kClh 
which is 82 • 
and which becomes 82 • kss, 
, 
as s • hly • o 
81 and 82 coDbined shows the change in employment consequent upon an 
increase in earnings as a result of an increase in direct employment by 
one. Thus, the employment multiplier (k
e
) may be taken to be -
k • I + k(A~s).19 
e 
An estimate of A is required. The local expenditure coefficient of 
-
17. Thh alSumes, with Arehibald, that regional ineome has oaly to inereae 
by the average weekly earninge of labour for another to be taken into 
employment. An allowance for a profit margin would deereaee the 
denominator. 
18. 82 ie, of eourse, equal to l/r. 
19. Algregation ie neca.eary u there ie no informatioa available on 
direetional milration flowa, on chan ... in aetivity rate. or OIl the 
di.tribution of unemployment benefit. 81 and 82 eannot be applied 
.eleetively. 
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the employed is dependent upon the marginal propensities to consume ( c ), 
to import ( m ), and to be taxed ( t ), whereas that of the unemployed is 
dependent upon c and m alone. If a is unlikely to be below 0.3, then, 
because of variations in c and m, A is likely to be less than 0.3. 
However, different values cannot be given to c or m on the basis of any 
evidence and so t must be depended upon to provide an estimate of A • 
A is thus an overestimate of the true A .20 Prest's work suggested that at 
1959/60 rates, t was between 0.18 - 0.21, whereas at 1948/9 rates a figure 
of about 0.30 was found. 21 The explanation for this change was the increase 
in allowances and decrease in rates over the period. The examination of the 
structure of rates and allowances for 1938/9, 1948/9 and 1959/60 suggests 
that for the later 1930's, t lay between 0.18 and 0.30. (See Table XXXVII) 
The fact that 1938/9 had different rates and allowances to the rest of the 
1930's means that a t close to 0.30 is not favoured. (See Table XXXVIII) 
For convenience, 0.25 might be taken for t. Therefore, whilst a varies from 
0.3 to 0.6, A varies from 0.225 to 0.45. If k - 1.2 and s varies from 0.34 
to 0.44, the following range of estimates for ke results:-
a 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 
A 0.225 0.3 0.375 0.45 
a 0.44 1.11 1.15 1.19 1.22 
0.42 1.12 1.16 1.20 1.24 
0.38 1.13 1.18 1.22 1.27 
0.34 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.30 
20. Thua ke ia biaaed upwarda. But the fact that the movement over time of t 
contra.~s with the movement expected in c and m, means that the ke for 
thia reaaon is bias~d downwards. 
21. A.R.Prest.'The Sensitivity of the Yield of Perlonal Income Tax in the 
United Kingdom',Economic Journal.72(l962).592. Paymenta in respect of 
insurance contribution. are DOt considered. The fact that t for 1938/9 
cannot be determined with any certainty makes it somewhat point1esa to 
up the tax rate by what would be amal1 amounta. The net effect of thia 
omiaaion ia to bia. the resulting ke upwards. But ke ia DOt very 
sensitive to change a in t. 
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Estimates in the bottom half of the table are suggested by the discussion 
of the value of s and, therefore, the minimum employment impact of one new 
job is likely to be given by the third row of column one and the true 
impact could be somewhat in excess of that. 
If the assumptions about the movement of men from unemployment to 
employment are relaxed and the new jobs are taken by immigrants or by 
persons not previously in the labour force then there is no offsetting loss 
and ke becomes, 
or 
• 
Thus where k • 1.2 and A • 0.225, ke • 1.27 rather than 1.11 - 1.15. 
Similarly, where k • 1.2, A • 0.3, ke • 1.36. There seems some point in 
allowing for an increase in activity rates as much of the new factory 
employment was for women. 22 There was also some return migration to the 
Special Areas as a result of improving prospects and so ke might be taken 
as 1.3 and this might still be somewhat pessimistic in view of the income 
multiplier begun with. 
These estimates are belo~ e.ployment multipliers given by Greig. 23 
The latter's calculations were based on an examination of data selected for 
its high input-output li~ages. Important modifications were introduced 
22. See Chapter 7. 
23. Por a full discus8ion lee M.A.Greig,'Studies in the Theory and 
Application of Regional Multipliers', (unpublished Ph.~thesis, 
University of Stirling, 1972) and M.A. Greig, The Eeono.ic :r:act of 
the Hi hlands and Islands Davelo ment Board Inve.tment in r .herie.s 
leon e MUlt 1 .tA ••••• ment H.I.D.B.l972 • 
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into the multiplier model. The mUltiplicand was expanded to allow the 
inclusion of linkage effects. In the first-round multiplier average 
propensities were used, it being argued that if the new industry had 
not been established the new employees would not have remained unemployed 
within the area but would have moved out of it, and, that in-migration to 
the area, especially of particularly skilled labour, would increase with 
the expansion of opportunity. Public service employment was considered 
directly related to the growth of total employment. 
Should the estimates for the 1930's be raised by taking into 
consideration some of these modifications? The estimate of the employment 
multiplier is only concerned with the direct increase in employment and the 
indirect increase resulting from the increased level of local spending out 
of the income of employees in the observed new jobs. No allowance is made 
for any increase in direct and indirect employment as a result of increased 
demand for non-labour inputs. Neither is any allowance made for any 
increase in employment as a result of increased output. This is because 
such a path cannot be followed without great difficulty when the consequences 
of a number of new jobs in different establishments rather than the 
f •• d 24 consequences 0 one new factory 1S exam1ne • It was not possible, 
therefore, to determine the proportion of increased inputs attributable to 
-
24. A back projection of input-output tables would be necessary. The number 
of branch plants might be an alternative guide to the strength of within 
region linkages. The Board of Trade data shows that branch plants were 
let up in the Special Areas as follows: 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
Scotland North East South Wales West Cumberland 
o 
1 
o 
1 
7 
o 
o 
1 
2 
4 
o 
o 
o 
2 
1 
1 
o 
o 
o 
o 
Calculated from Board of Trade, Annual Survey. of Industrial » ... lop!!Dt, 
1934-8. 
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the increase in direct employment. Indeed, the demand for inputs may not 
have changed. Similar comments are applicable to the consideration of 
increased forward linkages. The true multiplicands might be more than is 
represented by the local expenditure coefficient of increased wages from 
the new employment. Another reason for failing to cover this ground is the 
nature of the direct employment estimates in factories and on public works 
schemes. There is a distinct possibility of considerable double-counting 
taking place as some of the observed increase in employment may have been 
due to the linkage effects of some other observed increase in employment. 
Only the impact of wages can safely be followed through the process of income 
and employment generation. 
Some modification in respect of average propensities seems justified 
if 'move-industry' policy and transference conflict. If new industry 
discourages out-migration then the introduction of new employment will 
result in some of the potential migrants .. ying within the region. 
Public service employment would have been unlikely to expand in the 
Special Areas as a result of an increase in direct employment in another 
sector. Social capital was often alleged to be under-utilised25 and labour 
is likely to have been underemployed on such capital. There would have been 
no induced employment on new investment nor an increase in employment on 
existing capital. 
-
25. supra,Chapter 5. 
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Whether the multiplier model is adjusted or not, the income multiplier 
which forms the basis of the earlier calculations of ke might be too 
pessimistic. If k = 1.3 then k ranges from 1.12 to 1.32. k· 1.4 gives 
e 
ke between 1.13 and 1.34 and k • 1.5 gives ke from 1.14 to 1.37. It seems, 
therefore, that the range 1.3 to 1.4 might be a better approximation than 1.3. 
How reasonable are the results obtained? Historical ke were expected 
to be higher than present ke as a result of changes in the governing 
propensities. t has changed with the result that regional multipliers are 
now likely to be higher. In contrast, communications have improved and the 
structure and composition of industry is such that increased regional trade 
might be expected. The areas that are being considered might now be more 
dependent upon imported goods than in the late 1930's. ke would be higher 
in the past than now. Changes in c also suggest higher ke in the past. The 
resultant estimates are not as high as this reasoning suggests as Archibald's 
pessimistic income multiplier has been used as the basis of the estimates 
and his estimate of local value added has formed the basis of the estimates 
of a and A • 
However, in order that the most is made of the contributions of new 
employment to the reduction of unemployment in the Special Areas a large 
value of ke is taken to estimate the direct and indirect employment in the 
years from 1934. Likewise, so that the contribution of transference is 
minimized a low value of r is used. ke • 1.35 and r • 5. 
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Finally, although the same ke is applied in the main text of the 
chapter to both types of direct employment, it is likely that the resulting 
estimate of employment is overstated in the case of increases in public 
works employment as there will be little, if any, increase in permanent 
26 
employment as a result. An understatement might be the product of 
applying ke to increases in direct factory employment. 
-
26. The obvious exception is where the construction work is the establi.hment 
of an industrial site or trading estate. But this impact is not overlooked 
in the aggregated figures of employment in both public works and new 
factories. 
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Table XXXVII 
Taxation in the U.K. 1938/9, 1948/9, 1959/60 
RATES OF TAX 
Lowest reduced rate 
Middle reduced rate 
Highest reduced rate 
Standard Rate 
Surtax 
MAIN ALLOWANCES 
Income Tax 
Personal (single) 
Personal (married) 
Children 
Earned income relief 
SUrtax 
1938/9 1948/9 
1/8 in £ 3/- in £ 
(on first £135) (on first £50) 
5/6 in £ 
1/3 to 9/6 
(on incomes 
over £2000) 
£100 
£180 
£ 60 
6/- in £ 
(next £200) 
9/- in £ 
2/- to 10/6 
(on incomes 
over £2000) 
£110 
£180 
£ 60 
1/5 (on first (300) 1/5 (on first 
£400) 
Nil Nil 
1959/60 
1/9 in £ 
(on first £60) 
4/3 in £ 
(next £150) 
6/3 in £ 
(next (150) 
7/9 in £ 
2/- to 10/-
(on incomes 
over (2000) 
£140 
£240 
£100-£150 
. 2/9 (OIl tirst 
(4005) 
1/9 (O'D. next 
(5940) 
Excess of 
personal and 
children's 
allowances>£14O 
Source: Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland Revenue for the 
year ended 31st March 1961. Hundred and Fourth Report (Parl.Papers, 
1961-2,XVII), Tables 24,75; A.R.Prest,'The Sensitivity of the Yield 
of Personal Income Tax in the United Kingdom', Economic Journal,72 
(1962), 593. 
Table XXXVIII 
laxation in the U.K. 1934/5 - 1938/9 
RATES OF TAX 
Lowest reduced rate 
Standard rate 
Surtax 
MAIN ALLOWANCES 
Income Tax 
Personal (single) 
Personal (married) 
Children 
each subsequent 
child 
Earned income relief 
Surtax 
1934/5 1935/6 1936/7 1937/8 1938/9 
2/3 in £ 1/6 in £ 1/7 in £ 1/8 in £ 1/8 in £ 
(on first (on first {on first (on first (on first 
(175) (135) (135) (135) (135) 
4/6 4/6 4/9 5/-
1 
l/l~d. to 8/3 on incomes over £2000 
(1934/5 - 1937/8) 
£150 
£ 50 
£ 40 
£100 
£170 
£ 50 
(all years) 
£180 
£ 60 
£180 
£ 60 
1/5 on first £300 (all years) 
Nil (all years) 
5/6 
1/3 to 9/6 
on incomes 
over £2000 
£180 
£ 60 
SOUrce: Eighty-Second Report of the Commissioners of His Majesty's Inland 
Revenue for the year ended 31st March 1939 (P.P.,1938-9,XII), 
Tables 38,54; Report of the Commissioners of Her Majesty's Inland 
Revenue for the year ended 31st March 1961. Hundred and Fourth Report 
(P.P.,1961-2,XVII), Tables 24,75. 
APPENDIX 3 
A Regression Analysis of the Impact of Regional Policy on the Special Areas, 
1934-1938 
To test the impact of regional policy on variations in Special Areas 
unemployment it was necessary, given the small number of observations 
available, to combine the effects of employment policy and transference in a 
single indicator. The expected relation between unemployment and new 
employment was negative. As employment increased, so unemployment should 
decrease. This was also true of transference and so it was possible to 
obtain an indicator by addition of the two series. The expected relation 
between unemployment and the policy variable was negative. Where net 
migration was used as an indicator of the effects of transference policy, 
as in Scotland, a positive relationship was expected between unemployment 
and net migration. Consequently, the computation of a series indicating 
the overall short-term impact ~f policy involved changing the signs of the 
net migration series and adding this and the employment series. The expected 
relation between this policy series and unemployment was negative. 
A regression of the form, 
• a + 
Was run, where 
+ + E. 1 
Yli • Special Areas unemployment in the i'th year, 
X2i • Unemployment in Great Britain minus Special Areas 
unemployment in the i'th year, 
X3i • Regional Policy variable in the i'th year, 
and E. • Error term. 1 
The results are presented in Tables XXXIX and XL. The Scottish results 
use net migration and net migration adjusted for wastage and multiplier 
effects in the regional policy indicator. The available transference data 
was insufficient to be included in the analysis. The signs of the 
coefficients are correct throughout, although the standard errors are 
uncomfortably high. Collinearity is a problem in both equations. l The 
change in R2 suggests that the policy variable was of the greatest 
importance in the two equations. However, given the small number of 
observations, none of the coefficients nor the overall fit of any of the 
equations was statistically significant. 
The best results for England and Wales appear to be for equations I 
and 2 where transference and transference adjusted for wastage and multi-
plier effects are used in the compilation of the regional policy series. 
R2 is high and the contribution of the policy variable to the explanation 
of variations in the dependent variable is high. However, the sign of the 
national unemployment variable is incorrect. The other equations are less 
good. The signs are in some cases correct, but in all the standard errors 
are large. This is explained by collinearity in the independent variables, 
1. A relationship between the policy variable and national unemployment 
is unfortunate, although not unexpected. Given a low level of national 
unemployment, out-migration from areas with relatively high unemployment 
will increase. Purther, as employment increases nationally so unemployment 
will decline. Even though the Special Areas' weighting in the national 
statistics is small, this relationship may also be reflected. The simple 
correlation between national unemployment and the two policy indicators 
in Scotland were 0.58 and 0.49. 
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b1 .• 2 2 a pro em not overcome ln equatlons 1 and • Again the relationships 
described are not statistically significant. 
To overcome the limitation of a small number of observations it was 
decided to pool the data for England, Wales and Scotland and re-run the 
regressions. This was possible in those cases where net migration and 
adjusted net migration were used in the compilation of the regional 
policy variable. These results are shown in Table XLI. As expec~ed, 
the overall fit of the equations became significant, although only the 
policy variable amongst the independent variables was also significant. 
However, the results were not satisfactory. Despite the high R2 and 
the importance of the policy variable in contributing to a high R2, 
the sign of the policy variable was incorrect. Co1linearity remained 
a problem and in equation 2 resulted in the mean square of the residuals 
increasing with the inclusion of the X2 variable in the equation. 
The relative impact of the two components of policy was examined 
on the same lines. The data of Table XXXIV in the text suggested that 
transference was a more effective policy weapon than employment policies, 
even after the wastage from transference and multiplier effects had been 
allowed for. The question remains, how close was the relationship between 
changes in unemployment and the different policy instruments. An attempt 
was made to answer this question by running a regression of Special Areas 
unemployment on a number of explanatory variables. 
-
2. Again a relationship between national unemployment and the policy 
variable is to be expected. The simple correlation between national 
unemployment and the policy indicators in England and Wales were 
-0.83, -0.65, -0.86 and -0.92. 
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The data was run with a linear model of the form, 
-
Special Areas unemployment in the i'th year, 
X2i - an aggregate of new factory employment, public works 
employment and the consequent indirect employment in 
the i'th year, 
X3i - an indicator of transference policy in the i'th year, 
and E. 
1 - Error term. 
The results are shown in Tables XLII and XLIll' for Scotland and England 
and Wales respectively. R2 is high in both sets of results and suggests 
a good level of explanation. In Table XLII, however, the signs of the 
transference indicator are incorrect and for both independent variables 
the standard error of the regression coefficients are high. Neither 
equation has a statistically significant fit, probably because of the 
small n. The results for England and Wales were more satisfactory, although 
still not statistically significant. The signs of the regression 
coefficients are correct throughout, although the size of the standard 
errors makes it 
Contribution of 
difficult to accept the sign of the X3 variable. The 
2 the X3 variable to the chanle in R is small, in contrast 
with the Scottish data, and the inclusion of this variable in the 
equation resulted in the precision of the estimates declining in all 
four equations. 
The data was again pooled in an attempt to obtain statistically 
aignificant reaults. Table XLtV contains thi. information and shows that 
the tranlference variable (X3) and the overall fit of the equations is 
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significant. However, coliinearity is again a difficulty and the signs 
of all the regression coefficients are wrong. 
What conclusions can be drawn from this exercise? Although the 
level of explanation is high throughout the analysis, the null hypothesis 
of no relation between Yl ,X2 and X3 cannot be rejected except when the 
data is pooled. In these cases, the signs of the X3 variable are incorrect 
indicating that policy was operating to increase regional unemployment 
and that both of the componenta_of policy were contributing to this 
apparent malfunctioning of policy. However, this conclusion may be 
spurious. The dissimilarity of the different specified relationships 
in England and Wales, and Scotland, makes it different to draw general 
1 . 3 Cone US10ns. There is also the possibility that the incorrect specification 
of lags in the interaction of the transference variable and the dependent 
variable resulted in perverse relationships.4 The inability to measure 
transference in Scotland was another limitation on the analysis. The 
principal limitation, however, was the shortage of observations. S As a 
Consequence, the results for the Special Areas of England and Wales and 
of Scotland were not significant. 6 
-
3. For example, Special Areas unemployment and the transference variable 
were dissimilarly related in England and Wales, and Scotland. The partial 
correlation coefficients, controlling for the employment variable, were 
0.49 and 0.49 for the English and Welsh data of net migration and adjusted 
net migration. In Scotland, the coefficients were respectively -0.88 
and -0.88. The pooled data result was -0.77 and -0.77. 
4. This possibility was previously noted in Chapter 5. 
5. As a result, a test could not be made for autocorrelation in the 
residuals. 
6. The possibility of contradiction in the direction of operation of policy 
instruments on unemployment could not be judged. The simple correlation 
coefficients did suggest that policy instruments were contradictory in 
Scotland, but not in England and Wales. But these observations lacked 
significance. 
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Table XXXIX 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on a Regional 
Policy variable and an indicator of National Unemployment. Scotland, 
1935-1938 
Independen t Constant Regression ~an!e R2 
Variable Coefficient 1n R 
(1) X2 0.08(0.04) 0.31 
X3 - 3.52(2.10) 0.51 0.82 
- 47546.63 
(2) X2 0.07(O.O3} 0.32 
X3 - 3.96(1.68) 0.58 0.90 
- 34649.46 
The transference component of the Regional Policy variable 
(X3) is represented by net migration for calendar years (1) and net 
migration adjusted for wastage and multiplier effects (2). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
All equations are insignificant at the 5 per cent level. 
n 
4 
4 
Table XL 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on a Regional Policy variable 
and an indicator of National Unemployment. England and Wales, 1935-1938 
Independent Constant Regression Cha;!e in 
Variable Coefficient R2 n 
(1) X2 -0.55(0.22) 0.49 
X3 -12.74(3.70) 0.43 0.92 4 
1614726.79 
(2) X2 -0.29(0.15) 0.25 
X3 -12.71(3.49) 0.68 0.93 4 
1100769.28 
(3) X2 0.70(0.43) 0.66 
X3 4.51{2.65) 0.09 0 0 75 4 
-1062496.58 
(4) X2 0.90(0.69) 0.61 
X3 10.52(8.08) 0.03 0 0 64 4 
-1542933.56 
The transference component of the Regional Policy variable 
(X3) is represented by transference (1), transference adjusted for 
wastage and multiplier effects (2), net migration for calendar years 
(3) , net migration adjusted for wastage and multiplier effects (4). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
All equations are insignificant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table XL! 
lhe Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on a Regional 
Policy variable and an indicator of National Unemployment. England, 
Ra1es and Scotland, 1935-1938 
Independent Constant 
Variable 
X2 
(1) X3 
-244448.48 
(2) 
-231619.17 
Regression 
Coefficient 
0.18(0.18) 
3.54(0.73) 
0.17(0.18) 
5.33(1.12) 
Change R2 n 
. R2 1n 
0.02 
0.88 0.90 8 
0.02 
0.88 0.90 8 
The transference component of the Regional Policy variable (X3) 
is represented by net migration for calendar years (1) and net migration 
adjusted for wastage and multiplier effects (2). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Both equations are significant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table XLII 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on Different Regional 
Policy instruments, Scotland, 1935-1938 
Independent Constant Regression Change 
R2 Variable Coefficient in R2 n 
(1) X2 - 4.08(2.05) 0.34 
X3 - 7.29(3.94) 0.51 0.85 4 
97624.47 
(2) X2 - 4.08(2.05) 0.34 
X3 -13.02 (7.04) 0.51 0.85 4 
97631.02 
The transference variable (X3) is represented by net migration 
for calendar years (1) and net migration adjusted for wastage and 
multiplier effects (2). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
All equations are insignificant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table XLIII 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on Different Regional 
Policy instruments. England and Wales, 1935-1938 
Independent Constant Regression Change 
R2 Variable Coefficient in R2 n 
(1) X2 -12.69(3.25) 0.93 
X3 - 0.80(2.34) 0.01 0.94 4 
526219.47 
(2) X2 -12.69(3.25) 0.93 
X3 - 1.42(4.16) 0.01 0.94 4 
526216.95 
(3) X2 -13.93(3.66) 0.93 
X3 0.40(0.68) 0.02 0.95 4 
549371.51 
(4) X2 -13.93(3.66) 0.93 
X3 0.68(1.21) 0.02 0.95 4 
54937a.57 
The transference variable (X3) is represented by transference (1). 
transference adjusted for wastage and multiplier effects (2). net migration 
for calendar years (3) and net migration adjusted for wastage and multiplier 
effects (4). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
All equations are insignificant at the 5 per cent level. 
Table XLIV 
The Regression of Special Areas Unemployment on Different 
Regional Policy instruments, England, Wales and Scotland, 1935-1938 
Independent 
Variable 
X2 
(1) 
X3 
(2) 
Constant 
58166.52 
58168.05 
Regression 
Coefficient 
4.02(3.30) 
-2.64(0.99) 
4.02 (3.30) 
-4.72 (1. 78) 
Change R2 n 
• R2 ln 
0.03 
0.85 0.88 8 
0.03 
0.85 0.88 8 
The transference variable (X3) is represented by net migration 
for calendar years (1) and net migration adjusted for wastage and 
multiplier effects (2). 
Standard errors in brackets. 
Both equations significant at the 5 per cent level. 
APPENDIX 4 
Net Migration, Direct Factory Employment and Unemployment for Certain Towns 
in the Special Areas, 1934-1938 
Direct Unemployment 
Change in Unemployment Net Migration Factory 
Employment No. % 
West Cumberland Special Area 
Whitehaven 
-61 225 2137 28.3 
1469 -261 2076 27.1 
-1500 -725 3545 46.4 
-649 -135 2045 28.2 
72 -90 1396 19.5 
Maryport 
84 -209 99 1926 57.5 
-239 -206 2010 58.6 
-377 -342 1771 50.9 
-214 -219 1394 41.5 
-310 -85 1180 37.1 
North East Coast Special Area 
Crook 
-129 -149 3769 38.7 
~297 -169 3640 37.8 
-934 -8149b 3343 36.1 
223 -419b 2409 25.9 
-838 -457 99 2632 28.7 
Spennymoor 
232 -164 3367 30.5 
-202 -410 3599 32.6 
-1129 2977b 3397 29.9 
-103 -264b 2268 20.6 
351 -406 2165 20.2 
Bishop Auckland 
-668 42 5999 52.9 
-358 303 5331 49.0 
-1199 17409b 4973 48.0 
-365 -429b 3774 35.5 
-80 -481 198 3409 31.8 
Gateahead 
109 -2410 - 11848 40.7 
-2422 -2708b 11957 42.4 
-2542 -7431b 9535 36.2 
27 -1100 298 6993 26.6 
-508 -939 793 7020 26.0 
Direct Unemployment 
Change in Unemployment Net Migration Factory 
Employment No. % 
Sunderland 
-3433 -2896 99 28522 47.3 
-4599 -2201b 25089 42.8 
-6517 -2432b 20490 35.4 
284 -1617 198 13973 24.0 
92 -941 496 14257 24.4 
Consett 
-9 -56 1163 8.4 
-94 194 1154 8.0 
-366 18286b 1060 7.3 
531 -187b 199 694 4.6 
-352 -245 1225 8.0 
Seaham Harbour 
-417 -559 3253 22.1 
-333 -585 199 2836 20.0 
-1104 7185b 2503 17 .5 
-211 
-523b 1399 10.1 
-46 -241 1188 8.7 
South Wales Special Area 
Ebbw Vale 
-1452 -689 4806 48.4 
-445 -465 3354 34.4 
-1647 -149 2909 30.4 
310 -240 299 1262 12.9 
-462 -209 1572 12.1 
Brynmawral 
-341 -144 2119 74.6 
190 -104 1778 65.6 
-840 -206 1968 75.7 
-3 -68 1128 43.2 
-95 -94 1125 55.7 
al A furniture factory and a boot manufacturer were let up in 1937 and 1938 
respectively but are not included in the Board of Trade data (lee infra, 
(i». Final Report of the commilsioner for the Special Areas (England 
and Wales) (P.P., 1938-9,111), para.382. 
Direct Unemployment 
Change in Unemployment Net Migration Factory 
Employment No. % 
B1ainac/ 
-640 -358 2348 87.6 
13 -310 1708 58.9 
-736 -488 1721 60.4 
-47 -203 985 36.2 
n.a. -41 938 57.2 
Pontypoo1 
-952 26528b 5807 41.6 
-562 -905 4855 35.0 
-1064 -946 4293 31.2 
745 -502 3229 23.9 
-2231 -65 199 3974 31.0 
B1aenavon 
616 -192 920 24.4 
-294 -299 1536 40.0 
-398 -294 1242 34.8 
23 -112 844 24.4 
-362 -86 99 867 25.2 
Merthyr Tydfil 
-3020 
-1541 14235 65.6 
-468 -1580 11215 52.9 
-2731 -2393 10747 51.3 
-14 -978 8016 40.2 
-1356 -798 199 8002 43.3 
Pontypridde/ 
520 -982 6654 52.6 
-805 -1287 7174 56.4 
-1997 -1114 6369 51.7 
-146 -505 596 4372 36.1 
-973 -376 1189 4226 36.0 
Aberdare 
-674 .. 940 6772 50.2 
-236 -1221 6098 45.1 
-2741 .. 1363 5862 45.3 
180 -437 3121 24.4 
-379 ... 369 299 3301 26.2 
c/ The Net Migration .erie. refer. to Nantyg10 and B1aina. 
e/ The Direct Factory Employment .erie. include. the Treforeat Trading 
Eatate. 
Direct Unemployment 
Change in Unemployment Net Migration Factory 
Employment No. % 
Moun tain Ash 
297 -879 4667 42.2 
1305 -1510 4964 45.5 
-4309 -1359 6269 63.2 
840 -471 1960 21.4 
-1192 -719 2800 31.6 
Scottish Special Area 
Dumbarton 
119 -36 199 2250 36.1 
-847 -371 2369 33.5 
-530 -11 1522 21.4 
107 349 992 13.0 
-170 254 299 1099 14.6 
Hamilton 
-644 -293b 99 5934 33.6 
-360 -331 5290 30.9 
-917 135 99 4930 30.1 
-99 -10Sh 4013 24.8 
-204 -533 99 3914 24.4 
Motherwel1 and Wishaw 
-627 -383 99 12203 n. a. 
-1963 -278 99 11576 n.a. 
-2707 402 9613 n.a. 
708 -236 6906 n.a. 
-782 -44 7614 D.a. 
Coatbridge 
-753 -214 6108 36.4 
-894 -710 5355 31.5 
-1112 658 4461 26.1 
1372 176 198 3349 19.3 
-1336 -302 4721 26.3 
Direct Unemployment 
Change in Unemployment Net Migration Factory 
Employment No. % 
Airdrie 
-439 
-30 4952 42.4 
-656 -387 4513 39.8 
-719 1063b 99 3857 34.9 
459 34 3138 28.4 
-523 
-114 3597 33.4 
C1ydebank 
-412 -465 6212 26.8 
-1819 -948 5800 23.9 
-1776 -358 99 3981 17.6 
24 -145b 2205 10.1 
-281 -128 2229 9.4 
Paisley 
-35 261 6127 18.3 
-1179 384 6092 18.6 
-1246 322 99 4913 15.0 
1132 -184 198 3667 11.4 
-922 344 693 4799 15.0 
Barrhead 
229 3 1375 24.5 
-624 
-52 1604 28.7 
-242 
-65 980 17 .5 
576 -318 738 13.0 
-395 -46 99 1314 22.9 
Lin1ithgow 
20 -8 523 26.7 
':'7 
-169 543 27.4 
-125 19 526 25.4 
-205 29 499 411 2l.5 
-23 -30 206 10.3 
(i) The Direct Factory Employment data was derived from the Board of 
Trade, Annual Surveys of Industrial Development, 1934-8. 
(ii) Are .. covered are local authority areas in the case of miaration data 
and Ministry of Labour local office areas in the case of unemployment. 
(iii) Net Miaration is for mid-year period. and allow. for boundary 
chanae., (b). Calculated from data in the Stati.tical Review. of 
the Registrar-General for England and Wale. and the Annual Report. 
of the Reaistrar-General for Scotland. 
(iv) Direct Factory Employment i. a maximum estimate. 
(v) Unemployment. The percentaae. are from the Miniltry of Labour'. 
Local Une!DPloyment Index. The numbers unemployed are derived frOll 
the .ama source on the basia of the aiven percenta .. of the nUllllbera 
of in.ured population in the previoUi July. The percent .... shown 
are for June of each year. Until 1937, the numbers us.d to calculate 
(v) continued 
percentages unemployed were the total on the register aged 
fourteen and over, as a percentage of the insured population. The 
insured unemployed was used from 1937. 
CHAPTER 8 
Stewarts & Lloyds, Ltd. and Richard Thomas & Co. Ltd.: A Study of 
Location in the Iron and Steel Industry. 
This chapter digresses from the macro-economic standpoint that 
has been taken in the preceding chapters of this thesis and introduces 
an inductive micro-economic approach. From an exaudnation of two 
cases of changing locations in the iron and steel industry it is 
demonstrated that regional policy underwent a change in emphasis 
in the 1930's from transference to a 'move-industry' policy. This 
chapter also highlights the problems of government intervention in 
industrial location if the industry is not 'footloose' and shows 
the associated problems of locating industry by purely social criteria. 
In contrast, the 'non-interventionist' case, where location decisions 
are left to the industrialist but labour mobility encouraged, 
demonstrates the problems of areas losing and gaining population as 
a result of industrial movement. 
I 
In the early 1930's the British tinplate industry was suffering 
from an excess of capacity in relation to current and foreseeable 
demand. A system of production quotas existed which spread the limited 
demand through the existing plant and prevented anyone works operating 
to capacity. It was impossible to reap the economies of scale secured 
through capacity production. The competitive position of the 
British industry was declining; it was unable to sell its 
product at profitable prices and its technical equipment was 
becoming obsolete, whilst an absence of profits hampered the 
setting aside of funds to allow for depreciation. 
The industry needed new investment if it were to survive. 
Meanwhile, there was the American example of the continuous wide 
strip mill for the manufacture of sheet and tinplate. If this 
example could be followed the basis of the British industry 
might be improved, but even more than the existing equipment, such 
a plant needed to be working at full capacity to justify its high 
capital costs. Sir William Firth, chairman of Richard Thomas & Co., 
proposed that the industry cooperate in building such a mill. 
But there were too many small units in the industry to make such 
a course possible, and so Firth began to prepare the way for 
Richard Thomas & Co. to 'go it alone,.l Steps were taken to eliminate 
some of the industry's excess capacity and thereby increase the quota 
allowed to the firm. From 1932-6 the company acquired 61 tinplate 
1. W.E.Minchinton, The British Tin late Indult :A Rilto 
(Oxford.1957). pp.19 -200; J.C.Carr and W.Tapl n. H ItOry 
of the Britilh Steel Industry (Oxford,l962). Chapter XLV. 
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mills and 19 sheet mills, preferring this method to the cut and thrust 
of competition. 
Certain economies of operation could be gained with the building 
of an integrated plant with coke ovens, blast furnaces, steel 
furnaces and ancillary equipment on the same site as the rolling and 
finishing processes. The other influences on costs were the transport 
of raw materials and finished products. It was with these considerations 
in mind, and with the examples of Stewarts & Lloyds at Corby and the 
deliberations of United Steel on extensions at their Appleby-
Frodingham plant, that Sir William Firth announced the company's 
2 plans. He proposed the erection of a modern strip mill at the 
Redbourn works (Lincs.) that would be capable of producing 150,000 
tons of tinplate and sheets per annum at a saving of £200,000. The 
Redbourn property offered a particularly favourable site for such 
a plant as it had available suitable buildings and space and an 
adequate supply of cheap ore suitable for producing the necessary 
high grade steel. The estimate of saving was given on the basis 
of the supposition that demand would not increase, and that some 
Welsh plant would have to be closed down. Sir William regretted 
that the same low production cost could not be attained in Wales. 3 
2. Minchinton, op.cit.pp.20l-2. The case of Stewart'~ & Lloyds is 
discussed in the second •• ction of this chapter. 
3. The Times, 16 July 1935. 
Thus, it seemed that the earlier pattern of Stewarts & Lloyds 
development at Corby was to be imitated, South Wales to be the 
area to suffer as a consequence. Nothing was said, however, of 
transferring labour from Wales to Lincolnshire to work on the new 
plant. 
The prospect of this re-location of the tinplate history was 
far from welcomed in south Wales, especially in the Swansea district 
where the industry had, until then, been centred. The Lord Mayor of 
Cardiff "hoped Cardiff and Swansea would fight against the transfer of 
the works • • • The transference of the industry might leave the Welsh 
area affected derelict.,,4 A meeting of delegates of tinplate workers 
adopted a resoltuion at a Swansea meeting asking the Government to 
set up an inquiry into the proposed moveS and the Mayor of Llanelly, 
regretting the company's proposals, considered Llanelly "quite 
capable of absorbing the wholemdustry".6 The Government's 
standpoint was unclear. Special Area policy was still in its formative 
stages in mid-1935, only having been operative for six months, and 
there was some confusion over the course to be followed when such 
situations arose. The Commissioner's First Report, published almost 
simultaneously with Richard Thomas & Co.'s announcement, argued for the 
economic location of the iron and steel industry but insisted that workers 
needed to be protected from a life of idleness in potentially derelict 
4. ibid. 13 July 1935. 
5. ibid. 15 July 1935. 
6. ibid. 16 July 1935. 
~l 
7 
areas. Conflicting policy aims had not yet been reconciled. 
Meanwhile, opposition to the movement continued. A sustained 
campaign of opposition was to have some results. On October 23 1935 
the President of the Board of Trade and the Minister of Labour 
received a joint deputation from commercial, trading and industrial 
interests of Monmouthshire urging the Government to take immediate steps 
to reopen the Ebbw Vale steelworks that had been closed for six 
years and had formerly employed 6,000 men. A petition with forty 
8 thousand signatures was presented. But steps had already been 
taken. On 31 October 1935, Sir John Benyon, chairman of the 
Ebbw Vale Stee~. Iron & Coal Co., announced that negotiations for 
the acquisition of the Eb~ Vale steelworks by Richard Thomas & 
9 Co. Ltd., had reached an advanced stage. The acquisition of the 
Ebbw Vale works was to make the building of the Lincolnshire works 
unnecessary. The Commissioner for the Special Areas had taken an 
active interest in the reopening of the works and had had a ahare 
in the discussions. 
It might seem that Richard Thomas & Co., had been forced to 
change their original plans in response to public pressure. Indeed, 
7. Firat Report of the Commissioner for the Special Areal (England 
& Wales) (ParI. Papers. 1934-5,1), para. 191-2. 
8. The Time., 22 Oct.1935. 
9. ibid. 31 Oct.1935. 
Baldwin claimed personal responsibility for the change in a speech at 
Newcastle. IO But it was Firth who approached the Commissioner for the 
Special Areas with the suggestion that Ebbw Vale might be bought. 11 
Further, although there were particular disadvantages associated with 
the Ebbw Vale site in contrast to other possible locations within 
south Wales, the labour demands of the new plant could not have been 
met in Lincolnshire. Finally, Firth later claimed that the Redbourn 
announcement had merely been a feint to discourage potential 
competitors. 12 It demonstrated that Richard Thomas were prepared 
to produce tinplate outside of south Wales. 
But this later rationalization of the change of course ought 
not to be taken too literally. At first Richard Thomas suggested a 
Lincolnshire location and then Ebbw Vale. Were Richard Thomas really 
prepared to sacrifice the economic advantages of a midlands location, 
in return for an increased sense of public responsibility? My 
opinion is that there were not, and that they were pUlhed to 
Ebbw Vale. 13 
10. ibid. 13 Nov.1935. 
11. see Second Report of the comadssioner for the Special Areas 
(England and WalesX P.P., 1935-6, XIII), para 19-27; Minchinton, 
op.cit.p. 204; Carr and Taplin, op.cit.p.545. 
12. Carr and Taplin, op.cit.p.S45 
13. Certain factors support this conclusion: the continuina efforts 
to expand in the east Midlands; the choice of Ebbw Vale rather 
that a more suitable Welsh site; the readinels of the Government 
to provide financial support when the company experienced later 
difficulties1 
On 4 April 1936 The Times announced proposals of Richard Thomas 
to establish a strip tinplate mill at another site far from Wales 
at Irth1ingborough, about 12 miles from corby.14 This again 
reflected the company's desire to expand at a low-cost 10cation. 15 
In a speech at Swansea on 26 May, Firth made his position clear. 
"It would be absurd and against national interests to 
build modern works in South Wales. Northamptonshire 
and Lincolnshire were undoubtedly the natural centres 
for the economic production of British steel • • • 
Welshmen must be prepared to live where production 
could be most economically effected rather than 
protest that where they lived was where employment 
should be provided." 16 
F h ••• 1 d 17 urt er cr1t1c1sm resu te • However, the Irth1ingborough proposals 
never got off the ground. A Times editorial put the events in their 
social context. 
"Some may still argue that such a mill should on 
strictly economic grounds be placed where originally 
proposed, in Lincolnshire; alternatively, if a Welsh 
site was essential on social grounds, that it should 
be placed at a port rather than at the head of a 
valley. But even economists of the strictest sect 
will rejoice that so depressed a communlty is once 
more to be turned to creative activity." 18 
Site problems, changing plans and increasing capacity were 
leading to growing delays and increasing costs. Some were becoming 
sceptical of the company's prospects. The Economist noted that 
productive capacity in the tinplate industry was large in proportion 
14. The Times, 4 April 1936 
15. The Radbourn Wort. were ultimately modernized in conjunction with 
the Ebbw Vale reconstruction. 
16. The Times, 27 May 1936 
17. See, for example, Banaard(Commona) 5th aer.3l4,2173-5, 15 July 1936. 
18. The Timea, 25 Sept.1936 
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to present or prospective demands. Further, the construction of 
the strip mill was a costly process, and a large annual output 
would be required to offset these construction costs with efficient 
production. The ambitious investment programme would require a 
heavy capitalization and yet liquid assets were at a low ebb. 19 
There was engendered an unwillingness to invest at the same time 
that the company required increased funds. A debenture issue in 
early 1937 was described as an "indifferent success" and the 
opportunity was taken to reiterate the doubts about the company's 
.. 20 pos1t10n. 
By the end of April 1938 the cash resources of the company 
were exhausted and bank credit had been depleted. Issue was ruled out 
b~~he standing of the company on the stock market. The cessation 
of work at Ebbw Vale was only prevented by an arrangement under 
which temporary finance for immediate capital requirements was 
provided on the condition that a suitable inquiry was made into 
the prospects and financial needs of the company. This was carried 
out by the Chairman of the Lancashire Steel Corporation and, 
simultaneously, the British Iron and Steel Federation examined the 
position, advising the deputy governor of the Bank of England that 
Ebbw Vale's completion was in the national interelt.2l The Times 
reported that a total of £6 million would be required to complete 
the new works and to provide the company with adequate working capital. 
19. The Economilt, 21 Nov.1936 
20. ibid. 30 Jan.1937 
21. The Times, 5 July 1938; Carr and Taplin, op.cit.p.547 
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This: amount covered an extension of the original plans, which, by 
further reducing operating costs, would compensate for the immediate 
inflation of capital requirements. The new capital was to be provided 
by the joint stock banks and certain banking houses headed by the 
Bank of England and whilst the stock was outstanding control of the 
company was to be vested in a committee consisting of the Governor 
of the Bank of England, the chairman of the company, a representative 
of the steel industry and a nominee of the debenture holders. Three 
leading steel chairmen were to be added to this combination to 
22 
"strengthen" the board. 
Sir William Firth detailed the reasons necessitating financial 
assistance and public control of the company at the 1938 Annual 
Meeting. He argued that Ebbw Vale was a favourable site because of 
the proximity of cheap coking coal and its situation both for export 
and inland distribution. In time of national emergency it was less 
vulnerable than the east coast. Good offices, houses and labour were 
available and theccost of demolition had been partially offset by the 
scrap recovered. 23 However, the timing of the project had been 
unfortunate. Government intervention to re-Iocate the proposed strip 
mill from Lincolnshire to Ebbw Vale resulted in some delay whilst plans 
were adjusted, and the company itself spent a considerable time modifying 
22. The Times, 5 July 1938. 
23. ibid. 29 July 1938. Some of these arguments may be questioned. 
For example, Ebbw Vale, an inland hill-site, wa. not favourably 
situated with reaard to the .upply of ore or tbe di.tribution 
of its product. Further, low inter-departmental transfer cost. 
were not a feature peculiar to an integrated plant at Ebbw Vale. 
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and extending the proposals for the Ebbw Vale site. 
"What happened". Firth continued. "was that insufficient 
margin was allowed for wage increases that have taken 
place • • • insufficient provision was made for unfore-
seen site difficulties •• insufficient allowance was 
made for the advance in the prices of structural steel 
and machinery. and no allowance was made • • for the 
abnormal d~lays we have experienced in obtaining 
delivery." Another difficulty was the absence of 
experience of our contractors in the2Soundation work necessary for the strip mill plant." 
In addition to these underestimates due to increased costs there was a 
further £1.500.000 which was a p~oduct of extensions in scale of the 
26 
original plans. As implied earlier. however, it was deceptive of Firth 
to distinguish between these two components of increased costs as the 
delay caused by the latter component contributed towards the increase in 
the former and, besides, allowance ought to have been made for some of the 
increases which Firth seemed to regard as largely products of fate. Cost 
estimates should have been revised realistically and more frequently. It 
does not seem possible to agree with Firth when he argues that "the only 
criticism that can justly be directed against your board •• is that 
the scheme was embarked upon before the money was secured". 27 
In September 1938 production began at the hot strip mil128 and by 
April 1939 the plant wae operating at 70 per cent of capacity, employina 
24. ibid. Delays in delivery were due to the primacy of rearm_nt. 
25. ibid. 
26. ibid. 
27. The Time., 29 July 1938. 
28. Carr and Taplin,op.cit.p.S48. 
29 3,500 men. At the outbreak of war, the plant was approaching full 
capacity employing about 6,000 men. 30 Its contribution to employment, 
however, had been greater when it was under construction. 
If the plant had not been a successful venture for the company 
before 1939, it was to prove most successful when working at full capa-
city. Ebbw Vale steel sheet and tinplate was capable of competing in 
export markets with high-quality American products, and was very much 
more suitable than the products of the traditional processes for use in 
the motor industry. It was also very much cheaper. In fact, "there is 
no question of the superiority of the new process, or of the success of 
the Ebbw Vale works in particular".3l If the plant eventually became 
profitable for the company, the original motivations for its location at 
Ebbw Vale were not so well satisfied. The technical progress embodied in 
the new plant made it seem probable that total employment in the tinplate 
industry would be drastically reduced and tinplate workers had now 
another threat to the maintenance of their employment. I t also seemed 
probable that the location of the main part of the industry would tend 
to shift from west Wales toward. the eastern part of the South Walel 
29. The Timel, 18 April 1939. 
30. ibid. 29 July 1938. 
31. M.P.Foaarty, Prolpects of the Industrial Are .. of Great Britain 
(1945) ,p.123. 
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Special Area, thus simply shifting the focus of the unemployment problem. 32 
In addition, the problem in qualitative terms may have become more 
difficul t. Migration was less of a characteristic of tinplate workers 
than of coal miners as they were less accustomed to mobility, had a higher 
proportion of home ownership in their numbers and more of them were 
Welsh-speaking. Further, the hope of recovery was never abandoned and, 
therefore, labour movement could not be looked to for a solution. As a 
result of these problems of technological unemployment maximum gains from 
the improved techniques were not gained in the post-war period as the 
33 plant was overmanned. 
It seems, therefore, that Richard Thomas & Co., began by hoping to 
establish a plant on a midlands orefield location. But the changing 
social climate and, perhaps, the vociferous complaints of the Welsh, led 
to Government intervention and a change of plans. As a result of the 
new location and the delay caused by this and later modifications in the 
company's plans, production was not able to start before the end of 1939 
and further Government intervention was required in the form of 
financial assistance to enable the company to avoid abandoning its Ebbw 
Vale construction. However, when production was started it proved 
successful, although it would have been more successful at another site 
and the contribution to the solution of the unemployment problem in 
south Wales was not as great as was expected. Was the Gove rumen t 
32. ibid.p.S3; D.L.Burn. The Bconomic Hi1to!Y of Steel-Makin •• 1867-1937 
(Cambridge, 1940),p.460. 
33. Minchinton,op.cit.pp.2l3-4.243. 
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intervention a success? Should Richard Thomas have been allowed to act 
independently of social considerations and, indeed, would they have done 
if left unhampered? Such questions are best left until the case of 
Stewarts & Lloyds has been examined. 
II 
Stewarts & Lloyds announced their decision to expand at Corby in 
November 1932. They were proposing to build a basic Bessemer plant and 
tube works in an integrated unit on a 'green-field site' at an estimated 
cost of £3,300 :, 000. The chairman's announcement to the shareholders 
of the company promised that the "scheme will bring about large reductions 
. f' " 34 1n manu actur1ng costs • "When the plant is finished all the tubes now 
manufactured at several tube works from imported basic Bessemer steel 
will be produced on one site at Corby", and, "employment will be given 
altogether to some thousands of men". 35 Clearly Mr. MacDiarmid was 
conscious of the contribution to employment that the expansion in capa-
city would make in a climate of high unemployment. However, the promised 
concentration of tube manufacture in Northamptonshire held worrying 
prospects for employment in the firms existing tube works, principally in 
Lanarkshire. 
34. The Time.,30 Nov.l932. That ie, through economies of scale, an 
intearated plan~, fuel economies etc. 
35. ibid. AD orefields location was encouraged by fuel economies 
enabling location to no longer be restricted to cakina coal relourcel. 
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The immediate reaction to Stewarts & Lloyds' announcement in Scotland 
was concern that the tube industry and its employment was to be lost to 
36 the area. Stewarts & Lloyds' counter to these arguments was that 
"the decision to locate the new plant at Corby was reached after a com-
prehensive examination of the economic advantages, both with regard to 
assembly of raw materials and marketing". 37 The next day Stewarts & 
Lloyds announced that "there is no intention of abandoning tube manufac-
ture in Scotland" but there will be "a new allocation of orders as 
between the Scotch and English works". 38 If the Scottish works were not 
to be abandoned, Corby would provide new employment rather than trans-
ferring employment from one part of the country to another and simul-
taneously the company warned unemployed men in other parts of the country 
not to "make their way to the Northamptonshire ironfields, as work will 
. I b ,,39 A N h h· f be found flrst for local a our • ort amptons lre correspondent 0 
The Times was not convinced by these arguments pointing out that whereas 
the scheme both in construction and subsequent manufacture was to aive 
employment to some thousands of men, "the population of Corby h about 
2,000, and today, according to Labour Exchange figurel, there are six 
iron and steel workers on the unemployed lilt for Corby, and a number of 
men on part time". 40 Clearly, expansion of manufacture at Corby, even 
if not to be at the expense of the Scottish work I , was lure to requi re a 
large influx of labour on a permanent basis from other districts. This 
36. For example, lee, Glu,ow Herald,30 Nov.1932. 
37. ibid. 
38. The Timel, 1 Dec.1932. 
39. ibid. 
40. ibid. 
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conclusion was not lost to the National Housing and Town Planning Council 
which urged the implementation of a regional plan within which to guide 
development in the Corby area and another correspondent warned of the 
ravages of open-cast mining for good agricultural land. 4l 
It was not long before it became clear that Stewarts & Lloyds' 
promise that tube-making was not to be abandoned in Scotland was not 
quite the same thing as a promise that capacity or employment were not 
to be reduced. In October the first major reduction in Scottish capacity 
as a result of the Corby development was announced. 42 'nle Scottish 
steelworks of Stewarts & Lloyds at Clydesdale, Mossend was to close at the 
end of 1933. The Universal Plate Mill was to be dismantled and trans-
ferred to Corby. The Glasgow Herald prophesied an immediate increase 
in local unemployment and the community of Bellshill was disturbed by 
the prospect. By early November it was evident that Stewarts & Lloyds' 
decision was not to be reversed for the sake of local employment, either 
by the Government or the company itself, and Bellshill's Miners Welfare 
Institute resolved that the local authority should approach the Ministry 
of Labour, the County Council and the company in order to provide alterna-
tive employment. 43 Protestations do not seem, however, to have been as 
numerous nor as loud as the later complaints from Wales. Opinion .till 
accepted transference as the normal solution and campaian' to influence 
41. ibid. 8 Dec.193Z; 23 Dec.1932. Prom the compmy' •• tandpoint open-
ca.t mininl was cheap md Northamptonshire' •• hallow beds favoured 
it as a location from the fir.t. 
42. Glaslow Berald,2l Oct.1933. 
43. ibid. 4 Nov.1933. 
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the location of industry were, at this stage, exceptional. 
Out-migration from the area continued. It was now obvious that a 
considerable exodus of labour from Scotland to Northamptonshire was 
likely and partially intended to occur and the question of Government 
responsibility for either alternative employment or assistance with the 
process of transfer of popUlation became more pressing. But there was 
no thought to restrict the plans of Stewarts & Lloyds, for example to 
insist that any new plant was to be built in Scotland. The Gove rnmen t ' s 
intervention was to be limited to smoothing the process of labour 
• . 44 
mgraUon. This attitude, in contrast to that displayed in the 
Richard Thomas case. illustrates the changing emphasis of regional 
policy in the 1930's. 
Meanwhile. the construction of the Corby works was proceeding such 
that it was hoped production could commence in late 1934. 45 On 
4 November 1933 The Times reported that. 
"the transformation of the village of Corby. North8q)tou-
shire. into a busy steel centre is proceeding apace 
Several contracts are being placed locally. Power is 
being obtained from the electricity 'grid'. Heavy 
concrete foundations to support the new Bessemer con-
vertors are now being put down. a 250 foot brick chimney 
towers over the skeleton frames of the main works. and 
this will be partnered by a steel chimney 150 foot high. 
A large gas-holder is allo to be erected to store the 
gas from the coke ovens. "46 
The impact on the local economy was considerable even at this early Itage, 
44. Hanlard' (Commonl) 5th ser.284.508-9.14 Dec.1933. 
45. Glaalow Herald.30 Dec.1933. 
46. The Tb .. ,/r'Nov.1933. 
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for example, "bricklayers, carpenters, and labourers arrive daily at 
Corby from Leicester, Rugby, and Market Deeping to work on the new 
housing estate", 47 and preparations were being made for extensive 
alterations to the current Corby. At leas t 2,000 addi tional workers 
were expected to be employed when the works was operational and a hous-
ing estate of 700 dwellings was envisaged along with a new sewerage 
system and an improved water supply. Indeed, the Ministry of Health 
were considering development schemes for the area involving expenditure 
of £23,000 and Stewarts & L10yds were also contributing towards the 
provision of Corby's social capital. The firm was to construct 50 
houses monthly at first, rising later to 100 a month~8 Houses were not 
all the firm were to provide. East Carlton Hall was to be provided with 
reading rooms, billiard room, a swimudng pool and tennis courts so that 
it could accomodate unmarried members of the executive staff of the 
company. Stewarts & Lloyds also contributed to the cost, along with 
the Central Electricity Board and Kettering Urban Council, of the erection 
49 
of power transmission lines from the Northampton sub-grid to the works. 
The first blast furnace at Corby was lit on 8 May, 1934, SO an 
electric excavator was erected on the fields adjoining the works to strip 
the overburden that covered t~e ore,Sl and the firlt heat of Itee1 was 
made in January 1935. 52 Tube production followed in June. By then 
47. ibid. 
48. ibid. 20 Oct.1933. 
49. ibid. 12 April 1934. 
50. ibid. 1.0: . , 1934. 
51 ibid. 13 June 1934. 
52. ibid. a Jan.1935. 
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two blast furnaces and three Bessemer convertors were in use, the 
rolling mills and tube works were busy, a model town had been grafted 
on to a village, and employment had been found for 2,500 men. 53 The 
housing estate boasted 800 completed homes and, given the number of 
migrants from Scotland, the town was seen as a "definitely Scottish 
connnunity in a typically English county". 54 
Although Corby was now in production, the repercussions on the 
firm's other locations and on the steel industry in general had not yet 
finished. The decision to curtail production of the Rutherglen works 
was annolmced in February 1936. This was the biggest single reduction 
in Scottish employment, involving 1,200 workers, that had yet been 
contemplated by the company. It argued that, 
"the Phoenix Works is not geographically suited to be 
supplied with its raw material from the new works, 
and it has therefore been found necessary to 
concentrate the manufacture of the bulk of the 
tubes formerly made in these works at Corby. The 
balance will be transferred to other works of the 
company in Scotland. "55 
Stewarts & Lloyds did have some concem for the unemployment it was likely 
to cause and "endeavoured to minimize the disturbance to local employment 
by the transfer of as many workpeop1e as pouib1e". S6 The Govemment. 
despite the increasing public concem for the Special Area problem, leemed 
53. ibid. 29 June 1935. 
54. ibid. The origin. of Stewart. & Lloyd.' workforce il de.cribed 
in D.C.D.Pocock. 'The Milration of Scottish Labour to Corby New 
Town' Scotti.h Geolraehical Maaazine.76(1960). AI.o lee. D.C.D. 
Pocock. 'Some 'eature. of the Population of Corby New Town' • 
Sociololical Review,new ler.8(1960). 
55. Gl"low Herald. 28 'eb.1936. 
56. The Time.,4 March 1936. 
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satisfied in the knowledge that this was the company's intention. S7 
The contribution of the Corby developments to the standing of 
Stewarts & Lloyds are as well judged by the comments of the chairman. 
"Our low costs of production have enabled us to 
supply our customers in the home market with tubes 
of the highest quality at prices not appreciably 
higher than those ruling in 1913, notwithstanding the 
higher rates of wages, shorter working hours, and 
improved housing conditions and recreation and other 
facilities which now obtain • • • Corby has proved an 
unqualified success."S8 
From the viewpoint of private costs and benefits, Corby was indeed an 
unqualified success. Even including the co~y's accepted obligation 
towards its employees, both in Scotland and in Northamptonshire, from 
the company's standpoint its policy was successful. But the questions 
remain; was enough concern displayed by the company for the consequences 
its actions would have on local employment rates? Was it optimal 
policy to expect 2,000 Lanarkshire steelworkers to uproot with their 
families and move to the English midlands? Should the Government have 
intervened and, if so, in which direction, to encourage labour movement 
or to freeze the existing location of Stewarts & Lloyds plants? What 
more seneral observations can be drawn from the histories examined, in 
particular, from contrasting the two? 
57. Hanlard(Commonl) 5th .er.309,2286,12 March 1936. 
58. The Time., 18 May- 1936. 
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III 
In simple terms, a comparison of the experiences of the two concerns 
with regard to the location of their establishments yields the following 
conclusion; that Stewarts & Lloyds moved to what was an economic loca-
tion and that Richard Thomas & Co., attempted to follow this example but 
were diverted from this path by a changed climate of Government and 
public opinion. As a result, the latter company experienced certain 
difficulties. However, the different timing of the investment decisions 
is one factor explaining the different fortunes of the concerns; 
another is the actual process of investment; yet another is location. 
Until now the axiom that the optimum location for the steel industry 
was the east midlands orefield has been taken for granted. Conversely, 
south Wales has been dismissed as a relatively poor location, although 
some distinction has been made between inland sites and coastal loca-
tions. However, although the particular disadvantages of the Ebbw Vale 
site contributed to the difficulties of Richard Thomas & Co.; once in 
production, the plant wal successful. To add that the plant was not as 
successful as it might have been rests on the assumption that a midlands 
location was the best location; both in the short-term and over the 
longer period that steel plant was likely to survive. In relation to 
the expected life of a Iteel plant, location factorl will change and if 
the long-view il conlidered when contemplating a re-location the likely 
changes in resource diltribution, in techniques, or in markets ought to 
be considered. But this il &eking Mr. MacDiarmid and Sir Willi .. Firth 
to have predicted lome 40-50 yearl into the future, 81 this was the 
expected life Ipan of Iteel plant in the 1930'1. There was little 
guarantee of an optimum decision even if the long-view was considered. 
It was not reasonable to expect the emergence of basic oxygen processes. 
or the premature decline of the importance of the midlands orefield. to 
be predicted. Thus. Stewarts & Lloyds' decision may be defended. but 
the location at Ebbw Vale cannot. 
Duncan Burn argued that location on domestic ore fields was the 
better location for the steel industry. However. "the political strength 
of the old high-cost locations has been increased " and • • trade 
union opinion has proved to be very strongly attaChed to the existing 
distribution of production".59 Others disagreed with this interpre-
tation. Langley argued that the cost advantages of the home orefield 
locations were offset somewhat by the lower iron content and the con-
sequently greater fuel requirements of the midlands location per ton of 
pig iron. Domestic ore extraction was likely to become more expensive 
as deeper seams were worked and imported ore would cheapen with an 
improvement in port facilities, as Firth had argued in the case of the 
Welsh ports. 60 Other factors pointed to traditional locations for steel 
capacity, not least the high capital costs of green-field developments 
. . 1· I d 61 and the duplication of soclal caplta lnvo ve • It was not clear 
59. D.L.Burn, 'Recent Trend. in the History of the Briti.h Steel Induatry'. 
Economic History leview, 17(1947), 101. 
60. The Time., 5 Dec.1936. 
61. S.J.Lanaley, 'The Location Probl.m in the Briti.b Ste.l lndu.try', 
Oxford Economic Paper.,new .er.3(195l). Al.o se. Report of the 
British Iron aDd Ste.l Federation to the Hini.ter of Supply (P.P., 
1945-6,XIII),p.1l where .imilar conclusion. are reaCh.d. 
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whether the midlands was the best location, considering private costs, 
either in the short or the long-run. Limited reserves of domestic ore 
and high costs of capital construction made it doubtful whether Stewarts 
& Lloyds' example could be successfully followed. 62 
If social costs are now considered the best location choice becomes 
more complex. At Corby, a rural community was rapidly transformed into 
a steel town and labour was drawn from other parts of the country, 
particularly from Lanarkshire. Although Stewarts & Lloyds contributed 
towards the costs of this redistribution of population, both by assisting 
transfer and by the provision of housing and other facilities, the whole 
cost was not borne by them. The Ministry of Labour shared the costs of 
moving population,63 the County Council assisted in the housing field and 
the education authority took action to deal with the increasing school 
population. Northamptonshire County Council considered that "the needs of 
the new Corby have been adequately and readily met by the local autho-
rities concerned, although some difficulty has been experienced owing 
to the unpredictable rapidity with which development has taken place".64 
Further, the Import Duties Advisory Committee were disturbed by the 
62. Aa argued by G.R.Denton, 'Investment and Location in the Steel 
Induetry: Corby,'Oxford Economic Papere,new eer.7(19SS),274. 
Jewtee and Winterbottom doUbted Whether Corby'e proeperity could be 
anything other than traneient being b .. ed on exhauatible reeourcel. 
J.Jewtee and A.Winterbottom, AD Induatrial Surv.y of Cumberland and 
Fum.ee (Manch.eter,1933).p.47. 
63. Report of the Import Duti.e Advieory CoDBdtt.e on the Preeent 
Poeition and Futur. Development of the Iron and Ste.l Induatry 
(P.P •• 1936-7.XII),para.137. 
64. ibid.para.140. 
failure to restore land subjected to open cast mining,65 and feared 
that "developments of the nature exemplified at Corby may create in 
areas in which works are closed down 'pockets', or even considerable 
areas, of depression". 66 If these social losses had to be wholly 
considered in Stewarts & Lloyds' accounts it is conceivable that the 
private gains would have been transformed into an overall loss and the re-
location would not have taken place. However, although some of the 
Scottish labour of Stewarts & Lloyds was reluctant to move or easily 
returned to Scotland - because of the ties of home and companionship, 
the increasing demand for labour in the Special Areas as prospects improved, 
and the great dependence on the fortunes of one firm if the move to Corby 
was made - it was true that this was often offset by better pay, greater 
security of employment and better housing if the move was made. Further, 
"so far as Lanarkshire is concerned, none of the public services in any 
area have been left derelict owing to the movement of the industry from 
the area", 6 7 and, although "there has • • • been a large migration of 
population from the Bellshi1l area • • • again the public services have 
not been affected". 68 Thus, it appears that even considering both 
social and private costs, Stewarts & Lloyds would probably have proceeded 
with their development at Corby as being, on balance, beneficial to the 
national as well as the firm's economy. 
65. ibid. para.l41; and see the Report on the Restoration Problem in the 
Ironsto. Industry in the Midlands; SU1IIID8ry of Findings and 
Recommendations (P.P •• 1945-6.XIII). 
66. Report of I.D.A.C. on •••• (P.P •• l936-7,XlI),para.l42. 
67. P .1.0. Memorll1dum by the Co1lllllisaioner for Special Are .. in Scotland 
on the Effects of the Withdrawal of Bil Industries. BLG 27/77; 
P .1.0. Supplementary Evidence of the Association of County ComcUs 
in Scotland to the loyal Co1lllllission on the Geographical Distribution 
of the Industrial Population. HLG~2113'. 
68. P.l.0. Supplementary evidence •••• op.cit. 
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The technological innovation embodied in the Ebbw Vale plant 
and its size in relation to the rest of the tinplate industry had the 
result that the labour attached to the industry had to be reduced. The 
location at Ebbw Vale, although not necessitating the provision of 
fresh social capital as at Corby, did require a re-Iocation of the 
tinplate industry from the Swansea and Llanelly areas. Intra-regional 
migration might be thought of as the ideal regional policy if it is 
used in conjunction with an optimum plant location. But in the Richard 
Thomas case, the plant location was not optimal, and the tinplate workers 
of west Wales were probably more immobile than other Welsh occupational 
groups. Thus it seems that Government intervention was less than success-
ful. Neither in the short nor the long-term was the Ebbw Vale site anything 
approaching an optimum location and judged even on the limited grounds 
of relief to Welsh unemployment the verdict seems unfavourable. National 
losses, in the sense of a less than maximally efficient plant in an 
inappropriate location, were not offset by regional gains in terms of 
employment. 
However, the above case studies do not necessarily lead to a position 
favouring the economic location of industry by private criteria, with 
a redistribution of labour to those new locations. Firstly, Stewarts & 
Lloyds and other large firms were likely to be exceptional in the provision 
of housing and in the assistance to labour migration. Secondly. much of 
industry i8 'footloose' and so itl efficient operation should not be 
lubltantially affected as between different are... A 'move-industry' 
policy can be effective in this sphere. Thirdly, in 'non-footloose' 
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cases where the availability of raw materials or labour are of 
unavoidable importance, economic criteria cannot always be successfully 
determined for the long-run and a case can be made for giving less weight 
to such factors and more weiaht to considerations of regional unemployment. 
Nevertheless, it is a curious fact that maay communities where 
the steel industry exists are totally dependent upon that industry for 
their livelihood. The location of steel works do not seem to generate 
the spatial association of linked-industries. Consequently, given the 
scale of such communities, a large amount of new industry has to be 
induced to such locations in order that the communities may survive. It is 
necessary to bear in mind, therefore, the nature of the labour demands 
of the new employment in relation to the skills and abilities of a 
steel-making labour force. It does not seem realistic to not consider 
a policy of labour transference. 
A reflection on the current position of the steel industry is 
instructive. The industry is still indifferently located. For example, 
Ebbw Vale is now dependent upon imported ore, rather than Lincolnshire' 
Northamptonshire ironstone. and its situation 20 milea from a deep water 
port is a severe handicap. M a result the Britiah Steel Corporation 
announced in November 1972 that the steel-making plant at Ebbw Vale was to 
be clo.ed, although tinplate faciUde. were to be retained. 69. If the 
problem had been faced in the 1930' •• the pre.ent problema may have been 
avoided. Further, port facilitie. atill CaDDot handle the larae ore 
69. The Guardian. 17 Nov. 1972 
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carriers thus pushing up the freight charges per ton of ore. 70 
These lessons still do not seem to have been fully learnt. Although 
the B.S.C. plan to cut production and employment at four Scottish 
works by 1977 (at Tollcross, Cambuslang and two at Motherwell) in 
order to phase out the now obsolete open-hearth aethods, it also 
intends to expand production at Ravenscraig, Lanarkshire. 71 This 
is an inland site originally built upon after public protest on the 
original plans in 1958 to build a new strip mill in the Midlands. 72 
As in the 1930's, the localities affected by such decisions are 
concerned not with the problems of industrial location or of technical 
efficiency, but with the problems of local unemployment. 73 The 
comment of the Second Industrial Survey of Wales that "state support, 
for purely sentimental reasons, given to industries which proved in 
the long-run to be unsuccessful, would be harmful rather than beneficial,,74 
is still true. Long-run considerations of location factors need to be 
considered when Government intervention is to be made in a heavy industry 
in the interests of short-term employment, and a greater allowance is 
necessary for depreciation, to discourage inertia in the face of new 
factors influencing the industry's best techniques and locationa. As 
The Times puts it, "the B.S.C. chairman has undoubtedly told ministers 
70. R. Pryke, 'Strategy for Steel", Journal of the Public Enterpriae 
Group, 2 (1972) 
71. The Guardian, 21 June 1972 
72. G. McCrone, Relional p01i~in Britain(1969).p.118. 
73. For example, aee Royal Co ssion on the Geo1ar aphical Diltribution 
of the Industrial population. Evidence of the Aasociation of Counties 
of Cities in Scotland QQ.2448-2453. lS Dec. 1937. 
74. Quoted in ibid. Evid~ce of National Industrial Development Council 
of Wales and Monmouthshire, para. 4, 16 March 1938. 
that they must choose between a short-term decision to save jobs in 
areas of high unemployment and a long-term one designed to enable the 
.. ff'" " 75 country to ma1nta1n an e 1C1ent 1ndustry • The prob lem is the 
prediction of long-run changes in location factors. In the long-run 
neither Corby nor Ebbw Vale were best locations for the steel industry, 
although there was more ground to reject Ebbw Vale at the time the decision 
was taken. 
75. The Times. 22 Dec. 1972. 
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C. THE CULMINATION OF THE INTER-WAR YEAR'S EXPERIENCE 
OF REGIONAL POLICIES: THE DISCREDITING OF 
TRANSFERENCE 
CHAPTER 9 
The Barlow Report Regional Policies Desideratum 
I 
Contemporary reference to the problems of the growth of London are 
legion. An early account concentrates on some aspects of atmospheric 
pollution in large cities. 1 In 1934, references to the apparent link 
between London's problems and those of the Depressed Areas were made. 2 
But it was not until 1936/37 that this view became the orthodoxy. 
Certainly, the emphasis on the strategic risks of the concentration of 
population in time of war were untypical. More typical were views that 
expressed concern for the increasing traffic problem in the capital or 
for the contrast in health standards between town and country.3 If a link 
between the different areas' problems was implied, it was normally that 
the success of transference out of the Depressed Areas depended upon 
conditions in the potential receiving areas of the south, rather than that 
1. Sir N.Shaw and J.S.Owens, The Smoke Problem of the Great Cities (1925). 
2. Lieut-Co1. Head1em (Barnard Castle). Hansard(Commons) 5th Ber.293, 
2028-2033,14 Nov.1934. 
3. 
these conditions in the south were a product of an excess inflow of labour 
from the Depressed Areas occasioned by the southward 'drift of industry'. 
As the emphasis in regional policy moved to a position favouring the 
encouragement of new industry in the Depressed Areas"so it was that the 
latter view came to prominence. The effects of transference both in the 
receiving areas and in the Depressed Areas led to pressures for a regional 
I , ' , 1 b'l' 4 po iCY concentrating on capita mo 1 ity. 
Parliamentary debate focused on the question of state intervention in 
the location of industry. Mr A. Edwards, the M.P. for Middlesbrough East, 
suggested in December 1935, "the possibility of preventing people setting 
up factories in the south in preference to the industrial areas" 88 a means 
, , 1 "h 5 of encouraging industria expansion in t e north. He wanted southern 
growth and transference curtailed to help economic growth in the north. In 
March 1936, Mr Dalton (Bishop Auckland) noted that, "if the present 
southward drift of industry continues, before long the whole of British 
industry will be gathered in an ever-expanding ring around Greater London -
Greater London which in time of peace is a geographical abortion and in time 
of war would be a death-trap for millions". 6 Mr Dalton wanted southern 
4. See Chapter 6 for an account of the Ihifting emph .. is of repona1 
policy for the Depres •• d Ar .... 
S. Han.ard(Common.). Sth .er.307.1041.11 Dec.193S. Allo •••• ibid.214S. 
11 March 1936. 
6. ibid. 309,1026,2 March 1936. 
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growth and transference curtailed to alleviate the problems of the south.' 
The changing view of the regional problem, and of the appropriate 
policy to deal with it, was codified in the Third Report of the Commissioner 
for the Special Areas in England and Wa1es. 8 Sir Malcolm Stewart noted the 
disadvantages of London's growth. The welfare of the present population 
was threatened as open spaces became built-up areas and access to the 
countryside became more difficult. As a result of the increase in size and 
the "lack of the industrial planning of London", there resulted a loss in 
terms of time, discomfort, expense and fatigue necessitated by the daily 
journey to work in the London area, The appearance of a traffic problem 
also menaced the efficient distribution of goods within the metropolis 
whilst the concentration of population and industry in the area represented 
a strategic danger in the face of potential aircraft attacks,9 Sir Malcolm 
argued that much of the growth of Greater London was not dependent upon 
economic considerations, and wondered whether it would be possible to 
restrict industrial expansion and "through the control of Greater London, 
which has become a national menace, a better distribution of industrial 
activity can be secured , •• the Special Areas would benefit to the extent 
7. The factors behind the southward drift of industry were noted by 
Viscount Wolmer (Aldershot). "In the days of old, factories had to go to 
the north where the coal and power were. Now, with the electric grid, we 
can brina the power wherever it is wanted. The amenities of London are 
much greater than the amenities of Northumberland, and a capitalist's 
wife would much rather live near London than near Newcastle. The effect 
of this •• will be that London will continue to grow •• and •• I submit, 
this is unhealthy from a national point of view." ibid.1116,2 March 1936. 
8. Third Report of the commi8sioner for the Special Areal (Bngland and 
Wales)'P.Pl.19G6~T'III). 
9. ibid. Appendix I. 
~8 
that they obtained their share of diverted development. ;,-to Chamberlain's 
reaction to this proposal expressed scepticism on its likely efficiency, at 
1 . l' . t' h S . 1 d' 11 east 1n re at10n to aSS1S 1ng t e pec1a Areas as well as Lon on 1tse1f. 
Besides, wider issues were raised by Sir Malcolm's proposals. Thus, it was 
that the seeds of the Barlow Comudsaion were sown. 12 The terms of reference 
d h mb • f h C . • 13 an t e me ersh1p 0 t e O~SS1on were announced on 7th July, 1937. 
The prospect of a Royal Commission was not generally welcomed, it being 
. d • f 'd' • 14 . V1ewe as a dev1ce or aV01 1ng act10n. S1r Montague Barlow considered 
this problem in a memorandum of March, 1938. 15 He first complained of the 
16 terms of reference. These "are not very clear, and bear traces of having 
b b · db' h' • ,,17 een su Ject to amen ment y var10US aut or1t1es • He might have gone on 
to consider this factor as a partial cause of the delay before the 
Commission's conclusions were reached. In March, 1938 he considered two 
alternatives, either to report within twelve months or possibly as long a 
10. ibid. para. 24. 
11. See Hansard(Commons) 5th ser.317,1595-6,17 Nov.1936 and _upra,Chapter 6. 
12. Another preliminary announcement of the impending study appears in 
Hansard(Commons), 5th ser.321,1026-7,9 March 1937. 
13. ibid. 326,342,7 July 1937. 
14. See Chapter 6; "The promised Royal COIIIDission on the location of 
industry might have been claimed as a statesmanlike move had it been 
appointed in 1927, when the need was already obvious, instead of in 
1937." "Hundreds of thousands of people who have been left to rot for 
ten years or more can view with little enthusiasm a further long delay 
for elementary inquiry and discussion~ P.E.P., Planning, V (9 March 
1937) ,pp.1-2. 
15. P.R.O. Points for Consideration: Memorandum by the Chairman, HLG 27/43. 
16. The terms of reference are well-known and need not be reproduced here. 
17. P.R.O. Points for •••• , op.cit. 
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contemplation of the evidence as two years. 
"In view of the wide Terms of Reference and the importance 
attached by Parliament, the Press, and the Public generally, 
to the findings of the Commission, it is essential that 
full consideration should be given to all relevant evidence; 
a sketchy Report not based on full consideration of all 
available facts would be of little use to anyone." 18 
However, he noted that 
"there is considerable pressure in Parliament and elsewhere 
in favour of a Report being issued with all speed, but it is 
often not realised, at any rate by those who have little 
direct experience of the rather cumbrous machinery of enquiry 
by Royal commission or similar bodies, how slow such machinery 
must necessarily be in operation". 19 
Nevertheless it was hoped that the Report might be presented by Christmas 
1938. As it was, the Report was not presented until January 1940, although 
it had been awaiting the printers, who were occupied with war demands, 
since August, 1939. 
This delay and the coincidence of the appearance of the Report with 
wartime did much to lessen its immediate impact. But in the long-term it 
is a widely held view that the Report was of supreme importance in shaping 
post-war pOlicy.20 Indeed, Professor Brown has gone so far as to describe, 
"the Barlow Report ••• as a general treatment of desiderata relating to the 
distribution of the industrial population, ~hic~ has not yet been 
superceded".2l The Report itself and its conclusions are widely known and 
18. ibid. 
19. ibid. 
20. For example, lee,G.McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (1969). 
21. A.J.Brown,'Regiona1 Economics, with Special Reference to the U.K.', 
Economic Journa1,79(1969),760. 
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so it is only necessary here to indicate the general import of the 
C . ., l' 22 A OtmIl1SS10n scone US10ns. s Loasby puts it, the "Barlow Report is a 
classic example of an inquiry with its conclusions written into its terms 
of reference".23 The Commission agreed that social, economic and strategic 
disadvantages arose from the concentration of the industrial population in 
particular areas of the country. The Commission was required to propose 
a remedial course of action. In this objective it failed. Sir Alan Barlow 
of the Treasury thought that "the general impression left by a first 
reading of the Commission's report cannot but be that the Commission have 
thrown back at the Government the problems with which they were charged".24 
"The essence of the Report is the proposal to set up a Central Authority 
(or a new Ministry) which leaves undetermined what is the proper action, if 
any, to be taken to reconcile the obvious disadvantages of interfering with 
the freedom of industry to choose its own location.,,25 The Ministry of 
Health concurred with Sir Alan Barlow's views. Maude replied, "I much 
hope that we shall find it possible simply to play for time. The report 
contains, in my view, very little of value and even if the proposals, or any 
of them, ought to be adopted, they seem to ae to be quite impracticable in 
• ,,26 
wart1me. Similarly, the Scottish Office considered that "there is little 
22. For the Report itself - Royal commission on the Distribution of the 
Industrial Population, Report (p.P.,1939-40,IV). (Hereafter Barlow 
Report). Useful summaries of the Report are to be found in G.McCrone, 
op.cit. pp.102-5; J.H.Jones,'The Report of the Royal Commission on the 
Distribution of the Industrial Population', Journal of the loyal 
Statistical Society, 103(1940); P.R.O. Location of Industry. Correspondence 
ari.ing out of the Report HLG 52/1006. Summary of the Report prepared 
by the Treasury, 28 Dec.1939. 
23. B.J.Loasby,'Location of Industry: Thirty Years of "Planning"', District 
Bank Review, 156(1965), 35. 
24. S.R.O. Report of Barlow commission: Comments.DD~10/304. Letter from 
Sir Alan Barlow to all Government Departments summarizing the Report and 
asking for views, 28 Dec.1939. 
25. ibid. 
26. P.R.O. Location of Industry. Correspondence ariling out of the Report, 
op.cit. Letter from E.J.Maude to Barlow, 10 Peb.1940. 
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in the findings and recommendations that could not have been formulated 
by anyone having any kind of knowledge of the problems before the 
Commission began its work".27 There seems to have been some premonition 
that such a reaction to the Report was likely. In June 1938, Maude wrote 
to Barlow noting that "the Commission have no idea what to recommend and 
their report may be something of a fiasco".28 
The Times was less critical of the Report. 
"Both in the reservations and in the minority report are 
a sense of urgency and a note of conviction which are 
not present in anything like the same degree in the 
majority report. Basically there is agreement between 
the majority and the minority ••••• Differences developed 
when the comudssion came to the crucial choice between 
advisory and executive powers in the application of 
remedies. Even at this parting of the ways of opinion 
there was agreement that in the great and rapidly 
developing area of London and the Home Counties immediate 
action is required." 29 
The Times'verdict was that "a Ministry for the location of industry does 
not fit easily into the political scheme; but a Board, with large executive 
powers and informed by the spirit of the reservations of the minority 
report, could do great things for industry and for Britainn • 3D But 
The Economist was critical of the inability of the Commission to frame an 
effective course of action and of the failure to answer the central question 
27. S.R.O. Report of Barlow commission: Comments.op.cit. Minute from 
Scottish Office to Scottish Home Department, 14 Peb.1940. 
28. P.R.O. Royal Comidlsion on Location of Industry: Constitution and terms 
of reference. HLG 68/50. Letter from E.J.Maude to Barlow, 15 June 1938. 
29. The Times, 1 Peb.1940. 
30. ibid. 
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of equity versus efficiency posed by the need to intervene in industrial 
1 ' 31 ocatlon. The Dundee Courier echoed the common opinion when it stated 
that "the report •••• is more successful in expounding the problem than in 
'b' , 1'" 32 prescrl lng lts so utlon • 
It is instructive when looking at comments on the Report from disparate 
sources to note that many of them concern the powers recommended by the 
Report to be vested in either the Board. or, as the Minority hoped, in a 
new Ministry. There was no dispute as to the Report's conclusions on the 
problems of large aggregates of population and industry. Even the 
relatively slight attention given to the Special Areas aspect of the 
problem. particularly given the importance of this aspect in the oriains 
of the Commission. received no criticism. It was already the established 
orthodoxy that the problems of London and of the Special Areas were the 
different sides of the same coin. The Note of Reeervations to the Majority 
Report expressed this most concisely. 
"The ganeral background of the inquiry was undoubtedly public 
concern regarding the lop-eided development of industrial 
activity in certain parte of the country. the social .od 
economic evile of which became apparent in the dieuter of 
the depreeeed areas •••• coneequently. we have looked upon 
the axceeeive concentration of population in London and 
other larae conurbations &8 more a ~~tom of the main 
, '1' 't If" d1sease than ae an eV1 1n 1 ee • 
31. The EconOmilt, 3 Feb.1940. The Economilt w.oted the C01llllillion. or a 
similar body to remain in operation durin, war-time 10 that pOlt-war 
policy could'be b&8ed on an analysie of the e.tablilhed trends and of 
the impact of war. See The Economilt. 13 J.o.1940. 20 April 1940. 
32. Dundee Courier~ 1 Feb.l940. 
33. Barlow Report. op.cit.p.208. 
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It is significant that the one area where the Comudssion could agree on 
vigorous action, was the need for control of the location of industry in 
London and the Home Counties as was originally recommended by Sir Malcolm 
Stewart. 
In the House of Commons, the origins of the Royal Commission were also 
seen in the imbalance of regional development and the growing dissatisfaction 
with transference. Mr Lawson (Chester-Ie-Street) saw the Comadssion as a 
product of the "dolorous conditions existing in the Special Areas, side by 
side with the growth of great industries in large new areas". 34 "It would 
be a far better thing if, instead of bringing people from those industrial 
areas to industries in the south, industries were taken to the industrial 
areas. Therefore ••••• an embargo should be placed upon the development of 
industry in Greater London.,,35 However, the Govemment were inclined to 
shelve the Report. Mr Elliot (the Minister of Health) put the Government's 
view. 
"It was said recently that perhaps this cowtry was mad, but, 
if 10, it waa with a superb madness. After aU, a Debate on 
the report of a Royal commission, which was set up in July, 
1937 reportinl in 1940, in this eiahth month of a gilaDtic 
war : •••• rt.ms a certain ~~ftk of unreality against which we 
must all be on our guard. 
"Clearly at the present time when world affairs are in the kind 
of flux in which they are now, it would be premature to reach 
concluli~I, or even to weigh the meritl of the propolals in the 
report." 
34. Baolard(Commonl) 5th ser.359,1028,17 April 1940. 
35. ibid. 
36. ibid. 1036,17 April 1940. 
37. ibid. 1046,17 April 1940. 
The Parliamentary Secretary to the Board of Trade (Major Lloyd George) 
added that, "if we ask some Minister to plan for what is going to happen 
after the war, we may find someone else doing the reconstruction for us".38 
Therefore, in the short-term the impact of the Report was negligible, 
partially because of its own deficiencies and partially due to the advent 
of war. Nevertheless, the Report did draw together existing fact and 
opinion on regional development in Britain and represented the final step 
in the process of accepting the doctrine of the interrelated nature of the 
problems of the south and the north. Transference was discredited as a 
tool of regional policy. 
II 
Regional policy in the post-war period has been dominated by the 
doctrine that the problems of the south and north are interrelated. 39 
Holmans has questioned whether this policy orthodoxy is acceptable. 40 The 
evidence may also be examined for the inter-war period. This involves the 
investigation of the notion that London's growth was excessive. In turn, 
this notion suggests the existence of an optimum city size that has been 
surpassed. But the concept of an optimum city size cannot be defended and 
38. ibid. 1093,17 April 1940. 
39. Although policy has not always fully reflected this interpretation of 
the evidence with appropriate instruments, particularly before the 1960's. 
40. A.E.Holmans,'Reltriction of Industrial Expansion in South-East England: 
A Reappraisal',Oxford Economic Paperl,new ser.l6(1964). Also lee, 
A.P.Thirwa11.'A Reply to Mr. Holmanl on "Reltrictionl of Expanaion in 
South-East Eng1and":Oxford Economic Papers,new. ser.17(1965) and 
A.E.Ho1manl,'Reltrict{on of Induatria1 Expansion in South-East England: 
A Rejoinder',Oxford Economic Papers, new ser.17(1965). 
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thus there are grounds for doubting whether London's growth was non-optima1. 41 
Nevertheless, contemporaries feared that London was too large on social, 
42 
economic and strategic grounds. The increase in size of the London area 
in this period is indicated by the growth of population. Chapter 2 provides 
details of population increase and net migration for Greater London and the 
L.C.C. area. The centrifugal movement of the population from the inner 
areas of the conurbation to the outer areas and beyond was also noted. Here 
it will suffice to present similar data for the Conurban Ring - that part of 
Greater London not within the L.C.C. area - for it is here that the most 
startling growth took place in the 1930's. The inner area, in fact, lost 
population. This information is provided in Table XLV. This shows the 
importance of migration in relation to natural increase in contributing to 
the expansion of the area's population over the period. Of the total 
increase of just over 1 million, almost 900,000 is attributable to net 
migration. It seems probable that the greater part of this net balance of 
migration came from areas outside of the conurbation in most years. Another 
indicator of size is presented in Table XLVI where the population density 
for various areas of London is shown. Generally, it can be seen that the 
area as a whole was expanding rapidly, this growth being concentrated on the 
fringes of the conurbation. This expansion was principally the result of 
migration; outwards from the inner areas of London, and from other parts 
of the country, especially the Depressed Areas. 
41. See Appendix, 'The Concept of Opt~ City Size'. 
42. In the late 1930'1 there val a particular .trell on stratesic feara, 
See Barlow Report, op.cit. 
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This population increase led to an increase in traffic. However, as 
the Bressey Report pointed out, increasing traffic was also a function of 
the "growth of travel habit, the ever-increasing popularity of the motor 
car, the spread of motor ownership to classes which formerly would have 
regarded such a possession as beyond their means, /&nd7 the tendency of 
- -
the Londoner to live further afield and thus become more dependent upon 
transport ••••• ,,43 The traffic problem had various origins. Bressey 
concluded that "there is no escape from the conclusion that their capacity 
~ondon's Highway!7 leaves no margin available for anything approaching the 
increase in traffic we are bound to anticipate".44 The report was bound by 
its objectives and this conclusion to recommend the construction of new 
routes and improvements at particular points that would result in improved 
traffic flow, promoting public safety and alleviating congestion. For 
example, Haumersmith Broadway required "some sort of signal control". The 
Royal Commission on Transport had earlier advocated road widening at this 
point. 45 Improvements of arterial roads had resulted in better traffic 
flows to the outskirts of the central area where narrower roads and the 
46 
convergence of routes had resulted in congestion. The growth of traffic 
43. Bressey Report, op.cit. p.lO. 
44. ibid. 
45. Royal Commission on Transport, op.cit. They thought it ironic that 
Hammersmith Broadway should be no wider than the width of the average 
slum. 
46. Several digressions are tempting. Firstly, there is a 'Parkinson's Law' 
of traffic increase. The improvement of facilities generates more 
traffic with the'result that the improved situation is very soon as bad 
as the unillproved situation. See Royal COIIIDission on the Geographical 
Distribution of the Industrial Population. Memorandum of Evidence 
submitted by the MiDistry of Transport, op.cit. QQ.20l9-2023. Secondly, 
and related to this point, it needs to be considered whether the 
emphasi. on fitting the streets to the traffic (al expressed in the 
Royal Commission on Tranlport, the Bressey Report and subsequently) 
needs to be revised in favour of fitting the traffic to the streets. 
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at particular points illustrates this problem. (See Table XLVII). 
Similarly, the novel investigations of the Bressey Report substantiated 
the relation between increasing traffic and increased congestion. After 
the selection of particular routes for examination both across and around 
inner London, it was found that there were wide variations in average speed. 
The speeds on the central routes were lowest. 
"These low speeds, to which traffic is reduced across the inner 
zone of London, rise gradually as the routes approach the 
outskirts, where average speeds of 18 m.p.h. were not 
infrequently recorded. The numerous journeys performed on the 
three cross-London routes indicate an average speed of roughly 
l2~ m.p.h. from end to end. This can usefully be compared 
with the North Circular Road, where the corresponding figure 
is 23.6 m.p.h." 47 
A recommendation for a South Circular Road followed, as did a preference 
for roundabouts rather than intersections and traffic lights. The 
b·• d d 1 48 o Ject1ve was to re uce e a,. 
However, a traffic problem had wider implications than simply for 
traffic itself. As Sir Malcolm Stewart had earlier indicated, there were 
ramifications on health, productive efficiency and the physical environment. 
For example, 
"the effect of running very heavy traffic in narrow channels 
between tall buildings, or underground, is greatly to increase 
exposure to noise, which is very fatiguing and harmful to the 
nerves. In the carriage of a city tube train travelling at 
30 m.p.h. the noise ranges from about 90 to 106 phons - a level 
at which an adult lion continuously roaring to capacity (105 
phons at 18 ft.) would scarcely be audible." 49 
47. Bressey Report, op.cit. pp.17-l8. 
48. In common with latter-day transport economists such studies measure the 
impact on urban society of increaled traffic in terms of the effect of 
increased traffic on other road users. See E.J.Milban,The Costl of 
Economic Growth(1969), p.132 for a critique of this approach. 
49. P.E.P •• Planning, VI(26 July 1938), p.S. 
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Further, the increasing density of settlement of industry and population 
resulted in increasesin site values which, as well as contributing towards 
the separation of home and workplace, also hampered attempts to deal with 
the increased demand for transport facilities. Existing thoroughfares in 
central areas might need to be reconstructed or it might be necessary to 
provide tube railways and either course was very costly.50 
Nevertheless, the London Passenger Transport Board agreed with the 
general principles expressed in the Ministry of Health's evidence to the 
B 1 .• 51 ar ow C0mm1SS10n. "While the peak traffic problem is serious and not 
capable of easy remedy at all, it points not so much to any restrictions 
upon the growth of London as to the planning of London.,,52 
The remaining evidence on London's problems is more sketchy. Although 
there was a general contrast in mortality between town and country this was 
not necessarily due to size as such. There were also some advantages of 
large aggregates of population. "For example, in the sphere of public health, 
it enables a hospital service to be economically provided with specialist 
staff and units for the various forms of special treatment, since the numbers 
50. Royal Commdssion on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population.Memorandum of Evidence submitted by the Ministry of Transport, 
op.cit. para.40. 
51. ibid. Memorandum of Ministry of Health, 6 Oct.1937, Q.479. 
52. ibid. Memorandum of the London Passenger Transport Board, 15 Feb.1938, 
para. 9. Similar conclusions were reached in the Memorandum of Evidence 
submitted by the Registrar-General for England and Wales, 16 Nov.1938, 
where it was shown that the excess in mortality between urban and rural 
areas was not related to size but rather to such factors as overcrowding 
and smoke production. Such factors, in turn, were not necessarily 
accompaniments to urban life but could be alleviated by planning. For 
evidence on overcrowding a180 see, Ministry of Health, Report on the 
Overcrowding Survey in England and Wales (1936). 
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involved ensure a full use being made of the facilities offered."53 
Nevertheless, rates of mortality did differ within London with overcrowding, 
and atmospheric pollution, (see Table XLVIII), although these were superior 
h •• B' • 54 .. to ot er conurbat10ns 1n r1ta1n. Aga1n 1t seems that the absence of 
planned development, rather than the size of London, resulted in its health 
problems. 
It seems that London could not be considered non-optimal. Nevertheless, 
a number of problems were associated with its development55 which in turn 
were seen as a product of unsystematic growth. It does not follow, therefore, 
that the appropriate policy to deal with London's problems was a restriction 
on further growth or a dispersal of population to either satellite towns 
and garden cities or to the Depressed Areas of the country. London's 
problems might have been solved by planning. 56 
III 
If London's problems were not attributable to size alone, then the 
role of migration in increasing size was not to be blamed for the problems. 
However, if the rapidity of growth was a factor, then migration might still 
be held responsible. In some way migration may be viewed as a cause of 
53. Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Populatio~Memorandum of London County Council, 16 Feb.1938, para.SO. 
54, Barlow Report, op.cit. p.83. 
55. ibid. pp.5l-l03,153-l78 for a comprehensive coverage. 
56. Indeed, policies designed to alleviate congestion or pollution by 
reducing the lize of the city may worsen rather than improve such 
negative externalities. See, E.S.Mills,'Welfare Aspects of National 
Policy Towardl City Sizel', Urban Studies, 9(1972). 
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London's problems. It may also be possible to view the regional problem 
in the Depressed Areas as being aggravated by London's unrestricted growth. 
The general problems of areas receiving in-migrants are well 
'11 d b h t f th C C '1 A ., 57 1 ustrate y t e commen s 0 e ounty ounC1 s ssoc1at10n. 
"There is, in the first place, the obvious difficulty of 
establishing, at comparatively short notice and on the 
large scale required, the varied services, notably 
education, health and transport, which must be provided 
to cope with the legitimate demands of an increased 
population such as has been experienced in some areas 
during recent years. The cost of these services is 
heavy in any circumstances, but their provision is apt 
to become even more expensive when undertaken in haste 
and in districts which have hitherto been more rural 
than urban in character. In second place, populations 
so transferred usually are the occupants of comparatively 
small houses, while their physical and financial conditions 
are in many cases such as to necessitate frequent recourse 
to the public health and public assistance services. The 
increase of rateable values resulting from immigration of 
this type therefore is wholly insufficient to meet the 
increased cost imposed upon the receiving area." 
In Surrey the, 
"influx of families from jistressed areas and of poorer 
immigrants has resulted in increased demands for council 
houses, and special reference should be made to the fact 
that the population of the St. Helier estate contains a 
high number of tuberculosis cases and possibly of persons 
with other physical defects. As the people are of working 
class type, maximum use of public services is made." 58 
Buckinghamshire, particularly the Slough area, also experienced high 
in-migration with consequent heavy demands on public services such as 
57. P.R.O. Memorandum of Evidence to Royal Commission on the Geographical 
Distribution of the Industrial Population from the County Councils 
Association. HLO 27/42. 
58. ibid. 
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housing, sewerage and hospital accommodation. Further, the 
"labour requirements for such a growing area can only be 
met by transfers from other areas, and social problems 
and questions connected with juvenile employment 
consequently arise. The situation is easier when whole 
families move as such, but the transfer of large numbers 
of boys and girls and adults who must live in lodgings 
and whose employment is unstable creates problems difficult 
of solution." 59 
Similar problems were experienced in other areas of the South-East, 
particularly in Cowley, and the Dagenham and Becontree areas of Essex. 
Local finances were strained in an effort to meet the new demands and 
where supply lagged behind these demands, congestion occurred. 
The reaction of migrants are illustrative of the problems of 
resettlement in new, and often strange, communities. The treatment of 
Welsh migrants in Oxford affords evidence of some discrimination. 
"On the way home in a bus one day an Oxford woman began to 
say that the Welsh were stealing jobs in Oxford by working 
for low wages." 
"He found a strong dislike of Welsh people on the part of 
Oxford men, who thought the Welsh were taking their work 
and were all reds." 
"The two younger boys for a long time were afraid to leave 
the house because 'one night a gang of English boys met 
them, called them Taffies and tried to make them swear and 
siag 'God Save the King"." 
"Many landladies asked applicants for lodgings whether they 
were Welsh, and turned away all those who were." 60 
• d· t d 61 I d d· f h But not all m1grants were 1sconten e • n ee • 1t was 0 ten t e case 
59. ibid. 
60. G.H.Daniel,'Some Factors Affecting the Movement of Labour'. Oxford 
Economic Papers, No.3 (1940), 173-9. 
61. ibid. 
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that the out-migration of one individual to a new area would lead to a 
62 
cumulative movement to that new area. For example, the following 
extracts from letters of transferred labour to those remaining in the 
Depressed Areas of Whitehaven and Cleater Moor encouraged such cumulative 
movement. 
From Slough a transferee wrote, "I thought you would have been 
down here before now. I have a job waiting for you and my 
friend the Boss asked me last night when you would be here as 
he is keeping the job open for you", 
or from London, "I was talking to the Boss this morning, so 
you can come soon as possible, you'll be alright with Joe and I. 
Sorry Dan I'm short of cash at present, I'd have lent you fare, 
but hope you can manage off the Exchange, and Jog as(lic) been 
off three weeks, a motor car run over his foot." 3 
The characteristics of migrant populations had particular consequences 
for the receiving areas. Migrants tended to be largely composed of those 
in the younger age groups of the population.64 Where migration was narrowly 
focused, this affected the age structure of the local community and the rate 
of natural increase. Activity rates also tended to rise as a result of the 
changing age distribution of the popUlation. The faster growth of the 
insured employed population in London and the South East than the total 
population il testimony on this point. However, it seems unlikely that 
this phenomenon was entirely due to migration as it is probable that the 
activity rate of the native population was increasing in a climate of industrial 
62. 
63. 
64. 
For example. the mining village of Pontycymmer provided most of the 
migrants from the Maesteg district to Oxford. Survey of the Social 
Service. of Oxford and District. 1(1938-40). p.S9. 
P.R.O. Indultrial Tranlference SCheme-General leview 1938. LAB 8/218. 
See A.D.K.Owen.'Social Consequences of Industrial Transference', 
Socioloaical Review, 29(1937), 340. 
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expansion. But if in-migration is significant in this respect, then it 
might be possible to agree with Owen that the labour inflow "made possible 
much of the remarkable expansion of industry which has taken place in 
London and the midlands".65 Professor J.R.Jones of the Royal Commission 
was concerned to establish whether this labour supply was cause or effect 
of London's growth. The London County Council considered that, 
"it is difficult to get cuase and effect. It is a question 
whether the population from outside London increased 
industry, 'or whether the increase in industry in London 
tended to draw the population from outside. I should 
think probably the population would be drawn from outside 
London by the fact that there is more work in London." 66 
Professor Jones later observed that the relative growth of London "was but 
the expansion of an area almost filled with expanding industries and 
relatively free from declining industries, and able to recruit the labour 
essential to relative growth by the fact that workers in other areas were 
1 " 67 being driven out by unemp oyment ••• • Dennison's investigation of the 
labour recruitment of two expanding factories concluded that "much of the 
i1 b • ." 68 labour supply has been bu t up y m1grat10n • 
The prob1e .. of the South-East, and more particularly of London, and 
those of the Depressed Areas can be connected. London's growth was not a 
65. ibid. p.346. 
66. Royal commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
population.Memorandum of Evidence of London County Council, 2 March 1938, 
Q.3582. 
67. J.B.Jones, op.cit. p.327. 
68. s.R.Dennison, The Location of Industr and the De ressed Areas 
In the absense of a comprehens ve survey of labour 
London industry in this period, it is not possible 
migrant labour supply was necessary for growth. 
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(1939) • 
in 
that a 
cause of the Special Area problem. The latter was a product of 
structural factors. However, locational disadvantages followed 
structural depression and to this extent, the relatively favourable 
position of London worsened the problem in the Depressed Areas by attracting 
labour. Even so, such migration was predominantly 'pushed' not 'pulled'. 
Industrial growth was not diverted as the growth industries of London had 
, bl' h d' h 'I 69 h 1n fact been long-esta 1S e 1n t e cap1ta. T ere were few factory 
I ' 70 re- ocat10ns. But London's problems were certainly in part due to 
migration, both through its contribution to the rapid increase of population 
to a high level and through the particular characteristics of a migrant 
population. A reservation needs to be made in respect of the contribution 
of intra-regional migration to the problems of the area. 
IV 
The ill-effects of migration in the Depressed Areas were impDrtant in 
first encouraging a shift of regional policy emphasis towards attempts to 
influence industrial location. This change in emphasis, plus the 
consequences of migration for receiving areas, led~ to a recognition of the 
problems of London's growth. In turn, this resulted in connections being 
seen between the regional problem in the north and that in the south. The 
69. See P.Hal1, The Industries of London since 1861 (1962); Barlow Report, 
op.cit. pp.249-280. 
70. Board of Trade, Annual Surveys of Industrial Development, 1933-8. 
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Barlow Report represented the final stage in the acceptance of this 
comprehensive view. In some part, the problems were interlinked and, as 
such, the subsequent policy emphasis on diverting growth from the south 
to the north had its factual basis. 
London's social and economic problems were explicable by the absence 
of effective planning in an era of rapid population increase from in-
migration. Strategic fears were important in recommending dispersal and 
decentralisation of population and industry and an interpretation of this 
recommendation involving an inter-regional redistribution of activity 
rather than a wholly garden city or satellite town solution, was dependent 
on the apparently justified link between distress in the north and too-
rapid growth in the south. However, even though there may be some casual 
interconnection, there must remain some doubt as to whether the appropriate 
policy recommendation was to reverse this process and abandon transference 
as a policy instrument. 7l London's relative growth was not dependent on 
transferred industries. Therefore, any attempt to divert this growth else-
where by restricting growth in the South-East may have simply resulted in 
the contemplated expansion being abandoned. Further, to the extent that a 
London location had certain locationa1 advantages, then a diversion of an 
establishment would result in a decline in efficiency and in growth. Such 
a result can only be justified on efficiency as well aa allocative grounds 
71. The following argument draws heavily on Holmans, op.cit. 
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if the external diseconomies of expansion were more severe in the South-
East than elsewhere. It is not clear that this was the case, for example, 
the level of congestion was not uniform through the South-East, being 
worse in central London. Thus, a location in the Conurban Ring or at 
Slough might have given rise to less negative externalities than a location 
in Newcastle or Glasgow. The centrifugal movement of popUlation from 
the urban core of conurbations was not peculiar to London;72 neither 
were the attendant problems. Similarly, mortality tended to be higher 
in northern conurbations than in southern and overcrowding was at its 
worst in Durham and Northumberland. 73 Further, although in-migration to 
the South-East created demands for additional social capital, this did not 
necessarily imply a wasteful duplication of facilities under-utilised in 
74 the Depressed Areas, and the scope for sewerage improvement schemes found 
by the Commissioner for the Special Areas in Scotland suggested a require-
ment for improvements of capital stock in the north. 
Perhaps each manifestation of the regional problem needed to be dealt 
with in its own context. A set of policies dealing with the problems of 
rapid metropolitan expansion were required on the one hand, and on the 
72. 
73. 
74. 
See supra, Chapter 2; W.Hewitt, Work laces and Movements of Workers in 
the Merseyside Area (Liverpoo1,1928 ; R.Lawton, The Journey to Work n 
England and Wales: Forty Years of Change', Ti dschrift veor Economische 
en Sociale Geografie, 54 (1963); K.K.Leipmann, The Da ly Ebb an Flow 
of Labour between Home and Workplace in English Industrial Areas: A 
Statistical and Sociological Study', (unpublished Ph.D. thesis, London 
School of Economics,1942). 
Royal commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Popu1atio~Memorandum of Evidence of the Registrar-General for England 
and Wales, op.cit.; Ministry of Health. Report on the Overcrowding 
Survey, op.cit. 
supra, Chapter 8. 
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other, policies to alleviate distress in the Depressed Areas. In such 
circumstances there is no reason to dismiss labour migration as a policy 
instrument. In an intra-regional context this is obvious. Inter-
regionally, the problems arising from migration may have been dealt with 
by regulating the flow of labour movements and ensuring that the inflow 
to any particular area was not so rapid as to give rise to insuperable 
short-run problems. In the Depressed Areas, a similar regulation would 
have ensured a concurrent reduction of population and social capital to 
the level at which technological and locational considerations could justify 
the provision of employment for the remaining population. Where no 
justification existed,'euthanasia' ought not to have been discounted, despite 
its political unpopularity. 
The policy conclusions arising from the Barlow Report may not have been 
practicable or desirable. Nevertheless, the attempt to deal with London's 
problems forced attention on the long-standing problems of the Depressed 
Areas of the country. The real significance of the recognition of London's 
plight might be seen in the impetus it gave to the efforts to deal with the 
problems of the north. 
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Table XLV 
Population and Net Migration in London's Conurban Ring, mid-1930 -
mid-1939. 
Population Net Migration Net Migration as 
a % of popUlation 
(i) (ii) (iii) 
1930 3,671,134 134,096 3.65 
1931 3,817,961 106,519 2.79 
1932 3,944,547 99,403 2.52 
1933 4,061,920 91,415 2.25 
1934 4,170,748 99,901 2.40 
1935 4,289,693 125,790 2.93 
1936 4,434,602 104,811 2.36 
1937 4,560,468 53,183 1.17 
1938 4,637,175 53,720 1.16 
1939 4,714,549 
Notes. 
Co1.(i) - mid-year points. 
Co1.(ii),co1.(iii) - mid-year periods. i.e. the last observation refers 
to the period mid-1938 to mid-1939. For the methodology, see supra, 
Chapter 2, Appendix 1. 
Source: Calculated from the Annual Statistical Reviews of the 
Registrar-General for England & Wales. 
Table XLVI 
Population Density per square mile. Resident Population. London, 
mid-1930 - mid-1939. 
Greater London London Conurban Ring 
1930 11,645 37,598 6,374 
1931 11,821 37,387 6,628 
1932 11,980 37,246 6,848 
1933 12,064 36,740 7,053 
1934 12,123 36,156 7,241 
1935 12,229 35,771 7,447 
1936 12,375 35,394 7,699 
1937 12,489 34,996 7,917 
1938 12,554 34,725 8,051 
1939 12,595 34,303 8,185 
Table XLVII 
Vehicular Traffic at Hammersmith Bridge and Putney Bridge, London, 
Ju11. 1930-1937. 
Hammersmith Putney Weather 
Bridge Bridge Conditions 
15 July,193O 11,635 20,606 Dull but Dry 
14 Ju1y,1931 12,241 21,080 Dull 
11 Ju1y,1933 13,559 19,868
a / Showery 
9 Ju1y,1935 16,032 28,331 Fine 
13 Ju1y,1937 16,886 30,667 Fine 
a/ affected by repair and reconstruction works. 
Source: London County Council, Statistical Abstract for London, 
1927-37, Vo1.XXIX(1938). 
Table XLVIII 
Infant Mortality in Greater London, 1930-1939 (rates per 1000 live births) 
L.C.C. Conurban Ring 
1930 59 49 
1931 65 52 
1932 67 52 
1933 60 49 
1934 67 47 
1935 58 65 
1936 66 49 
1937 60 49 
1938 57 44 
1939 47 40 
Source: London County Council, Statistical Abstract for London, 
1927-37, Vol.XXIX(1938); ibid. 1937-46, Vo1.XXX(1948). 
APPENDIX 
The Concept of Optimum City Size 
Much of the literature concerned to discover an optimum city size 
concentrates on costs alone, particularly on the costs of public service 
provision. Given the potential of economics of scale at low populations 
and the potential of diseconomies of scale at high populations, a set of 
U-shaped cost curves can be generated with the optimum being equal to the 
point of mdnimum costs. (A on Diagram V) In the absence of marginal cost 
pricing there is no mechanism to prevent this point A being surpassed. 
The in-migrant to the city is only charged at average cost, even though by 
his mdgration not only are costs increased to him but also to the existing 
residents of the city. The existence of these external diseconomies prevent 
city size from being confined to the point of minimum average cost. 
A consideration of the complementary social product curves (should 
evidence exist) illustrates the possibility of several other optima. which 
casts doubt on the value of a conception of some unique optimum. There is 
no reason to confine attention to the cost curves in a search for an 
optimal solution. It will be in the interests of residents to maximize the 
difference between AP and AC (point B). In contrast a criteria of the 
maximisation of output (and ,opulation) sUllests the MP • Me solution 
(point C). The existence of several optima is possible with a variation 
in the criteria of optimality.l 
Evidence on costs other than that for public service provision is 
rare. There is no certain empirical justification for the upturn in 
average cost. Moreover, what is really required is some evidence on 
average social cost. Such a consideration would move the family of cost 
curves upwards on the diagram, accounting for the relationships of 
environmental, health and congestion externalities with city size. 
Contemporary approaches to the question of optimum city size 
illustrate the empirical shortcomings of this concept. Lomax used a 
cross-sectional minimum costs approach and concluded that the optimum 
size as determined by local government costs was in the region of 
100,000 - 150,000. 2 A U-shaped cost curve was also contemplated by 
the Ministry of Health. 
"There can be no doubt that up to a point the larger a town 
the more likely the health and other services are to be 
carried out with efficiency and economy ••••• The view, 
however, has sometimes been expressed that a town may 
become so unwieldy as to increase disproportionately the 
cost of its services." 3 
2. K.S. Lomax, 'The Relationship between Expenditure per Head and Size 
of Population of County Boroughs in England and Wales'. Journal of 
the Royal Statistical Society, 106 (1943). Also see, C. Clark, 
'The Economic Functions of a City in Relation to its Size', 
EconometricA, 13 (1945). 
3. Royal Commission on the Geographical Distribution of the Industrial 
Population. Memorandum of Ministry of Health, 6 Oct. 1937, para 30. 
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But to supply evidence to confirm or reject this supposition involved 
certain difficulties. The Ministry considered that there were "a number 
of factors to be considered, apart from mere size, and particular services 
will sometimes be found to be more cheaply carried out in the very large 
towns".4 One problem a.,ose from equating costs with expenditure. 
Comparisons also needed to be made between services homogeneous in quality. 
Certain services5 were examined and the Ministry observed that in street 
cleansing, "the inhabitants of the larger cities demand and get a higher 
standard of street cleansing than elsewhere"; 6 for public lighting and 
fire brigades, "the figures show a wide variation in cost in towns of 
approximately the same size". 7 Generally, "the diversity of costs ••••• 
between towns of approximately the same size suggests that factors other 
than the size of the town have a very large influence". 8 Sir John Maude 
considered that "the real evil is not the size of the town but the lack 
of proper planning of the town".9 
4. ibid. 
5. Street Cleansing, Refuse Collection and Disposal, Public Lighting, 
Fire Services. Other services, such as water supply, were 
deliberately not considered being thought to be dependent upon local 
natural resources and conditions. ibid. 17 Nov. 1937. Section VI. 
6. ibid. para. 3. 
7. ibid. para. 7. 
8. ibid. para. 6. Diagram VI illustrates the estimated average cost 
curves for thel. services. 
9. ibid. 6 Oct. 1937, Q.479. 
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The net cost per 1,000 population of other services such as the 
treatment of tuberculosis, venereal disease, mental deficiency and the 
cost of maternity and child care, was also investigated by the Ministry 
of Health. Similar conclusions were reached. "The figures ••••• show 
no clear relationship to the size of the town."lO 
"The information available seems to show that most of 
the disadvantages of aggregation of population can 
be eliminated by intelligent town planning ••••• 
concentration of population in towns makes easier 
rather than more difficult the provision of social 
amenities and communal services such as water 
supply, sewerage, refuse collection ••••• etc. 
and the example of say, Birmingham, suggests that 
there is practically no limit to the size of town 
for which they can be provided." 11 
There was little evidence on local government costs to support a 
U-shaped average cost curve. Neither was there evidence for the period 
to enable an examination of the influence on producers' or consumers' 
costs of variations in city size. The empirical basis for a minimum 
costs approach was lacking. 12 Neither was there any information 
10. ibid. 16 Nov. 1938, para. 31. 
11. ibid. para. 38. 
12. Of course, not only is empirical verification of the U-shaped 
average cost curve doubted, but little is knownof the shape of 
the average social cost function. The Ministry of Transport 
failed to find any relationship between the size of towns 
and traffic accidents. Royal commission on the Geographical 
Distribution of the Industrial Population. Memorandum of 
Evidence submitted by the Miniitry of Transport, 2 Dec. 1937, 
para. 44. 
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pertinent to the revenue curves and so the approach to the study of 
city size through the concept of optimum city size failed through a lack 
of evidence. It is also conceptually indefensible. 
A DIAGRM1MATIC REPRESENTATION OF THE CONCEPT OF 
OP'l'IHUN CITY SIZE 
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CHAPTER 10 
Conclusion: The Legacy of the Inter-War Years 
Labour migration has been underestimated as a weapon for tackling 
the regional problem. For most of the inter-war years it was the 
preferred method for dealing with localized depression, for these years 
were not characterized by the dominance of the 'move-industry-to-the 
workers' orthodoxy that dominates regional policy today. Labour migration 
was also an effective means of reducing regional disparities in 
unemployment experience. 
The relative place of labour migration amongst other policy 
instruments was shown in Chapters 4 and 6. There is little controversy 
concerning the role of transference before 1934. At that time there was 
no competing instrument of regional policy. With the introduction of the 
Special Areas Act in 1934, regional policy is often considered to have 
begun. Such a view is mistaken. Neither is it acceptable to identify 
the introduction of a 'move-industry' policy with the first Special Areas 
legislation. The new departure in policy was a very gradual one and 
owed much to the first English Commissioner, Sir Malcolm Stewart. 
Besides, transference was simultaneOUSly encouraged and was the dominant 
policy instrument until at least 1937. 
The effects of regional policy were dealt with in Chapters 5 and 7. 
Before 1934. it waa shown that unemployment in the north would have been 
more severe were it not for labour migration. However, the cyclical 
downturn of the early 1930's outweighed all other influences on 
regional employment and made the implementation of policy difficult. 
After 1934, when increased emphasis was again put on transference, it 
was shown that this policy instrument made the greatest contribution to 
the reduction of unemployment in the Special Areas. Transference did not 
fail. 1 
The failure to recognize the importance and efficiency of labour 
migration in the inter-war years has resulted in post-war policy virtually 
ignoring this avenue of attack on the regional problem. 2 But this 
explanation cannot hold for the failure of the Government in the immediate 
post-war period to utilize a transference policy.3 A number of other 
1. In contrast, see H.W.Richardson and E.G.West,'Must We Always Take 
Work to the Workers'~Lloyd's Bank Review, 71(1964),35,36; 
B.J .Loasby, 'Location of Industry: 'i'Thirty Years of"P1anning-.·, 
District Bank Review,156(1965),33. Both Loasby and Richardson and 
West are of the opinion that the absence of full employment was an 
important explanation of 'failure'. 
2. This is the verdict of McCrone. G.McCrone, Regional Policy in 
Britain (1969),p.99. In 1971, only 8,000 people were assisted by 
the various transfer schemes of the Department of Employment. House 
of Commons Expenditure Committee (Employment and Social Services 
Sub-Committee), Employment Services. Minutes of Evidence of the 
Department of Employment (Par1.Papers,1971-2,XIII), 8 March 1972, 
paras. 664-734. The general approach is as stated by Mr Raison -
"I accept the principle that we should not go out of our way to 
encourage geographic toobi1ity of labour". ibid.para.693. The 
Metoorandum of the Association of Officers of the Ministry of Labour 
to the same committee also took the view "that the first priority 
should be the development of regional policies to bring jobs to the 
people rather than the reverse". ibid • Minutes of Evidence of the 
Association of Officers of the Ministry of Labour, 19 July 1972, 
para.44. 
3. Advocates of such a policy include, Richardson & West, op.cit.; 
E.G.West,'Regional Planning: Fact and Fallacy', Lloyd's Bank 
Review,80(1966), who questions the alleged disadvantages of 
population drift; K.Bartley,'Pub1ic Policy and the Regions', 
District BaDkReview,l59(1966), who argues that growth requires 
unbalanced development and thus labour toobi1ity; H.R.Kahn,'Labour 
Mobility: Some Critical Ref1ections',District Bank Review, 
157(1966), who hopes advocates of labour migration will not 
overstate their case making it susceptible to criticism; and 
A.T.Peacock and D.G.M.Dosser,'The New Attack on Localized 
Unemployment', Lloyd's Bank Review, 55 (1960) , who hope for greater 
encouragements to labour migration. 
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explanations are feasible. Firstly, labour transference was ignored 
because of the orthodoxy established by the Barlow Report. The problems 
of the 'over-congested' south were seen as a product of labour inflows 
from the depressed north. Rather than a policy regulating the play of 
free market forces, a course of action diametrically opposed to this 
course was recommended. Industrial growth was to be diverted northwards 
and labour encouraged to stay where it was. Location policies had had 
little time to work themselves out before the war. In the post-war 
period a fresh chance was available that was now backed by the findings 
of a Royal Comudssion. Secondly, with an effective government policy on 
industrial location determined by social criteria, the unpopular policy 
of transference could be abandoned. Finally, a commitment to full 
employment meant that to avoid inflationary pressures in the fully 
employed regions of the economy, unemployed labour in other regions had 
to be found employment where they were. To transfer them southwards 
would more likely add to demand than supply.4 
The abandonment of an effective policy instrument is regrettable. 
There are two tasks for labour mobility in an approach to regional 
4. This has been argued by L. Needleman , 'What Are We to Do About the 
Regional Prob1em?';L1otd'sBankReview,75(1965); L.Need1eman and 
B.Scott,'Regional Problems and Location of Industry Policy in 
Britain',Urban Studies,1(1964). Another case for control of the 
migration of population is put by A.P.Thirwal1,'Migration and 
Regional Unemployment: Some Lessons for Regional Planning', 
Westminster Bank Review,(1966). Evers1ey has shown that population 
changes were beginning to fit in with the dominant regional policy 
of moving work to the workers from 1961. D.E.C.Eversley, 
'Population Changes and Regional Policies since 'the War', 
RegionalStudies,5(1971). 
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depression which recognizes the need for the use of this instrument. 
One is to move population out of areas where the principal industries 
are moribund. It was suggested in Chapter 8 that out-migration was the 
appropriate solution for the problems of Ebbw Vale. Industry should 
only be directed to areas of high unemployment if there are no 
detrimental consequences for its efficiency. This was not so in the 
case of the steel plant at Ebbw Vale. Such a policy might not merely 
divert expansion to localities unfavoured by entrepreneurs but 
positively discourage it. In the contrasting 'non-interventionist' 
case, where location decisions are free but labour mobility encouraged, 
there are no problems of mis-located industry. The areas losing and 
gaining population might experience a number of problems, but probably 
not of a magnitude to offset the gains from an optimum location. The 
deliberate depopulation of a community should be considered as a real 
alternative to a policy dictated by social considerations. A failure 
to come to terms with such a situation, as at Ebbw Vale, merely buys 
time for a community. The same problem faces Ebbw Vale today, with 
the steel industry intent on efficiency and better locations. 
A second task for labour migration in an approach to the regional 
problem which us~this policy instrument is to link areas of probable 
expansion with areas of surplus labour within regions. In this case 
policy combines economic and social aims. A region may be selected 
for development because of its high wastage of labour resources, but 
within it, an area ripe for development may be selected as the siting 
for new industry. The labour supply may be brought to this area by 
inducements to short-distance Ddgration or to commuting. This task for 
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labour migration is less likely to provoke personal and social objections 
to mobility than the previous task. Depopulation is a drastic policy and 
inter-regional movement is mo.re likely to be between non-homogeneous areas 
than movements within a region. 
Although transfer was abandoned as a main aim of regional policy, 
the post-war Labour Government did not, by contrast, implement the 
findings of the Barlow Report uniformly. The 1945 Distribution of 
Industry Act was the basis of the Government's regional policy until' 
1960. It was designed to achieve the objective of a 'proper 
distribution of industry',5 an aim which might have owed its origins 
to the Barlow Report and to the contemporary emphasis on diversified 
industrial structures. In practice, it fell short of Barlow's 
'economic view' of the problem. It is probable that this Act owed as 
much to the precedents set by pre-war legislation, to the Labour 
Party's views of the problem and to anti-transference feelings, as to 
6 the Barlow Report. 
Why was Barlow side-stepped?7 Partly because the Report was 
shelved in war-time; partly because the 'economic' interpretation of 
the regional problem might be evident only with the benefit of hindsight. 
5. For the Act see Public General Statutes,S & 9 Geo.VI, c.36(1945). 
6. The Labour Party's social approach to the regional problem is 
illustrated in, Labour Party; LaboutandtheDisttessed Ateas: 
APtoft8.1ili1e·of·I1iIiJ.ediateAction, Interim Report of the Labour 
Party s coDDlssion of Enquiry into the Distressed Areas (1937). 
7. Lee notes that this was so, but offers no explanation. 
C.H.Lee;ReSiona1EconomieGrowthintheUnited Kingdom since 
tbe 1880'8~idenhead,1971),pp.156,7. 
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The formulation of Barlow orthodoxy was a gradual process, the result 
of a culmination of different attempts to grapple with various problems, 
so the comprehensive view which is apparently so evident in Barlow today 
was not so evident to contemporaries. The measure adopted after 1945 
were selective. A new towns policy was encouraged, not as growth points, 
but to provide overspill housing. Continuing research and review of 
the problem was not implemented. Attempts were not made to diversify 
the structure of industry in certain areas or to improve the environ-
ment by removing any locational disadvantages. Nevertheless, the 
emphasis was on limiting, industrial growth in London and the South-
East and encouraging it elsewhere. Such a policy dictated by social 
considerations was bound to have its shortcomings. 8 
Policy appeared to be very successful in the immediate post-war 
period and may have encouraged the retention of this approach. 9 A 
number of factors, other than policy, were responsible for the success. 
The feared post-war recession in the northern areas failed to 
materialize. The heavy industries were prosperous. Labour shortages, 
the retention of building licences and the existence of various 
factories from war-time building programmes combined to encourage 
8. Some of these shortcomings were anticipatedlJ Cairncross. He 
recognized that "a locational policy must • • • not try to put 
pressure on industry to go to places that are not really 
suitable". Scottish Council(Development & Industry), Repott of 
the Committee on Local Development in Scotland (Edinburgh,l952), 
para.59. Also see, A.K.Cairncross and R.L.Meier,'New Industries 
and Economic Development in Scotland'; Three Banks'Review,14(l952). 
A current example is provided by the Chrysler plant at Linwood, 
Renfrewshire. See The Guatdian, 26 Oct.l972. 
9. MdCrone,op.cit"pp.112,3; A.J. Brown,The FramewotkofRegiortal 
EconomcsirttheUrtitedKirtidom (Cambridge,l972),p.286. 
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locations in the north. Spontaneous labour mobility may also have 
been encouraged by the experience of war, national service and direc-
tion of labour. Barriers to mobility were reduced. 
From the early 1960's, regional policy again had an 'active 
phase', as after the prosperity of the greater part of the 1950's, 
regional disparities began to re-emerge with recession. The emphasis 
in policy began to switch towards a concern for economic growth. 
Instead of viewing unemployment as a social problem, it was considered 
as a loss to national output. When the 1945 regional policy was put 
to the test it was found wanting. These more recent developments, 
in policy, however, are dealt with elsewhere. lO It remains to note 
that despite pressure for a policy on labour migration, 
particularly in the context of an 'economic' policy, the Government 
has failed to take any action. Policy seems still to be socially, 
rather than economically oriented. 
10. For example, McCrone,op.cit,Chapter Vi Brown,op.cit.Chapter 11; 
Lee,op.cit,Chapter 11; B.Moore and J.Rhodes,'Eva1uating the 
Effects of British Regional Policy' ,Economic Journa1,83(1973). 
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